religious men, no person has a right to take away his own life, it follows, that he connot confer any such right upon society, by any compact which he may form for that purpose. For this excepted case, therefore, as society can derive no authority from consent expressly or tacitly given in the formation of government, a different source of lawful power must be sought. This, however, will readily be found in the natural right of selfpreservation, or self-defence. This right each individual has from nature; and however it may be modified in thé organization of society, by the compact of its members, or by the various laws made by virtue of that compact, is by no means either given up or abandoned. The various individuals of society, therefore, by constituting their rulers their defenders and protectors, may, and without doubt do, confer on them the right to use any means necessary for their protection, which the several individuals possess themselves. The right, which society has, to punish with death, a murder committed within its territory, seems to follow. Because, though no single individual of the society would have any such right to punish, while in a state of nature; nor, even after the formation of the society, could have any such right, unless it were conferred on him by the rulers; yet, the society itself, and their rulers, as their delegates, would have such lawful power, because the society itself could not subsist, if they had not authority to deprive of life an offender, whose crime showed that he was an enemy of mankind, a disorganizer not to be restrained by law; and one who would destroy the life of every individual who was obnoxious to his malice, as often as the case occurred, if he could do it with impunity. As therefore nature has formed man for society, for mutual protection and benefit, and as it is impossible that society can subsist in security without an authority to deprive of life, those offenders, whose crimes strike at its foundation, it seems to follow, that society possesses this right over such capital offenders, as necessary to its self-preservation.

SEC. IX. Of the pretended right to make war. Under the law of nature, it will be difficult to point out an instance, where an individual has a right to make war on another, if it

is to be considered, as affording a justification for offering violence to him, in any other circumstances than those already suggested under the heads of the right of self-preservation.' 'the right of self-defence,' &c. &c. For, a war for the purpose of retaliation, of punishing a wrong-doer, of setting an example, or giving a warning to others, it is believed, is wholly unauthorized by natural right. Suppose, in a state of nature, that A has slain the son of B, yet, by the law of nature, B has no right to deprive A of life, because A's crime is finished and can no longer be prevented, since B's son cannot be restored to life. B can derive no authority or right from the pretence, that he means to protect the rest of mankind, because it does not appear, that they are in any immediate or unavoidable danger, nor that he has any authority to act as their ruler or protector. Neither has he any authority, as judge, to punish a crime, when he has no lawful jurisdiction to determine on the merits of the case. For, it is possible that B's son may have been slain on a justifiable occasion. The reader may be referred to the case narrated in the Bible, where Abner slew Asahel in self-defence, yet was treacherously murdered for it by Asahel's brother Joab. In the case supposed, the principal injury is done to the person slain. This injury the father has no natural right to avenge, because this authority belongs to the Supreme Being alone. If, therefore, the father arrogates to himself this office, the assumption seems obnoxious to the charge of impiety, because, it seems to imply, a disbelief in the existence of a God, or a distrust in his justice. Yet, if the father should sustain any peculiar loss or damage from the death of his son, it cannot be doubted, that, by the law of nature, he will have a right to enforce reparation, in the same manner, as, if the damage arose from any other wrongful act. But, in a state of nature, the punishment of the principal crime must be left to the Ruler of the Universe. Why then, it may be asked, may not the punishment of murder be left to him, if committed in organized society? The answer is, that God has given an express command to punish wilful murder with death. This command, it is supposed, is addressed to the rulers of every organized society, who, in this respect, must consequently be considered

as invested by him with the necessary authority to try and punish the crime. For, it is much more reasonable to suppose, that this power is confided to an impartial tribunal, than to consider it as left to be exercised by the partiality and violence of private feeling. In the former case, guilt must be proved before it is punished; in the latter, innocence itself, might not always be able to obtain even a hearing.

SEC. X. Of the right to form associations, and organize society. The true doctrine on this subject, it is believed, will be best illustrated by the following imaginary case. Let it be supposed, then, that five thousand families are living peaceably, though in a state of nature, on a territory of sufficient extent, each family residing on its separate district. Let it be supposed, further, that some few of them, who are scattered among the rest, are desirous of forming a society, for their mutual protection, but that the greater number, disliking the restraints of society, and preferring their natural liberty and independence, refuse to join in this project. Here, it cannot be doubted, that the smaller number have a perfect right to form such a society, notwithstanding the refusal of the others to unite in it. Because man is formed for society, and has a natural right to provide for his security and happiness, in any way that he has a physical power to do, so that he violates no duty of religion, and infringes no right of the rest - of mankind. It follows, therefore, that the dissenting families have no right to prevent the formation of the society. For, though they may be apprehensive of ill-consequences from the neighborhood of such a society, they have no right on that account to interfere with the freedom of action of its members; because their fears may be ill-grounded. The dissentients, consequently, will have no right to molest the society or any of its members, until some injury has actually been offered by them. When this happens, the individual injured by the society will retain his natural right to demand and enforce reparation in the manner already suggested in a preceding section. On the other hand, it is clear that, the society would have no right to compel any of the dissentients to come under its regulations or obey its laws; because, in relation

to them, the constituent members of the society gain no new rights or powers by forming their association and agreeing upon a government. Their laws therefore will not bind those who refuse to enter into the society, as respects whom, the members of the society will retain the same rights which they had before its formation, though the power and authority to enforce those rights will probably be entrusted to the rulers of the society, and not be enforced by the members individually. This, however, will depend on the terms of the association, or the constitution of the society. It is thus apparent, that the smaller number of families, derive no right to control the majority, from the mere act of forming a society. Let us consider, then, whether if the society had been formed by the greater number, they would have a right to control the smaller number, and compel them to join in it, or submit to its laws and regulations. To determine this question, it will be sufficient to suppose the society to be formed by the precise number of 499 families, and that there are 501 dissentients. Now, it is obvious, that if two of the dissentients alter their opinions and join the society, the dissentients will then become the smaller number. But, can it be supposed for a moment, that, by the law of nature, where there is no previous agreement to that effect, the change of opinion in two persons, shall take away the right of refusing to join the society, which 499 independent families previously had? This would be absurd; for, where there is no previous agreement in restraint of a natural right, it never can be taken away by the mere act of a third person. If it could, it would be improperly called a right, since its existence would depend on such person's discretion. It is thus evident, that there is no natural right, in the major number of the inhabitants of a territory, while living in a state of nature without any government, to control the smaller number, either by compelling them to join in the formation of a government, or by making laws for the regulation of their conduct. Each individual therefore, in strictness, has a right to refuse to join in the original formation of the society, and yet retains all his natural rights entirely unimpaired.

Two important consequences follow from the doctrine just

stated. 1. As each individual has a right to refuse to join the society, he may stipulate for what terms he pleases, as the conditions on which he is willing to join in forming the association. And, if those terms are agreed to, and he accordingly joins the society, those terms must be kept, for, if they are violated, he will have a right to return to his state of independence. Suppose, for example, that the smaller number should stipulate, that it should be part of the social compact, that no law should be enacted, unless by the voice of two thirds of the members; this would be binding upon the whole society, and could never be altered, without the consent of all. If this stipulation were infringed, the constitution would be violated, the compact would be broken, and consequently would cease to be binding, and the society would be dissolved so far as concerned the dissenting members. This is sufficient to show, that the right of the majority to govern, however fair and equal, has no other foundation, than the agreement of the original members of the social compact, not being at all grounded on any natural right; this subject however will be examined more at large in another place.

2. As no individual, in a state of nature, can justly be compelled to join in the formation of society; so the society, or, those who propose the formation of one, have an absolute right to refuse admission to its rights and privileges, to all those persons whom they dislike, for whatever cause. It follows, that they may justly stipulate for whatever qualifications they think best, of character, abilities, or property; and no person, not possessing such qualifications, will have any just cause of complaint, at being excluded from the society, for the want of them.

But, after these qualifications have been once agreed upon, unanimously, (for the majority have no natural right, in this respect to bind any but themselves,) these qualifications cannot rightfully be altered, so as to disqualify any of the members, without the consent of every one, including even the party thus to be disqualified. If this were not so, it is obvious, that a great fraud might be practised. For, if they agreed unanimously on certain qualifications at first, and then the majority had a right to alter them, and accordingly did so, it