child, where a parent has a right to control the child until it is old enough to provide for and protect itself, at which time it seems to be set free by nature; or, unless the submission to the control of another, is voluntary in the first instance, as, in the case of a female, who by marriage puts herself in subjection to her husband, and under his protection. This natural liberty arises necessarily from

SEC. III. The natural equality of men as to their rights. All men are by nature equal as to their rights. For, they are all of the same family; and, though they differ in their natural qualities and endowments; yet, there is no evidence that it is the will of the Creator that one should rule over another, unless the mere happening of a thing can be used as an argument to justify it, which would equally justify every species of acknowledged wrong. It will be difficult, therefore, to make out any natural right, by which the strong, the beautiful, the fair complexioned, or even the wise, may justly compel the subjection of the weak, the ugly and deformed, the dark colored, or the ignorant and foolish. For, among men, right always depends upon justice, equity and equality; and rever upon force, fraud or cunning, or wisdom perverted to a selfish purpose. If no superiority of natural endowments can confer a right to subject others to its control, no casual concurrence of circumstances can afford the slightest pretence for any such right. It is not intended, however, to deny that a man, for such consideration as he thinks proper, may voluntarily relinquish to another individual, or to any body of men, whether formed into an organized society or not, any portion of his natural freedom, and consequently may abandon his natural right to equality with them in this respect. For, there appears no sufficient reason to doubt, that, in a state of nature, a man may bind himself to serve another, either for a certain length of time, or even during his life, and in this way come under an obligation to obey all his master's commands in all things within the agreement for service, unless they involve the performance of some act of injustice. And, in general, though possibly there may be some few exceptions, the slave will be justified in doing, by his master's orders, whatever the master would have a right to do in person.

For similar reasons, by the law of nature, a father may justly bind his son to service to a third person, if he makes proper stipulations for the son's support and education, and the son will be bound to serve such person, as long as he would have been bound to submit to and obey his father; i. e. until he is old enough to provide for and protect himself, at which time the father's natural right to control his son ceases, and the son is set free; and at that time being old enough to have a family of his own to provide for, he is no longer bound by the law of nature to submit to his father or to any body else. But, from the duties of gratitude, respect and reverence to his parents, the child is not released by any lapse of time.

SEC. IV. Rights of conscience and freedom of opinion. From the natural equality of men as to their rights, it follows, that no man, or body of men, has any right to control another's belief or opinion in religious matters, or to forbid the most perfect freedom of inquiry in relation to them, by force or threats, or by any other motives than arguments or persuasion. Suppose, for instance, a missionary were to be so absurd as to attempt to compel a conversion to the Christian faith by establishing an inquisition among a heathen people, and punishing with death all those who refused to make a profession of faith; this would be no less an infringement of the natural rights of the natives, than it would be disgraceful to the great and most praiseworthy cause of heathen conversion. For, nature has given no man a commission to inquire into and control another's belief in this respect; and the divine revelation authorizes the use of no other measures to bring the unconverted to a right belief, than those of instruction and per

suasion.

Yet, in a state of nature, a man might justly expel from his household, any person who entertained a different opinion from himself on religious or any other subjects, on the supposition that he was under no other obligation to retain him in his family than the imperfect duty of hospitality. Is there any christian, that would consider himself as doing wrong, if he excluded from his family, an Atheist, a Mahometan, or an open scoffer at

revealed religion, though such person to all appearance possessed a fair character and irreproachable morals? Certainly not. For, to wait and see if the guest attempted to spread his own false doctrine, or corrupt or undermine the principles of his host's family, would be merely gratuitous, and the guest could have no just cause of complaint, if such an opportunity were withheld. Since the attempt might be successful in the first instance, and after the contagion were once spread the mischief might be irreparable. For a similar reason, in a state of nature, every man has a perfect right, however illiberal the exercise of it may be, to choose to employ such individuals only as entertain opinions on any subject in accordance with his own. And any individual, who may be rejected from such employment on account of his opinions, will have no just cause of complaint; because the other is under no obligation to employ him at any rate, unless he has agreed to do so. But, it is obvious that no agreement can justly be dissolved for any such cause, unless it forms ment itself. part of the agree

What natural right, then, it may be asked, does a heathen. prince infringe, who refuses to permit a Christian missionary to reside within his territory, because he ignorantly supposes that the diffusion of the Christian religion may be injurious to his people? Certainly none. The guilt he incurs is that of rejecting the gospel, for which he is answerable to its great author from whom it proceeds, but to no earthly tribunal. But the missionary, personally, has no just cause of complaint, if compelled to leave the country, without other ill usage, because it is presumed, he is not on his own errand, but, in a qualified sense, is a messenger of his divine master.

SEC. V. Right of appropriation, and property. The foundation and true origin of the right of property seem to be, that the usufruct of the earth, and its various products and contents, was originally given to mankind in general; but, with the exception of certain grants made to one or two particular nations or tribes of men, which are mentioned in the Old Testament, no particular territory appears to have been assigned

by the great Creator, to any particular individual or nation. It seems to follow, that every individual as well as nation, has by nature, a right to appropriate to his or their use, so much land or territory, wherever it may be found not appropriated by others, as the individual or nation has occasion for, and can actually occupy, without any other right or title, than what arises from the mere act of appropriation, by taking possession and keeping it in actual occupation. For, if any person could have any right to turn out of possession a prior occupant, it would infer some natural superiority of right in such person over the occupant; but this would obviously be an unfounded pretention, unsupported by any evidence whatever. But, if, by taking possession, an individual excludes the rest of mankind, so long as he retains it; then, it is evident, that if he should always retain the possession, he will always be entitled to the usufruct of the land exclusive of others; which limited property seems to be all that ever was intended by nature. And therefore if he should abandon the possession of the land, it would be again reduced to a state of nature, and consequently would, in like manner, again become the property of the next occupant in succession, and the former occupant would lose all right to resume the possession. This however would hold good in those cases only, where the first occupant intentionally abandoned the possession, or voluntarily relinquished it to another.

The manner in which property would be transferred to a purchaser, or transmitted to a descendant or other kinsman, so as to make him an heir, may easily be deduced from this view of the subject. For, in a sale of land, the occupant or owner would merely deliver to the purchaser, that possession, upon which alone his right of property depended, and the purchaser from that time, would have a right to retain the possession against all the rest of mankind. If the owner of land was desirous, that his son should inherit it after his death, he would take care that his son should be the first occupant after that event took place; for, otherwise the son could have no natural right to what had been in his father's possession when he was alive. The obvious reason is, that the son could have no greater right than his father had, whose right would have ceas

ed when his occupation ceased. Consequently when the father died, if the possession were then vacant, it would go to the next occupant; or, if the father had put the son in possession previously to his own decease, the son as occupant and owner would have a right to retain it.

It has been supposed by some, that, while living in a state of nature, an individual, having occasion to make use of any natural product, not previously appropriated by any other person, could not rightfully appropriate it to his own use, without the express or tacit consent of the rest of mankind. For, they consider the earth and all its products and contents, as intended by nature, as a joint stock for the general sustenance or other benefit of the whole human race. But, this opinion, it is believed, is erroneous, and such as if traced through its necessary consequences, would lead to great absurdity. For, if this opinion were well founded, then every person born, or to be born, would have a right to claim a portion or proportional part of all property on the face of the earth, on the ground that by nature, he had a rightful interest or share in it, which he had never relinquished. A further consequence would be, that no one could justly claim an exclusive property in any thing; and thus men would derive little or no benefit from the bounty of their Creator. But, in fact, there never was any such general community of property among all mankind. The true views of the subject, it is believed, may be illustrated, by considering the natural products of the earth, as well as the surface of the earth itself, in the same situation in this respect, as the waters of a river, which, though intended by the bounty of the Creator, as a joint provision for the necessities of all mankind, indeed of all creatures, living near enough to have access to it; yet, is by no means to be considered as a joint stock; because no individual that does not make use of its waters can have any interest in it. But, it would be quite otherwise, if it were a joint stock. And therefore, in a state of nature, where a man goes to the bank of a river with a vessel to draw water, and takes out such a quantity as he has occasion for, as soon as he has separated it from the rest of the water in the river, it becomes his, by this simple act of appropriation. For this purpose, it is not necessary, that he should