government and against the states, will not be binding. It is true, within the jurisdiction conferred by the constitution, every decision of the supreme court, must be submitted to by the states, since, by adopting the federal constitution they have. agreed to do so; and, on the improbable supposition, that the court should make an incorrect decision, in fact, still it must be considered as correct, and obeyed as such, there being no higher court of appeal provided by the constitution. But, how can the states be bound by the decisions of the supreme court, on the supposition that they should usurp jurisdiction over matters not submitted to them by the states, in the federal constitution? If it is asked ;-how can it be ascertained, whether such jurisdiction is granted in the constitution, or not, otherwise than by the construction given to it by the supreme court, and which they alone are authorized to decide in the last resort; the answer must be, that the question, whether a certain jurisdiction is conferred in the constitution, or not, must be determined by a reference to the constitution itself. This subject is not left to the mere discretion of the court. For, as this court can neither extend its jurisdiction beyond the express limits prescribed to it; so neither can it assume jurisdiction in cases where the constitution is silent. It can never depend upon mere construction. For, where the constitution is entirely silent in relation to a particular subject, and where the powers delegated to the supreme court can be exercised without giving authority or jurisdiction in relation to that subject, it must be self-evident, that the supreme court can have no constitutional jurisdiction. It is no small argument of the excellence and wisdom of the provisions in the constitution, that, in order to find cases not provided for in it, recourse must be had so frequently to absurd or at least very improbable suppositions. Let it be supposed then for a moment, that the supreme court should assume jurisdiction of a suit, commenced by a citizen of a state against another state, and that the court should decree against the state sued, can it be imagined, that the state would be bound to submit to the decree? Certainly not; because one of the amendments to the constitution of the United States, expressly provides, that the judicial power of the federal government shall not extend

to such a case. Suppose again, that this court should entertain jurisdiction on a prosecution for a crime, committed within a state and against the laws of the state alone, would not any judgment which this court might pronounce in this case, be wholly void? No one can be so unreasonable as to believe, that the extent of delegated powers, can depend upon the construction of the delegate alone. No one can be so absurd as to imagine, that the limited jurisdiction of any court, however high, can be extended by the mere construction of the court itself. This subject will be farther examined in a different connexion, in the next chapter.

CHAPTER V.

Of the Independence of the States and the Sovereignty of the Union considered together, and how far the latter is consistent with the former.

To form just and adequate ideas on the subject of the present chapter, it may not be amiss to consider shortly, what would be the condition of the several states, if the Union among them were peaceably dissolved, and, with that single exception, every thing else were left in the same situation that it now is. The people of each state, it is apparent, would then find themselves in possession of a distinct territory, with a separate regularly organized government, fully authorized by the people for the regulation of its concerns; and though perhaps not invested with any power to wage a foreign or offensive war; yet having full authority to resist invasions from without, and to suppress tumults and insurrections within; and generally to provide for the public peace and the domestic tranquillity of its citizens, and the support and maintenance of the government. Under such circumstances as these, and acknowledging no earthly superior in any other government or tribunal whatever, it is impossible not to perceive, that each state would be completely sovereign and independent. It was in this condition, that those states of the American Union claimed to be, which agreed to the articles of confederation; and, with the exception of that compact, this was the situation those states were in, which first agreed to adopt the federal conrtitution.

It is thus apparent, that the constitution of the United States is the only restraint, which the several states have imposed upon their own independence. It is also the only bond that unites them under one government. A proper regard for their own interests, it is true, would tend to keep them at peace with each other, and might also induce them to form alliances for mutual protection against external aggression. But such conse

quences would greatly fall short of the advantages, to be derived from a union, under a constitution like that of the United States. For, the general government, being invested by it with all the powers of peace and war, and with the control also of the whole resources of all the states, without being under any necessity of consulting the local authorities, in these respects has all the consistency and strength of a great empire, with no other restraint upon the exercise of the vast powers thus bestowed in the constitution, than requiring, that they shall be employed for the general good of all the states, and not to advance any partial, local, or sectional interests.

The independence of the several states, is therefore confined to the relation existing among them, as individual states. But, no state is independent of the union, that is, of the states, taken collectively as forming one nation under the federal constitution. Their absolute independence is limited, just so far as they have seen fit to limit it themselves, in that national compact; but no further.

What then is the construction, that ought to be given to this compact, in this respect? Two principles of construction are laid down in express terms, in the amendments to the constitution, and which consequently have become part of the constitution on itself. 1. That the enumeration in the constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.' 2. The powers, not delegated to the United States, by the constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.'

It is believed, that the former of these principles is not wholly free from obscurity. The intent of it, however, probably was, that the enumeration of certain rights expressly retained by the people, shall not be construed in denial of others belonging to them, not elsewhere given up in the constitution, and not contained in such enumeration.

Among the powers most characteristic of sovereignty, given to congress in the constitution, are, 1. The power of laying taxes, duties, imposts and excises, for the purpose of paying the national debts, and providing for the common defence and general welfare, &c. 2. The power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, &c.

3. The power to establish a rule of naturalization. By the present rule established by the exercise of this power, an alien may become a citizen of the United States, without being a citizen of any of the states. For, though by naturalization he becomes entitled to the privileges of a citizen of the United States, and consequently to the privileges of a citizen of that state to which he belongs, or wherein he may see fit to reside; yet, if the union should be dissolved, he would become again a mere alien, unless the state, in which he abode, saw fit to adopt him.

4. The powers to coin money; to establish post roads; to raise and support armies; to provide a navy, &c.

The restrictions upon the authority of congress, are merely such restraints and limitations, as the people of the United States have seen fit to impose on their government, and are not the exceptions merely of powers, reserved to the state governments.

The restriction upon the authority of the states, relate to the exercise of such sovereign powers, as the citizens of the states, if they had thought expedient, might have entrusted to their respective state governments; but, having confided some of these powers to congress, and having expressly restricted congress from the exercise of the rest, there would be an apparent inconsistency and impropriety, in permitting the states to exercise them.

No state, therefore, can enter into any treaty, alliance or confederation, whatever. This applies as well to treaties, alliances and confederacies, &c. between two or more states, as to treaties, alliances, &c. between one or more of the states, and a foreign nation. But, though certain powers are denied or forbidden to the state governments, in the federal constitution, which the people of the respective states might otherwise have delegated to their respective state governments; it by no means follows, that other powers not mentioned among those which are thus forbidden or denied, may, of course, be lawfully exercised by the states. For, this must depend upon the language of the state constitutions themselves, respectively.

The general superintending power, intended to be bestowed on congress, by the federal constitution, is also apparent from the provision, that the United States shall guarantee to