by holiday orators, that their glory would be imperishable, will be effaced from the columns of time, before this century has passed away. But, what is this in comparison with the degraded and imbecile state, to which this now great and flourishing republic will infallibly be reduced?

Two other questions naturally suggest themselves here.

1. If a law should be passed by congress, or any other public measure be adopted by the federal government, injurious to the interests of a particular state, and which should be decided by the supreme court of the United States to be constitutional, does the right, which the state has of adopting the course of remonstrance, just considered, belong to the governernment of the state or to the people of the state;—to the rulers, or, to the citizens?

The answer obviously must be, that, since, agreeably to the constitution of the United States, all rights, not delegated in it, are reserved to the states, or to the people, the determination of this question will depend upon the respective state constitutions. For, if the people of any state have given this superintending power to their state rulers in their constitution, those rulers will have the right to interpose, in the cases and in the manner before suggested and to that extent, but no further, between the general government and the people of their state. For, that such a power may be delegated by the citizens of each state, to their state rulers in general, or to the legislative, or the executive, or the judicial department singly, cannot be doubted. But, unless this power is thus expressly delegated, it must remain in the citizens; and, in that case, the interference of the state government itself, in its political capacity, will be a mere usurpation of illegal authority. It will not be denied, however, that, if the legislature of any state, should feel convinced that a law injurious to the interests of the state, and not warranted by the federal constitution, or the real intention of those who adopted it, had been enacted by congress, they would be bound to make it known to the people of the state, so that all proper measures might be adopted to procure its repeal. But, further than this, the state governments cannot constitutionally proceed, without authority

from their citizens. For, within the powers delegated in the federal constitution, the government of the United states is the government, not only of all the states taken collectively, as one great nation; but, also is the government of each state taken separately; in the same manner, that within the powers delegated in the state constitutions, the state governments have the sovereign control of the affairs of the respective states, provided they do no act inconsistent with the federal constition. But, neither the federal government, nor any of the state governments can justly transcend their assigned limits.

On examination of the state constitutions, however, it is believed, that no such power will be found to be given to the state governments, either expressly or by necessary implication, to interpose between the federal government and the citizens of any of the states; indeed, there would seem to be a manifest impropriety in intrusting any such power to them, if it is considered in what manner the state governments are organized. For, as the governor, as well as the members of the state legislatures, are chosen for short periods only, there could be but little dependance placed upon the permanence of any measures which, in an emergency of this nature, they might see fit to adopt; since however wise, firm and consistent the characters of the rulers may be, the administration of public affairs in popular governments, will always fluctuate, more or less according to the frequency of elections, with the changes of popular opinions. Because, a change in the public sentiment will immediately remove from office, all those individuals, whose offices are elective, and who are not pliant enough to accommodate their professions to the doctrines of the times; and will put in their place, persons entertaining different opinions, and who consequently will adopt a different course of public measures. Besides, though the individuals usually selected for the public service, may be esteemed by the people, well qualified to answer the ordinary occasions of the public, by enacting the necessary laws for the regulation of the internal affairs of the state, and in the exercise of the powers conferred on the state governments in the state constitutions; yet, it is not at all unlikely, that, for the more important occasions of altering the state constitution itself,-for the

momentous crisis of assuming a new attitude with regard to the federal government, as well as an unexpected relation to the other states, the citizens of a state would think it expedient to call upon the highest abilities within their reach, for assistance because nothing less would be thought adequate to direct them in any so dangerous a conjuncture.

Further; though aspiring men, even in the highest offices of the state administration, if restricted to the exercise of the powers conferred on them by the state constitution, would have but little opportunity of disturbing the tranquillity of society, in the common course of affairs; yet, if any power were conferred on such persons by the people, or, if they were permitted to usurp a power, to interfere in the manner before suggested, or, in any other manner between the government of the United States and the citizens of their own state, the most dangerous consequences might ensue. Because the strong desire, which such persons always have, to distinguish themselves in the eyes of the citizens of their own state, might prompt them to seize upon every pretence to rail against the general government; and, as far as inflammatory harangues, seditious and turbulent resolves, messages and addresses would go, to set it at defiance; and, in the improbable yet possible case of an actual encroachment upon some of the rights of the state, instead of adopting the wise and magnanimous course of friendly expostulation and remonstrance, thus giving the general government an opportunity of retracing its steps and redressing the grievance, if there were one, would gladly avail themselves of any such occasion, and from motives of selfish aggrandizement would be tempted to raise the standard of hostility, in the rash and unprincipled attempt to dissolve the union by force. Yet, what could they hope to gain by any such attempt? Certainly, the most probable consequence would be, that, though they might bring upon their own state the illimitable horrors of intestine war, they would ultimately be compelled to submit to reasonable terms of compromise, and observe the national compact to which all have agreed.

It would be desirable, without doubt, that the power, now under consideration, should be confided to the governor and the members of both houses of the legislature of the respective

states, if their term of office were longer, so that there would be less reason to distrust the consistency as well as perma. nence of their public measures; because, they then would become the guardians and protectors of the rights of the states against the encroachments, not of the general government, for of this there is hardly a possibility, but of the legislative department of it. If then, congress should enact a law, which the authorities of a state considered to be unconstitutional and injurious to the interests of the state, those state rulers would immediately take care to have the question of its constitutionality determined by the supreme court of the United States; and, if aggrieved by their decision, would adopt the regular course before suggested, so far as was just and expedient, without the necessity of convening primary assemblies of the people, a measure seldom desirable, or in any manner disturbing the tranquillity of the public mind. The supposition indeed is possible, though perhaps it would be better to consider it impossible, that there might be a final difference of opinion as to interests, which are believed to be of sufficient consequence, to demand for their preservation, the dissolution or dismemberment of the union. But, as it seems really impossible, that a necessity for adopting a measure so fatal to the strength and prosperity of this now great and flourishing nation, should ever arise from any other cause than the selfish or angry passions of the leaders and partizans of the various parties or factions, which already distract the country; if the people of the United States, or those of either of the several states, ever have recourse to this miserable alternative, they will have nothing to which to ascribe the loss of the happiness, which, if they choose, they may enjoy under their complicated but admirable system of government, and the total decline of their rank among the nations of the earth, but their infatuation, their ignorance of their true interests, their misplaced confidence in superficial orators and selfish statesmen, and their weak concessions to rude importunity and senseless clamor.

2. It may be asked; are there really no limits to the jurisdiction of the supreme court of the United States, with regard to what are generally considered as constitutional questions?

The answer must be, that, in one respect, there are limits, but in another, there are none. It would seem, that congress niust always be bound by a decision of the supreme court of the United States; but the states are not always bound. If the supreme court should decide, that a law is unconstitutional, congress must always be bound by the decision, because the authority of that court to decide upon the constitutionality of all laws enacted by congress, proceeds from the same source from which congress derives all its authority to enact laws. They therefore cannot deny the authority of the court, in this respect, without removing the foundation of their own powers. But with regard to the states, the case is different. For, the states have delegated to the government of the United States certain limited powers only, and, for the purpose of providing a check upon the rulers to prevent their overstepping the limits prescribed to them, have erected the supreme court to decide, in the last resort, whether they exceed their powers or not. If therefore the supreme court should decide that any measure of the government of the United States is unconstitutional, it would be considered from that moment illegal and void, and the general government would be bound by the decision. But, if the supreme court should decide that the measure is constitutional, a further question may arise, which is, whether the point decided, comes within the jurisdiction of that court as limited in the constitution of the United States; for, if it does not, the decision of the court will not bind the states. In order that the supreme court should have jurisdiction in relation to a particular subject, it must either be conferred in the constitution in express terms, or it must be necessa ry to the exercise of some authority expressly delegated in the constitution. In either case, there would seem to be but little question as to the jurisdiction of the court. But, the supreme court must have jurisdiction conferred on them in the constitution, over the subject matter involved in their decision. If they have not, their decision, though obligatory on the national government, when given against them, because this court always has authority to decide that a measure, purporting to be adopted under the authority of the constitution, is in fact unconstitutional; yet, if given in favor of the general