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I think it probable that the old king was personated by one of his chiefs, and therefore have not pressed my demand.

I considered the present occasion a fitting one for making a demonstration in the upper part of the river, and accordingly, after the operations, took the three gun boats, with 100 marines and the Baua, to Enbomma, where I had a palaver with the eight kings, and had the satisfaction of receiving their assurance that they had no sympathy whatever for the pirates, and would do what they could to bring about the capture of Manuel Vacca.

These kings, unlike the chiefs in the lower parts of the Congo, have a recognised authority throughout the country, and it was observable that they were treated with marked deference by their inferiors.

These proceedings, to which I attach much importance, were conducted with the greatest ceremony, and appeared to impress the natives with much wonder and astonishment.

There appears to be little doubt that the present complications would never have arisen had the crew of the "Geraldine" been properly armed, and I have, therefore, as a precautionary measure, requested Her Majesty's Consul to issue instructions obliging the consignees of merchant vessels hereafter arriving in the river, and the masters thereof, to provide proper means for their defence before attempting to ascend above Boolembemba.

Their lordships will have noticed with satisfaction the assistance rendered me throughout these operations by Captain Richard Bradshaw, of Her Majesty's ship 66 "Encounter." I cannot too highly applaud his faithful execution of all my

numerous arrangements, both preliminary and subsequent to my arrival in the river, by which the success of the expedition has been so materially furthered, and I find it difficult to express my sense of its merits.

Captain Bradshaw's services during the Abyssinian and Ashantee campaigns are already on record, and when taken into consideration with those now under report will, I trust, secure for him some mark of their lordships' favour.

I am likewise indebted to Mr. Consul Hopkins for the ready aid and co-operation he has invariably afforded me, and which from his knowledge of the Portuguese language and familiar acquaintance with the native character, were of much value. I strongly recommend him to favourable notice.

The uninterrupted health of the squadron during the time it has been employed in this unhealthy river may be attributed to the care with which FleetSurgeon Henry Fegan, C.B., considered the precautions that should be adopted to secure its preservation, and I have to acknowledge the many valuable suggestions he has submitted to me.

I cannot close this report without referring to the valuable and important services rendered me by my secretary, who daily accompanied me up the creeks, and on several occasions conveyed my instructions to Captain Bradshaw through the bush.

Mr. Gibson's unvarying zeal and indefatigable conduct have already been made the subject of a favourable report, and I beg again to bring his name under the notice of their lordships.

I have the honour to be, Sir, dient servant,

your obe

W. N. W. HEWETT, Commander.

VIII.

LOSS OF THE "VANGUARD."

The following sentence, dated Sept. 29, 1875, was pronounced by the Courtmartial held on Capt. Dawkins, Lieut. Hathorn, Navigating Lieut. Thomas, and the remainder of the officers and crew of H.M.S. "Vanguard," for the loss of that vessel off Wicklow Head, on Sept. 1.

Having heard the evidence which has been adduced on this trial, the Court is of opinion that the loss of H.M.S. "Vanguard" was occasioned by II.M.S. "Iron Duke" coming into collision with her off the Kish Bank, in the Irish Channel, about fifty minutes past noon on Sept. 1,

from the effects of which she foundered; that such collision was caused-firstly, by the high rate of speed at which the squadron of which the vessels formed part was proceeding while in a fog; secondly, by Capt. Dawkins, when leader of his division, leaving the deck of his ship before the evolution which was being performed was completed, as there were indications of foggy weather at the time; thirdly, by the unnecessary reduction of speed of H.M.S. "Vanguard" without a signal from the Vice-Admiral in command of the squadron, and without H.M.S.

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"Vanguard" making the proper signal to H.M.S. "Iron Duke;" fourthly, by the increase of speed of H.M.S. "Iron Duke" during a dense fog, the speed being already high; fifthly, by H.M.S. "Iron Duke" improperly sheering out of line; sixthly, by the want of any fog signal on the part of H.M.S. "Iron Duke." The Court is further of opinion that the cause of the loss of H.M.S." "Vanguard by foundering was a breach being made in her side by the prow of H.M.S. "Iron Duke" in the immediate neighbourhood of the most important transverse bulkhead-namely, that between the engine and boiler rooms-causing a great rush of water into the engine-room, shaft alleys, and stokehole, extinguishing the fires in a few minutes-the water eventually finding its way into the provision-room flat and provision-rooms, through imperfectly fastened water-tight doors, and owing to leakage near ninety-nine bulkhead.

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The Court is of opinion that the foundering of H.M.S. Vanguard" might have been delayed, if not averted, by Capt. Dawkins giving orders for immediate action being taken to get all available pumps worked, instead of employing his crew in hoisting out boats; and if Capt. Dawkins, Commander Tandy, Navigating-Lieut. Thomas, and Mr. David Tiddy, the carpenter, had shown more resource of energy in endeavouring to stop the breach from the outside with the means at their command, such as hammocks and sails; and the Court is of opinion that Capt. Dawkins should have ordered Capt. Hickley, of H.M.S. "Iron Duke," to tow H.M.S. "Vanguard" into shallow water. The Court is of opinion that blame is imputable to Capt. Dawkins for exhibiting want of judgment and for want of duty in handling his ship; and that he showed a want of resource, promptitude, and decision in the means he adopted for saving H.M.S. "Vanguard" after the collision. The Court is further of opinion that blame is imputable to Navigating-Lieut. Thomas for neglect of duty in not pointing out to his captain that there was shoaler water within a short distance, and in not having offered any suggestion as to the mode of stopping the leak on the outside. The Court is further of opinion that Commander Tandy showed great want of energy as second in command under the circumstances. The Court is further of opinion that Mr. Brown, the chief engineer, showed want of promptitude in not applying the means at his command to relieve the ship of water. The Court is further of opinion that Mr. David Tiddy, carpenter of H.M.S." Vanguard," is open to blame

for not offering any suggestions to his captain as to the most efficient mode of stopping the leak, and for not taking immediate steps for sounding the compartments and reporting from time to time the progress of the water.

The Court adjudges Capt. Richard Dawkins to be severely reprimanded, and to be dismissed from H.M.S. "Vanguard," and he is hereby severely reprimanded, and so sentenced accordingly. The Court adjudges Commander Dashwood Goldie Tandy and Navigating Lieut. James Cambridge Thomas to be severely reprimanded, and they are hereby severely reprimanded accordingly. The Court adjudges Mr. Robert Brown, chief engineer, and Mr. David Tiddy, carpenter, to be reprimanded, and they are hereby reprimanded accordingly. The Court imputes no blame to the other officers and ship's company of H.M.S. " Vanguard" in reference to the loss of the ship, and they are hereby acquitted accordingly.

ADMIRALTY MINUTE ON THE FOREGOING SENTENCE.

Admiralty, Oct. 12, 1875.

The Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty have had under review the minutes of proceedings at a court-martial assembled by their order of Sept. 7 last, to inquire into the cause of the loss of H.M.S. Vanguard," and to try Capt. Richard Dawkins and the officers and ship's company of that ship, under the 91st and 92nd sections of the Naval Discipline Act, 1866.

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The evidence adduced at the trial was, as regards the conduct of all persons concerned, so complete and exhaustive that their lordships deem it unnecessary to order any further inquiry with a view to fix responsibility upon anybody for the loss of the ship.

The Court was of opinion that the loss was occasioned by H.M.S. "Iron Duke" coming into collision with the "Vanguard" off the Kish Bank, in the Irish Channel, at about fifty minutes past noon on Sept. 1, from the effects of which she eventually foundered, and that such collision was caused

1. By the high rate of speed at which the squadron (of which those vessels formed a part) was proceeding while in a fog.

2. By Capt. Dawkins, when leader of his division, leaving the deck of his ship before the evolution which was being performed was completed, especially as there were indications of foggy weather at the time.

3. By the unnecessary reduction of speed of H.M.S. "Vanguard" without a signal from the Vice-Admiral in command of the squadron, and without H.M.S. "Vanguard" making the proper signal to H.M.S. "Iron Duke."

4. By the increase of speed of H.M.S. "Iron Duke" during a dense fog, the speed being already high.

5. By H.M.S. "Iron Duke" improperly sheering out of line.

6. By the want of any fog signal on the part of H.M.S. "Iron Duke."

Their lordships consider that the first cause assigned by the Court did not in any way contribute to the disaster.

That the Vice-Admiral in command was, under the circumstances of the case, justified in continuing the rate of speed ordered until the time when he made the signal to reduce it; but that the ViceAdmiral was wrong in the view he put before the Court, that it was within the discretion of leaders of divisions to act, with regard to speed in a fog, independently of, and contrary to, the orders given by him. Their lordships cannot point out too strongly the imperative duty that attaches to every officer in command of a squadron to keep his ships together in their assigned stations in readiness to execute his orders; and the opinion expressed by the Vice-Admiral in his evidence, that the captains of the ships in his squadron would have been justified in parting company during a fog without orders from him, is one which their lordships cannot approve.

They also consider that the signal made by the Vice-Admiral on the day of the

disaster for the alteration of formation

from " 'single column" to "columns of divisions line ahead," though not contributing to that disaster, was not the best signal to make; but that the signal 017 in the general signal book would have been preferable, and would have caused the evolution to have been performed in the least time and space, and have kept the squadron throughout under his control. Their lordships are of opinion that the loss of the "Vanguard" was mainly owing-first, to the reduction of speed of that ship; and, secondly, to the improper sheering out of line and quitting station by H.M.S. "Iron Duke," by the order of Lieut. Evans, officer of the watch.

Their lordships attach no blame to Capt. Hickley, of H.M.S. "Iron Duke," in respect of the speed of his ship at the time of collision, it being his duty to regain his station, and he being warranted in supposing that H.M.S. Vanguard" was maintaining the speed at which she was going when she was last in sight.

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Their lordships are pleased to approve the several sentences passed upon Capt. Dawkins, and certain officers of the "Vanguard," and they order Lieut. Evans to be dismissed from H.M.S. "Iron Duke."

While deploring the misfortune which has befallen Her Majesty's Service by the foundering of the "Vanguard," their lordships wish to record their heartfelt satisfaction that no lives were lost on the occasion, and they notice with approbation the promptitude with which the boats of the "Iron Duke" were lowered and ready for service immediately after the collision.

IX.

FUGITIVE SLAVES AND QUEEN'S SHIPS.

INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED BY THE LORDS COM-
MISSIONERS OF THE ADMIRALTY "WITH
REFERENCE TO THE QUESTION HOW FAR

OFFICERS IN COMMAND OF HER MAJESTY'S

SHIPS ARE JUSTIFIED IN RECEIVING ON

BOARD FUGITIVE SLAVES WHO, ESCAPING
FROM THEIR MASTERS, MAY CLAIM THE
PROTECTION OF THE BRITISH FLAG":

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1. Cases of this kind may be divided into three classes; where slaves come on board a ship or boat in harbour or within territorial waters either to escape from the alleged cruelty of their masters or to avoid the consequence of their misdeeds: where the British ship or boat is on the high seas and the refugee slave, escaping, perhaps, from a vessel also at sea, would

be in danger of losing his life were he not received on board: where a person has been detained on shore in a state of slavery, and, escaping to a British ship or boat, claims British protection on the ground that he has been so detained contrary to treaties existing between Great Britain and the country from the shores of which he escapes, as in the case of territories which, like Oman, Madagascar, and Johanna, are partially free.

2. The broad rule to be observed is that a fugitive slave should not be permanently received on board any description of ship under the British flag unless his life would be endangered if he were not allowed to come on board. The

reason for this rule is, that were it otherwise, the practical result would be, in the first instance, to encourage and assist a breach of the law of the country, and next to protect the person breaking that law. And a contrary rule would lead to endless disputes and difficulties with the legal masters of slaves, for it might happen, to take an extreme instance that the whole slave portion of the crews of vessels engaged in the pearl fishery in the Persian Gulf might take refuge on board British ships, and, if free there, their masters would be entirely ruined, and the mistrust and hatred caused in their minds would be greatly prejudicial to British interests.

3. Such being the general and broad rule, it remains to apply it, as far as possible, to the three classes of cases mentioned above. In the first case, the slave must not be allowed to remain on board after it has been proved to the satisfaction of the officer in command that he is legally a slave. In the second, the slave should be retained on board on the ground that on the high seas the British vessel is a part of the dominions of the Queen, but when the vessel returns within territorial limits of the country from a vessel of which the slave has escaped he will be liable to be surrendered on demand being made, supported by necessary proofs. In the third class, a negro might claim protection on the ground that being by the terms of a treaty free, he was, nevertheless, being detained as a slave. It would then become the duty of the commanding officer to satisfy himself as to the truth of this statement, and to be guided in his subsequent proceedings in regard to such person by the result of his inquiries and the law which would then affect the case. Those interested in maintaining the slavery of the person claiming his freedom should assist at the inquiry, and in the event of his claim being established, the local authorities should be requested to take steps to insure his not relapsing into slavery.

4. As a general principle, care should be taken that slaves are not misled into the belief that they will find their liberty by getting under the British flag afloat, or induced by the presence of a British ship to leave their own ships, if at sea, or their employment, if on shore.

5. When surrendering fugitive slaves, commanding officers should exercise their discretion in endeavouring, according to the circumstances of each case, to obtain an assurance that the slaves will not be treated with undue severity.

6. A special report is to be made of every case of a fugitive slave seeking

refuge on board one of Her Majesty's ships.

7. The above instructions are also to be considered part of the general Slave Trade instructions, and to be inserted at page 29 of that volume, with a heading of" Receipt of Fugitive Slaves."

CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE ADMIRALTY AND THE BRITISH AND FOREIGN ANTI-SLAVERY SOCIETY ON THE SUB

JECT.

TO THE LORDS OF THE ADMIRALTY. The members of the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society respectfully beg to convey to your lordships the expression of their profound regret that certain instructions have been issued requiring naval officers to surrender fugitive slaves to their masters.

They submit that these instructions constitute the entire abandonment of that noble and honourable policy which has distinguished Great Britain for more than 100 years.

Ever since the decision in the case of the slave Somerset, nobly defended by Granville Sharp in 1772, it has always been held that a slave on British soil or on board a British vessel of war was absolutely free and the property of no man.

This is the cherished opinion of the people of this country, and we should feel alarmed for the cause of humanity could we believe they would ever consent to allow the settled policy of the nation to be reversed, and fugitive slaves once on board Her Majesty's ships to be ever delivered back to the grasp of the slaveowner. "Thou shalt not deliver unto his master the servant who is escaped from his master unto thee," was the command of God under the Old Dispensation, and, being in harmony with the spirit and principles of the New Testament, should be binding upon every Christian nation.

In addition to all the other objections to these instructions, we cannot shut our eyes to the fact that they afford a moral support and give the direct sanction of this country to slavery.

On all these grounds they therefore respectfully urge upon the Lords Commissioners the immediate repeal of these obnoxious regulations.

On behalf of the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society,

We are, very respectfully,
JOSEPH COOPER,
EDMUND STURGE,
ROBERT ALSOP,

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Hon. Secs.

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AMENDED CIRCULAR SUBSEQUENTLY PUBLISHED BY THE ADMIRALTY IN PLACE OF THE FOREGOING CIRCULAR.

It is now laid down that when any person professing, or appearing to be a fugitive slave, seeks admission to one of Her Majesty's ships on the high seas, beyond the limit of territorial waters, and claims the protection of the British flag, the commanding officer is to bear in mind that, although Her Majesty's Government is desirous by every means in its power to remove or mitigate the evils of slavery, yet Her Majesty's ships are not intended for the reception of persons other than their officers and crew. A commanding officer is, therefore, to satisfy himself before receiving the fugitive on board, that there is sufficient reason in the particular case for thus receiving him. In any case in which for reasons that may be deemed adequate a commanding officer shall have received a fugitive slave on board one of Her Majesty's ships, and have taken him under the protection of the British flag upon the high seas beyond the limit of territorial waters, he may be retained on board the ship, if he so

desires, until he can be landed in some country or transferred to some other ship where his liberty will be recognised and respected. Within the territorial waters of a foreign State commanding officers of Her Majesty's ships are bound by the comity of nations, while maintaining the proper exemption of their ships from local jurisdiction, not to allow them to become a shelter for those who would be chargeable with the violation of the law of the place. If, therefore, while one of Her Majesty's ships is within the territorial waters of a State where slavery exists, a person professing or appearing to be a fugitive slave seeks admission on board, the commanding officer is not empowered to receive him unless his life would be in manifest danger if he were not admitted into the ship. Should such a person be received in order to save him from danger, he ought not to be permitted to continue on board after the danger is passed. But commanding officers are not to entertain any demand as to the surrender of such person, or enter into any examination as to his status. If, while any of Her Majesty's ships are within the territorial waters of any chief or State in Arabia, or on the shores of the Persian Gulf, or on the East Coast of Africa, or in any island lying off Arabia, or off Zanzibar, Madagascar, and the Comoro Islands, any person should claim admission on board, and protection, on the ground that he has been kept in a state of slavery contrary to treaties existing between Great Britain and such territory, he may be retained until the truth of his statement is examined into. In making this examination it is suggested that the nearest British consular authority should be communicated with, and special reports are always to be made of fugitive slaves seeking refuge on board any of Her Majesty's ships.

X.

ROYAL WARRANT ON THE ORGANISATION OF THE COMMISSARIAT AND TRANSPORT AND OF THE ORDNANCE STORE DEPARTMENTS OF THE ARMY.

War Office, Dec. 11.

It is deemed expedient with a view to the re-arrangement and better classification of the Supply and Transport services of the Army to revise and modify the constitution of the Department, established by the Warrant of the 12th of November, 1869, entitled the Control

Department, and to reorganise such Supply and Transport service.

The title of Control Department is to be abolished, and the Department, except that portion of it designated the Pay Sub-Department, divided as follows:-(a) the Commissariat and Transport Department; (b) the Ordnance Store Depart

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