CHAPTER II.

Parliamentary proceedings continued-Judicature Bill-Land Transfer Bill-Agricultural Holdings Act-Act for Improvement of Artisans' Dwellings—Acts for amending Labour Laws-Sir Stafford Northcote's Bills concerning Savings' Banks and Friendly Societies-Sanitary Legislation-Merchant Shipping BillMr. Plimsoll's demonstration-Foreign subjects before Parliament-The Continent-Turkey-Central Asia-Proposed visit of Prince of Wales to India, and Mr. Disraeli's Speech.

Ir will be remembered that the discussion and passing of the Public Worship Bill at the concluding stage of the preceding Session had rendered it necessary to postpone the final steps regarding the Judicature Act Amendment Bill, which then seemed to be on the point of settlement. The principal feature of that measure had been the provision made for extending to Ireland and Scotland the transference of supreme appellate jurisdiction from the House of Lords to a specially constituted Court, such as Lord Selborne's Act had provided for England and Wales. A slight recapitulation of the state of the case may be desirable. Great law authorities had, from time to time, recommended the fusion of legal and equitable jurisdiction, and the organisation of a single and final Court of Appeal detached from the House of Lords. Lord Chancellor Selborne, soon after his acceptance of office, introduced a measure sketched upon these lines, and intended to bring all our courts of law into homogeneous action. He was greatly assisted in his object by Lord Cairns, whose influence prevailed upon the Peers of the realm to concede with grace a right which, perhaps, they felt they could no longer exercise with advantage to the administration of law and equity. The Bill went down to the House of Commons, and was there so favourably entertained, that Scotch and Irish members saw no sufficient reason for confining its operations to England, and generally assented to the inclusion of Scotland and Ireland in regard to the matter of a final appeal in law cases to the Supreme Court constituted by the Bill. Lord Cairns, however, objected to this extension of the measure, as violating the exclusive privileges of the House of Lords, and it was thereupon given up, with the understanding that an amending Bill would be introduced in the succeeding Session to give the Peers a fair opportunity of deciding for themselves, in the first instance, whether the arrangement which they had conceded to England should be made for all other parts of the British Empire. Before Parliament met again the general election and change of ministry had taken place. One of the measures, however, announced by Mr. Disraeli's Cabinet was framed to carry into completion the Act introduced by Lord Selborne, and, in substance, supported by Lord

Cairns. It was carried through the Lords, not without opposition, but, on contested points, with large majorities; and it was sent down to the House of Commons, where there was every prospect of its being easily and speedily passed. Just then, however, the Public Worship Regulation Bill was before the House, and the right hon. Premier elected to give this a preference in point of time and opportunity over the legal measures of his own. colleague. In the result, the Judicature Act Amendment Bill had to be dropped, and, to the great mortification of the Chancellor, it perished for the Session. This year, substantially, the same Bill was announced in the Royal Message, and was again introduced to the House of Lords by Lord Cairns at an early period. It was somewhat more stoutly contested by its opponents, but it got through Committee and stood for Report.

All at once, on the 8th of March, the Lord Chancellor announced the withdrawal of the Bill, on the ground that Government had found a vast amount of opposition in store for it, from both parties in the House, and that to carry it through would be impossible.

It seems that among the English Peers time and reflection had extended a feeling of regret that they had given up their legal privilege. A sort of committee, or caucus, as such councils are called in the United States, was formed outside the House for collecting and concentrating opinion upon the subject. Several leaders of the Bar also were strongly opposed to the change. Formidable amendments were announced by Lord Redesdale, Lord Penzance, and the Duke of Buccleuch. In short, the opponents of the Bill, who, acquiescing perhaps prematurely in defeat, had not ventured to contest the abolition of the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Lords when Lord Selborne brought forward his scheme of judicial reconstruction, now became aggressive against the supplementary measure of Lord Cairns.

Lord Selborne expressed himself strongly on the method taken by the malcontents to defeat the measure. Speaking some weeks later, he asked:-What would their Lordships have thought if Members of this House, enjoying the consideration which was undoubtedly and justly enjoyed by some of those to whom he alluded, were to go out of doors and canvass for a show of professional or public opinion adverse to the retention by their Lordships of the Appellate Jurisdiction? Such, he thought, would have been the most improper course he could possibly himself have taken. So far from being willing to use such means, he had never sought to bring personal influence to bear even on his nearest and dearest friends in regard to their conduct on these questions. They all knew what could be done by means of associations, and how fictitious and valueless was much of the so-called opinion which in that manner was organised. He thought it far from improbable, that as many as 400 barristers, including not a few Queen's Counsel, could have been got to sign

a petition that the Judicature Act might be altogether repealed, if they had thought the change in the House of Commons afforded them an opportunity of carrying that point. He did not mean to say that an external organisation which endeavoured to enlighten the minds of the people at large on legal or other reforms was not perfectly legitimate; but here, after two Sessions of legislation by their Lordships, this organisation was got up in the autumn and was suddenly brought to bear on this matter in an unusual and extraordinary manner, and in a manner which had the effect of removing from Parliament the voice and influence it ought to have in determining the course which Her Majesty's Government should pursue.

But the point gained, so far, by the malcontents, was only the non-extension of the new Appellate Tribunal to Scotland and Ireland. The substitution, as regarded England and Wales, would come into action in November, according to present law. Though considerably dissatisfied at the failure of his scheme, Lord Cairns saw that his best course was to fall in with the evident bent of opinion, and to make the new legal arrangements as consistent and homogeneous as he could. He therefore decided that in proceeding with the Judicature Amendment Act he would propose the repeal of the clauses providing for a Court of Final Appeal, and recommend a Court of Intermediate Appeal instead. These recommendations he explained in a speech on the 9th of April.

The Bill turned out to be, as it was on the whole probable that it would, a purely temporary and provisional measure. The sections of the Act of 1873 abolishing the jurisdiction of the House of Lords were to be suspended until the 1st day of November 1876, and it was provided that until that date "an appeal may be brought to the House of Lords from any judgment or order of the Court of Appeal" constituted by the present Bill, "in any case in which any appeal or error might now be brought to the House of Lords, or to Her Majesty in Council, from a similar judgment, decree, or order of any court or judge whose jurisdiction is by the principal Act transferred to the High Court of Justice or the Court of Appeal." The jurisdiction of the House of Lords as a Supreme Court of Appeal for the United Kingdom being thus retained for another year, the following was proposed as the constitution of the intermediate Court of Appeal constituted by the new Bill. It was to consist of five ex-officio judges, and also so many ordinary judges, not exceeding five at one time, as Her Majesty shall from time to time appoint. The ex-officio judges were to be the Lord Chancellor, the Lord Chief Justice of England, the Master of the Rolls, the Lord Chief Justice of the Common Pleas, and the Lord Chief Baron of the Exchequer. The first ordinary judges of the Court were to be the present Lords Justices of Appeal in Chancery, "such two of the salaried judges of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as Her Majesty may appoint under the Royal Sign Manual, and such one other person

as Her Majesty may be pleased to appoint by letters patent." The Act of 1873 and the present Bill were, it was provided by Section 2 of the latter, to come into conjoint operation on the 1st of November 1875, but Lord Cairns was not without hope that, if Parliament should agree to the Bill he introduced, both it and the Act of 1873 might be in operation before that date, and it would, he considered, be a great advantage if they could be brought into operation before the summer assizes. That, however, he added, must depend partly on the other House of Parliament.

On April 29, Lord Selborne, on the Report of the Amendments to the Judicature Bill, reviewed the provisions with regard to Appeals, of the Act of 1873, which the present Bill suspended, and said that the more he considered the matter the more he was convinced that the Court of Appeal constituted by the Act of 1873 would have been a strong Court, and was preferable to the one proposed to be formed by the present Bill. It was a point of great importance, he observed, to give strength to the Court which dealt with the first Appeals, which formed the great mass of Appeals, and it was by the Courts below that the law was built up. At the same time, the Act of 1873 provided for the rehearing of causes with the leave of the Court; and there could be no doubt that in all proper cases such leave would have been granted. The Act of 1873 would have tended to discourage frivolous Appeals; but he had great misgivings as to the sufficient power of the Court of Appeal proposed to be established by the present Bill to do the work which it would have to perform. He would not say much as to what was eventually to be the Final Court of Appeal, as the Lord Chancellor had described the proposal made on that point as only provisional, but he saw no reason why the Act of 1873 should not have had a fair trial. Whatever the future Final Court of Appeal might be, it certainly would not be the House of Lords, but a Court constituted by Act of Parliament. He had thought it best to refer to this subject because he considered it one of great importance, and because he thought that the attention of the country should be directed to it.

Lord Penzance contended that the machinery of the Act of 1873 did not establish an efficient second Appeal; but Lord Hatherley remarked that that Act had proposed that there should be a rehearing in the event of the Court being of opinion that there ought to be a rehearing; while Lord Redesdale protested against the assumption that an improvement could not be made in the House of Lords for the purpose of hearing Appeals.

The Lord Chancellor said that as the Government desired to reserve till next Session the question what should be the Final Court of Appeal, he would not enter on that point upon the present occasion. With regard to the Court proposed to be constituted by the present Bill, he considered that it would be sufficiently strong for the important duties it would have to perform.

The measure after passing the House of Lords came before the Commons early in June, where, after encountering some

vigorous criticism from Mr. Watkin Williams and Sir William Harcourt in particular, it passed, and with little substantial change became law before the Session closed. The reduction of the number of Judges of First Instance under the provisions of the Act of 1873 had always been disapproved by the Bench and the Bar, and it was now repealed in the House of Commons on the motion of Sir Henry James. The reduction provoked a characteristic and almost pathetic protest from Mr. Gladstone. It was not, he declared, his business to inquire into the details of circuits or of Guildhall Sittings, or to ascertain whether the Judges were too many or too few. It was enough for him that a saving once approved by Parliament was to be abandoned in deference to professional opposition.

Under the new Act, the "High Court of Judicature" held its first sitting on the 1st of November; the Supreme Court consisting of two main "permanent Divisions," called respectively the "High Court of Justice" and the "Court of Appeal." For the more convenient despatch of business, the High Court of Justice is itself separated into five Divisions, distinguished for the present by names corresponding with the names heretofore distinguishing the several Courts now "united and consolidated together," Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty being combined and forming one Division.

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The division of the legal year into Terms is abolished," so far as relates to the administration of justice," and "Sittings are substituted. The Judges of the High Court of Justice are "the Lord Chancellor, the Lord Chief Justice of England, the Master of the Rolls, the Lord Chief Justice of the Common Pleas, the Lord Chief Baron of the Exchequer, the several Vice-Chancellors of the Court of Chancery, the Judge of the Court of Probate and of the Court for Divorce and Matrimonial Causes, the several puisne Justices of the Courts of Queen's Bench and Common Pleas, the several junior Barons of the Court of Exchequer, and the Judge of the High Court of Admiralty, 'except such, if any, as shall be appointed ordinary Judges of the Court of Appeal."

The Court of Appeal consists of five ex-officio Judges and not more (at any time) than three ordinary Judges. The ex-officio Judges of this Court are the Lord Chancellor, the Master of the Rolls, and the three Chiefs of the Queen's Bench, Common Pleas, and Exchequer; and the ordinary Judges are the two Lords Justices of Appeal and one to be appointed. Such ordinary Judges are styled "Justices of Appeal.'

The jurisdiction of the High Court of Justice embraces the jurisdiction heretofore vested in or exercised by the several Courts "united and consolidated together" as above shown, together with that of some two or three Provincial Courts-such as the Court of Common Pleas at Lancaster, &c. The business assigned to the five several Divisions of the High Court is particularly specified in the Act (1873), and is to be of a nature corresponding with that which would have been within the “ex