strict upon this matter, requiring that the absence must be really temporary with an intent to return known to the innkeeper within a definite and reasonable time.1 And, of course, since the relationship continues, the liability to compensate the innkeeper must be understood to continue during the absence.

§ 1033. Transfer to connecting service.

Where the carriage involves the services of several carriers, the transit is considered to proceed without interruption. Of course, if the arrangement is found to be that the original carrier undertakes a through transit, there will be one transit, and the initial carrier will be responsible for the goods during the entire journey. The

policy of the law is that some one should be liable as a common carrier from the beginning of the connecting service to its end. And in the more usual case of connecting carriage a prior carrier is not relieved of responsibility until the subsequent carrier has received the goods.1 By the accepted law this liability of a first carrier continues until the first carrier has deposited the goods where the second carrier receives them, and given notice, as would generally be requisite, to the succeeding carrier that the goods were there awaiting his transportation,2 together with the necessary instructions for forwarding the goods.3 If, however, the second carrier finally refuses the goods,

ville R. R. Co. v. Campbell et al., 7 Heisk. 253 (1872).

Wisconsin.-Laughlin v. Chicago & N. Ry. Co., 28 Wis. 204, 9 Am. Rep. 493 (1871).

1 Alabama.-Mount Vernon Co. v. Alabama Gt. S. R. R. Co., 92 Ala. 296, 8 So. 687 (1890).

Connecticut.-Palmer v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co., 56 Conn. 137, 13 Atl. 818 (1888).

Georgia.-Wallace v. Rosenthal, 40 Ga. 419 (1869).

Illinois.-Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Mitchell, 68 Ill. 471, 18 Am. Rep. 564 (1873).

Michigan. Moore v. Michigan Central R. R. Co., 3 Mich. 23 (1853).

South Carolina.-Miller Bros. v. Railway Co., 33 S. C. 359 (1890).

Tennessee.-Insurance Co. v. Railroad Co., 8 Baxt. 268 (1874).

West Virginia.-Lewis v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 47 W. Va. 656, 35 S. E. 908, 81 Am. St. Rep. 816 (1900).

Wisconsin.-Hooper v. Chicago

& N. Ry. Co., 27 Wis. 81, 9 Am. Rep. 439 (1870).

2 United States.-Myrick v. Michigan Cent. R. R. Co., 9 Biss. 44 (1879).

California.-Colfax Mountain Fruit Co. v. Southern Pac. Ry. Co., 118 Cal. 648, 46 Pac. 668 (1896), 50 Pac. 775, 40 L. R. A. 78 (1897).

Connecticut.-Palmer v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co., 56 Conn. 137, 13 Atl. 818 (1888).

Kentucky.-Louisville, St. L. & T. Ry. Co. v. Bourne & Embry, 16 Ky. L. Rep. 825, 29 S. W. 975 (1895). Michigan.-Rickerson Roller Mill Co. v. Grand Rapids & I. R. R. Co., 67 Mich. 110, 34 N. W. 269 (1887).

Missouri.-Dunn v. Hannibal & St. J. R. R. Co., 68 Mo. 268 (1878).

New York.-Sprague v. New York Cent. R. R. Co., 52 N. Y. 637 (1873).

3 Illinois.-Michigan S. & N. I. R. R. Co. v. Day, 20 Ill. 375, 71 Am. Dec. 278 (1858).

Michigan. Hutchings v. Ladd, 16 Mich. 493 (1868).

the first carrier has performed its duty as such. But there rests upon it in this case, as in many other cases of unexpected interruption, the duty to store the goods refused and notify the consignor of the situation.2

§ 1034. End of innkeeper's liability as such.

After a guest pays his bill and departs, the innkeeper continues liable as such during a reasonable time for bag

gage left in his charge.1 So, after the bill had been paid and while the guest's horse was being harnessed in order that he might drive away, the innkeeper continued liable as such for the safety of the horse.2 Where a traveler was told he could have a room only until an expected guest who had engaged it should arrive, and on these terms he took the room and put his goods in it, and when the expected guest arrived the innkeeper's servants put the goods in the corridor, where they were lost, it was held that the innkeeper's liability continued after the goods had been placed in the corridor. And where the innkeeper undertook to deliver the baggage at a steamboat or at a railroad station, the innkeeper's liability was held to continue until it was so delivered.1

§ 1035. Termination of the carrier's liability as such.

There is irreconcilable conflict among the authorities upon the question as to when the special liability of the common carrier comes to its end. Upon abstract principles it should end when the transportation undertaken may properly be said to have been completed; but there are no less than four principal theories as to the termination of the special liability, viz.: (1) In some jurisdictions the end of the movement of the goods is the end of their carriage. (2) In other jurisdictions the liability of a common carrier continues until a reasonable time for the consignee to get the goods has expired. (3) In still other

1 Colorado.-Murray v. Marshall,

9 Colo. 482, 13 Pac. 589, 59 Am. Rep. 152 (1886).

Georgia.-Adams v. Clem, 41 Ga. 65, 5 Am. Rep. 524 (1870).

Michigan.-Baehr v. Downey, 133 Mich. 163, 94 N. W. 750 (1903). New York.-Maxwell v. Gerard, 84 Hun, 537, 32 N. Y. Supp. 849 (1895).

2 Seymour v. Cook, 53 Barb. 451, 35 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 180 (1868).

3 Medewar v. Grand Hotel Co., 2 Q. B. 11, 60 L. J. Q. B. 209, 64 L. T. 851, 55 J. P. 614 (1891).

4 Georgia. Sasseen et al. v. Clark, 37 Ga. 242 (1867).

Maryland.-Giles v. Fauntleroy, 13 Md. 126 (1858).

jurisdictions the common carrier remains liable as such until he has given reasonable notice. (4) Some carriers must offer personal delivery before they are exonerated. These matters will be considered briefly in substantially this order in the following sections. In all jurisdictions, however, the extraordinary liability as a common carrier may at length come to an end with the carrier still in possession of the goods. And during this period of custody awaiting delivery the carrier's liability becomes that of a warehouseman, viz.: a liability for failure to use due care to protect and guard the goods according to their nature. But the carrier may in special cases by a new agreement with the owners hold the goods for them as a warehouseman. No citations are given for the matters described in this paragraph as the various aspects of the problem are sufficiently discussed with appropriate citations in the paragraphs immediately following.

§1036. End of transportation.

According to what would seem to be the proper test, common carriage should come to its end when the undertaking assumed has been performed. A common carrier, as such, undertakes only transportation to a certain place. When he has deposited the goods at that point on the route he has done all that he has professed, and it seems therefore that his exceptional liability as a common carrier should then terminate. The cases to this effect are sufficiently numerous to justify its acceptance; and it has, moreover, the practical advantage of a fixed rule always capable of exact application.1 In the Massachusetts case

1

1 Georgia. Knight v. Wrightsville & T. Ry. Co., 127 Ga. 204, 56 S. E. 363 (1906).

2 Norway Plains Co. v. Boston &

Illinois.-Chicago & A. R. R. Co. v. Scott, 42 Ill. 132 (1866).

2

Iowa.-Mohr & Smith v. Chicago

Maine R. R. Co., 1 Gray (Mass.), 263, 21 Am. Dec. 423 (1854).