cases cannot be supported. The conflict of authority in one class of cases deserves notice. It is a usual stipulation for a railroad to make in the bill of lading under which live stock is shipped, that the consignee shall make his complaint before taking the stock away. In some cases this is held unreasonable; and so it may seem, particularly in the case where the effects of the injury cannot be known for some time. But other cases consider even this extreme stipulation justified, as necessary for the protection of the railroad; and the further clause which is usually found that the claim must be made before the consignment is mixed with other stock is apparently reasonable.2 In all the cases under this topic the reasonableness of the stipulation is the problem. The reasonableness of the time stipulated for is determined by the usual circumstances of the case. As will be seen in the cases cited, weight will be attached to various circumstances, such as-the distance of the transportation contracted for, whether the shipper is to accompany the shipment, what time must naturally elapse before the owner will learn

1 United States.-Ormsby v. Union Pacific Ry. Co., 2 MacCrary, 48 (1880).

Illinois.-Wabash R. R. Co. v. Thomas, 222 Ill. 337, 78 N. E. 777, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1041 (1906).

Ohio.-Baltimore & O. R. R. Co. v. Hubbard, 72 Ohio St. 302, 74 N. E. 214 (1905), five days too short to determine injury to live stock.

Tennessee.-Smitha v. Louisville & N. Ry. Co., 86 Tenn. 198, 6 S. W. 209 (1887).

2 Arkansas.-Kansas & A. V. Ry. Co. v. Ayres, 63 Ark. 331, 38 S. W. 515 (1897).

Illinois.-Baxter v. Louisville, N. A. & C. Ry. Co., 165 Ill. 78, 45 N. E. 1003 (1897).

3

Iowa.-Hudson & Co. v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 92 Iowa, 231, 60 N. W. 608, 54 Am. St. Rep. 550 (1894).

Missouri. Smith v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 112 Mo. App. 610, 87 S. W. 9 (1905).

3 United States.-Express Co. v. Caldwell, 21 Wall. 264, 22 L. ed. 556 (1874).

Illinois. Chicago, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Bozarth, 91 Ill. App. 68 (1900).

Missouri.-Thompson v. Chicago & Alton R. R. Co., 22 Mo. App. 321 (1886).

North Carolina.-Wood v. Southern Ry. Co., 118 N. C. 1056, 24 S. E. 704 (1896).

of his loss, whether the damage would make itself apparent at once, whether sufficient directions are given as to the making of the complaint, and whether a claim agent is accessible.1

1 Alabama.-Western Ry. Co. v. Harwell, 91 Ala. 340, 8 So. 649 (1890).

Indiana.-Adams Exp. Co. v. Reagan, 29 Ind. 21, 92 Am. Dec. 332 (1867).

New York.-Ghormley v. Dinsmore, 19 Jones & S. 196 (1885).

Tennessee.-Glenn & Sons V. Southern Express Co., 86 Tenn. 594, 8 S. W. 152 (1888).

Texas. St. Louis, A. & T. Ry. Co. v. Turner, 1 Tex. Civ. App. 625, 20 S. W. 1008 (1892).

PART VIII. TERMINATION OF SERVICE

CHAPTER XXX

END OF THE UNDERTAKING

1030. When the undertaking is completed.

Topic A. How Long Service Continues

§ 1031. Interruption in transit.

1032. Temporary absence from an inn.

1033. Transfer to connecting service.

1034. End of innkeeper's liability as such.

1035. Termination of the carrier's liability as such. 1036. End of transportation.

1037. Reasonable time for removal.

1038. Whether notification is necessary.

Topic B. How the Service Is Terminated

§ 1039. Extent of obligation to deliver. 1040. Delivery by express companies.

1041. Delivery by telegraph companies.

1042. Delivery of goods by railroad companies.

1043. Delivery of bulky freight.

1044. Setting down passengers.

Topic C. Whether Delivery Is Properly Made

§ 1045. Performance according to instructions. 1046. Legal excuse for withholding delivery.

1047. Delivery to true owner.

1048. Delivery to wrong person.

1049. Delivery to the designated person.

1050. Demurrage charges.

1051. Full completion of performance.

1030. When the undertaking is completed.

As has been sufficiently shown in a former chapter, the

carrier and the innkeeper are subject to an extraordinary liability in respect to the goods intrusted to them, although strangely enough not as to the persons in their care. This extraordinary liability, which makes them practically insurers, continues, however, only so long as the public service that they have undertaken is being performed; and as will be seen presently, the obligation they are thereafter under is simply the obligation to exercise due care. As there is this great difference in the liability, the cases upon it are so numerous that even to deal with them briefly requires some space. The subject has its general interest because here is a case where the extent of the undertaking assumed in the provision of a public service is minutely measured, for the special liability attaches only so long as this public service is being performed. Aside from this particular problem there is the general problem of the proper termination of all liability by completed performance. This is to a large extent a question of the full scope of the particular undertaking, which would involve detailed description of the usual course of each particular business if it were to be treated in detail.

Topic A. How Long Service Continues

§ 1031. Interruption in transit.

The undertaking of the carrier is to transport. His special liability, therefore, should be confined to the time. of transportation. It has already been sufficiently discussed when this transportation may have been said to have begun. It will be seen very soon when this transportation may be said to have been ended. And by the usual rule all that goes on between these two extremes is held to be during transit. If the carrier stops the trans

The transit continues while the passenger is upon a transfer car. Citizens' St. R. R. Co. of Ind. v.

Merl, 134 Ind. 609, 33 N. E. 1014 (1893).

By temporarily alighting from a

portation for his own convenience, from time to time, transit is still considered as continued. Even if there is an interruption in the transit which is unvoidable, the carrier is still held strictly accountable as such for loss of the goods.1

§ 1032. Temporary absence from an inn.

The time from which an innkeeper comes under exceptional liability for the goods of his guest has already been defined; and the time when he ceases to be under that liability will soon be fixed. Between these two times one may certainly hold the host liable for goods left in the inn, while he is absent about his business in the neighborhood. There are a variety of cases holding that a temporary absence of the guest of a considerable length does not terminate the relationship.2 But the law is rather

crowded car to permit another passenger to conveniently get off one does not cease to be a passenger. Tompkins v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 201 Mass. 114, 87 N. E. 488, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1063, 131 Am. St. Rep. 392 (1909).

A temporary departure by a passenger from the train for any good or reasonable cause, without intent to abandon transportation does not end the relation of carrier and passenger. Austin v. St. Louis & S. F. Ry. Co. (Mo. App.), 130 S. W. 385 (1910).

For example, if a passenger steps off at a station before reaching his destination intending to return to the train, he does not lose his rights as a passenger. Parsons v. New York Central & H. R. R. R. Co., 113 N. Y. 355, 21 N. E. 145, 10 Am. St. Rep. 450 (1889).

The same law prevails if the

goods are stopped in transit for any reason whether excusable or not. Fenner v. Buffalo & S. L. R. R. Co., 44 N. Y. 505, 4 Am. Rep. 709 (1871).

And so it is even if the goods are warehoused in transit. Mason v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 37 Upp. Can. Q. B. 163 (1875).

2 Colorado.-Brown Hotel Co. v. Burckhardt, 13 Col. App. 59, 56 Pac. 188 (1899).

Iowa.-Hayes v. Turner, 23 Ia. 214 (1867).

New York.-McDonald v. Edgerton, 5 Barb. (N. Y.) 560 (1849).

Tennessee.-Whitemore v. Haroldson, 2 Lea (Tenn.), 312 (1879).

Vermont.-McDaniels v. Robinson, 26 Vt. 316, 62 Am. Dec. 574 (1854).

England.-Allen v. Smith, 12 C. B. (N. S.) 638, 31 L. J. C. P. 306, 9 Jur. (N. S.) 230, 6 L. T. 459, 10 W.