scriber's line.1 And the delivery of a telegram in its regular order and within an hour from the time it was received at the office in the city of delivery has been held to be with reasonable dispatch.2 But where several hours were taken for the transmission of a message which would ordinarily only take a few minutes the company was held liable. And a delay of eleven days before forwarding property received for transportation made a railroad company liable.4 3 5 According to the general principle that what is due diligence in performance depends upon the circumstances of the case, special circumstances may call for unusual haste. A sudden emergency may call for unusual haste to extricate passengers from a perilous situation or to rush through to its designation perishable freight unexpectedly exposed. To cite an example from another business, telegraph messages announcing impending death should be handled with extraordinary dispatch. And the same is 1 Buffalo County Tel. Co. v. Turner, 82 Neb. 841, 118 N. W. 1064, 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 693 (1908). 2 See Julian v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 98 Ind. 327 (1884). 3 See Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Johnson, 9 Tex. Civ. App. 48, 28 S. W. 124 (1894). Alabama Gt. So. Ry. Co. v. Quarles & C., 145 Ala. 436, 40 So. 120, 5 L. R. A. 867, 117 Am. St. Rep. 54 (1906). What is a reasonable time for performance is a question of fact to be submitted to the jury when the evidence legally admits of more than one conclusion. See Blodgett v. Abbott, 72 Wis. 516, 40 N. W. 491, 7 Am. St. Rep. 873 (1888). On proof of a delay in delivery by the company at the destination, a prima facie case is made out against it, and the burden of proof then rests upon it to show that it was not responsible for the delay. See Bosley v. Baltimore & C. R. R. Co., 54 W. Va. 563, 46 S. E. 613, 66 L. R. A. 871 (1904). 5 See, for example, Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Frees, 87 Pa. St. 234 (1878). See, for example, Frey v. New York C. & H. R. R. R. Co., 114 N. Y. App. Div. 747, 100 N. Y. Supp. 225 (1906). 'See, for example, Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Smith (Tex. Civ. App.), 30 S. W. 937 (1894). 3 true of a telegram dealing with purchases in a fluctuating market.1 Notwithstanding the special haste required in such circumstances the carrier cannot refuse to take perishable goods from a shipper who will not sign a release of his common law rights.2 Nor can a telegraph company refuse to take a message from one who gives formal notice of the special importance of the prompt transmission of his message. Contrasting different cases will bring out the general principle that what is due diligence depends upon the circumstances of the case. Thus as an express company from the nature of its business undertakes to transport goods with the utmost dispatch, it is liable for not forwarding promptly a box of souvenirs. But as a railroad company practically only undertakes to handle ordinary freight without unreasonable delay, it may hold hay for a considerable time before forwarding it without being liable.5 § 904. Adherence to schedule time. A public service corporation which publishes a schedule undertaking to perform service at certain times and places is liable to anyone damaged by its default in failing to so perform in accordance with its professed undertaking." 1See, for example, Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Scircle, 103 Ind. 227 (1885). 'See, for example, American Express Co. v. Smith, 33 Ohio St. 511, 31 Am. Rep. 561 (1878). See, for example, Vermilye v. Postal Telegraph Cable Co., 205 Mass. 598, 91 N. E. 904 (1910). "Lambert-Murray Co. v. Southern Express Co., 146 N. C. 321, 59 S. E. 991 (1907). Strough v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co., 87 N. Y. S. 30 (1904). Delaware.-Reed & W. v. Philadelphia, W. & B. R. R. Co., 3 Houst. 176 (1873). Georgia.-Savannah S. & S. R. R. Co. v. Bonaud, 58 Ga. 180 (1877). Maryland.-Duling v. Philadelphia, W. & B. R. R. Co., 66 Md. 120, 6 Atl. 592 (1886). Mississippi.-Wilson v. New Orleans & N. E. R. R. Co., 63 Miss. 352 (1885). Nebraska.-McClary v. Sioux City & P. R. R. Co., 3 Neb. 44, 19 Am. Rep. 631 (1873). And indeed a corporation undertaking to do public service is usually bound to maintain a reasonably suitable schedule unless it is willing to perform any service requested whenever asked. When such a schedule is established, generally speaking delays consequent upon awaiting the regular course of a reasonable schedule of service will not be ground of action against the company.2 But when there have been unexpected stoppages, further delays cannot always be excused by relying upon the performance of the schedule as thus delayed; for it may well be necessary to provide an additional service if the delay is a considerable one and the new service can be arranged.3 The duty of a railroad to transport passengers upon the advertised schedule time is held to impose upon it the highest degree of care and the utmost diligence under New York.-Weed v. Panama R. R. Co., 17 N. Y. 362, 72 Am. Dec. 474 (1858). South Carolina.-Miller v. Southern Ry. Co., 69 S. C. 116, 48 S. E. 99 (1903). Texas.-Eddy v. Harris, 78 Tex. 661, 15 S. W. 107, 22 Am. St. Rep. 88 (1890). England.-Denton v. R. R. Co., 6 El. & Bl. 860 (1856). 1 Georgia.-Riley v. Wrightsville & T. R. R. Co., 133 Ga. 413, 65 S. E. 890, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 379 (1909). Illinois. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. George, 19 Ill. 510 (1858). Indiana.-Pittsburg, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Nuzum, 50 Ind. 141, 19 Am. Rep. 703 (1875). Missouri.-Ratcliff v. Quincy, O. & K. C. R. R. Co., 118 Mo. App. 644, 94 S. W. 1005 (1906). Manchester & L. R. R. Co., 52 New York.-Barker v. New York England.-Hurst v. Gt. Western Ry. Co., 19 C. B. (N. S.) 310 (1865). A change of schedules will not protect the company unless reasonable notice thereof is given to the public. Massachusetts.-Sears v. Eastern R. R. Co., 14 Allen, 433, 92 Am. Dec. 780 (1867). Michigan.-Van Camp v. Michigan Central Ry. Co., 137 Mich. 467, 100 N. W. 771 (1904). 2 Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co. v. Tuckett (Tex. Civ. App.), 25 S. W. 150 (1894). Gulf C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Porter, 25 Tex. Civ. App. 491, 61 S. W. 234 (1901). 1 the circumstances. Nevertheless safety and promptness are not to be put on the same plane, for promptness must always yield to safety.2 Topic B. Deviation from the Undertaking § 905. Usual course of performing service. 3 In the absence of express agreement, the carrier is bound to transport the goods by the usual and ordinary route and by the usual means of conveyance. The undertaking of a common carrier, in the absence of any special contract, is to transport the property to the place of destination by the most usual, safe, direct and expeditious route. Failing in any of these, unless prevented by inevitable accident, he is held liable for the loss. Thus, deviation may be defined in general terms as any substantial departure from the arrangement made between the company and the customer. The salient example is a change in the route designated by the consignor.5 1 Hansley v. Jamesville & W. R. R. Co., 115 N. C. 602, 20 S. E. 528, 44 Am. St. Rep. 474 (1894). Latour v. Southern Ry. Co., 71 S. C. 532, 51 S. E. 265 (1904). United States.-Express Company v. Kountze Bros., 8 Wall. 342 (1869). Connecticut.-Crosby v. Fitch, 12 Conn. 410, 31 Am. Dec. 745 (1838). Colorado.-Denver & R. G. R. R. Co. v. De Witt, 1 Colo. App. 419, 29 Pac. 824 (1892). Georgia.-Phillips v. Brigham, 26 Ga. 617, 71 Am. Dec. 227 (1859). New York.-Maghee v. Camden & A. R. R. Tr. Co., 45 N. Y. 514, 6 Am. Rep. 124 (1871). South Dakota.-Church v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 6 S. D. 235, 60 N. W. 854, 26 L. R. A. 616 (1894). Texas.-Galveston, H. & H. R. R. v. Allison, 59 Tex. 193 (1883). England.-Davis v. Garrett, 6 Bing. 716 (1830). Illinois.-Merchants' Dispatch Transportation Co. v. Kahn, 76 Ill. 520 (1875). Indiana.-Powers v. Davenport, 7 Blackf. 497, 43 Am. Dec. 100 (1845). Mississippi.-Bennet v. Byram, 38 Miss. 17, 75 Am. Dec. 90 (1859). Tennessee.-Louisville & N. R. R. Co. v. Odill, 96 Tenn. 61, 33 S. W. 64, 54 Am. St. Rep. 820 (1896). 5 United States.-The Maggie Hammond, 9 Wall. 435, 19 L. ed. 773 (1869). Georgia.-Robinson v. Holst & Mere delay, however, is not a deviation, unless it amounts to an abandonment of the contract or is so gross as to indicate departure from the undertaking.1 Deviation is any dealing with the property taken in some way not authorized by the patron, but such intermeddling is not conversion although many of the consequences of a conversion flow therefrom for the time being. § 906. Performance in unauthorized manner. In accordance with the general principles just discussed it has been held a deviation for a carrier, in violation of his undertaking, to ship goods before the time agreed upon; 2 or on a different vessel from that stipulated for.3 So it is deviation to ship by rail instead of by water, by water instead of by rail,5 by sea instead of canal and by an outside route rather than an inside route.7 It may be a deviation to forward by steamship instead of sailing ves 'W., 96 Ga. 19, 23 S. E. 76 (1895). Massachusetts.-Simkins v. Norwich & N. L. St. Co., 11 Cush. 102 (1853). Missouri.-Glover v. Cape Girardeau & So. Ry. Co., 95 Mo. App. 369, 69 S. W. 599 (1902). New York.-White v. Ashton, 51 N. Y. 280 (1873). Pennsylvania.-Empire Co. V. Wallace, 68 Pa. St. 302, 8 Am. Rep. 178 (1871). 1 Arkansas.—Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Pffeifer, 90 Ark. 524, 119 S. W. 642, (1909). Kentucky-Cassilay, etc., v. Young & Co., 39 Am. Dec. 505, 4 B. Mon. 265 (1843). New York.-Wamsley v. Atlas S. S. Co., 168 N. Y. 533, 61 N. E. 896, 85 Am. St. Rep. 699 (1901). Wisconsin.-Fahey v. Northern 6 Transportation Co., 15 Wis. 129 (1862). 2 Campion v. Canadian Pacific Ry. Co., 43 Fed. 775, 11 L. R. A. 128 (1890). See also Louisville & C. Packet Co. v. Rogers, 20 Ind. App. 594, 49 N. E. 970 (1898). 3 Green & B. R. Nav. Co. v. Marshall, 48 Ind. 596 (1874). And see Goddard v. Mallory, 52 Barb. 87 (1868). 4 Merrick v. Webster, 3 Mich. 268 (1854). |