APPENDIX D THE EXPEDITING ACT § 1. Expedition of cases.1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, SEC. 1. (A8 amended June 25, 1910.) any That in any suit in equity pending or hereafter brought in any circuit court of the United States under the Act entitled "An Act to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and monopolies," approved July second, eighteen hundred and ninety, "An Act to regulate commerce," approved February fourth, eighteen hundred and eighty-seven, or other Acts having a like purpose that hereafter may be enacted, wherein the United States is complainant, the Attorney General may file with the clerk of such court a certificate that, in his opinion, the case is of general public importance, a copy of which shall be immediately furnished by such clerk to each of the circuit judges of the circuit in which the case is pending. Thereupon such case shall be given precedence over others and in every way expedited, and be assigned for hearing at the earliest practicable day, before not less than three of the circuit judges of said court, if there be three or more; and if there be not more than two circuit judges, then before them and such district judge as they may select or, in case the full court shall not at any time be made up by reason of the necessary absence or disqualification of one or more of the said circuit judges, the justice of the Supreme Court assigned to that circuit or the other circuit judge or judges may designate a district judge or judges within the circuit who shall be competent to sit in said court at the hearing of said suit. In the event the judges sit1 This heading is not in the act. ting in such case shall be equally divided in opinion as to the decision or disposition of said cause, or in the event that a majority of said judges shall be unable to agree upon the judgment, order, or decree finally disposing of said case in said court which should be entered in said cause, then they shall immediately certify that fact to the Chief Justice of the United States, who shall at once designate and appoint some circuit judge to sit with said judges and to assist in determining said cause. Such order of the Chief Justice shall be immediately transmitted to the clerk of the circuit court in which said cause is pending, and shall be entered upon the minutes of said court. Thereupon said cause shall at once be set down for reargument and the parties thereto notified in writing by the clerk of said court of the action of the court and the date fixed for the reargument thereof. The provisions of this section shall apply to all causes and proceedings in all courts now pending, or which may hereafter be brought. § 2. Appeal to Supreme Court.1 SEC. 2. That in every suit in equity pending or hereafter brought in any circuit court of the United States under any of said Acts, wherein the United States is complainant, including cases submitted but not yet decided, an appeal from the final decree of the circuit court will lie only to the Supreme Court and must be taken within sixty days from the entry thereof: Provided, That in any case where an appeal may have been taken from the final decree of a circuit court to the circuit court of appeals before this Act takes effect, the case shall proceed to a final decree therein, and an appeal may be taken from such decree to the Supreme Court in the manner now provided by law. Public, No. 82, approved February 11, 1903; Public, No. 310, approved June 25, 1910. 1 This heading is not in the act. APPENDIX E FORMS FOR PROCEEDINGS BEFORE COMMISSIONS § 1. Complaint of unreasonable charges. INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION MCCLAIN, WADE & Co. against OREGON RAILWAY & NAVIGATION Co. The petition of the above-named complainants respectfully shows: I. Your petitioners complain of the Oregon Railway & Navigation Company and respectfully represent: That on the 13th day of June, D. A. 1887, your petitioners shipped from the City of Colfax, in the Territory of Washington, to the City of Portland, in the State of Oregon, two car loads of wheat, to wit: 122 sacks of wheat of the weight of 20,000 pounds on one car, and 230 sacks of wheat of the weight of 30,000 pounds on the other car. That the said two car loads of wheat were loaded on said cars at your petitioners' sole expense, and were delivered to said Oregon Railway & Navigation Company for transportation to Portland, Oregon, as aforesaid, on said 30th day of June, A. D. 1887. That the distance from the said City of Colfax, in Washington Territory, to Portland, Oregon, does not exceed 320 miles. That the said Oregon Railway & Navigation Company, against the protests of your petitioners, have charged your petitioners for transporting the said two cars loads of wheat the said 320 miles, the full sum of $175, or at the rate of $7 for each ton of 2,000 pounds. II. Your petitioners further aver that it is stated in the annual report of the said Oregon Railway & Navigation Company for 1886, that the total cost of all property of every description owned by said company, including ocean steamers, river and sound boats, barges and wharves, is $32,924,433.72; while its net income from railroad earnings alone was, as appears by the same report, $2,256,589.78, or 6 8/10 per cent on the whole nominal investment of that company, without counting its earnings from other sources. That during the same year that company transported over its railroad lines 123,413,669 tons of freight and merchandise, and that the average price it received for transporting merchandise from Portland, Oregon, to Colfax, Washington Territory, was in excess of $30 per ton. III. Your petitioners further allege that the rates recommended by the railroad commissioners of the State of Oregon, for the transportation of wheat from points in the State of Oregon, equidistant from said Portland, Oregon, with the city of Colfax, in Washington Territory, and reached by the line of the Oregon Railway & Navigation Company, is $4 per ton, or $3 per ton less than the said company has charged your petitioners. IV. Your petitioners further allege that the said Oregon Railway & Navigation Company has agreed to make a rate from points in Columbia county, Washington Territory, as far from Portland, Oregon, as is the city of Colfax, for the transportation of wheat and other grains over the line of said railroad to said Portland, Oregon, of $5 per ton, while still continuing the rate from said Colfax at $7 per ton, thus charging your petitioners, and all other handlers of grain in Colfax, $2 per ton more for transporting their wheat the same distance than is charged the wheat raisers and buyers shipping from said points in Columbia county. V. And your petitioners further allege that the sum of $7 per ton for the transportation of wheat as aforesaid from Colfax, Washington Territory, to Portland, Oregon, is unjust and unreasonable; and that a just and reasonable charge for such transportation is $3.50 per ton, which is approximately the rate fixed for a haul of the same distance by the Illinois State law. VI. Wherefore, your petitioners pray that you may direct the said Oregon Railway & Navigation Company to reimburse to your petitioners the sum of $87.50, the sum paid by your petitioners to the said Oregon Railway & Navigation Company for the transportation of said two car loads of wheat to Portland, Oregon, in excess of a just and reasonable freight charge. And your petitioners further pray that the said Oregon Railway & Navigation Company may be required to establish a rate for the transportation of grain from Colfax, Washington Territory, to Portland, Oregon, not in excess of $3.50 per ton. MCCLAINE, WADE & Co., By Alfred Coolidge, § 2. Complaint of wrong classification. INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION NATIONAL MACHINERY & WRECKING CO. against PITTSBURG, CINCINNATI, CHICAGO & ST. LOUIS RY. CO. ET AL. The petition of the above-named complainant respectfully shows: I. That the complainant is a partnership composed of Jacob W. and Milton S. Kohn, in the State of Ohio, having its principal office and place of business in the city of Cleveland in said State and is a dealer in boilers, generators, motors and other machines, shipping the same, new and secondhand, between points lying in different States of the United States, particularly in those States lying in Official Classification territory, which is generally described as that territory lying north of the Potomac and Ohio and east of the Mississippi rivers. II. The above-named defendants are common carriers engaged in the transportation of property by continuous carriage or shipment by railroad between points in different States of the United States and largely in said Official Classification territory, and as such common carriers are subject to the provisions of the Act to Regulate Commerce approved February 4, 1887, and acts amendatory thereof or supplementary thereto. III. That complainant, in the course of its business, ships over defendants' lines of railroad old and secondhand dynamos from points in other States to Cleveland, where they are converted into junk. That in Official Classification No. 26, dated January 2, 1905, adopted by defendants and now enforced upon their lines, dynamos, new and secondhand, boxed or on skids, crated, are classified at first class and take first-class rates over defendants' lines. That by such classification and rating defendants compel complainant to pay on its shipments of old and secondhand dynamos, which are practically worthless, the first-class rate, which is the same as is charged on new and valuable dynamos. That said rating of secondhand dynamos in the same class as new dynamos is unreasonable, unduly discriminatory, and should be changed. That the classification of secondhand or defective dynamos |