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marized thus by Mr. Justice Deady in Roberts v. Koehler: "A ticket for transportation on a railway between certain termini, which is silent as to the time when or within which it may be used, does not authorize the holder to stop over at any point between such termini, and resume his journey thereon on the next or any following train. The contract involved in the sale and purchase of such a ticket is an entire one, and not divisible. It is a contract to carry the passenger through to the point of his destination as one continuous service, and not by piecemeal, to suit his convenience or pleasure.

§ 1256. Two partial fares for a single journey.

For this reason a passenger has no right to split up a single journey into two by tendering fare from the point of departure to an intermediate station, and then, continuing on the train, tender fare from the intermediate station to his destination, even though he might thus secure a cheaper passage by taking advantage of cheaper rates between two of the stations. This point was fully considered in the case of the London & Northwestern Railway v. Hinchcliffe. On this principle it was held in ' an Australian case that a rule providing that no passenger should take a ticket at any intermediate station for the purpose of continuing his journey in the same train as that in which he arrived, except from some stopping place where booking clerks are not provided, was reasonable and valid.3

§ 1257. Part of journey completed before fare collection. It not infrequently happens that a passenger has completed part of his journey before the fare is demanded and

1 United States.-Roberts v. Koehler, 30 Fed. 94 (1887).

California.-Drew v. Central Pac. R. R. Co., 51 Cal. 425 (1875).

22 K. B. 32 (1903).

3 Davies v. Williamson, 21 N. S. W. L. R. 124 (1899).

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collected; and a passenger is sometimes found dishonest enough to attempt to ride to his destination upon payof fare for the remaining distance. That this attempt is illegal has been made plain. The journey in which he is engaged is the whole journey from his place of departure to his destination; and the fare which is due, and which alone is due, is the fare for the whole distance.1 The same thing is true if for some reason he would have a legal right to leave the train at an intermediate station without paying fare, but instead of doing so chooses to remain on the train and complete his journey. This was the ground of the decision in a case decided by the Supreme Court of Missouri. In that case the plaintiff, bound on a journey from A to B, could not get a seat until he reached X, an intermediate station; and he then refused to pay fare from A to B, but instead of doing so tendered fare from X to B only. He was ejected for nonpayment of fare, and the court held that the ejection was justified, though he might lawfully have left the train at X, the first station, without paying fare, since he could get no seat.2

§ 1258. Resumption of journey by ejected passenger.

Although the penalty of ejection which is visited upon a rejected passenger is much discussed later on, there is one phase of it that comes up in this connection. Suppose the passenger has been properly ejected may he be refused further transportation? Certainly by the principles first discussed he cannot take the train again without paying full fare from the original point of departure to his destination, since what he desires is the completion of the original journey. In Pennington v. Philadelphia, 1Manning v. Louisville & N. R. R., 95 Ala. 392, 11 So. 8, 36 Am. St. Rep. 225, 16 L. R. A. 55 (1891).

'Davis v. Kansas City, S. J. &

C. B. R. R., 53 Mo. 317, 14 Am.
Rep. 457 (1873).

3 Alabama.-Manning v. Louisville & N. R. R., 95 Ala. 392, 11 So.

Wilmington and Baltimore Railroad Company, Mr. Justice Bryan said in the course of an excellent discussion: "The plaintiff was required to leave the cars at Back River Station, on his journey back to Baltimore from Perryman's. After he had left the cars and while on the platform he offered to pay the conductor his fare from that station to Baltimore, but the conductor refused to give him admission to the cars. The plaintiff had already accomplished a portion of the return journey to Baltimore without paying his fare. He clearly was not entitled to be conveyed from Perryman's to Baltimore without paying fare for the whole distance. If he had been carried from Back River Station to Baltimore, on payment of the fare only from that place, he would have escaped payment of a portion of the fare: and so, in fact, he would have accomplished the return trip at a reduced rate. The company was under no obligation to carry him for less than the full rate for the whole distance and so he was properly excluded from the cars." 1.

§ 1259. Passenger expelled at a regular station.

If the passenger is expelled at a regular station, where passengers have a right to demand reception, he certainly cannot take the train again without paying full fare from the original point of departure to his destination, since what he also desires to do is to continue on his journey.2

8, 16 L. R. A. 55, 36 Am. St. Rep. 225 (1891).

Iowa.-Stone v. Chicago & N. W. R. R. Co., 47 Iowa, 82, 29 Am. Rep. 458 (1877).

Maryland.-Pennington v. Phila., W. & B. R. R., 62 Md. 95 (1883). Massachusetts.-Swan V. Manchester & L. R. R., 132 Mass. 116, 42 Am. Rep. 432 (1882).

1 Supra.

2 United States.-Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Smith, 152 Fed. 608 (1902).

Georgia.-Georgia So. & Fla. Ry. Co. v. Asmore, 88 Ga. 529, 15 S. E. 13, 16 L. R. A. 53 (1891).

Iowa.-Hoffbauer v. O. & N. W. Ry. Co., 52 Iowa, 342 (1879).

Maryland.-Garrison v. United Ry. & E. Co., 97 Md. 347, 55 Atl. 371, 99 Am. St. Rep. 452 (1903).

Where, however, the passenger had a ticket for the station at which he was ejected, but wrongfully claimed that his ticket entitled him to be carried further, he was held entitled to take the train and ride on to his destination upon paying the additional fare.1 the additional fare. Mr. Justice Guffy said: "Lebanon Junction is admitted to be a point where the train stopped, and it did not stop there for the purpose of ejecting the plaintiff, and after he had quietly and submissively yielded to expulsion he was entitled to the same rights and privileges that any other citizen or passenger had, who wanted to go to Louisville, as he manifestly did, for he took the next train for that point."

1260. Change of destination during the journey.

If a passenger takes a train intending to go to an intermediate station, but during his journey changes his mind and determines to go further, he is still proposing to take a single journey, and must pay the difference between the fare he has already paid and the entire fare for the whole journey he decides to take; but upon doing so he would, it seems, have a right to stay in the train and complete his journey. Such a case was supposed in the argument of an Australian case, and it was urged that the passenger might be obliged to wait at the intermediate station for the next train. The court, however, said: "He need do nothing of the kind. All that he would have to do would be to remain in his seat, and tell the guard that he wanted

New Jersey.-State v. Campbell, 32 N. J. L. 309 (1867).

New York.-Pease v. Delaware, L. & W. R. R. Co., 101 N. Y. 367, 5 N. E. 37, 54 Am. St. Rep. 699 (1886).

North Carolina.-Clark v. Wilmington & W. R. R. Co., 91 N. C. 506, 49 Am. Rep. 647 (1884).

Ohio.-Railroad Co. v. Skillman, 39 Ohio St. 444 (1883).

Tennessee.-Louisville & N. R. R. Co. v. Garrett, 8 Lea (Tenn.), 438, 41 Am. Rep. 640 (1881).

1 Louisville & N. R. R. Co. v. Breckinridge, 99 Ky. 1, 34 S. W. 702 (1896).

See Choctaw, O. & G. R. R. Co.

to go on to Dubbo, and pay the difference in the fare." 1 Even if he originally bought a ticket to the intermediate station he would not have a right to buy a ticket for the remaining portion of his journey; the railroad could insist that he pay the excess fare. On the other hand, the railroad could doubtless require that he buy a ticket for the remainder of his journey or else pay the fare for the entire journey, receiving back his ticket for the first part of it. In London & Northwestern Railway v. Hinchcliffe 2 it is so held.

§ 1261. Second journey on same train.

Although a single journey is treated as an entirety, it does not necessarily follow because a person goes beyond his first destination on the same train that there may not really be two separate journeys.3 If the train waits long enough at the intermediate station, the passenger may complete the object of his first journey and undertake another quite independent journey on the same train.1 Thus where the defendant bought a ticket from M to F, intending to remain at F long enough to transact some business there and then go on to X; and the train waited at F forty minutes, which proved to be long enough for the defendant to transact his business, and he therefore took the same train for X, he was held not to be guilty of rebooking at an intermediate station while upon the same journey.

§ 1262. No separate charge for a part of the transit.

By the general principle governing this matter, the carrier, it seems, cannot divide up his route so as to make

v. Hill, 110 Tenn. 396, 75 S. W. 963 (1903).

1 Davies v. Williamson, 21 New So. Wales L. R. (Law), 124 (1899). 22 K. B. 32 (1903).

3 Louisville & N. R. R. Co. v. Breckinridge, 99 Ky. 1, 34 S. W. 702 (1896).

Flannery v. Hastings, 15 Austral. L. T. 1 (1893).

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