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discharge bankrupts and set aside discharges and reinstate the cases; (13) enforce obedience by bankrupts, officers, and other persons to all lawful orders, by fine or imprisonment or fine and imprisonment; (14) extradite bankrupts from their respective districts to other districts; (15) make such orders, issue such process, and enter such judgments in addition to those specifically provided for as may be necessary for the enforcement of the provisions of this Act; (16) punish persons for contempts committed before referees; (17) pursuant to the recommendation of creditors, or when they neglect to recommend the appointment of trustees, appoint trustees, and upon complaints of creditors, remove trustees for cause upon hearings and after notices to them; (18) tax costs, whenever they are allowed by law, and render judgments therefor against the unsuccessful party, or the successful party for cause, or in part against each of the parties, and against estates, in proceedings in bankruptcy; and (19) transfer cases to other courts of bankruptcy.

Nothing in this section contained shall be construed to deprive. a court of bankruptcy of any power it would possess were certain specific powers not herein enumerated.

Under the act of 1867 which contained the word "residing "1 there was a decision that the debtor's residence was where he did business, though his family lived elsewhere and he lived with them a part of the time.2 Under the present act a person who resides in one district and has his principal place of business in another may file his petition or be proceeded against in either place. If he does business in two dis

1 Act of 1867, § 11, 14 Stats. 521, R. S. § 5014.

2 Re Watson, 4 N. B. R. 613, Fed. Cas. No. 17,272.

tricts the petition must be filed where his principal place of business is. Residence and domicile are equivalent expressions probably.1

The provision that the court shall have jurisdiction where the debtor has been for the next preceding six months or the greater portion thereof is substantially the same as the corresponding provision of the law of 1867, under which it was held that the debtor need not have resided within the United States for six months, but that he should apply in the district where he had been longest.2

There is a new provision in this clause giving the court power over bankrupts who have no residence or place of business within the United States but have property here. This would apply to aliens. They were held subject to bankruptcy proceedings under English laws.3 The terms of the provision are broad enough to cover aliens who had never been in the United States but it is contrary to principles of international law to declare such persons bankrupt. If the alien had been within the United States and committed an act of bankruptcy there the case would be different,5 because the United States may make such laws as it pleases for any person subject to its jurisdiction. But if the act of bankruptcy were committed elsewhere, the fact that at some previous time he had been in the United States would make no difference, as he was not subject to the jurisdiction when he committed the act.

Under the bankrupt laws of 1841 and 1867, a person might file a petition to be declared a bankrupt where he resided or had a place of business. It was held that he must have a fixed place of business and it was not enough to show merely that he was engaged in business. It was no objection, however, that the bankrupt was acting as agent.8

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The courts are given power to adjudge persons bankrupt who have been declared so abroad. This is a new provision which was probably inserted to enable the court to act in aid of foreign bankruptcies. The rights of creditors who have proved in the foreign bankruptcy is regulated by § 65 of the act.

The subject of reconsidering claims which have been allowed is contained in § 57 k of the act. The method of procedure is laid down by Rule XXI. (6). See infra, § 519.

Clause 3 gives the court power to appoint a receiver or a marshal to take charge of the bankrupt's property before the trustee is qualified. This covers different ground than do §3e and § 69. The former section relates to an application by a petitioning creditor to hold the property until the petition is heard. The latter has a similar object in view. In neither case has the court power over the property after the hearing of the petition and in both cases the petitioner must file a bond. Under the clause we are now considering the court may act on the application of any party in interest without requiring a bond and the property may be held after the debtor is adjudged a bankrupt until the trustee is qualified. The fact that no bond is required suggests a way in which an enterprising petitioning creditor by an arrangement with another. creditor not a petitioner may have the bankrupt's property taken possession of by order of the court without the necessity of giving a bond. It has been held that the court may appoint a receiver on its own motion,2 but this may be doubted, as the terms of clause 3 seem to require an application.3

The act of May 28, 1896, c. 252, § 204 forbade the appointment as a receiver of the marshal or any of the other federal officers therein enumerated. It may be a question how far this law has been changed by clauses 3 and 5. It seems to have been assumed by Judge Speer in the United States District Court for Georgia that a marshal could not be appointed a

1 See Re Gutwillig, 90 Fed. Rep. 475, ib. 481, affirmed 92 Fed. Rep. 337; Re Abrahamson, 1 N. B. N. 23; Rautman v. Hopkins, 1 N. B. N. 41; Re Etheridge Furniture Co., 92 Fed. Rep.

329.

2 Re Abrahamson, 1 N. B. N. 23.

3 See Re Gutwillig, 90 Fed. Rep. 475, ib. 481, affirmed 92 Fed. Rep. 337.

4 29 Stats. 184.

receiver.1 The act of 1896 would certainly not prevent a marshal's taking possession of the estate and since by clause 5 the court is expressly given power to appoint a marshal to carry on the bankrupt's business for a limited time, it would seem the intention of Congress to modify the act of 1896 as far as it applied to marshals. The other federal officers mentioned in that act are undoubtedly disqualified from acting as receivers. The circuit courts are given concurrent jurisdiction of offences.2

Clause 7 gives the district court power over controversies between trustees and adverse claimants in certain cases. Such controversies can only be determined by a regular suit and can not be settled by summary proceeding.*

Under clause 13 the court would have power to enforce all orders necessary to the administration of the affairs of the bankrupt, as for instance an order to the bankrupt to give possession of real estate to a purchaser from the trustee.5

Under the bankrupt acts of 1841 and of 1867, the district courts could in certain cases enjoin further proceedings in the courts of a State. They will have the same power under this act, and the Supreme Court has provided that the judge shall hear an application for such an injunction. But the power to enjoin State courts exists only in the cases provided by the bankrupt act. By virtue of § 11 a the court can restrain a suit pending in a State court, and by virtue of the clause now under consideration it can restrain proceedings under authority of a State court which would interfere with the operation of the bankrupt act.9 Thus a court of bankruptcy will restrain

1 Re Steinheimer, 1 N. B. N. 21.
2 Act of 1898, § 23 c.
3 See infra, § 486.

4 Re Fowler, 1 N. B. N. 215; Re Buntrock Clothing Co., 92 Fed. Rep. 886, 1 N. B. N. 228; Smith v. Mason, 14 Wall. 419; Stickney v. Wilt, 23 Wall. 150; Marshall v. Knox, 16 Wall. 551; Milner v. Meek, 95 U. S. 252; Sargent v. Helton, 115 U. S. 348.

5 Re Burgoyne, 8 Morrell, 139.

6 Ex parte Christy, 3 How. 292;

Haines v. Carpenter, 91 U. S. 254; Dial
v. Reynolds, 96 U. S. 340; Ex parte
Schwab, 98 U. S. 240; Chapman v.
Brewer, 114 U. S. 158.
7 Rule XII. (3).

8 See cases cited in note 6.

9 Blake v. Francis-Valentine Co., 89 Fed. Rep. 691; Re Gutwillig, 90 Fed. Rep. 475, 481, affirmed 92 Fed. Rep. 337; Rautman v. Hopkins, 1 N. B. N. 41; Re Kletchka. 92 Fed. Rep. 901; Re Nathan, 92 Fed. Rep. 590.

proceedings under a voluntary assignment for creditors,1 or foreclosure suits by mortgagees.2

This right does not exist except as an incident to bankruptcy proceedings.3

It is the better practice if a third person is to be enjoined to file a petition or short bill in equity making him a party. But the injunction may be granted in a summary way without the necessity of bringing a formal suit in equity.5

The bankrupt act leaves it doubtful whether the court could refuse to approve a trustee who had been appointed by the creditors under § 44. The Supreme Court Rules provide that the trustee's appointment is subject to be approved or disapproved by the judge or referee. The judge alone can remove. The Rules also provide that no trustee shall be appointed to act in classes of cases 7 and that when there are no assets no trustee need be appointed if no creditor appears at the first meeting.8 The reasons for refusing approval of a trustee are usually that they are supposed to be too friendly to the debtor or that their interests are adverse to those of the creditors.9

In England a trustee will not be confirmed if his personal interests are such that it will be difficult for him to act impartially.10

Ordinarily the trustee will be appointed by the creditors. In such a case the creditors will subscribe his letter of appointment and the referee will approve it in writing." If the creditors do not appoint a trustee the referee will do so.

12

A creditor desiring the removal of a trustee must file a petition stating the reasons.13 Notice must be given to the trustee of the hearing on the petition and the reasons for removal stated

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