But against this it is objected*. That the instance of the antipodes does not argue any special ignorance in these learned men; or that they had less skill in such human arts than others; since Aristotle himself, and Pliny, did deny this as well as they.

I answer:

1. If they did, yet this does make more to the present purpose: for if such great scholars, who were so eminent for their knowledge in natural things, might yet notwithstanding be grossly mistaken in such matters as are now evident and certain, why then we have no reason to depend upon their assertions or authorities, as if they were infallible.

2. Though these great naturalists, for want of some experience, were mistaken in that opinion, whilst they thought no place was habitable but the temperate zones: yet it cannot be from hence inferred that they denied the possibility of antipodes; since these are such inhabitants as live opposite unto us in the other temperate zone: and it were an absurd thing to imagine that those who lived in different zones, can be antipodes to one another; and argues that a man did not understand, or else had forgotten that common distinction in geography, wherein the relation of the world's inhabitants unto one another are reckoned up under these three heads; antaci, periæci, and antipodes. But to let this pass: it is certain, that some of the fathers did deny the being of any such, upon other more absurd grounds. Now if s.ch as Chrysostom, Lactantius, &c. who were noted for great scholars; and such too as flourished in these latter times, when all human learning was more generally professed, should notwithstanding be so much mistaken in so obvious a matter: why then may we not think that those primitive saints, who were the penmen of scripture, and eminent above others in their time for holiness and knowledge; might yet be utterly ignorant of many philosophical truths, which are commonly known in these

* Alex. Ross. 1. 1. sect. c. 8.

days? It is probable, that the Holy Ghost did inform them only with the knowledge of those things whereof they were to be the penmen, and that they were not better skilled in points of philosophy than others. There were indeed some of them who were supernaturally endowed with human learning; yet this was, because they might thereby be fitted for some particular ends, which all the rest were not`appointed unto: thus Solomon was strangely gifted with all kind of knowledge, in a great measure; because he was to teach us by his own experience the extreme vanity of it, that we might not so settle our desires upon it, as if it were able to yield us contentment*. So too the apostles were extraordinarily inspired with the knowledge of languages, because they were to preach unto all nations. But it will not hence follow, that therefore the other holy penmen were greater scholars than others. It is likely that Job had as much human learning as most of them, because his book is more especially remarkable for lofty expressions, and discourses of nature; and yet it is not likely that he was -acquainted with all those mysteries which later ages have discovered; because when God would convince him of his own folly and ignorance, he proposes to him such questions, as being altogether unanswerable; which notwithstanding, any ordinary philosopher in these days might have resolved. As you may sce at large in the thirty-eighth chapter of that book.

The occasion was this: Jobt having before desired that he might dispute with the Almighty concerning the uprightness of his own ways, and the unreasonableness of those afflictions which he underwent, does at length obtain his desire in this kind; and God vouchsafes, in this thirtyeighth chapter, to argue the case with him. Where he does shew Job how unfit he was to judge of the ways of providence, in disposing of blessings and afflictions; when as he was so ignorant in ordinary matters, being not able to discern the reason of natural and common events. As why

the sea should be so bounded from overflowing the land* ? What is the breadth of the earth? What is the reason of the snow or hailt? What was the cause of the rain or dew, of ice and frost, and the like ? By which questions, it seems, Job was so utterly puzzled, that he is fain afterwards to humble himself in this acknowledgment: I have uttered that I understood not, things too wonderful for me, which I knew not. Wherefore I abhor myself, and repent in dust and ashes §.

So that it is likely these holy men had not these human arts by any special inspiration, but by instruction and study, and other ordinary means; and therefore Moses his skill in this kind is called the learning of the Egyptians. Now, because in those times all sciences were taught only in a rude and imperfect manner; therefore it is likely that they also had but a dark and confused apprehension of things, and were liable to the common errors. And for this reason is it, why Tostatus** (speaking of Joshua's bidding the moon stand still as well as the sun) says, Quod forte erat imperitus circa astrorum doctrinam, sentiens ut vulgares sentiunt: that perhaps he was unskilful in astronomy, having the same gross conceit of the heavens, as the vulgar had. From all which it may be inferred, that the ignorance of such good men and great scholars concerning these philosophical points, can be no sufficient reason, why after examination we should deny them, or doubt of their truth.

3. It is considerable, that in the rudiments and first beginnings of astronomy, and so in several ages after, this opinion hath found many patrons, and those too men of eminent note and learning. Such was more especially Pythagoras, who was generally and highly esteemed for his divine wit, and rare inventions; under whose mysterious sayings, there be many excellent truths to be discovered. But against his testimony, it is again objected††; if Pytha

* Ver. 8, 10, 11. + Ver. 18.

§ Cap. xlii. ver. 3, 6.

** Josh. c. 10. Quæst. 19.

‡ Ver. 22. ¶Acts vii. 22.

Ver. 28, 29.

tt Alex. Ros. I. 2. sect. 2. c. 10.

goras were of this opinion, yet his authority should not be of any credit, because he was the author of many other monstrous absurdities.

To this I answer; if a man's error in some particulars should take away his credit for every thing else, this would abolish the force of all human authority; for humanum est errare. Secondly, it is probable that many of Pythagoras's sayings which seem so absurd, are not to be understood according to their letter, but in a mystical sense.

2. But he objects again, that Pythagoras was not of this opinion; and that for two reasons; first, because no ancient author that he had read-ascribes it unto him. Secondly, it is contradictory to his other opinions, concerning the harmony that was made by the motion of the heavens; which could not consist with this other of the earth's motion.

To the first I answer; the objector could not chuse but know that this assertion is by many ancient authors ascribed to that sect whereof Pythagoras was the chief. He might have seen it expressly in Aristotle* himself. Or de ПIUDαYOQELOR λεγουσιν επι μεν του μεσω πυρ είναι, την τε γην εν του αστραν ουσαν κυκλῳ φερομένην περι μεσιν, νυκτα τε και ἱμεραν ποιειν.

In which the philosopher does compendiously reckon up the three chief particulars implied in the opinion of the Pythagoreans. First, the sun's being in the centre of the world. Secondly, the earth's annual motion about it, as being one of the planets. Thirdly, its diurnal revolution, whereby it caused day and night.

To his second reason I answer; first, that Pythagoras thought the earth to be one of the planets (as appears by Aristotle's testimony concerning him) and to move amongst the rest. So that his opinion concerning the motion of the heavens is not inconsistent with that of the earth. Secondly, but as for the celestial harmony, he might perhaps under this mystical expression, according to his usual custom, shadow forth unto us that mutual proportion and harmonical consent, which he did conceive in the several big

*De Cælo, 1. 2. c. 13.

ness, distance, motions of the orbs. So that notwithstand ing these objections, it is evident that Pythagoras was of this opinion, and that his authority may add somewhat for the confirmation of it. Unto him assented Aristarchus Samius*, who flourished about 280 years before the birth of our Saviour; and was by reason of this opinion, arraigned for profaneness and sacrilege by the Areopagites; because he had blasphemed the deity of Vesta, affirming the earth to move. To them agreed Philolaus, Heraclides, Pontius, Nicetas, Syracusanus, Ecphantus, Lucippus, and Plato himself (as some think.) So likewise Numa Pompilius, as Plutarch relates it in his life; who in reference to this opinion, built the temple of Vesta round, like the universe; in the middle of it was placed the perpetual vestal fire; by which he did represent the sun in the centre of the world. All these men were in their several times of special note, as well for their extraordinary learning, as for this opinion.

4. It is considerable, that since this science of astronomy hath been raised to any perfection, there have been many of the best skill in it, that have assented unto that assertion which is here defended. Amongst whom was the cardinal Cusanust, but more especially Copernicus, who was a man very exact and diligent in these studies for above thirty years together, from the year 1500 to 1530, and upwards; and since him, most of the best astronomers have been of this side. So that now there is scarce any of note and skill, who are not Copernicus's followers; and if we should go to most voices, this opinion would carry it from any other. It would be too tedious to reckon up the names of those that may be cited for it; I will only mention some of the chief; such were Joachinus Rheticus, an elegant writer; Christopherus Rothman; Mestlin, a man very eminent for his singular skill in this science; who though at the first he were a follower of Ptolemy, yet upon his second and more exact thoughts, he concluded Copernicus to be in the right; and that the usual hypothesis, præscriptione potius quam

* Archimedes de arænæ numero. † De doct. ignor. 1. 2.