than the agents of the military power, to assist it in preserving order in the conquered territory and to protect the inhabitants in their property and persons while it was occupied by the American arms. They were subject to the military power, and their decisions under its control, whenever the commanding officer thought proper to interfere. They were not courts of the United States, and had no right to adjudicate upon a question of prize or no prize, and the sentence of condemnation in the court at Monterey is a nullity, and can have no effect upon the rights of any party.

As a general rule it is the duty of the captor to bring it within the jurisdiction of a prize court of the nation to which he belongs and to institute proceedings to have it condemned. This is required by the act of Congress in cases of capture of ships of war of the United States; and this act merely enforces the performance of a duty imposed upon the captor by the law of nations, which in all civilized countries secures to. the captured a trial in a court of competent jurisdiction before he can finally be deprived of his property.

But there are cases where, from existing circumstances, the captor may be excused from this duty, and may sell or otherwise dispose of the property before condemnation; and where the commander of a national ship cannot, without weakening inconveniently the force under his command, spare a sufficient prize crew to man the captured vessel, or where the orders of his government prohibit him from doing so, he may lawfully sell or otherwise dispose of the captured property in a foreign country, and may afterwards proceed to adjudication in a court of the United States.

But if no sufficient cause is shown to justify the sale, and the conduct of the captor has been unjust and oppressive, the court may refuse to adjudicate upon the validity of the capture and award restitution and damages against the captor, although the seizure as prize was originally lawful or made upon probable cause. (13 Howard, U. S. Supreme Court Reports, 498.)

Opinions of writers on destruction of prize. The opinions of writers upon international law show considerable diversity in statement.

Kent says:

Sometimes circumstances will not permit property captured at sea to be sent into port; and the captor, in such cases, may either destroy it or permit the original owner to ransom it. (Abdy's Kent, International Law, p. 276.)

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Kleen enumerates the generally claimed grounds of destruction of seized vessels and comments thereon:

1°. Que le navire soit si délabré, ou marche si mal par suite du mauvais temps, qu'il ne puisse être tenu à flot ou remorqué; 2°. Que, devant l'approche d'un vaisseau de guerre ennemi, le navire puisse être pris par celui-ci, ou empêché de l'éviter ou de lui cacher les opérations; 3°. Que le capteur manque de l'équipage nécessaire pour amariner le navire; 4°. Que le port soit bloqué ou trop éloigné, ou que le navire ait trop peu de valeur pour y être mené; 5°. Que le capteur, étant pressé, n'ait pas de loisir de s'occuper du navire.

Aucun de ces prétextes ne soutient un examen sérieux. Le fait qu'un capteur voit dans les événements naturels, dans des risques pour lui-même, dans le manque d'équipage ou dans d'autres inconvénients pratiques, un obstacle à opérer telle saisie, peut bien constituer pour lui-ainsi qu'il a été généralement remarqué surtout en ce qui concerne des prises neutres-un motif de l'omettre, mais non pas un motif de commettre une violation du droit d'un neutre ou un acte de piraterie. La destruction d'une propriété neutre n'est jamais une "nécessité de la guerre," car le belligérant ne se défend pas par cela contre son ennemi. D'ailleurs le droit de la guerre repose tout entier sur la force comme seul titre juridique, condition sine quâ non. Le croiseur qui ne dispose pas de la force requise-soit en armement, en équipage, etc.-pour pouvoir remplir toutes les conditions d'une saisie légale (protection contre l'ennemi, amarinage, conduite au port, direction, etc.), n'est plus un capteur compétent. Comment un acte remplaçant la saisie pourrait-il être un titre d'appropriation, alors que la saisie elle-même ne l'est pas? Le croiseur qui, en pleine mer, détruit de la propriété privée non encore jugée et dont partant aucune preuve formelle n'a encore rendu manifeste le charactère ennemi ou coupable, s'arroge les attributions d'un juge, qualité qui ne lui revient pas.

Sur ces fondements et d'autres semblables, la défense absolue de détruire sur mer des prises neutres est à peu unanime: une telle destruction est partout qualifiée de criminelle. L'interdiction se recontre déjà pendant les guerres maritimes de la Revolution française alors que tant d'autres violations des droits des neutres furent pourtant tolérées-par la règle qu'une destruction pareille ne peut jamais être légitimée, tout au plus peut-elle être excusée en cas de force majeure, et encore dans ce cas, l'État du capteur doit réparation pleine et entière aux lésés. Depuis lors, la défense contre ces sortes de destructions est devenue sévère. (2 La Neutralité, p. 531.)

Lawrence makes a clear distinction between the destruction of neutral and the destruction of belligerent property.

Meanwhile it is necessary to point out that a broad line of distinction must be drawn between the destruction of enemy property and the destruction of neutral property. The former has changed owners directly the capture is effected, and it matters little to the enemy subject who has lost it whether it goes to the bottom of the sea or is divided by public authority among those who have deprived him of it. But the latter does not belong to the captors till a properly constituted court has decided that their seizure of it was good in international law, and its owners have a right to insist that an adjudication upon their claim shall precede any further dealings with it. If this right of theirs is disregarded, a claim for satisfaction and indemnity may be put in by their government. It is far better for a naval officer to release a ship or goods as to which he is doubtful than to risk personal punishment and international complications by destroying innocent neutral property. Even where what is believed to be enemy property is concerned, and destruction or release become the only possible alternatives, it would perhaps be wise to adopt the latter unless the hostile nationality of the vessel and ownership of the cargo are too clearly established to admit of mistake. But the necessity of rapid movement in modern naval warfare, combined with the fact that neutral ports will in most cases be closed to prizes, is almost certain to result in an increase of the practice of destruction, unless the nations will consent to take a further step forward and prohibit the capture of private property unless it be contraband of war. (Principles of International Law, p. 406, § 215.)

Pradier-Fodéré says, after considering the generally enumerated grounds for the destruction of enemy private vessels

En résumé la pratique internationale autorise, à titre exceptionel, les capteurs à détruire les navires ennemi qu'ils ont capturés, et la doctrine admet cette destruction dans les cas de nécessité absolue, dans les circonstances de force majeure, tout en reconnaissant, avec raison, que l'annéántissement d'un navire de

commerce désarmé et conséquemment n'opposant aucune résistance, est un acte qui excite l'horreur. On considère qu'une pareille pratique est une aggravation des désastres inséparables des hostilités dirigées contre la propriété privée, mais on la tolère comme une nécessité fatale qui peut s'imposer parfois, et dont il faut se garder de faire abus, car indépendamment de l'atrocité morale d'un semblable holocauste offert à l'intérêt des

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armes, l'anéantissement de vaisseaux et de cargaisons sur une vaste échelle serait, au point de vue économique, suivant l'observation très juste de de Boeck, un fait déplorable, dont le monde civilisé subirait le contre-coup, et qui fait reculer l'humanité aux plus mauvais jours de son histoire, avec la circonstance aggravante que les ruines accumulées par ce systéme de destruction dépasseraient aujourd'hui tout ce que les temps anciens peuvent offrir, étant donné le developpement du commerce international et la puissance et la rapidité dont sont désormais doués les vaisseaux de guerre. (8 Droit International Public, p. 659, §3185.)

Risley states his opinion as follows:

Where both ship and cargo have a hostile character her destruction is not a harsh measure, for the captor only destroys what would otherwise become his own property. In two wars destruction has been adopted as a deliberate policy-by the United States against Great Britain in 1812-1814, and by the Confederate States in the American civil war. In the latter case all the Confederate ports were blockaded, and they could not have sent in prizes if they had wanted to.

But where the cargo, or a portion of it, is neutral property, destruction can only be justified in exceptional cases, on the ground of military necessity, if the Declaration of Paris has any binding value. It is impossible to reconcile a policy of systematic destruction applied to neutral cargoes with the provision of the Declaration of Paris protecting neutral goods in enemy ships, except contraband. (The Law of War, p. 149.)

Sir Robert Phillimore says:

If a neutral ship be destroyed by a captor, either wantonly or under alleged necessity, in which she herself was not directly involved, the captor, or his Government, is responsible for the spoliation. The gravest importance of such an act to the public service of the captor's own State will not justify its commission. The neutral is entitled to full restitution in value. (International Law, III, CCXXXIII.)

Oppenheim, in his recent work, says of the destruction of neutral prizes:

That as a rule captured neutral vessels may not be sunk, burned, or otherwise destroyed is as universally recognized as that captured enemy merchantmen may not as a rule be destroyed. But whereas, as shown above in $194, the destruction of captured enemy merchantmen before a verdict is obtained against them is, in exceptional cases, lawful, it is a moot question whether the destruction of captured neutral vessels is likewise exceptionally allowed instead of bringing them before a prize court.

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British practice does not, as regards the neutral owner of the vessel, hold the captor justified in destroying the vessel, however exceptional the case may be, and however meritorious the destruction of the vessel may be from the point of view of the government of the captor. For this reason, should a captor, for any reason whatever, have destroyed a neutral prize, full indemnities are to be paid to the owner, although, if brought into a port of a prize court, condemnation of vessel and cargo would have been pronounced beyond doubt. The rule is, that a neutral prize must be abandoned in case it cannot, for any reason whatever, be brought into a port of a prize court. (2 International Law, 469, sec. 431.)

In Atlay's edition of Wheaton's International Law is the following opinion:

If the prize is a neutral ship, no circumstances will justify her destruction before condemnation. The only proper reparation to the neutral is to pay him the full value of the property destroyed. Neutral cargoes are not always equally privileged. In 1870, the Desaix, a French cruiser, captured two German vessels, the Ludwig and the Vorwaerts, and burnt them on the day of capture. Part of the cargo of these vessels belonged to neutral owners (British subjects), and was therefore under the express protection of the third article of the Declaration of Paris. The owners claimed compensation for the destruction of their goods, but the Conseil d'État, in a judgment delivered by the President, of the French Republic, held that though the Declaration of Paris exempts the goods of a neutral on board an enemy's ship from confiscation, and entitles the owner to their proceeds in case of a sale, yet it gives him no claim for damage resulting from the lawful capture of the ship or from any subsequent and justifiable proceedings of the captors. As the destruction of the two vessels was held to have been necessary under the circumstances, no compensation was awarded to the owners of the neutral cargo. (P. 507, sec. 359e.)

The destruction of an enemy merchant vessel seized at sea is doubtless the easiest disposition of such a vessel. It has been argued that when such a vessel would surely be condemned by a prize court, it would be lost to the enemy owner in any case, and its destruction at sea would be no greater loss to the enemy owner, while the enemy destroying the vessel would not profit by the action as when the vessel is taken into port and regularly condemned and forfeited. It is thus argued that relatively it would be an advantage to the enemy owner's state that the vessel