have involved property rights, salvage and other service, collisions, and in general such matters as could properly be subject to national court jurisdiction.

Property rights against a foreign war vessel.-In 1812 Chief Justice Marshall delivered the opinion in the celebrated case of the Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon. This case involved the very delicate and important inquiry, whether an American citizen can assert, in an American court, property rights against a foreign national vessel. The learned Chief Justice laid down the fundamental principle

The jurisdiction of the courts is a branch of that possessed by the nation as an independent sovereign power.

The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself. Any restrictions upon it, deriving validity from an external source, would imply a diminution of its sovereignty to the extent of the restriction, and an investment of that sovereignty to the same extent in that power which could impose such restriction.

All exceptions, therefore, to the full and complete power of a nation within its own territories must be traced up to the consent of the nation itself. They can flow from no other legitimate

source.

The consent may be either express or implied. In the latter case it is less determinate, exposed more to the uncertainties of construction, but, if understood, not less obligatory.

The world being composed of distinct sovereignties, possessing equal rights and equal independence, whose mutual benefit is promoted by intercourse with each other, and by an intrechange of those good offices which humanity dictates and its wants require, all sovereigns have consented to a relaxation in practice, in cases under certain peculiar circumstances, of that absolute and complete jurisdiction within their respective territories which sovereignty confers.

After a full discussion of various forms of immunity, the decision continues:

It seems, then, to the court to be a principle of public law, that national ships of war, entering the port of a friendly power open for their reception, are to be considered as exempted by the consent of that power from its jurisdiction.

Without doubt the sovereign of the place is capable of destroying this implication. He may claim and exercise jurisdiction either by employing force or by subjecting such vessels to the or

SALVAGE AND FOREIGN WAR VESSELS.

25

dinary tribunals. But until such power be exerted in a manner not to be misunderstood, the sovereign cannot be considered as having imparted to the ordinary tribunals a jurisdiction which it would be a breach of faith to exercise. Those general statutory provisions, therefore, which are descriptive of the ordinary jurisdiction of the judicial tribunals, which give an individual, whose property has been wrested from him, a right to claim that property in the courts of the country in which it is found, ought not, in the opinion of this court, to be so construed as to give them jurisdiction in a case in which the sovereign power has impliedly consented to waive its jurisdiction.

The arguments in favor of this opinion which have been drawn from the general inability of the judicial power to enforce its decisions in cases of this description, from the consideration that the sovereign power of the nation is alone competent to avenge wrongs committed by a sovereign, that the questions to which such wrongs give birth are rather questions of policy than of law, that they are for diplomatic rather than legal discussion, are of great weight, and merit serious attention. (7 Cranch, U. S. Supreme Court Reports, 116.)

Salvage and foreign war vessels.-Sir William Scott, in 1820, in a suit for salvage against the Prins Frederik, said:

I think that the first application for a recompense in the nature of salvage, ought, in the case of a ship of war belonging to a for eign state, to have been made to the representative of that state resident in this country. In the present case no doubt can be entertained that just attention would have been paid to the application, and due care taken, after proper information obtained, to have answered the claim in some form or other, as substantial justice might seem to require; for it is not reasonable to suppose that private individuals in this country should go unrewarded for services rendered to ships of foreign governments when they would have been liberally rewarded for similar services performed for such ships belonging to their own. (2 Dodson's Admiralty Reports, 451, 484.)

In the case of the United States frigate Constitution, carrying machinery, etc., from the Paris Exposition, stranded on Ballard Point, England, in 1879, and against which suit was brought for salvage by owner of steam tug which pulled Constitution off, Sir Robert Phillimore said:

There is no doubt as to the general proposition that ships of war belonging to a nation with whom this country is at peace

are exempt from the civil jurisdiction of this country. I have listened in vain for any peculiar circumstances to take this case out of that general proposition. It has happened to me more than once, since I have had the honour of sitting in this chair, to have been requested by foreign states to sit as arbitrator and to make an award in cases-one of collision and two of salvage. If a similar request had been made to the court in this case, I would gladly have undertaken the duty sought to be imposed upon it; but I have now only to consider whether there is any authority for the proposition that when a foreign state refuses to waive the privilege which it possesses it is competent to this court, nevertheless, to treat it as an individual and serve civil process on its property. I am clearly of the opinion that it would be very wrong and improper in me to assent to this application on the part of the owner of the steam tug. (4 Law Reports, Probate Division, 39.)

This decision denies the right of a British citizen to compel payment by a public vessel for services rendered when the vessel was in great need.

Military supplies belonging to a foreign sovereign.— In the case of Vavasseur v. Krupp the question of jurisdiction over the property of a foreign sovereign was raised. The foreign sovereign involved was the Emperor of Japan. The case was brought in England and is summarized as follows:

A foreign sovereign bought in Germany shells made there, but said to be infringements of an English patent. They were brought to this country in order to be put on board a ship of war belonging to the foreign sovereign, and the patentee obtained an injunction against the agents of the foreign sovereign and the persons in whose custody the shells were, restraining them from removing the shells. The foreign sovereign then applied to be and was made a defendant to the suit. An order was then made up by the master of the rolls, and approved on appeal, that notwithstanding the injunction he should be at liberty to remove the shells.

In 1877 the British court gave the opinion that property of a foreign sovereign in Great Britain could not be held, saying of the Chancery Division of the High Court of Justice

This court has no jurisdiction, and, in my opinion, none of the courts in this country have any jurisdiction, to interfere with the property of a foreign sovereign, more especially with what we call the public property of the state of which he is soverign as distin

REGULATIONS AS TO WAR VESSELS IN PEACE.

27

guished from that which may be his own private property. The courts have no jurisdiction to do so, not only because there is no jurisdiction as against the individual, but because there is no jurisdiction as against the foreign country whose property they are, although that foreign country is represented, as all foreign countries having a sovereign are represented, by the individual who is the sovereign. (Law Reports, 9 Chancery Division, 351.)

Domestic regulations as to foreign war vessels in time of peace. The attempt to regulate in some detail the entrance and sojourn of foreign public vessels has been made by several states. States having large navies have not generally made many regulations. Public vessels are required to respect police, quarantine, sanitary, fiscal, and harbor regulations.

Article 11 of the Netherlands royal decree of February 2, 1893, provided—

that foreign ships and vessels of war shall respect the existing police, sanitary, and fiscal laws and regulations, and shall further submit to all rules and regulations of the port, in both cases to the same extent as is demanded of the national ships and vessels of war. (2 Moore, International Law Digest, 593.)

Regulations somewhat similar in scope are in force in other states.

In the second volume of Professor Moore's monumental and most valuable work, "A Digest of International Law," there appears a letter from the Secretary of State to the Secretary of the Navy in regard to the attitude of the United States toward such regulations as above mentioned:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the letter from your Department, dated the 9th of August last, inclosing for an expression of this Department's views in the matter a copy of a letter from the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation of the Navy Department, with inclosures, relative to the propriety and feasibility of issuing an order to naval vessels directing that when pilots are not employed local foreign laws requiring the employment of pilots are not to be held to compel the payment of pilotage by public vessels.

In reply I have the honor to say that the laws of some of our States require the payment of pilotage fees when pilots are not employed, and these laws, by their terms, apply to all vessels.

The doctrine of international law is that all vessels are subject to the revenue and police regulations, including those in regard to pilotage, of the territorial waters which such vessels may enter. In the statement of the doctrine no exception is made in favor of public vessels.

In Secretary Chandler's letter of July 12, 1884, inclosed in yours, the statement is made that certain exemptions are allowed by international law to public vessels; and in Secretary Frelinghuysens letter, also inclosed with yours, the same statement is made. No authorities are cited in support of the proposition, while the doctrine above mentioned is stated in Lawrence, International Law, pages 223 and 226; Hall, International Law, page 192; Pradier-Fodéré, International Law, section 2379.

The latter says that "the ports, the roadsteads, the harbors form a dependency of the national public domain, and the ships of foreign nations are under the obligation to observe rigorously the general and special regulations in force in the harbors, roadsteads, and ports."

In view of the foregoing the Department could not advise the adoption of the rule suggested. (Page 583.)

Regulations in regard to the sojourn in time of peace of war vessels of a foreign power within the territorial waters of a given state may be and have been made. The regulations most frequently have regard to police and quarantine.

A royal decree of February 18, 1901, regulates in considerable detail the admission of foreign men-of-war to the harbors of Belgium.

Leopold II, King of the Belgians, to all present and to come, greetings:

Considering that the time is opportune to regulate, in conformity with international law and the obligations of perpetual neutrality, the admission of foreign men-of-war in the waters and harbors of Belgium;

On the proposition of our Ministers of Foreign Affairs, of War, and of Railways, Posts, and Telegraphs,

We have ordered and order:

GENERAL DISPOSITIONS IN TIME OF PEACE.

ARTICLE I. In time of peace war vessels belonging to foreign powers may enter freely Belgian harbors of the North Sea and anchor off said waters within territorial waters, provided that