55 eftimation of men. To fulfil both ends, guilt is placed by the moral fenfe entirely upon will and intention: a man accordingly blames himself for doing mifchief willingly and intentionally, without, once confidering whether he acted neceffarily or not. And his fentiments are adopted by all the the world: they pronounce the fame fentence of condemnation that he himself does. A man put to the torture, yields to the pain, and with bitter reluctance reveals the fecrets of his party: another does the fame, yielding to a tempting bribe. The latter only is blamed as guilty of a crime; and yet the bribe perhaps operated as strongly on the latter, as torture did on the former. But the one was compelled against his will to reveal the fecrets of his party; and therefore is innocent: the other acted willingly, in order to procure a great fum of money; and therefore is guilty.

With refpect to reafon, I obferve, that the argument I am combating is an appeal to a wrong tribunal: the moral fenfe is the only judge in this controverfy, not the faculty of reafon. At the fame time, I fhould have no fear of a sentence against me, were reafon to be the judge. For would not reafon dictate, that the lefs a man wavers about his duty; or, in other words, the lefs influence vicious motives have, the more praifeworthy he is; and the more blameable, the less influence virtuous motives have ?

Nor are we led by common fenfe to differ from reafon and the moral fenfe. A man commits murder, overcome by a fudden fit of revenge which he could not refift; will not one be led to reflect, even at firft view, that the man did not wish to refift? on the contrary that he would have committed the inurder, though he had not been under any neceffity? A perfon of plain underftanding will fay, What fignifies it whether the criminal could refift or not, when he committed the murder wittingly and willingly? A man gives poifon privately out of revenge. Does any one doubt of his guilt, when he never once repented; though after adminiftering the poifon it no longer was in his power to draw back? A man may be guilty and blame-worthy, even where there is external compulfion that he cannot refift. With fword in hand I run to attack an enemy: my foot flip

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Book III. ing, I fall headlong upon him, and by that accident the fword is pushed into his body. The external act was not the effect of Will, but of accident: but my intention was to commit murder, and I am guilty. All men acknowledge, that the Deity is neceffarily good. Does that circumstance detract from his praise in common apprehenfion? On the contrary, he merits from us the highest praise on that very account.

It is commonly faid, that there can be no virtue where there is no ftruggle. Virtue, it is true, is beft known from a struggle: a man who has never met with a temptation, can be little confident of his virtue. But the obfervation taken in a strict senfe is undoubtedly erroneous. A man tempted to betray his truft, wavers; but, after much doubting, refuses at last the bribe. another hefitates not a moment, but rejects the bribe with difdain duty is obftinate, and will not suffer him even to deliberate. Is there no virtue in the latter? Undoubtedly more than in the former.

Upon the whole, it appears that praife and blame reft ultimately upon the difpofition or frame of mind. Nor is it obvious, that a power to act against motives, could vary in any degree thefe moral fentiments. When a man commits a crime, let it be fuppofed, that he could have refifted the prevailing motive. Why then did he not refift, inftead of bringing upon himself fhame and mifery? The answer must be, for no other can be given, that his difpofition is vicious, and that he is a deteftable creature. Further, it is not a little difficult to conceive, how a man can refift a prevailing motive, without having any thing in his mind that should engage him to refift it. But letting that pafs, I make the following fuppofition. A man is tempted by avarice to accept a bribe: if he refift upon the principle of duty, he is led by the prevailing motive; if he refift without having any reafon or motive for refifting, I cannot difcover any merit in fuch refiftance: it feems to refolve into a matter of chance or accident, whether he refift or do not refitt. Where can the merit lie of refifting a vicious motive, when refiftance happens by mere chance? and where the demerit of refifting a virtuous motive, when it is owing to the fame chance? If a man, actuated by

no

no principle, good or bad, and having no end or purpofe in view, fhould kill his neighbour, I fee not that he would be more accountable, than if he had acted in his fleep, or were mad.

Human punishments are perfectly confiftent with the neceffary influence of motives, without fuppofing a power to withstand them. If it be urged, That a man ought not to be punished for committing a crime when he could not refift; the answer is, That as he committed the crime intentionally, and with his eyes open, he is guilty in his own opinion, and in the opinion of all men; and he juftly fuffers punishment, to prevent him or others from doing the like in time to come. dread of punishment is a weight in the scale on the side of virtue, to counterbalance vicious motives.

The

The final cause of this branch of our nature is admirable. If the neceffary influence of motives had the effect either to leffen the merit of a virtuous action, or the demerit of a crime, morality would be totally unhinged. The most virtuous action would of all be the leaft worthy of praife; and the moft vicious be of all the leaft worthy of blame. Nor would the evil ftop there: inftead of curbing inordinate paffions, we should be encouraged to indulge them, as an excellent excufe for doing wrong. Thus, the moral fentiments of approbation and difapprobation, of praife and blame, are found perfectly confiftent with the laws above mentioned that govern human actions, without having recourfe to an imaginary power of acting against motives.

The only plaufible objection I have met with againft the foregoing theory, is the remorfe a man feels for a crime he fuddenly commits, and as fuddenly repents of. During a fit of bitter remorfe for having flain my favourite fervant in a violent paffion, without juft provocation, I accufe myself for having given way to paflion; and acknowledge that I could and ought to have reftrained it. Here we find remorse founded on a fyftem directly opposite to that above laid down; a fyftem that acknowledges no neceffary connection between an action and the motive that produced it; but, on the contrary, fuppofes that it is in a man's power to refift his paffion, and that he ought to refift it. What fhall be faid upon this

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Book III. point? Can a man be a neceffary agent, when he is confcious of the contrary, and is fenfible that he can act in contradiction to motives? This objection is strong in appearance; and would be invincible, were we not happily relieved of it by a doctrine laid down in Elements of Criticism (a) concerning the irregular influence of paffion on our opinions and fentiments. Upon examination it will be found, that the prefent cafe may be added to the many examples there given of this irregular influence. In a peevish fit, I take exception at some flight word or gefture of my friend, which I interpret as if he doubted of my veracity. I am inftantly in a flame: in vain he protefts that he had no meaning, for impatience will not fuffer me to liften. I bid him draw, which he does with reluctance; and before he is well prepared, I give him a mortal wound. Bitter remorfe and anguish fucceed inftantly to rage. "What have I done? why did "I not abstain? I was not mad, and yet I have murder"ed my innocent friend: there is the hand that did "the horrid deed; why did not I rather turn it against

46

my own heart?" Here every impreffion of neceffity vanishes: my mind tells me that I was abfolutely free, and that I ought to have fmothered my paffion. I put an oppofite cafe. A brutal fellow treats me with great indignity, and proceeds even to a blow. My paffion rifes beyond the poffibility of reftraint. I can fcarce forbear fo long as to bid him draw; and that moment I ftab him to the heart. I am forry for having been engaged with a ruffian, but have no contrition nor remorse. In this cafe my fentiments are very different from what they are in the other. I never once dream that I could have refifted the impulse of paffion: on the contrary, my thoughts and words are, "That flesh and blood could not bear the affront; and that I must have been "branded for a coward, had I not done what I did." In reality, both the actions were equally neceffary. Whence then opinions and fentiments fo oppofite to each other? The irregular influence of paffion on our opinions and fentiments, will folve the question. All violent paffions are prone to their own gratification. man affected with deep remorfe abhors himself, and is odious

A

(4) Chap. 2. part 5.

odious in his own eyes; and it gratifies the paffion, to indulge the thought that his guilt is beyond the poffibility of excuse. In the firft cafe accordingly, remorse forces upon me a conviction that I might have reftrained my paffion, and ought to have reftrained it. I will not give way to any excufe; becaufe in a fit of remorfe it gives me pain to be excufed. In the other cafe, there being no remorse, there is no difguife; and things appear in their true light. To illuftrate this reafoning, I obferve, that paflion warps my judgment of the actions of others, as well as of my own. Many examples. are given in the chapter above quoted: join to these the following. My fervant aimed at a patridge, happens to shoot a favourite spaniel croffing the way unfeen. Inflamed with anger, Iftorm at his rafhnefs, pronounce him guilty, and will liften to no excufe. When my paffion is spent, I become fenfible that it was merely accidental, and that the man is abfolutely innocent. The nurfe overlays my only child, the long-expected heir to, a great eftate. It is with difficulty that I refrain from putting her to death: "The wretch has murdered my

infant, and deferves to be torn to pieces." When my paffion fubfides, I fee the matter in a very different light. The poor woman is inconfolable, and can fcarce believe that he is innocent: the bitterly reproaches herfelf for want of care and concern. But, upon cool reflection, both he and I are fenfible, that no perfon in found fleep has any felf-command; and that we cannot be answerable for any action of which we are not confcious. Thus, upon the whole, we find, that any impreffion we may occafionally have of being able to act in contradiction to motives, is the refult of paffion, not of found judgment.

The reader will obferve, that this fection is copied from Effays on Morality and Natural Religion. The ground-work is the fame: the alterations are only in the fuperftructure; and the fubject is abridged in order to adapt it to its prefent place. Part of the abridgment was published in the fecond edition of the Principles of Equity. But as law-books have little currency, the publishing the whole in one effay, will not, I hope, be thought improper. APPEN