the former, peculiar wisdom and forefight are confpicuous. Punishment is appropriated to enforce primary virtues; and if thefe virtues were alfo attended with high rewards, fecondary virtues, degraded to a lower. rank, would be deprived of that enthufiattic admiration which is their chief fupport: felf-intereft would univerfally prevail over benevolence, and banish thofe numberlefs favours we receive from each other in fociety, which are beneficial in point of intereft, and fill more fo by generating affection and friendship. In our progrefs through final caufes we come at last to reparation, one of the principles deftined by Providence for redreffing wrongs committed, and for preventing the reiteration of them. The final caufe of this principle, when the mifchief arifes from intention, is clear for to protect individuals in fociety, it is not fufficient that the delinquent be punished; it is neceffary over and above, that the mischief be repaired. Secondly, Where the act is wrong or unjust, though not understood by the author to be fo, it is wifely ordered that reparation fhould follow; which will thus appear. Confidering the fallibility of man, it would be too fevere to permit advantage to be taken of one's error in every circumftance. On the other hand, to make it a law in our nature, never to take advantage of error, would be giving too much indulgence to indolence and remiffion of mind, tending to make us neglect the improvement of our rational faculties. Our nature is fo happily framed, as to avoid thefe extremes by diftinguishing between gain and lofs. No man is conscious of wrong, when he takes advantage of an error committed by another to fave himself from lofs: if there muft be a lofs, common fenfe dictates, that it ought to reft upon the person who has erred, however innocently, rather than upon the perfon who has not erred. Thus, in a competition among creditors about the estate of their bankrupt debtor, every one is at liberty to avail himself of every error committed by his competitor, in order to recover payment. But in lucro captando, the moral fenfe teacheth a different leffon; which is, that no man ought to lay hold of another's error to make a make gain by it. Thus, an heir finding a rough diamond in the repofitories of his ancestor, gives it away, mistaking it for a common pebble: the purchafer is in confcience and equity bound to reftore, or to pay a juft price. Thirdly, The following confiderations unfold a final caufe, no lefs beautiful than that last mentioned. Society could not fubfift in any tolerable manner, were full scope given to rafhnefs and negligence, and to every action that is not strictly criminal; whence it is a maxim founded no lefs upon utility than upon justice, That men in fociety ought to be extremely circumfpect, as to every action that may poffibly do harın. On the other hand, it is also a maxim, That as the profperity and happiness of man depend on action, activity ought to be encouraged, inftead of being difcouraged by dread of confequences. Thefe maxims, feemingly in oppofition, have natural limits that prevent their encroaching upon each other. There is a certain degree of attention and circumfpection that men generally bestow upon affairs, proportioned to their importance: if that degree were not fufficient to defend againft a claim of reparation, individuals would be too much cramped in action; which would be a great difcouragement to activity: if a lefs degree were fufficient, there would be too great scope for rash or remifs conduct: which would prove the bane of fociety. These limits, which evidently tend to the good of fociety, are adjusted by the moral fenfe; which dictates, as laid down in the section of Reparation, that the man who acts with forefight of the probability of mifchief, or acts rafhly and uncautiously without fuch forefight, ought to be liable for confequences; but that the man who acts cautiously, without foreseeing or fufpecting any mischief, ought not to be liable for confequences. In the fame fection it is laid down, that the moral fenfe requires from every man, not his own degree of vigilance and attention, which may be very fmall, but that which belongs to the common nature of the fpecies. The final caufe of that regulation will appear upon confidering, that were reparation to depend upon perfonal circumftances, there would be a neceflity of enquiring enquiring into the characters of men, their education, their manner of living, and the extent of their underftanding; which would render judges arbitrary, and fuch law-fuits inextricable. But by affuming the common nature of the species as a ftandard, by which every man in confcience judges of his own actions, law-fuits about reparation are rendered eafy and expeditious. LIBERTY and NECESSITY confidered with respect to AVING, in the foregoing fections, afcertained the reality of a moral fenfe, with its fentiments of approbation and difapprobation, praise and blame; the purpose of the prefent fection is, to fhew, that thefe fentiments are consistent with the laws that govern the actions of man as a rational being. In order to which it is firft neceffary to explain these laws; for there has been much controverfy about them, especially among divines of the Arminian and Calvinift fects. Human actions, as laid down in the first section, are of three kinds: one, where we act by instinct, without any view to confequences; one, where we act by will in order to produce fome effect; and one, where we act against will. With respect to the firft, the agent acts blindly, without deliberation or choice; and the external act follows neceffarily from the instinctive impulfe. Actions done with a view to an end, are in a very different condition; in thefe, deliberation, choice, will, * A stonechatter makes its neft on the ground or near it; and the young, as foon as they can shift for themselves, leave the neft instinctively. An egg of that bird was laid in a swallow's neft, fixed to the roof of a church. The fwallow fed all the young equally without diftinction. The young stonechatter left the neft at the ufual time before it could fly; and falling to the ground, it was taken up dead. Here is inflinct in purity, exerting itself blindly without regard to variation of circumftances. The fame is obfervable in our dunghill-fowl. They feed on worms, corn, and other feeds dropt on the ground. In order, to discover their food, nature has provided them with an inftinct to scrape with the foot; and the instinct is fo regularly exercifed, that they scrape even when they are fet upon a heap of corn. Book III. will, enter: the intention to accomplish the end goes first; the will to act in order to accomplish the end is next; and the external act follows of courfe. It is the will then that governs every action done as means to an end; and it is defire to accomplish the end that puts the will in motion; defire in this view being commonly terned the motive to act. Thus, hearing that my friend is in the hands of robbers, I burn with defire to free him defire influences my will to arm my fervants, and to fly to his relief. Actions done against will come in afterward. But what is it that raifes defire? The answer is at hand it is the profpect of attaining fome agreeable end, or of avoiding one that is difagreeable. And if it be again enquired, What makes an object agreeable or difagreeable, the anfwer is equally ready, that our nature makes it fo; and more we cannot fay. Certain vifible objects are agreeable, certain founds, and certain smells: other objects of thefe fenfes are difagreeable. But there we must ftop; for we are far from being fo intimately acquainted with our own nature as to affign the caufes. These hints are fufficient for my prefent purpose: if one be curious to know more, the theory of defire, and of agreeablenefs and difagreeablenefs, will be found in Elements of Criticism (a). With refpect to instinctive actions, no perfon, I prefume, thinks that there is any freedom, more than in acts lone againft will: an infant applies to the nipple, and a bird builds its neft, no less neceffarily than a stone falls to the ground. With refpect to voluntary actions, fuch as are done with a view to an end, the neceffity is the fame, though lefs apparent at firft view. The external action is determined by the will: the will is determined by defire: and defire by what is agreeable or difagreeable. Here is a chain of caufes and effects, not one link of which is arbitrary, or under command of the agent he cannot will but according to his defire: he cannot defire but according to what is agreeable or difagreeable in the objects perceived: nor do thefe qualities depend on his inclination or fancy; he has no power to make a beautiful woman ugly, nor to make a rotten carcafe sweet. (a) Chuis 2. Many 66 Many good men apprehending danger to morality from holding our actions to be neceffary, endeavour to break the chain of causes and effects above mentioned, maintaining, "That whatever influence defire or mo"tives may have, it is the agent himself who is the "cause of every action; that defire may advise, but cannot command; and therefore that a man is still "free to act in contradiction to defire and to the strong"eft motives." That a being may exift, which in every cafe acts blindly and arbitrarily, without having any end in view, I can make a fhift to conceive: but it is difficult for me even to imagine a thinking and rational being, that has affections and paffions, that has a defireable end in view, that can easily accomplish this end; and yet, after all, can fly off, or remain at reft, without any cause, reafon, or motive, to fway it. If fuch a whimsical being can poffibly exift, I am certain that man is not fuch a being. There is perhaps not a perfon above the condition of a changeling, but can fay why he did fo and so, what moved him, what he intended. Nor is a single fact stated to make us believe, that ever a man acted against his own will or defire, who was not compelled by external violence. On the contrary, constant and univerfal experience proves, that human actions are governed by certain inflexible laws; and that a man cannot exert his felf-motive power, but in pursuance of some defire or motive. Had a motive always the fame influence, actions proceeding from it would appear no lefs neceffary than the actions of matter. The various degrees of influence that motives have on different men at the fame time, and on the fame man at different times, occafion a doubt by fuggesting a notion of chance. Some motives however have fuch influence, as to leave no doubt: a timid female has a physical power to throw herself into the mouth of a lion, roaring for food; but he is withheld by terror no iefs effectually than by cords: if she fhould rush upon the lion, would not every one conclude that he was frantic? A man though in a deep fleep, retains a physical power to act, but he cannot exert it. A man, though defperately in love, retains a phyfical power to refuse the hand of his miftrefs; but he canVOL. IV. C not |