on human teftimony, are two without the latter, the former would be an useless principle; and without the former, the latter would lay us open to fraud and treachery. The moral fenfe accordingly dictates, that we ought to adhere ftrictly to truth, without regard to confequences.

It must not be inferred, that we are bound to explain our thoughts, when truth is demanded from us by unlawful means. Words uttered voluntarily, are naturally relied on, as expreffing the fpeaker's mind; and if his mind differ from his words, he tells a lie, and is guilty of deceit. But words drawn from a man by torture, are no indication of his mind; and he is not guilty of deceit in uttering whatever words may be agreeable, however alien from his thoughts: if the author of the unlawful violence fuffer himself to be deceived, he ought to blame himself, not the fpeaker.

It need fcarce be mentioned, that the duty of veracity excludes not fable, nor any liberty of fpeech intended for amufement folely.

Active duties, as hinted above, are all of them directed to particular perfons. And the first I shall mention is, that which fubfifts between a parent and child. The relation of parent and child, the strongest that can exift between individuals, binds these perfons to exert their utmoft powers in mutual good offices. Benevolence arnong other blood-relations, is alfo a duty; but not so indifpenfable, being proportioned to the inferior degree of relation.

Gratitude is a duty directed to the perfon who has been kind to us. But though gratitude is ftrictly a duty, the measure of performance, and the kind, are left moftly to our own choice. It is fcarce neceffary to add, that the active duties now mentioned, are acknowledged by all to be abfolutely inflexible, perhaps more fo than the reftraining duties: many find excufes for doing harm 3 but no one hears with patience an excufe for deviating from truth, friendship, or gratitude.

Diftrels

Dr.

ing phyfic, which is naufeous to the tafte, and which no man takes but for fome end which he cannot otherwife attain. Reid's Enquiry into the human mind,

Dittrefs tends to convert benevolence into a duty. But diftrefs alone is not fufficient, without other concurring circumftances: for to relieve every perfon in diftrefs, is beyond the power of any human being. Our relations in diftrefs claim that duty from us, and even our neighbours: but diftant diftrefs, without a particular connection, fcarce roufes our fympathy, and never is an object of duty. Many other connections, too numerous for this fhort effay, extend the duty of relieving others from diftrefs; and these make a large branch of equity. Though in various inftances, benevolence is thus converted into a duty by distress, it follows not, that the duty is always proportioned to the degree of 'diftrefs. Nature has more wifely provided for the fupport of virtue. A virtuous perfon in diftrefs commands our pity: a vicious perfon in diftrefs has much less influence; and if by vice he have brought on the distress, indignation is raised, not pity (a).

One great advantage of fociety, is the co-operation of many to accomplish fome useful work, where a fingle hand would be infufficient. Arts, manufactures, and commercial dealings, require many hands: but as hands cannot be fecured without a previous engagement, the performance of promifes and covenants, is, upon that account, a capital duty in fociety. In their original occupations of hunting and fishing, men living feattered and difperfed, have feldom opportunity to aid and benefit each other; and in that fituation, covenants being of little ufe, are little regarded: but hufbandry requiring the co-operation of many hands, draws men together for mutual affiftance; and then covenants make a figure arts and commerce make them more and more neceffary; and in a polifhed fociety great regard is paid to them.

But contracts and promifes are not confined to commercial dealings: they serve alfo to make benevolence a duty and are even extended to connect the living with the dead: a man would die with regret, if he thought his friends were not bound by their promises, to fulfil his will after his death! and to quiet the minds of men with refpect to futurity, the moral fenfe makes the performing

(a) See Elements of Criticifm, vol. 1, p. 187. edit. 5.

forming fuch promifes our duty. Thus, if I promife to my friend to erect a monument for him after his death, confcience binds me, even though no perfon alive be entitled to demand performance: every one perceives this to be my duty; and I must expect to fuffer reproach and blame, if I neglect my engagement.

To fulfil a rational promife or covenant, deliberately made, is a duty no lefs inflexible than thofe duties are which arife independent of confent. But as man is fallible, often mifled by ignorance or error, and liable to be deceived, his condition would be deplorable, did the moral fenfe compel him to fulfil every engagement, however imprudent or irrational. Here the moral fenfe gives way to human infirmity: it relieves from deceit, from impofition, from ignorance, from error; and binds a man by no engagement but what answers the end fairly intended.

The other branch of duties, viz. thofe we owe to ourfelves, fhall be difcuffed in a few words. Propriety, a branch of the moral fenfe, regulates our conduct with respect to ourselves; as Justice, another part of the moral fenfe, regulates our conduct with respect to others. Propriety dictates, that we ought to act up to the dignity of our nature, and to the ftation allotted us by Providence: it dictates in particular, that temperance, prudence, modefty, and uniformity of conduct, are felf duties. Thefe duties contribute to private happiness, by preferving health, peace of mind, and self-esteem; which are ineftimable bleffings: they contribute no lefs to happiness in fociety, by gaining the love and efteem of others, and aid and fupport in time of need.

Upon reviewing the foregoing duties respecting others, we find them more or lefs extenfive; but none fo extenfive as to have for their end the good of mankind in general. The most extenfive duty is that of restraint, prohibiting us to harm others: but even that duty has a limited end; for its purpofe is only to protect others from mifchief, not to do them any pofitive good. The active duties of doing pofitive good are circumfcribed within still narrower bounds, requiring fome relation that connects us with others; such as thofe of parent, child, friend, bene

'factor.

factor. The fighter relations, unlefs in peculiar circumflances, are not the foundation of any active duty: neighbourhood, for example, does not alone make benevolence a duty: but fuppofing a neighbour to be in diftrefs, it becomes our duty to relieve him, if it can be done without distress to ourfaves. The duty of relieving from diftrefs, feldom goes farther; for though we always fympathife with our relations, and with thofe under our eye, the diftrefs of perfons remote and unknown affects us very little. Pactions and agreements become neceffary, if we would extend the duty of benevolence, in any particular, beyond the limits mentioned. Men, it is true, are capable of doing more good than is required of them as a duty; but every fuch good must be a free-will offering.

And this leads to arbitrary actions, viz. thofe that may be done or left undone, which make the fecond general head of moral actions. With respect to thefe, the moral fenfe leaves us at freedom: a benevolent act is approved, but the omiffion is not condemned. This holds ftrictly in fingle acts; but in viewing the whole of man's conduct, the moral fenfe appears to vary a little. As the nature of man is complex, partly focial, partly felfish, we have an intuitive perception, that our conduct ought to be conformable to our nature; and that in advancing our own intereft, we ought not altogether to neglect that of others. The man accordingly who confines his whole time and thoughts within his own little fphere, is condemned by all the world as guilwrong conduct; and the man himself, if his moral perceptions be not blunted by felfishness, must be fenfible that he deferves to be condemned. On the other hand, it is poffible that free benevolence may be extended beyond proper bounds. The juft temperament is a fubordination of benevolence to felf-love: but where benevolence prevails, it commonly leads to excefs, by prompting a man to facrifice a great intereft of his own to a fmall intereft of others; and the moral sense dictates, that fuch conduct is wrong.

ty of

Thus, moral actions are divided into two claffes : the firft regards our duty, containing actions that ought to be done and actions that ought not to be done;

the

the other regards arbitrary actions, containing actions that are right when done, but not wrong when left undone. The well-being of fociety depends more on the first class than on the fecond: fociety is indeed promot ed by the latter; but it can scarce fubfift, unless the former be made our duty. Hence it is, that actions only of the first clafs are made indifpenfable; those of the other clafs being left to our free-will. And hence also it is, that the various propenfities that dif pofe us to actions of the firft fort. are diftinguished by the name of primary virtues; leaving the name of secondary virtues to thofe propenfitics which difpofe us to

actions of the other fort *.

The deduction above given makes it evident, that the general tendency of right actions is to promote the good of fociety, and of wrong actions, to obftruct that good. Univerfal benevolence is indeed not required of man; because to put that principle in practice, is beyond his utmoft abilities. But for promoting the general good, every thing is required of him that he can accomplish; which will appear from reviewing the foregoing duties. The prohibition of harming others is an easy talk; and upon that account is made univerfal. Our active duties are very different: man is circumfcribed both in capacity and power: he cannot do good but in a flow fucceffion; and therefore it is wifely ordered, that his obligation to do good fhould be confined to his relations, his friends, his benefactors. Even diftrefs makes not benevolence a general duty; all a man can readily do, is to relieve thofe at hand; and accordingly we hear of diftant miffortunes with little or no concern.

At the fame time, let not the moral fyftem be misap prehended, as if it were our duty, or even lawful, to profecute what upon the whole we reckon the most beneficial to fociety, balancing ill with good. The moral 'fenfe permits not a violation of any perfon's right, however trivial, whatever benefit may thereby accrue to another. A man, for example, in low circumftan

ces,

Virtue fignifies that difpofition of mind which gives the afcendant to moral principles. Vice fignifies that difpofition of mind which gives little or no afcendant to moral principles.