subordinate to it. It is an intention to create an inalienable estate-tail in the first donee, and to invert the rule of interpretation by making the general intention subservient to the particular one." "The rule is too intimately connected with the doctrine of estates to be separated from it, without breaking the ligaments of property." In the case in which this language was used, the question was as to the construction of a grant to a married woman during her natural life, and after her decease to the heirs of her body, and to them and their heirs and assigns; and it was held, under the rule in Shelley's case, to be an estate-tail in the first taker, and, at her decease, to descend to her oldest son as heir at common law. A similar doctrine was maintained in a subsequent case in respect to a devise in very nearly the same terms as in the grant in the one above stated, and the rule is there again affirmed as a part of the law of that State. The rule applies also in Texas 3 and Indiana. In Rhode Island the rule is abolished in case of devises to one for life, and to the children or issue generally of such devisee. Such a devise vests the estate in the first taker for life; and, at his decease, in his children or issue generally. But where the devise is to one for life, and then to the devisee's heirs, the first taker takes a fee under the rule in Shelley's case. If it is to devisee for life, and after his decease to his male heirs, it would create an estate-tail in the first taker, under the same rule. So, where a wife had an estate conveyed to trustees for her sole use during her life, and, in default of appointment at her death, to be conveyed to her heirs at law, under this rule she took an equitable estate in fee-simple, and, in default of appointment at her death, it went to her heirs. But a devise to one for life, and afterwards to his lawful issue, to them and 1 13 Penn. St. 344. 2 George v. Morgan, 16 Penn. St. 95; Paxon v. Lefferts, 8 Rawle, 59; v. M'Michael, 10 S. & R. 429; Kleppner v. Laverty, 70 Penn. St. 73. 3 Hawkins v. Lee, 22 Texas, 547; Hancock v. Butler, 21 Texas, 804. 4 Hull v. Beals, 23 Ind. 28; Siceloff v. Redman, 26 Ind. 251. Carter 5 Bullock v. Waterman St. Soc., 5 R. I. 273, 276; Moore v. Dimond, Ib. 127; Moore v. Weaver, 16 Gray, 307. 6 Cooper v. Cooper, 6 R. I. 264; Manchester v. Durfee, 5 R. I. 549; Jillson v. Wilcox, 7 R. I. 518. Tillinghast v. Coggeshall, 7 R. I. 383. their heirs, was held, under the statute of Rhode Island, to be an estate for life in the first taker, and a remainder in fee in his children when born. By a recurrence to the statutes and decisions of the following States, it will be found that it has been abolished therein as a rule of law.2 Connecticut, Gen. Stat. 1866, p. 537, § 5; 1 Williams v. Angell, 7 R. I. 145. 2 Alabama, Code, 1867, § 1574.Goodrich v. Lambert, 10 Conn. 448. — Kentucky, Rev. Stat. 1852, c. 80, § 10; Williamson v. Williamson, 18 B. Mon. 329. — Maine, Rev. Stat. 1857, c. 73, § 6. - Massachusetts, Gen. Stat. c. 89, § 12, both in deeds and wills; Richardson v. Wheatland, 7 Met. 169, 172. An estate for life vests in the first taker, and a remainder in fee-simple in the heirs. — Michigan, Comp. Laws, 1857, c. 85, § 28. — Minnesota, Comp. Laws, 1859, c. 31, § 28.- Mississippi. The rule seems to be abolished as to lands. Powell v. Brandon, 24 Miss. 343, 366.- Missouri, Gen. Stat. 1866, c. 108, § 6. — New Hampshire. Abolished as to wills. Gen. Stat. 1867, c. 174, § 5; Dennett v. Dennett, 40 N. H. 500.— New Jersey, Stat. tit. 10, c. 2, § 10. The rule extends to devises of lands; Den v. Demarest, 1 N. J. 525. New York, Rev. Stat. 4th ed. pt. 2, tit. 2, art. 1, § 28; Lalor, Real Prop. 96. Those who are heirs of the tenant for life at his death take by such limitation; Moore v. Littel, 40 Barb. 488. Ohio, abolished as to wills. Rev. Stat. 1854, c. 122, § 53. — Tennessee, Code, 1858, § 2008. — Virginia, Code, 1849, c. 116, § 11. Wisconsin, Rev. Stat. 1858, c. 88, § 28. 1. Classification of future uses. 2. Uses limited as remainders. 8. A seisin necessary to sustain uses in way of remainders. 4. Of the seisin where the use is created by covenant to stand seised. 5. Of seisin in case of a use created by feofment. 6. Of Scintilla Juris. 7. Contingent uses, how far like contingent remainders. 8. A resulting freehold will sustain a contingent use. 1. IF the foregoing chapters upon Uses and Remainders have accomplished what was proposed by them, the reader will be prepared to understand the rules which apply to uses which are, by their limitation, to arise or be executed at a period subsequent to their creation. Mr. Sugden divides these into three classes, future or contingent uses, springing uses, and shifting or secondary uses; and to these it has seemed fit to devote a separate chapter in the arrangement of the topics of this work. - 2. The first of these are, properly, uses limited to take effect as remainders;1 for remainders, whether vested or contingent, may be limited by way of use as well as at common law; and, in this country, such is the mode in which they are ordinarily, if not always, limited. This, of course, implies the 1 Gilbert, Uses, Sugd. ed. 152, n.; 1 Prest. Abst. 105. existence of a particular estate upon which the remainder depends, created at the same time and by the same instrument as the remainder, as in case of remainders created at common law. In this respect they differ, as will be shown, from springing uses and executory devises; and courts always give to future contingent estates the character of remainders, wherever the * terms in which they are limited [*277] will admit of such a construction. In the language of Lord Mansfield, "it is perfectly clear and settled, that, where an estate can take effect as a remainder, it shall never be construed to be an executory devise or springing use.' And it is stated by Mr. Sugden, that "it appears now to be well settled, that where an estate is limited previously to a future use, and the future use is limited by the way of remainder, it shall be subject to the rules of common law, and consequently, if the previous estate is not sufficient to support it, shall be void." 1 3. It is hardly necessary to repeat here what these rules. are, except that there is the same necessity of a freehold to precede and sustain a freehold contingent remainder, when limited by the way of use, as there is at common law. There must be in some one a seisin, ready to be executed to the use the moment the use vests by the happening of the contingency, in some known ascertained cestui que use in esse, or the remainder must fail.2 The question whether there is such a seisin, and in whom it is in certain cases, has been previously discussed; and its examination is now resumed for the purpose of illlustrating its bearing upon the subject under consideration. 4. To do this, an instance may be assumed of a contingent remainder limited by either of two different forms of conveyance which derive their validity from the statute of uses, covenant to stand seised, or feofment to use. In the first, it will be remembered, the conveyance takes effect without a trans 1 Goodtitle v. Billington, Dougl. 758; Gilbert, Uses, Sugd. ed. 165, n.; Co. Lit. 217; Adams v. Savage, 2 Ld. Raym. 854; Fearne, Cont. Rem. 284, and Butler's note; 2 Sharsw. Bl. Com. 175, note for American cases; Burt. Real Prop. § 797; 1 Prest. Abst. 108; Wilson, Uses, 47. mutation of possession of the premises conveyed. In the other, such a transmutation takes place. Suppose, then, a person covenants to stand seised to the use of A for life, remainder to his first and other sons in tail, while he has no son, remainder to B in tail, remainder to the cove[*278] nantor in fee. Keeping in mind the rule that there can be no use upon a use, it is not difficult to discover in these limitations all the requisite elements for giving effect to the several estates thereby created. The seisin, being in the covenantór, is in the first place executed in A, the tenant for life to whom the first use is limited; and as B is a known person in esse, the use in him, as a remainder, is vested and executed, whereby both A and B have a legal estate in them by force of the statute, the one in possession, the other in remainder. But as the seisin in A cannot serve the use in the son of A, to whom the contingent remainder by way of use is limited, so as to give him a legal estate in remainder when he shall come in esse, such seisin is to be sought elsewhere, and is found in the covenantor himself, in whom the seisin originally was, and who has the reversion in fee of the legal estate.1 5. To illustrate the application of the principle requiring a seisin to be in some one to serve the use to cases of the creation by way of use of a contingent remainder by a feofment to use, lands were conveyed to one to the use of A for life, remainder to his first and other sons in tail, he then having no son, remainder to B in fee. The use, as in the preceding case, became executed in A and B, and the use to B was a vested remainder for the reasons before stated. But when the question was made as to the seisin which was to support the contingent remainder in the son of A, and to be executed and become, with the use when vested, a legal estate in him, the difficulty was to ascertain the person in whom it was to be found. It was said not to be in the feoffor, for he parted with his seisin when he made the feofment; it was said not to be in the feoffee, because the statute at once took the seisin from him and united it with the use in A; and it could not 1 8 Prest. Conv. 400. |