The highest point in Western wages was $27.84 in 1866, just after "the boys" got home from war service, engaged ambitiously in rural enterprises of all kinds, and sought tofill depleted stocks and supply the strong demand for farm products of every description. The excess above normal wages was nearly the same as in the other sections, not quite 24 per cent. The decline was quite as rapid as elsewhere, aided by great increase of production, the result of the energy and zeal of farmers and laborers and the enlarged use of agricultural implements. In 1869 the average was $26.29, and in 1875 it fell to $23.25, within 4 per cent of the rates since prevailing, though there was still a much larger percentage of currency depreciation.

In the South there was less difference. After resumption of specie payments wages were more uniform than before and the highest rate, $16.65 in 1866, was scarcely 14 per cent higher than that of the later uniform period. At this time cotton was high and the motive for high wages was strong. For a year or more there was little reduction in wages, though the price of cotton was declining. In 1875 the rate was $15.28, within 5 per cent of that of the average of the later period.

What was the reason for this increase of wages in this period following the war? It is not difficult to indicate the causes, but not so easy to assign to each its exact share in the advance. So far as it was due to depreciated currency it was apparent rather than real. All foreign goods were paid for in gold, advancing the currency price by the amount of premium, but the price of many domestic commodities was not so inevitably affected. In the resumption of industrial activities, to some extent their reconstruction, after the upheaval of the war period, the demand for labor became very active and the supply inadequate by reason of the heavy losses of four years in field and camp. This insufficiency of supply would inevitably increase the rate of wages under the pressure of any ordinary demand. To restore the wastes of war, demand for labor arose in all directions in construction, renovation, and development, in production of food and clothing, in railroad building and equipment, in farm and factory, all tending to unusual demand for labor and increase in rate of wages. It will readily be seen that reducing wages to gold valuation does not take away this increase of wages, and especially it does not eliminate the fluctuations of that period, showing that depreciated currency was not the sole cause of variations from normal rates, which were greater in some districts than others, greater in some years than others, in some cases more and in others less than the premium on gold. These causes worked together and diminished in their operation together, increasing production, gradually relieving the excessive demand, and relaxing its unusual call upon labor and increasing prosperity, tending to reduce the gold premium approximate to par.

5. PANIC REDUCTIONS OF FARM WAGES.

The great monetary depression in the later financial history of the United States was in 1873 to 1879, lasting 6 years, and reducing prices and wages more and more until the end. Its effect was gradual and cumulative. All prices of commodities, except as the result of comparative scarcity, were lowest in 1879. Farm wages were also lowest that year. Comparing with 1875, when the influence of depression began to be positively felt in wages, the fall of the subsequent four years in the total labor of the United States, as the result of investigations shows, was about 18 per cent. It was of course felt in its severity in the centers of manufacturing, commercial, and financial business. The decline in these few years in the Eastern States-not the entire reduction, but most of it-was 26 per cent. Large numbers in all the industries were out of employment, and many were seeking work or a temporary living from land cultivation, competing with the regular supply of farm laborers. This affected first and most seriously the farm labor supply of these great industrial districts. In the Middle States the decline was 25 per cent. The Central West was at first little affected; consumption of agricultural products and exports were still liberal. Ultimately the surplus labor of the factory regions began to migrate westward, both as farmers and farm laborers, and competition in wages and in production asserted its influence; yet it was never felt as in the Middle and Eastern States, as we find the reduction in wages was scarcely 15 per cent. The South was nearly in the same catagory, with a reduction of not quite 17 per cent. Notwithstanding its exports of more than two-thirds of the cotton crop, it could not fail to feel the effects of a depression that partially paralyzed the productive and constructive energies of the country of which it is a part, but it felt them far less severely than those centers of industry and business. The Pacific coast, so distant, so nearly independent and self-supporting, with a currency that had suffered no depreciation, scarcely felt the effects of the general depression in the rates of its agricultural wages, which declined only 8 per cent. It could not escape entirely, but was affected only a third as much

as the East, and half as much as the agricultural West and South. These geographical districts show these differences in decline of wages without board in four years:

The reduction above is calculated from wages without board, or total wages. The result is not very different for wages with board, except in the Eastern States, where the board allowance declined heavily and the reduction is about 30 per cent in the cash wage.

While the laborers suffered in decrease of income, even much more than the fall in wages indicates, because fewer were employed, and the sum of wages paid was much reduced, the farmer sustained losses and felt great discouragement on account of low prices and diminished income, and if in debt was liable to default of interest and Dossible mortgage foreclosure.

6. RECOVERY AND STEADY UNIFORMITY.

On the resumption of specie payments in 1879 recovery was very prompt and rapid. With restored confidence, the wheels of business began to revolve in every line of industry, and the farmer at once felt the impulse, resumed his routine of cultivation, planned improvements, and employed more labor. Wages necessarily advanced, and at the next investigation, in 1882, the increase throughout the United States averaged over 15 per cent. The extremes were found on the ocean coasts, the advance in the Eastern States, on the revival of manufacturing industry, being 24 per cent. Industrial labor in this region exercises a controlling influence, agricultural labor being a small and relatively unimportant factor. As adverse industrial conditions reduced agricultural wages most in this region, so a revival of industrial prosperity increased rural wages more than in any other portion of the country.

On the Pacific coast a remarkable state of things appears. There the depression had scarcely been felt. The very high wages of the early days had constantly declined as immigration enlarged the labor supply. As there had been no depression, there was no recovery. The surprising prosperity of the coast, its booms in gold, in wheat, in sheep and cattle, in fruits and wines, attracted such a stream of immigration that labor constantly increased in abundance, and instead of an advance in wages, a decline of 7 per cent is noted in these regions. It was still high, not quite down to the normal level of the subsequent period of steady uniformity which has so long characterized the agricultural development of the Pacific coast.

In the Central West the advance was about 17 per cent. If calculated on the rate of wages with board, it was more, as in 1879 this rate of payment had fallen very low. In the Middle States and in the South the advance for 1879 to 1882 was nearly the same as in the West. The percentage of increase is a little larger than the above if calculated on the cash part of the rate with board. The record of these changes is as follows:

These figures exhibit a striking change of conditions. So great a change in so short a time could not be the result of accident or slight cause. A radical difference in existing conditions appears. Discouragement and despondency have been followed by hopefulness and courage. The farmer begins to see some profit in labor and demand grows while wages advance.

Now follows a period of steady prosperity which from year to year shows no appreciable fluctuation in wages. At every investigation the national average is $18 and a fraction per month for wages of all classes and races. In 1882 it was $18.58. In 1885 some minor financial troubles existed and a sensitive public confidence showed some slight signs of disturbance, reflected possibly in the reduction of wages in that year to $18.06. The cloud soon passed away, and thenceforth, while wages were remarkably uniform, there was a barely perceptible tendency to advance, the average being $18.24 in 1888, $18.34 in 1890, and $18.60 in 1892. The same general uniformity is seen in the several geographical divisions, the variations being very slight and really too small to challenge investigation as to causes of difference.

The contrast between the steadiness and uniformity of wages in this period and the frequent changes in the preceding period is a very strong and suggestive one. It leaves no room to doubt the injurious effect of business depression, of conditions tending to disturb confidence in financial stability, upon the interests of the farm laborer and upon his rate of wages. Such depression not merely reduces the rate of his compensation, but makes it more difficult for him to find employment at all. The contrast shows that anything that reduces the profits of the farmer depresses his hopefulness or destroys his ambition, and affects injuriously at once the wages of the farm laborer and his chances of employment.

7. EFFECT OF RECENT DEPRESSION.

What effect on wages and employment had the panic of 1894-1897? It had a seriously injurious influence. Industries are more developed, conditions more settled than formerly, and there is more capital to sustain a siege of depression, yet its effects can not be avoided. Some have thought that wages have not been reduced because experienced employees in responsible positions have held positions and pay during those four years of disaster, but the masses of less efficient and trusted laborers were compelled to accept lower rates or give place to some of the multitudes seeking employment. A still more deplorable alternative was the loss of a situation because the employer had decided to do the best he could with help in his own family, since he saw a doubtful chance of profit in hired labor. There are large districts where the loss to laborers in the recent panic was far more in nonemployment than in working at reduced pay. In the richest farming districts of the West, where dairying, cattle feeding, and other specialties requiring skill and attention through the year are prominent, farmers disliked to lose experienced men and the men declined to take lower compensation, and this tended to sustain accustomed wages to a certain degree among the higher classes of laborers. The ordinary laborers had no such safeguard, and were reduced to a minimum both in numbers and rates of wages. This is not mere theory. It is the record of fact and experience in every part of the country by multitudes of careful observers of wide observation. There are districts where the labor supply was not excessive and others where there was no little destitution from inability to find work at any rate. This accounts for some disparity of view on this subject among intelligent reporters.

The following statement on this subject is made by Mr. B. W. Snow, of Chicago, after a large experience in agricultural investigation, in which farm wages has had a place:

"During the industrial depression of 1894-1897 there was some decline in farm wages throughout the West. The decline, however, was not anywhere near so heavy as was the decline in wages paid and the lack of employment in other lines of industry. The lack of employment for large numbers of men in cities and smaller manufacturing towns forced a very considerable number of such persons to leave cities and towns and seek employment on the farms in the surrounding country. It would be difficult, of course, to say what percentage was added to the regular supply of farm labor from this class, but it was enough to materially affect the farm labor market.

"In the Western States those who cultivate large bodies of land and require much labor usually hire a certain number of men by the year or by the season, and in addition to these, during the stress of work like harvesting, use as much extra help by the day or month as they find necessary. The owners of small farms, however, who with the assistance of their own family are in a position to do a greater part of their own work, usually hire such additional help as they may need by the day or by the week. For a great majority of farmers this employment of extra help for a short period

when most needed is undoubtedly the most convenient. The effect, however, of this custom upon the quality of farm labor is very bad; it makes employment uncertain and tends to develop a spirit of shiftlessness and unrest. The result of industrial depression is to largely increase the amount of help available for such hiring, but with the return of industrial activity in cities this class of temporary farm help will become smaller.

"Any industrial disturbance which throws men out of employment in the cities will have its most marked and most permanent effect upon rate of wages paid by the month, because it forces to the country a class of men who are not all around good farm laborers, such men as the practical farmer would hire by the month; to the contrary, they are a class of men who are most available for hiring by the day, and, as they work cheaper, a great many farmers who otherwise might hire by the month are con trained to rely upon securing these men for a short period."

The South, with less labor employed in industries outside of agriculture, was less affected by the industrial paralysis of 1894-1897. So prominent is cotton culture in her agriculture that depression depends mostly upon the price of cotton. When cotton was scarce and high it was expected that larger crops would bring lower prices-as they did and growers expected to be obliged to reduce the cost of production; but when the plantation price went below 8 cents-down to 5, and even 4, when the great crops of 1894, 1897, and 1898 were made then the pinch came and real depression was felt, and growers were constrained to reduce wages. Hitherto wages

had been only moderately affected by changes in condition of general prosperity. Wages had met with fluctuations, but had not suffered much reduction. The testimony of many agricultural experts assures a reduction of from 10 to 25 per cent at the depths of such depression. A few quotations from letters of representative men, received during this investigation, will suffice to show approximately the extent of such reduction. Prof. J. S. Newman, of Clemson Agricultural College, South Carolina, writes:

"Wages for grown field hands on cotton plantations averaged about $6 and board while cotton sold at 44 to 5 cents. When cotton brought 9 to 10 cents, average wages were about $8. The board usually consists of 14 pounds of corn meal and 23 pounds of bacon per week. If sirup is issued in part, the meat is proportionately reduced." Dr. W. C. Stubbs, director of the Louisiana Experiment Station, shows clearly that reduction is due almost solely to the extreme cheapness of cotton by the fact that wages of the sugar districts were far less affected, as follows:

"On the line of our sugar belt the low prices of cotton have not materially affected the price of labor with its decline; whereas, for the extreme northern portion of the State, remote from other industries, the decline of cotton has very materially reduced wages. I should say that, on the whole, when worth 8 or 9 cents, labor is worth 60 to 75 cents per day, but when it has declined to 4 cents per pound, labor has declined from 60 to 40 cents. I do not think there is much disposition to increase wages at present; that is, for the present crop of cotton. It will not be done by thoughtful farmers, if they can prevent it, since with favorable seasons larger areas will be put into cotton and a big crop produced, and the result will be a tremendous reduction in price."

The rural industries of Louisiana are geographically separated and quite distinct, and labor conditions vary in each. Cotton occupies the north beyond the Mississippi; sugar, the south; rice, the southwest and other watered or swampy districts; and fruit and market gardening, the eastern and shore counties.

Prof J. H. Connell, director of the experiment station of Texas, a State with many and various agricultural interests-stock growing, cattle feeding, cotton and sugar growing, etc.-thinks the price of labor did not respond to the drop in cotton to 4 cents, but says that land rentals sympathized with the reduced price of the product, $4 lands renting for $3 during 1898-99, and that labor in cotton picking was reduced throughout Texas from 40 and 50 cents per hundred pounds to 30 and 40 cents when cotton fell from 7 cents to 4. At interior points cotton has not been sold for 8 cents for several years. He adds:

"Wage labor has, with few exceptions, been maintained at 90 cents per day (the laborer furnishing his own supplies) for the last decade, or, when the landlord furnishes the supplies, the laborer is paid at from $12 to $15 per month upon the majority of farms throughout this section. It should be borne in mind, however, that cotton farming is done upon the share or rental system, in many cases no wages being paid except during the cotton chopping season, when 'day labor' prices are gladly paid by those who have cotton to chop."

"Cotton chopping" is cutting out the surplus cotton to a "stand," or certain distance from plant to plant, according to richness of soil, and with these extra plants the mass of springing weeds. It must be done speedily or the plants will be smothered.

Official and other investigations give testimony on the subject, all in the same direction, showing conclusively that in the period of business depression there was serious injury to labor interests. Unfortunately there was no complete investigation by the Department of Agriculture, and none whatever after 1895, when the influence was only felt in a limited degree. It serves, however, to show the tendency of depression to lower wages. The average without board in 1893, in this investigation, was $19.10; in 1894 it was reduced to 17.74, a decline of 7 per cent. The average of 1895 is $17.69. An investigation in 1897 would doubtless have shown a material further decline.

The Ohio official investigation made an average in 1893 of $16 with board, $15 in the first years of the panic, and $14 in 1897, a reduction of 12 per cent. The Michigan investigation by the secretary of state showed a decline in four years from $18.10 to $14.16, or nearly 22 per cent. The official investigation of the Province of Ontario, north and east of these States, but in the Dominion of Canada, showed a decrease in wages by the month, with board, during the same time from $17.13 to $14.29, a decline of nearly 17 per cent. During the same time wages of persons employed by the year, more permanent and steady in rate, declined only from $160 to $144, or 10 per cent.

Some States were affected far more than others, but all felt the influence of depression in some degree. While the rate of wages was decreased by 10, 15, and in some States 20 per cent, according to the pressure of oversupply of laborers and the absolute necessity of work, the greatest labor loss suffered was in nonemployment of multitudes who were wanted in prosperous times but whose services in years of panic were dispensed with, the farmer and his family attending to routine and unavoidable service, and postponing work that yielded no immediate returns, and farm improvements that could only represent investment of capital.

During these four years the Pacific coast farm laborers first experienced the discomforts and distresses of "hard times." Wages had been tending downward for thirty years, yet all the time relatively high, the highest farm wages in the country. The panic which was so long and severe in other sections of the country "in the seventies was unknown to farm laborers on the Pacific coast. Prior to 1894 demand for efficient labor was active and rates of wages high. With constant increase of population there was a large increment of laborers. Industries had become established and conditions settled, the supply of labor generally adequate, and wages more moderate, yet still liberal. The pastoral interests became unprofitable. Horses in the northern districts, in great herds, without care or control, were breeding worthless animals that could find no market, and were slaughtered by thousands at canning factories for foreign markets. Drought destroyed large numbers of cattle, and droves of thousands went to more eastern pastoral ranges. To cap the climax, the Wilson law condemned to unprofitableness and threatened bankruptcy the woolgrowing industry. For once the coast felt the effects of the panic of 1894–1897 in many directions and with considerable force. In Oregon men were glad to work for 50 cents a day and many worked for their board. In California there was a marked reduction of ruling rates of farm wages; laborers cheerfully accepted a lower rate of pay, knowing that the cut was necessary and hoping to tide over a situation which they hoped was temporary. After 1897 conditions began to improve. Various mining districts attracted large numbers of laborers; the call for soldiers for the Philippines relieved the pressure of the unemployed. Activity in handling war supplies in San Francisco made a further demand for labor there, so that when 1899 came in there began to appear an actual scarcity of labor. Wages had been advancing and still further advanced. Demand was active for the service of all capable of working in any lines and compensation ample. This is the situation to-day, emphasized in certain directions by a still stronger demand.

A summary of the facts concerning the reduction of wages in the depression of 1894-1897 may be thus stated:

The average of farm wages was everywhere reduced; the unemployed labor was much greater in proportion in some States than in others, causing differentiation in the percentage of reduction; the fall was less in skilled and more responsible positions, especially in sections where they were numerous and influential; in the inferior classes of labor wages were cut heavily, the competition for them being strong from the masses of the unemployed. But by far the most serious losses that befell farm labor was the failure to obtain employment on farms in any lines or at any regular rate of wages.