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former President. [Defendant Solomon's cross motion for
partial summary judgment at 16.] As to Count IV, Mr. Solomon asserted that Mr. Nixon has “no legitimate expectation of privacy with respect to tape recordings relating to Watergate or to matters of general historical significance. In support of this contention Mr. Solomon cited three cases: Nixon v. Administrator, 408 F. Supp. 321 (D.D.C. 1976) aff'd 433 U.S. 425 (1977); United States v. Mitchell, 551 F. 2d 1252 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Nixon v. Warner Communications, 435 U.S. 589 (1978). In Nixon v. Administrator, said Mr. Solomon, the Supreme Court held that as a matter of law, Mr. Nixon's entry into public life divested him of any expectation of privacy with respect to all of his communications except his extremely personal conversations with his family, physician, clergyman, lawyer or close friends. Thus, both the Supreme Court in Nixon v. Warner Communications and the circuit court in United States v. Mitchell found the Watergate tapes to be "impressed with the public trust." In essence, Mr. Solomon contended that public access to the tapes by any means could not invade Mr. Nixon's privacy rights since no such rights exist.
On July 23, 1979 the court filed an order denying Mr. Nixon's motion for partial summary judgment and granting the defendant's and the intervenor defendant's cross motions for partial summary judgment "for the reasons presented and discussed in Defendant Solomon's Memorandum." Thus, Counts III and IV of Mr. Nixon's third amended complaint were dismissed.
On August 1, 1979 plaintiff Nixon filed a motion to reconsider the order of July 23, 1979.
Status.—The case is pending in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.
The status report and agreement of February 14, 1979, is printed in the "Decisions" section of the report of Court Proceedings and Actions of Vital Interest to the Congress, March 31, 1979. United States v. Flood
Cr. No. 78-543 (D.D.C.) and Cr. No. 78-561 (D.D.C.)
On September 5, 1978, an indictment was filed in the United States District Court for the Central District of California against Congressman Daniel J. Flood. The three-count indictment charges Congressman Flood with perjury before the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California and before a Federal grand jury (18 U.S.C. $ 1623).
On October 12, 1978, a 10-count indictment against Representative Flood was filed in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. In the indictment, he was charged with one count of conspiracy (18 U.S.C. $ 371) and nine counts of bribery and aiding and abetting bribery (18 U.S.C. $$ 201, 202).
On October 18, 1978, the indictment which had been filed in California was transferred to the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.
The two indictments were consolidated on October 23, 1978.
On January 4, 1979, the District Court issued a MemorandumOrder ruling on several pre-trial motions filed by the Government and the defense. Among them was a motion to dismiss based on Representative Flood's assertion that the Speech or Debate clause required dismissal of the indictment "in view of the gross intrusions of the Executive into legislative areas." [Memorandum of Defendant Flood Concerning the Effect of The Speech or Debate Clause Upon The Government's Case at 6.]
Additionally Representative Flood had moved for a continuance until the Supreme Court had rendered its decision in United States v. Helstoski, 570 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1977) cert. granted, 47 U.S.L.W. 3401 (Dec. 12, 1978) (No. 78-846), another action involving an assertion of Speech or Debate Clause immunity. In response to this motion the court stated:
Since certiorari was granted very recently, it is unlikely
no longer law. [Slip Opinion at 3] In denying Representative Flood's motion to dismiss on Speech or Debate Clause grounds, the court declined to dismiss for the reasons set forth in refusing discovery by the defense of the grand jury minutes. Representative Flood had sought access to those minutes in an effort to determine whether they showed that testimony had been taken by the grand jury in violation of the Speech or Debate Clause.
In denying access to the minutes, the court stated that under its view of United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974); United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972); United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966); and United States v. Costello, 350 U.S. 359 (1976), those minutes were not material to the issue to be tried under this indictment. [Slip Opinion at 5)
The court went on to deal at length with other discovery matters sought by the defense.
On January 15, 1979, the jury was selected. Also on that date, the court granted the Government's oral motion to dismiss counts 3 and 4 of the indictment and a portion of count 1, the conspiracy count.
On January 25, 1979, the court granted another oral motion of the defendant to dismiss under count 1 of the indictment, one of the overt acts charged.
On February 3, 1979, a mistrial was declared by the court when the jury stated that it was unable to reach a verdict.
On February 12, 1979, Representative Flood filed a motion for judgment of acquittal.
On February 16, 1979, Representative Flood filed a motion to enjoin the investigation of jurors by the Department of Justice and to have any necessary inquiry conducted by the court in public session to be in accordance with Rule 606 of the Federal Rule of Evidence.
In a Memorandum-Order filed by the court on February 27, 1979, the court denied the motion for judgment of acquittal and the motion to enjoin the Department of Justice from interrogating jurors from the first trial. Notice of appeal from the denial of the
motion to enjoin the Department of Justice was filed on the same day. On March 1, 1979 the Court of Appeals denied the defendant's request for an injunction pending appeal.
On April 24, 1979 it was ordered that the time for the filing of Representative Flood's brief be extended until 21 days after his trial in the District Court.
Due to Representative Flood's medical problems (eye opacification and tinnitus), his retrial did not begin on June 4, 1979 as had been scheduled. On June 15, 1979 the court set a new trial date of October 15, 1979.
Status.-The case is still pending before the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.
The complete text of the Memorandum-Order of the District Court is printed in the “Decisions” section of Court Proceedings and Actions of Vital Interest to the Congress, March 31, 1979. RECENT DECISIONS