ment of the altered checks was strong or weak, when taken in connect-
ion with other evidence tending to show that the method in which
the business of the dredging company was conducted was such as to
justify the officers of thae bank in believing that the secretary was
authorized to so alter checks and get the money on them was such con-
duct as was calculated to mislead the bank, and so facilitate the perpe-
tration of the fraud and constituted the proximate cause of the loss,
but that the evidence should go to the jury under careful instruction
from the Court. National Dredging Co. vs. Farmers Bank, 580.
See VERDICT.
1. The record of the Justice failed to state that the referees ap-
pointed by him were judicious and impartial men of the county.
Held that although irregular it was not jurisdictional to fail to state
uch fact. The presumption is that the Justice did his duty unless
it appears to the contrary f'om the record. Jacoby vs. Bolen, 240.
2. The statute (Code 754), which provides what security shall be
required in taking an appeal from a Justice of the Peace, is fully com-
plied with when either one or more sureties sign the appeal bond.
Richardson vs. National Bank etc., 385.
3. Within his statutory jurisdiction the authority of a Justice
of the Peace is just as complete, for all purposes of hearing such cases,
determining or deciding them, and making up his record, as is the
authority of this Court. While the better practice would be for the
Justice to sign his record, yet it is not essential to the validity of a judg-
ment rendered by him that he should sign it, in the absence of a statu-
tory provision requiring his signature. While our statute sets out
what is essential to constitute a valid docket entry, it is silent upon
the matter of signing it. Johnson vs. The State, 450.
4, A cause of action stated to be "An action brought for compen-
satory damages for neglect of an agreement for labor or work to be
performed by the defendant," is not within the jurisdiction of the
Justice. Coulbourn vs. Moore, 460.
5. When the record of the Justice does not negative the excep-
tions contained in the statute, and show that the worldly business
which it is alleged was performed was not a work of necessity or
charity, the judgment below will be reversed. Wright vs. State, 461.
See APPEAL; CERTIORARI; JURISDICTION OF JUSTICE; Record of
JUSTICE.
KNOWLEDGE.-See BANK AND DEPOSITOR; GUILTY KNOWLEDGE;
MASTER AND SERVANT; PRESUMPTION OF KNOWLEDGE
Chattels bound by a chattel Mortgage were moved to the farm of
A. B. by the mortgagor, the tenant of said farm, and subsequent-
ly distrained by A. B. for rent. They were sold by the Constable
under the distraint, and the proceeds applied to the landlord's claim
for rent. Held that such application of the proceeds was proper and
legal, under the ruling made by the Court in the case of Ford vs.
Cleuell, 9 Hous. 179. Davidson vs. Frick, 26.
1. There need not be first an act of severance of property from its
connection with the realty, and after that an actual separate and dis-
tinct act of taking and carrying away, to constitute a severance and
larceny, but the act of taking and holding and carrying away, at and
from the instant of separating it from its connection with the realty-
that is, the one continuous transaction of detaching it, retaining pos-
session of it and carrying it away, with intent to commit larceny,-
amounts to a severance in law, although the severance and the taking
and carrying away are one continuous transaction. The Ruling in
the case of State vs. Hall, 5 Harr. 492, departed from. State vs. Wolf,
1323.
2. In an indictment for larceny, the property alleged to have been
stolen was stated to be the property of, Joseph Bancroft Sons' Comp-
any." At the trial it appeared from the States evidence that it was
the property of “Joseph Bancroft and Sons' Company." The State
permitted to enter a nolle prosequi. State vs. Dougherty, 398
At a subsequent trial upon an indictment which charged that
the property alleged to have been stolen was the property of Joseph
Bancroft and Sons' Company," the defendant contended that he could
not be convicted because he had been put in jeopardy for the same
offense in the tormer case: Held that the defendant was not in jeopardy
under the original indictment within the contemplation of the Consti-
tution of this State. Id.
4. In order to show they were engaged generally in the commission
of larceny, a witness was asked by the State at the trial what he and
the defendant, had driven into the country for on a Saturday night
following the theft; held not admissible. State vs. Stewart et al., 435.
5. The degree of credit which ought to be given to the testimony of
an accomplice is a matter exclusively within the province of the jury.
Great caution in weighing such testimony is dictated by prudence and
good reason. A jury may convict upon the uncorroborated testi-
mony of an accomplice, yet the better rule is that a conviction should
not be had unless such testimony is corroborated either by direct or
circumstantial evidence. A jury may convict upon the testimony of
an accomplice if they are satisfied from all the facts and circumstances
of the case, beyond a reasonable doubt, that it is true, without any
confirmation of such testimony. And is such a case, it would be
their duty to do so Id
6. If the finder of lost property knows who is the owner, or if,
from any mark upon it, or from the circumstances under which it was
found, the owner could reasonably have been ascertained, then the
fraudulent conversion of the property to the finder's use is sufficient
evidence to justify the jury in finding the felonious intent constituting
a larceny State vs. Dredden,446.
7 If the defendant was not an actual finder of the property, yet if
at the time he received it from the finder he knew or the circumstances
then existing were such as to reasonably inform him, who the owner
was, and notwithstanding such knowledge, or means of knowledge,
he appropriated the property to his own use without the consent of
the owner, he would be guilty of larceny. Id.
8 In order to determine whether the defendant knew to whom
the property belonged and feloniously intended to appropriate it to
his own use at the time he received it, the jury may consider all that
was said and done by the prisoner, or by others in his presence or
hearing, and any other circumstances which would indicate what his
actual knowledge and intentions were Id
9 The defendant was indicted for the larceny of a bag of corn.
The prosecuting witness testified that he thought the corn was his
but could not swear to it The wife of the prisoner testified that she
had gone to the house of the prosecuting witness with her husband,
who said to her that he wanted her to go up and engage the prosecut-
ing witness in conversation while he went down to the pig pen and got
the bag of corn which the colored boy had put out for him. Held
that there was sufficient evidence of the prisoner's guilt to be sub-
mitted to the jury. State vs. Bailey, 455.
See BREAKING AND ENTERING STORE.
Where an unskilled servant is directed by the master to perform
dangerous work with which he is not acquainted, and where the dan-
gers are latent, that is, not manifest or apparent, it is the duty ofthe
master to instruct such servant as to his duties, and to give warning
respecting the danger. It is also the duty of the master to see that
the number of servants engaged upon any particular work is sufficient
to secure the reasonable safety of each of them. Coughlan vs. P. B.
& W. R. R., 242.
In the lawful use of the streets of a city a pedestrian is not bound
to hunt for latent obstructions or dangers. He may fairly pre-
sume that they are in a reasonably safe condition for use, in the ab-
sence of any knowledge to the contrary. If, however, he knows of the
existence of the danger, or under the circumstances ought to know of
it, and with such knowledge voluntarily runs into the danger, he as-
sumes all the risk of such conduct. White vs. Peoples Ry., 476.
LEGAL TITLE TO REAL ESTATE-See EJECTMENT
LEGISLATIVE ACT.—See CONSTITUTIONAL Law
Where the Legislature has made no exception to the positive terms
of a statute, the presumption is that it intended to make none, and it
is not the province of the Court to do so. Lewis vs. Pawnee Bill's
etc. Co., 316.
1. The General Assembly has power to submit the question of
"License or no License" to a vote of the people at a special election.
State vs. Fountain et al., 520.
2. It is not a condition precedent to the exercise of such power
that a majority of the members in each House from the districts in
which such question is to be submitted, should submit a request as
provided in Article 13 of the Constitution. Id.
The Legislature, acting in the exercise of its police power, is
deemed to be the best judge of what laws and penalties are adequate
and proper to meet conditions existing in the various territorial sub-
LEGISLATIVE POWER.—Continued.
divisions of the State; but such laws must be uniform in their opera-
tion on all the citizens in the terrtorial subdivision. Id
1. However much publicity may have attended the proceedings,
the publication of which by the defendant constitutes the basis of the
present action, they were from their inception to the execution and de-
livery of the bail bond wholly preliminary and ex parte, and afforded
no opportunity to the defendant, who is the plaintiff in this suit, to be
heard in his defense to the charge contained in the affidavit. It must
be held both upon authority and sound public policy that the doc-
trine of privilege cannot be extended to the publication of such pro-
ceedings. Todd vs. Every Evening P. Co, 233.
Words which represent a person as dishonest or dishonorable,
and guilty of such disgraceful conduct as would bring him into public
contempt, are libellous, and actionable per se. When such words are
published the law presumes malice, and that the person to whom they
refer has sustained damage from the publication of the libellous mat-
ter. It is not necessary to a recovery by the plaintiff that he should
prove any special damages, or any actual intent or desire on the part
of the defendant to injure the plaintiff by the publication
3. Exemplary damages are given only where express malice is
proved Such malice exists where, in addition to the publication of
the libellous article, it is shown that the publication was made want-
only, maliciously, and with intent to injure, degrade or destroy one's
reputation. Express malice is never presumed, but must be proved.
In determin ng whether there was express malice the jury may con-
sider all the circumstances surrounding the publication, as disclosed
by the evidence, which teed to show the motive or spirit which act-
uated the publication, including any information or knowledge which
the defendant possessed or had the means at hand of obtaining,
touching the truth or falsity of the charges made. Id.
4. Even though the publication complained of is libellous, and un-
justifiable in law, the jury may take into consideration, in mitigation
of damages, any and all facts and circumstances disclosed by the
evidence, which tend to show that the article was published with a
proper motive and without intent or desire to injure the plaintiff. Id.
LICENSE TO SELL INTOXICATING LIQUOR.-See INTOXICATING
LIQUOR.
LICENSE TO SELL REAL ESTATE.-See REAL ESTATE AGENT.
LIEN OF MORTGAGE.-See MORTGAGE.
Said lien not diverted by sale made by County Treasurer for col-
lection of County taxes. Knowles vs Morris, 76
Under the will the trustee is directed to "apply the income as
received, to the maintenance and support of my daughter Ann Jane
during her lifetime, and from and after her decease, it is my will and
I direct that all the said property, money, stock," etc. * * * *
"shall be held by the said Thomas A. Rees free and discharged from
the aforesaid trust, to and for the use of the heirs and assigns of the
said Ann Jane forever." Held, that Ann Jane took only a life estate
in the trust property, and that the corpus of the funds after her de-
cease went to her heirs, and not to her executors. Jones vs. Rees, 504.
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS.
1. The limitation act, passed May 28, 1897, which provides that
no action for the recovery of damages upon a claim for personal in-
juries shall be brought after the expiration of one year from the date
upon which the injuries were sustained, is not subject to the excep-
tions contained in the general statute of limitations, Chap. 123 of the
Code. Lewis vs. Pawnee Bill's etc. Co., 316
2. Where the Legislature has made no exception to the positive
terms of a statute, the presumption is that it intended to make none,
and it is not the province of the Court to do so.
1. The act known as the Local Option Act, approved March 21,
1907, being Chapter 65 Volume 24 of the Laws of Delaware, is con-
stitutional, and the election held thereunder was legal and valid.
State vs. Fountain et al., 520.
2 The General Assembly has power to submit the question of
"License or no License" to a vote of the people at a special election.
Id.
3. It is not a condition precedent to the exercise of such power
that a majority of the members in each House from the districts in
which such question is to be submitted, should submit a request as
provided in Article 13 of the Constitution. Id.
4. The act is not unconstitutional in that the penalties and pro-
cesses provided by sections 11 and 12 thereof, are enforced only if a
majority of the electors in any district vote to enforce the same. Id.
5. The act is not violative of Section 16 of Article 2 of the Con-
stitution, which prohibits more than one subject being embraced in an
act or in the title thereof. Id.
6. The said act is not obnoxious to any provision of the Constitu-
tion of the United States. Id.
7. The case of Rice vs. Foster, 4 Harr. 479, has no application to
this case. Id.
8. The opinion given by the Chancellor and Judges to the Gover-
nor touching the constitutionality of the local option act passed at
the session of 1905, has no bearing upon the questions raised in this
Id.
9. The debates on the local option provisions in the Constitutional
Convention, reviewed ;and from such debates it appears that the
Convention believed that under Section 1 of Article 13, the General
Assembly would have the right to submit the question of "License or
no License" to a vote of the people without request.
10. The proceedings of the Constitutional Convention, however,
are entitled to but little consideration by the Court where the pur-
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