CHARGE. injuries, and also for any impairment of ability to earn a living in the future and any expenses she has incurred for medical or surgical services in endeavoring to be cured of her injuries. The jury disagreed. STATE US. JACOB Russell. Indictment for Selling Spirituous Liquor-Local Option LawAgent of Buyer or Seller or of both. 1. If one person delivers an article of property to another and receives pay therefor, no other person being known to the buyer in the transaction, the person who delivers the article is presumed to be the seller. 2. Under the statute (Chap. 65 Vol. 24 Laws of Delaware) known as the Local Option Law, if a person sells spirituous liquor to another, whether acting for himself or as the agent for another, and whether the whiskey belongs to himself or to some other person, if he effects the sale he is guilty of a violation of the statute. 3. Even though the jury should believe that the defendant was acting as the agent or messenger of the prosecuting witness when he delivered to him whiskey, nevertheless if they should believe that he was at the same time acting as the agent or representative of the owner of the whiskey, or was himself the owner, and effected the sale thereof, he would be guilty of a violation of the statute. (February 21, 1908.) LORE, C. J., and PENNE WILL, J., sitting. James M. Satterfield, Deputy Attorney-General, for the State. CHARGE. 1908. Richard R. Kenney for the defendant. Court of General Sessions, Kent County, February Term, INDICTMENT for selling spirituous liquor, the same not being sold for medicinal or sacramental purposes, in violation of Chapter 65, Volume 24, Laws of Delaware. The Court charged the jury as follows: Gentlemen of the jury:-The prisoner at the bar, Jacob Russell, is charged in this indictment with selling, on the 28th day of January of the present year in the town of Dover in this county, spirituous liquor, to wit, whiskey, to one Elmer Melvin, the same not being sold for medicinal or sacramental purposes. The indictment is based upon a statute of this State known as the Local Option Statute, being Chapter 65, Volume 24, Laws of Delaware, approved March 21, 1907. Under said statute it is "unlawful for any person or persons, firm, company, association or corporation, or the agent, officer or servant of any firm, company, association or corporation, to manufacture or sell spirituous, vinous or malt liquors, except for medicinal or sacramental purposes," etc.; and it was unlawful to do so on the 28th of January last. It is not denied by the prisoner that he delivered to the prosecuting witness, Melvin, in the town of Dover on the 28th day of January last, a quantity of whiskey and received the money or pay therefor. It is not claimed by the prisoner that any person was known to Melvin in the transaction but the prisoner himself. We say to you it is well settled that if one person delivers an article of property to another and receives pay therefor, no other person being known to the buyer in the transaction, the person who delivers the article is presumed to be the seller. And we further say that under the Local Option Statute to which we have CHARGE. referred, if a person sells spirituous liquor to another in Kent county, whether acting for himself or as the agent of another, and whether the whiskey belonged to himself or to some other person, if he effects the sale he is guilty of a violation of the statute. Even though you should believe that the prisoner was acting as the agent or messenger of the prosecuting witness, Melvin, when he delivered to him the whiskey, nevertheless if you should believe that he was at the same time acting as the agent or representative of the owner of the whiskey, or was himself the owner, and effected the sale thereof, he would be guilty of the offense charged in this case. It is your duty, gentlemen, to consider carefully the evidence in the case and apply thereto the law as we have stated it. If after so doing you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the prisoner effected the sale of the whiskey as alleged in the indictment, your verdict should be guilty. But if after a careful consideration of all the evidence you should entertain a reasonable doubt of the prisoner's guilt, your verdict should be not guilty. We say to you, however, that by reasonable doubt is not meant a vague, speculative or mere possible doubt, but a real, substantial doubt, such as remains in the minds of the jury after a careful consideration of all the evidence in the case. The jury disagreed. NOTE. At the succeeding April Term of the Court, upon a re-trial the defendant was acquitted. SYLLABUS. STATE US. ALFRED L. SHAFFNER. Criminal Law-Indictment-Attempting to Persuade Another to dence. 1. Perjury was an offense at common law, and is where a lawful oath is administered in some judicial proceeding or due course of justice, to a person who swears wilfully, absolutely and falsely, in a matter material to the issue or point in question. 2. Where the crime of perjury is committed at the instigation or procurement of another, it is termed subornation of perjury in the party instigating it, and is also an offense at common law. So also is an attempt to instigate or persuade another to commit perjury an offense at common law, notwithstanding the fact that the perjury was not afterwards actually committed. 3. By a statute of this State it is made a felony for any person to commit the crime of perjury, or to procure any other person to commit such crime. 4. While an attempt to procure one to commit perjury is not specifically provided for by statute, it comes within the terms of the general statute which provides that offenses indictable at common law, and not specifically provided by statutes, shall be deemed misdemeanors. 5. To establish such offense the State must show that the defendant instigated and endeavored to persuade the witness to swear in the former trial in substance and effect as set forth in the indictment; that this was false, and was known to be false, at the time of the instigation and attempt, both by the defendant and the person he is alleged to have attempted to procure to commit perjury. 6. In considering the testimony of the defendant the jury should have regard to the uncontradicted evidence as to his bad reputation for truth and veracity, his former conviction for offenses involving moral turpitide, and the interest he has in the determination of the case. (March 11, 1908.) JUDGES SPRUANCE and BOYCE sitting. Robert H. Richards, Attorney-General, and Daniel O. Hastings, Deputy Attorney-General, for the State. CHARGE. 1908. William W. Knowles for the defendant. Court of General Sessions, New Castle County, March Term, The defendant was indicted and tried at this term upon a charge of attempting to persuade another to swear falsely at the trial of a certain suit of divorce then pending in the Superior Court for New Castle County, wherein Israel Eisenman was plaintiff and Bessie Eisenman was defendant. The facts appear in the charge of the Court. SPRUANCE, J., charging the jury: Gentlemen of the jury:-By the indictment which you have been impanelled to try, Alferd L. Shaffner, the defendant, is charged with having attempted to persuade and procure one Roland C. Daniel to swear and give evidence at the trial of a certain suit of divorce then pending in the Superior Court of this State in and for this County, wherein Israel Eisenman was plaintiff and Bessie Eisenman was defendant, in substance and effect as set forth in said indictment, and in such manner as that such swearing and giving evidence would have constituted perjury on the part of the said Roland C. Daniel, if he had so actually sworn and given his evidence. Perjury was an offense at common law, and has been described to be where a lawful oath is administered in some judicial proceeding or due course of justice, to a person who swears wilfully, absolutely and falsely, in a matter material to the issue or point in question. Where the crime of perjury is committed at the instigation or procurement of another, it is termed subornation of perjury in the party instigating it, and is also an offense at common law. So also is an attempt to instigate or persuade a person to commit perjury, an offense at common law, notwithstanding the fact that the perjury was not afterwards actually committed. |