to perfect that title by compliance with the terms of that statute.
Ib.

INDICTMENT.

See CRIMINAL LAW, 17, 18, 19, 28.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE.

1. When a state railroad company whose road lies within the limits of the
State, enters into the carriage of foreign freight by agreeing to receive
the goods by virtue of foreign through bills of lading, and to partici-
pate in through rates and charges, it thereby becomes part of a con-
tinuous line, not made by a consolidation with the foreign companies,
but by an arrangement for the continuous carriage or shipment from
one State to another; and thus becomes amenable to the Federal act
in respect to such interstate commerce; and, having thus subjected
itself to the control of the Interstate Commerce Commission, it cannot
limit that control in respect to foreign traffic to certain points on its
road to the exclusion of other points. Cincinnati, New Orleans &
Texas Pacific Railway Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 184.
2. When goods shipped under a through bill of lading, or in
any other
way indicating a common control, management or arrangement, from a
point in one State to a point in another State are received in transit by
a state common carrier, such carrier, if a railroad company, must be
deemed to have subjected its road to an arrangement for a continuous
carriage or shipment within the meaning of the act to regulate com-
merce. Ib.

3. The Interstate Commerce Commission is not empowered either expressly,
or by implication, to fix rates in advance; but, subject to the prohibi-
tions that their charges shall not be unjust or unreasonable, and that
they shall not unjustly discriminate, so as to give undue preference or
disadvantage to persons or traffic similarly circumstanced, the act to
regulate commerce leaves common carriers as they were at the common
law, free to make special contracts looking to the increase of their
business, to classify their traffic, to adjust and apportion their rates so
as to meet the necessities of commerce, and generally to manage their
important interests upon the same principles which are regarded as
sound, and adopted in other trades and pursuits. Ib.

4. The Interstate Commerce Commission is a body corporate, with legal
capacity to be a party plaintiff or defendant in the Federal courts.
Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 197.
5. In enacting the interstate commerce acts Congress had in view, and in-
tended to make provision for commerce between States and Terri-
tories, commerce going to and coming from foreign countries, and the
whole field of commerce except that wholly within a State; and it
conferred upon the Commission the power of determining whether,
in given cases, the services rendered were like and contemporaneous,

whether the respective traffic was of a like kind, and whether the trans-
portation was under substantially similar circumstances and condi-
tions. lb.

6. If the Commission has power, of its own motion, to promulgate general
decrees or orders, which thereby become rules of action to common
carriers, such exertion of power must be confined to the obvious pur-
poses and directions of the statute, since Congress has not granted it
legislative powers. Ib.

7. The action of the defendant company in procuring from abroad, by
steamship connections, through traffic for San Francisco which, except
for the modified through rates, would not have reached the port of
New Orleans, and in taking its pro rata share of such rates, was not
of itself an act of "unjust discrimination" within the meaning of the
interstate commerce act. Ib.

8. In enacting the statutes establishing the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion, the purpose of Congress was to facilitate and promote commerce,
and not to reinforce the provisions of the tariff laws; and the effort
of the Commission to deprive inland consumers of the advantage of
through rates, seems to create the mischief which it was one of the
objects of the act to remedy. Ib.

9. The mere fact that in this case the disparity between through and local
rates was considerable did not warrant the Circuit Court of Appeals
in finding that such disparity constitutes an undue discrimination, es-
pecially as that disparity was not complained of by any one affected
thereby. Ib.

10. The conclusions of the court, drawn from the history and language of
the acts under consideration, and from the decisions of the American
and the English courts, are: (1) That the purpose of the act is to pro-
mote and facilitate commerce by the adoption of regulations to make
charges for transportation just and reasonable, and to forbid undue
and unreasonable preferences or discriminations; (2) That in passing
upon questions arising under the act, the tribunal appointed to enforce
its provisions, whether the Commission or the courts, is empowered to
fully consider all the circumstances and conditions that reasonably
apply to the situation, and that, in the exercise of its jurisdiction, the
tribunal may and should consider the legitimate interests as well of
the carrying companies as of the traders and shippers, and in consider-
ing whether any particular locality is subjected to an undue prefer-
ence or disadvantage the welfare of the communities occupying the
localities where the goods are delivered is to be considered as well as
that of the communities which are in the locality of the place of ship-
ment; (3) That among the circumstances and conditions to be con-
sidered, as well in the case of traffic originating in foreign ports as in
the case of traffic originating within the limits of the United States,
competition that affects rates should be considered, and in deciding
whether rates and charges made at a low rate to secure foreign freights

which would otherwise go by other competitive routes are or are not
undue and unjust, the fair interests of the carrier companies and the
welfare of the community which is to receive and consume the com-
modities are to be considered; (4) That if the Commission, instead
of confining its action to redressing on complaint made by some par-
ticular person, firm, corporation or locality, some specific disregard by
common carriers of provisions of the act, proposes to promulgate gen-
eral orders, which thereby become rules of action to the carrying com-
panies, the spirit and letter of the act require that such orders should
have in view the purpose of promoting and facilitating commerce, and
the welfare of all to be affected, as well the carriers as the traders and
consumers of the country. Ib.

JUDGMENT.

See JURISDICTION, A, 5.

JURISDICTION.

A. JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.
1. Where the judgment of the highest court of a State against the validity
of an authority set up under the United States necessarily involves the
decision of a question of law, it is reviewable by this court on writ of
error, whether that question depends upon the Constitution, laws or
treaties of the United States, or upon the local law, or upon principles
of general jurisprudence. Stanley v. Schwalby, 255.

2. On the 31st day of August, 1826, the Seneca Nation by treaty and con-
veyance conveyed away the lands sued for in this action for a valuable
consideration, the receipt of which was acknowledged, but the treaty
was not ratified by the Senate or proclaimed by the President. On
the 13th of October, 1885, this action was commenced in the Supreme
Court of New York to recover a portion of the lands so conveyed.
It was brought under the provisions of the act of May 8, 1845, c. 150,
of the Laws of New York for that year, entitled "An act for the pro-
tection and improvement of the Seneca Indians," etc. The trial court
gave judgment for defendant, which judgment was sustained by the
Court of Appeals of the State on two grounds: (1) that the grant of
August, 1826, was a valid transaction, not in contravention of the
Constitution of the United States, or of the Indian Intercourse act of
1802; and, (2) that the right of recovery under the New York act of
1845 was barred by the statute of limitations. Held, that as the
judgment could be maintained upon the second ground, which in-
volved no Federal question, this court, under the well established rule,
must be held to be without jurisdiction, and the writ of error must
be dismissed. Sencca Nation v. Christy, 283.

3. The Circuit Court having made no certificate to this court of the ques-
tion of its jurisdiction, the writ of error is dismissed on the authority
of Maynard v. Hecht, 151 U. S. 324, and other cases cited. Davis v.
Geissler, 290.

4. The jurisdiction of this court is to be determined by the amount

directly involved in the decree appealed from, and not by any con-
tingent demand which may be recovered, or any contingent loss which
may be sustained by either party, through the probative effect of the
decree, however direct its bearing upon such contingency. Hollander
v. Fechheimer, 326.

5. A decree in favor of plaintiff, but remanding the case to the trial court
for further proceedings to ascertain the amount of the indebtedness,
is not a final decree from which appeal can be taken. 1b.

6. When the highest court of a State, upon a first appeal, decides a
Federal question against the appellant, and remands the case for
further proceedings according to law, and upon further hearing the
inferior court of the State renders final judgment against him, he can-
not have that judgment reviewed by this court by writ of error, with-
out first appealing from it to the highest court of the State; although
that court declines upon a second appeal to reconsider any question
of law decided upon the first appeal. Great Western Telegraph Com-
pany v. Burnham, 339.

7. A Circuit Court of Appeals has no power under the Judiciary Act of
1891 to certify the whole case to this court; but can only certify dis-
tinct points or propositions of law, unmixed with questions of fact or
of mixed law and fact. Graves v. Faurot, 435.

8. The question propounded in this case amounts to no more than an
inquiry whether, in the opinion of this court, there is an irreconcilable
conflict between two of its previous judgments, and a request, if that
is held to be so, that an end be put to that conflict; and this is not
a question or a proposition of law in a particular case, on which this
court is required to give instructions. Ib.

9. This case comes within the established rule that on an application for
removal from a state to a Federal court, the Federal question or the
Federal character of the defendant company must appear from the
complaint in the action, in order to justify a removal; and such
Federal question or character does not appear in this case. Oregon
Short Line & Utah Northern Railway Co. v. Skottowe, 490.

10. The conduct of a criminal trial in a state court cannot be reviewed by
this court unless the trial is had under some statute repugnant to the
Constitution of the United States, or was so conducted as to deprive
the accused of some right or immunity secured to him by that instru-
ment. Mere error in administering the criminal law of a State or in
the conduct of a criminal trial. no Federal right being invaded or
denied is beyond the revisory power of this court under the statutes
regulating its jurisdiction. Indeed, it would not be competent for
Congress to confer such power upon this or any other court of the
United States. Gibson v. Mississippi, 565.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1;

CORPORATION, 2;

WRIT OF ERROR.

B. JURISDICTION OF CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEALS.

See JURISDICTION, A, 7.

C. JURISDICTION OF CIRCUIT COURTS.

1. The Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York had jurisdic-
tion of the acts complained of in this suit. Teras & Pacific Railway
Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 197.

2. Alberty, the accused, was a negro born in slavery, who became a citi-
zen of the Cherokee Nation under the ninth article of the treaty of
1866. Duncan, the deceased, and alleged to have been murdered, was
the illegitimate child of a Choctaw Indian, by a negro woman who
was not his wife, but a slave in the Cherokee Nation. Held, that, for
purposes of jurisdiction, Alberty must be treated as a member of the
Cherokee Nation, but not an Indian, and Duncan as a colored citizen
of the United States, and that, for the purposes of this case, the court
below had jurisdiction. Alberty v. United States, 499.

3. When an offence against the provisions of Rev. Stat. § 5209 is begun
in one State and completed in another, the United States court in the
latter State has jurisdiction over the prosecution of the offender.
Putnam v. United States, 687.

D. JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA.

Since the act of July 9, 1888, c. 597, as before that act, the Supreme Court
of the District of Columbia has no power to admit a will or codicil to
probate as a devise of real estate. Campbell v. Porter, 478.

E. JURISDICTION OF STATE COURTS.

See UNITED STATES, 5.

LIMITATION, STATUTES OF.

See CORPORATION, 2.

LOCAL LAW.

1. Under the provisions of the act of the State of Texas of July 14, 1879,
amended March 11, 1881, and repealed January 22, 1883, in respect of
the purchase of unappropriated lands, the applicant was obliged, in
order to obtain the right to purchase, to cause the land desired to be
surveyed, and the survey, field-notes and maps to be returned within
a time prescribed; and no tract could be purchased containing more
than six hundred and forty acres. R. and T. entered into an agree-
ment consisting of two papers but constituting and declared on in this
case as one contract, whereby R. agreed to transfer to T. his rights
to purchase acquired under applications for the survey of 1,160,320