Opinion of the Court.

dered judgment thereon, and this judgment was affirmed by the general term on appeal. 49 Hun, 524. The case was carried to the Court of Appeals of New York and the judgment affirmed. 126 N. Y. 122, 147. This writ of error was then brought.

The Court of Appeals considered the case fully on the merits and was of opinion "that the grant of August 31, 1826, was a valid transaction and was not in contravention of the provisions of the Federal Constitution or of the Indian Intercourse Act of 1802, and vested in the purchasers a good title in fee simple absolute to the lands granted, free from any claim of the Seneca Nation;" and also that, conceding "the invalidity of the grant of August 31, 1826, under the Indian Intercourse Act of 1802, nevertheless the title was subsequently confirmed and made good by the act of Congress of 1846, authorizing the President to receive from the Ontario Bank, and deposit in the Treasury of the United States, the money and securities representing the purchase money of the lands, followed by the transfer of the fund to the United States in 1855." The court further held: "We are also of opinion that as the right of the plaintiff to sue was given by and is dependent upon the statute, chapter 150 of the laws of 1845, (see Strong v. Waterman, 11 Paige, 607,) the statute of limitations is a bar to the action. By the act of 1845, the actions thereby authorized are to be brought and maintained in the same time' as if brought by citizens of the State. The question is not whether an Indian title can be barred by adverse possession or by state statutes of limitation. The point is that the plaintiff cannot invoke a special remedy given by the statute without being bound by the conditions on which it is given.”

In Strong v. Waterman, 11 Paige, 607, it was held by Chancellor Walworth that the Indians in New York had "an unquestionable right to the use, possession and occupancy of the lands of their respective reservations, which they have not voluntarily ceded to the State, nor granted to individuals by its permission; and the ultimate fee of such reservations is vested in the State, or in its grantees, subject to such right of use and occupancy, by the Indians, until they shall voluntarily

Opinion of the Court.

relinquish the same;" that the right of the Seneca Nation to the use and possession of the Cattaraugus reservation was in all the individuals composing the nation, residing on such reservation in their collective capacity, and that, they having no corporate name, no provision was made by law for bringing an ejectment suit to recover the possession of such lands. for their benefit, nor could they maintain an action at law in the name of their tribe to recover damages sustained by them by reason of trespasses committed on their reservations, or to recover compensation for the use of their lands when unlawfully intruded upon, although a bill might be filed by one or more of them in behalf of themselves and other Indians interested to protect their rights and to obtain compensation. And see Johnson v. McIntosh, 8 Wheat. 573; Mitchel v. United States, 9 Pet. 711, 745; Cayuga Nation v. New York, 99 N. Y. 235.

This decision appears to have been rendered May 6, 1845, and on the 8th of May the act was passed, the first section of which has been quoted above.

The proper construction of this enabling act, and the time. within which an action might be brought and maintained thereunder, it was the province of the state courts to determine. DeSaussure v. Gaillard, 127 U. S. 216; Bausermann v. Blunt, 147 U. S. 647.

The Seneca Nation availed itself of the act in bringing this action, which was subject to the provision, as held by the Court of Appeals, that it could only be brought and maintained "in the same manner and within the same time as if brought by citizens of this State in relation to their private individual property and rights." Under the circumstances, the fact that the plaintiff was an Indian tribe cannot make Federal questions of the correct construction of the act and the bar of the statute of limitations.

As it appears that the decision of the Court of Appeals was rested, in addition to other grounds, upon a distinct and independent ground, not involving any Federal question, and sufficient in itself to maintain the judgment, the writ of error falls within the well settled rule on that subject and cannot be

VOL. CLXII-19

Opinion of the Court.

maintained. Eustis v. Bolles, 150 U. S. 361; Gillis v. Stinchfield, 159 U. S. 658.

Writ of error dismissed.

MR. JUSTICE HARLAN and MR. JUSTICE BREWER did not hear the argument and took no part in the consideration and decision of this case.

DAVIS v. GEISSLER.

ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS.

No. 185. Argued March 27, 1896.- Decided April 18, 1896.

The Circuit Court having made no certificate to this court of the question of its jurisdiction, the writ of error is dismissed on the authority of Maynard v. Hecht, 151 U. S. 324, and other cases cited.

MOTION to dismiss. The case is stated in the opinion.

Mr. E. A. McMath for the motion. Mr. W. C. Oliver was on his brief.

Mr. D. P. Stubbs opposing. Mr. W. F. Rightmire was on his brief.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER delivered the opinion of the court.

This was an action brought by plaintiffs in error, citizens of the State of Illinois, against more than thirty defendants, alleged to be citizens of the State of Kansas, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Kansas. The petition averred the execution by defendants of a certain contract annexed for the payment to plaintiffs of five thousand dollars for the construction, erection and putting in operation of a creamery at or near Oakley, Kansas, the contract being signed by defendants in the form of subscriptions to stock; performance by plaintiffs; and that they had received on

Syllabus.

account the sum of one hundred dollars; and demanded judgment against defendants, jointly and severally, for $4900 and interest. Some of the defendants did not appear, but defendants in error did, and pleaded a modified general denial, and twelve other defences, setting up fraud in respect of the contract; non-performance; want of furisdiction, in that one of the defendants, B. Mahanna, was a co-citizen of Illinois with plaintiffs; and that Mahanna's subscription to the contract was really a subscription by plaintiffs, made by him as their agent. Defendants claimed that the contract was several and not joint, and that each was bound only for the amount of his own subscription, which in no instance exceeded eight hundred and fifty dollars. The case was tried by a jury, but after the evidence was closed the court declined to submit it, and entered an order, November 28, 1891, that "it appearing to the court that this court has not jurisdiction of the subject-matter of this action, it is ordered that this case be and the same is hereby dismissed at the costs of plaintiffs." To review this judgment the pending writ of error was sued out October 13, 1892.

The Circuit Court made no certificate of the question of its jurisdiction to this court, and the case comes within Maynard v. Hecht, 151 U. S. 324; Colvin v. Jacksonville, 157 U. S. 368; Van Wagenen v. Sewall, 160 U. S. 369; Chappell v. United States, 160 U. S. 499, 507.

Writ of error dismissed.

WOODRUFF v. MISSISSIPPI.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI.

The levee board of Mississippi, being authorized by a statute of the State to borrow money and to issue their bonds therefor, to be negotiable as promissory notes or bills of exchange, issued and sold to the amount of $500,000, principal bonds of $1000 each, payable "in gold coin of the United States of America," with semi-annual interest coupons, payable

Statement of the Case.

"in currency of the United States." In a suit to enforce a trust and lien upon certain lands in the State created in favor of the bondholders by an act of the legislature of the State, the Supreme Court of the State construed the bonds as obligations payable in gold coin, and held that the power to borrow money conferred by the statute upon the levee board did not authorize it to borrow gold coin or issue bonds acknowledging the receipt thereof and agreeing to pay therefor in the same medium, and that the bonds were void for want of power in that respect. Held, (1) That the inquiry as to the medium in which the bonds were payable, and, if in gold coin, the effect thereof, involved the right to enforce a contract according to the meaning of its terms as determined by the Constitution and laws of the United States, interpreted by the tribunal of last resort, and, therefore, raised questions of Federal right which justifled the issue of the writ of error, and gave this court jurisdiction under it;

(2) That the bonds were legally solvable in the money of the United

States, whatever its description, and not in any particular kind of that money, and that it was impossible to hold that they were void because of want of power to issue them;

(3) That as, by their terms these bonds were payable generally in money of the United States, the conclusion of the Supreme Court of Mississippi, that they were otherwise payable, was erroneous. FIELD, J., concurring. No transaction of commerce or business, or obligation for the payment of money that is not immoral in its character and which is not, in its manifest purpose, detrimental to the peace, good order and general interest of society, can be declared or held to be invalid because enforced or made payable in gold coin or currency when that is established or recognized by the government; and any acts by state authority, impairing or lessening the validity or negotiability of obligations thus made payable in gold coin, are violative of the laws and Constitution of the United States.

PLAINTIFFS filed their bill in the chancery court of Hinds County, Mississippi, to enforce a trust and lien upon certain lands created in their favor as holders of bonds of the levee board of the State of Mississippi, district No. 1, by an act of the general assembly of Mississippi, approved March 17, 1871, under which the bonds were issued. The bill alleged that the obligation of the bonds and the security provided for their payment by the act of 1871, had been impaired in contravention of the Constitution of the United States by several subsequent acts of the legislature of Mississippi, which were set forth in the bill.

Defendants demurred to the bill upon the ground, among