[Watson v. The State.] an indictment which charged that he "did sell or give spirituous, vinous, or malt liquor, to one Abe Culver, a minor, without the requisition of a physician for medicinal purposes." "On the trial," as the bill of exceptions states, "it was proved that the defendant, within twelve months before the finding of the indictment, and in said county, sold lager beer to the person named in the indictment, who was under twenty-one years of age, and whose father had authorized the defendant to let him have lager beer whenever he called for it; that this authority had never been revoked, and that the father was not present when the minor purchased and drank said lager beer. This being all the evidence, the court charged the jury, at the request in writing of the solicitor, that they must find the defendant guilty, if they believed the evidence; to which charge the defendant excepted." J. D. GARDNER, for the defendant, JNO. W. A. SANFORD, Attorney-General, for the State. BRICKELL, C. J.-The appellant was indicted and convicted, under the statute approved March 18, 1875 (Pamph. Acts 1874-5, p. 280), of the offense of selling or giving to a minor spirituous, vinous, or malt liquors. The objection now taken to the constitutionality of this statute, that the subject is not clearly expressed in the title, was considered at the present term, in the case of Adler v. State, and we said: "We do not think the objection to the constitutionality of the act under discussion is well taken. True, the title does not clearly point to all the provisions of the act. The authorities above cited show that this is not necessary. It does, however, clearly express,' that the 'sale or giving away of spirituous, vinous, or malt liquors,' is the subject. Every provision of the statute falls within the scope of this general subject." We are content with this conclusion. 2. "It is most unquestionable, that courts will take notice of what is within the common experience or knowledge of all men."-1 Greenl. Ev. § 6. It is not, therefore, necessary to prove the meaning of words in the vernacular language, nor the meaning of terms which, from continuous use, have acquired a definite signification, generally, if not universally known. This court has taken judicial notice of the nature of lotteries, and the manner in which they are conducted. Boullemet v. State, 28 Ala. 88. So, also, of the business of an ambrotypist and daguerreotypist, and photograph painter. Barnes v. Ingalls, 39 Ala. 193. So, that the word syndic, in the civil law, very nearly corresponds with that of assignee [Mitchell v. The State.] in the common law. Lager beer is certainly universally known here as a malt liquor; and it would be as vain and useless to offer evidence that such is its character, as that whiskey is a distillation of grain, or wine of fermented juice of the grape, or cider the expressed juice of the apple. The word is now found in the dictionaries commonly used; and from its introduction into this county as a beverage, that it is a malt liquor is known wherever it is drunk, or is an article of commerce. Courts cannot profess ignorance of the meaning of words of popular use, and about the signification of which no intelligent member of the community would hesitate. Evidence that lager beer was a malt liquor, was not necessary to support the indictment. Let the judgment be affirmed. Mitchell v. The State. Indictment for Betting at Cards in Public Place. 1. Sufficiency of indictment.—In an indictment for betting st cards in a public place (Rev. Code, § 3622; Form No. 29, p. 811), it is not necessary to aver that the defendant bet money or other valuable thing. 2. Proof of character of house or place where playing was done.—A conviction for betting at a game of cards, "at a house or place where spirituous liquors were at the time sold," &c., cannot be sustained, when the only evidence as to the character of the house is that spirituous liquors were there sold at the time of the trial. FROM the City Court of Montgomery. Tried before the Hon. JOHN A. MINNIS. The ninth count of the indictment in this case charged, that the defendant "bet at a game with cards, or dice, or some other device or substitute for cards or dice, at a tavern, inn, store-house for retailing spirituous liquors, or house or place where spirituous liquors were at the time sold, retailed, or given away," &c. The defendant demurred to this count, because it did not allege that he bet money, bank-notes, or other valuable thing; but the court overruled the demurrer. "On the trial," as the bill of exceptions states, "the State introduced one Owens as a witness, who testified, that the defendant, with others, played at a game of eucre for money, at the 'Rialto,' in the city of Montgomery, within twelve months before the finding of the indictment, and that the betting commenced for cigars and whiskey. One Harris, another witness for the State, testified to the same facts, and [Mitchell v. The State.] that the parties were drinking whiskey freely at the time. One Payne, another witness for the State, testified, that the Rialto' is situated on Market street in the city of Montgomery, and that spirituous liquors are now retailed there. This was all the evidence in the case;" and the defendant thereupon requested the following charge, with others, which was in writing: "2. If the evidence shows that the alleged playing took place at the 'Rialto,' and the only evidence as to the character of that place is that spirituous liquors are now retailed there, this is not sufficient evidence as to the character of the place to warrant a conviction on the 9th count of the indictment." The court refused to give this charge, and the defendant excepted to its refusal. GRAHAM & ARRINGTON, for the defendant. JNO. W. A. SANFORD, Attorney-General, for the State. MANNING, J.-The indictment in this cause was demurred to, on the ground that it does not aver that defendant bet or hazarded "any money, bank-notes, or other thing of value;" these words being used in the section of the Code, providing for the punishment of the offense supposed to have been committed by defendant. And it is shown that, when the original Code of 1852 was compiled, by which the form used in this case was first introduced, the words above referred to were not then in the description of the offense as it was defined in that Code. The argument might, perhaps, prevail, if it did not appear from the Revised Code, that when it was prepared and adopted, the form of the indictment was revised and amended, by an addition to it so as to make it applicable to betting at a game called "keno," &c., for the punishment of which provision was then made. From this it appears, that the codifiers and legislature considered the charge that a person "bet" at a prohibited game equivalent to saying that he "bet or hazarded money, bank-notes, or other things of value," at such game, and that it was not necessary to specify these in the indictment. The City Court did not err in overruling the demurrer. 2. We are of opinion, however, that there was no evidence before the jury showing that the "Rialto," when the betting and playing at cards were done, was at that time such a place as it was charged to be in the 9th count in the indictment. Testimony that spirituous liquors were sold there at the time of the trial, was not evidence of the character of the place when the playing was done in it, perhaps twelve or eighteen months before. The court, therefore, erred in re [Cooley v. The State.] fusing to give the second instruction to the jury asked by defendant and refused. For this error, the judgment must be reversed, and the cause remanded. Cooley v. The State. Indictment for Bigamy. 1. Proof of marriage by bill for divorce.--A bill in equity for a divorce, not verified by the oath of the complainant, is, like any other unsworn bill, regarded as the mere suggestion of counsel; and is not competent evidence against the complainant therein, in a subsequent prosecution for bigamy, to prove his marriage with the defendant as therein alleged. 2. Validity of infant's marriage.-A marriage, contracted by an infant under the age of consent- -seventeen years if a male, and fourteen if a female-(Rev. Code, 2333), is not absolutely void, but voidable only; and, until disaffirmed, is a marriage in fact, and sufficient to support a prosecution for bigamy in contracting a second marriage. FROM the Circuit Court of Randolph. Tried before the Hon. JOHN HENDERSON. saw The indictment in this case, which was found in February, 1877, and contained but a single count, charged that the defendant, John B. Cooley, "having a wife then living, unlawfully married one Melissa Cooley." On the trial, as the bill of exceptions shows, the defendant having pleaded not guilty, "the State introduced one Muncus as a witness, who testified, that on the 15th day of October, three or four years ago (he could not recollect which), he was present, a the defendant married to one Susannah Bradley; also, that he saw the defendant hold up his hand before Dr. Cantrell, and swear that he was twenty-one years old; also, that the defendant lived about a week with the woman he saw him marry." The State then introduced as evidence a bill in chancery filed by the said defendant on the 28th day of August, 1876, for a divorce from the said Susannah on the ground of adultery; which was offered in evidence, " as a confession by the said defendant that he had married the said Susannah, and had lived with her about three weeks, and to show that said defendant was over twenty-one years of age when said bill was filed." The defendant objected to the admission of said bill as evidence, "on the ground that, not being sworn to, it was the mere suggestion of counsel, and therefore not competent evidence in this case." The [Cooley v. The State.] court overruled the objection, and admitted the evidence; and the defendant excepted. The defendant's second marriage was admitted. On the part of the defense it was proved, by the entries in the family Bible of the defendant's father, that he was born on the 17th day of November, 1856; and that, with the exception of one week between the 15th October and the 17th November, 1873, he ate and slept at his father's house, and did not cohabit with the said Susannah; while the State proved, in rebuttal, by the mother of the said Susannah, that the defendant and the said Susannah "lived together at her house about two weeks after the 17th November, 1873." "This being all the evidence necessary for a proper understanding of the questions reserved, the court charged the jury, that if they believed, from the evidence, that the defendant married the first time before he was seventeen years of age, he might have treated the marriage as a nullity at any time before he was seventeen years of age; but, if he cohabited and lived with her after he arrived at the age of seventeen, this would be a ratification of the marriage, and he would be guilty as charged in the indictment." The defendant excepted to this charge, and requested the court, in writing, to instruct the jury as follows: 1. "If the jury believe, from the evidence, that the defendant was under seventeen years of age when he married Susannah Bradley, he is not guilty, and the jury must acquit him.” 2. “If the defendant was under seventeen years of age at the time of said first marriage, then said marriage was void, and incapable of ratification." 2. "If the defendant was under seventeen years of age at the time of his first marriage, then he could not ratify said marriage until he arrived at the age of twenty-one years." 4. "To constitute a ratification of a contract, the party alleged to have ratified it must be shown by evidence to have done so willingly and understandingly." The court refused each of these charges, and the defendant excepted to their refusal. SMITH & SMITH, for the defendant.-The statute law of this State declares, that males under seventeen, and females under fourteen years old, "are incapable of contracting marriage.'-'Rev. Code, $ 2333. This statute changes the rule of the common law, which allowed experimental marriages by infants, and renders marriages contracted by parties under the prescribed age, not voidable merely, but absolutely void, and incapable of ratification.-Cooley's Blackstone, vol. 1. 435, 433; Gathings v. Williams, 5 Ired. 487; Story on Agency, 240; 47 Ala. 143. But, whether such marriage be void or |