interest" of the residuary legatees, they cannot give a good title to one who knows that they have sufficient funds to meet all the legacies referred to in the power of sale. In Brome v. Pembroke, 66 Md. 193, the court of appeals of Maryland did pass upon the necessity of the sale, and held it to be unauthorized, because it did not appear to be necessary for the payment of debts. The will in that case directed the executor, who was also appointed a trustee, to hold the property in trust till a certain time, and then divide it, but also authorized him to sell as much of it as might be necessary to pay the testator's debts. The Supreme Court of Connecticut has done likewise. There an estate was devised to one" to use and improve during his natural life, and if he should want for his support, to sell any part or the whole of it for his maintenance." It was held that the estate could not be sold except in case of actual necessity, and that the devisee was not the judge of the necessity. Hull v. Culver, 34 Conn. 403. In Crozier v. Hoyt, decided by the Supreme Court of Illinois, the will contained the following provision: "I will that my wife have the entire control of my personal and real estate, of whatsoever kind or nature or wheresoever situated, after the payment of my debts, so long as she shall live, for her support and maintenance in such a manner as her situation in life requires." The remainder, after the termination of the life estate of the testator's wife, in certain real estate described, was given to Roberts, a son-in-law of the testator's wife, the clause so disposing of such remainder concluding thus: "In consideration that he take good care of my wife and treat her kindly, should she call on him to do so, and should she choose to live with him and her daughter-it being understood that he and his wife treat my wife as becomes a son and daughter." The succeeding clause gave certain described real estate to Crozier, the nephew of the testator, and then follows this provision: "All the rest of my estate, real and personal, after the termination of the life estate of my wife, I give to my heirs at law.". should it be necessary for her so to do for her maintenance and support-it being understood that she is not to waste any property; but I want to give her full power so as to support herself well. And should she choose to help her other daughter, if she should become a widow, or help her said daughter or her children, she has fuli power to do so before the heirs aforesaid take their remainders hereby giving my wife full power to sell any of the property aforesaid and give good title to the same, either at public or private sale, using her own judgment as to which shall bring the greatest amount of money." The tes tator had neither children nor descendants of children. After his death his widow sold and conveyed all the real estate. Upon bill filed by the heirs at law of the testator to vacate such sale for the want of power to make it, it was held that the exercise of the power of sale and conveyance was entirely within the discretion of the widow of the testator, and, in the absence of fraud or collusion, was not subject to review or control by a court of equity. Nor was the power to sell and convey to be limited in its exercise by the necessity for the maintenance and support of the testator's widow-but the power was given for all the purposes mentioned-to "help her other daughter,if she should become a widow, or help her said daughter or her children," if she should choose to do so, as well as to provide for her own maintenance and support. The power to help her daughter was not to be considered as restricted to the proceeds of the life estate of the widow, but extended to the whole estate, or to such part of it as she might choose to devote to such purpose, excluding only the real estate specifically devised. Crozier v. Hoyt, 97 Ill. 23. In Tennessee it is held that where land is conveyed to a trustee for the benefit of a husband and wife, with remainder to their children, and the trustees clothed with the power to sell and convey with the assent of the husband and wife, or the survivor of them, their discretion cannot be controlled in the absence of fraud, and the conveyance of the trustee, with the assent of the husband and wife, will defeat the remaindermen. Hamilton v. Mound City Mut. L. Ins. Co., 6 Lea (Tenn.) aforesaid, 402. A further clause provided: "I hereby give to my wife full power to sell all my personal estate and all my real estate, except the lands willed to Crozier and Roberts, 16. Statutory Powers.-Statutory powers can be constructively enlarged only in conformity with the principles governing legal construction, and because something is imported into the statute by a necessary or reasonable implication. The question is not whether the matter of implication will add to the efficiency of what is conferred in terms, but whether, without such matter, the statute will be wholly or in part inoperative.1 - VI. EXTINGUISHMENT, SUSPENSION, AND MERGER -1. In General.-As a general rule powers may be suspended or extinguished.2 Powers appendant may be destroyed by release, bargain and sale, or feoffment; powers in gross, by feoffment or release; but powers simply collateral cannot be destroyed by the act of the person to whom they are given.3 1. State v. Charleston, 1 S. Car. 30. See Markham v. Howell, 33 Ga. 508; Paff v. Kinney, 1 Bradf. (N. Y.) 1; Peay v. Talbot, 39 Tex. 335. Where a power created by statute has been fully executed, and something not authorized by the statute has been added, but which is clearly distinguish able from the rightful execution, the execution of the power is good so far as authorized by the statute, and void only as to the excess. Knox Co. v. Nichols, 14 Ohio St. 260; State v. Perryburg Board of Education, 35 Qhio St. 519. Though an executor, instead of exercising in the manner prescribed by statute a power of sale of land conferred upon him by the will, negotiates the sale, and procures the deed to be exe cuted by the heirs, and receives the proceeds, he may use such proceeds for the purposes specified in the will and required of him by law. Roberts v. Roberts, 71 Md. 1. If the statutory power to two persons is joint, and they give joint security, an act performed by one, after the other has ceased to act, will not bind the sureties. State v. Boone, 44 Mo. 254. While a court of equity may relieve against the defective execution of a power created by a party, it cannot do so when the power is created by law, nor can it dispense with any of the formalities required for its legal execution. McBryde v. Wilkinson, 29 Ala. 662; Mayor etc. of Baltimore v. Porter, 18 Md. 284; Smith v. Bowes, 38 Md. 463. Compare First Nat. Bank v. Mount Tabor, 52 Vt. 87; 36 Am. Rep. 734. Where there has been an execution of a statutory power, the record of the proceedings must show affirmatively that every formality has been complied with. Leak v. Richmond Co., 64 N. Car. 132. 2. 2 Chance, Powers 3102, 3136; Lampet's Case, 10 Rep. 408. 3. Wharton's Law Lexicon. Where a power is released by the donee to the one having the freehold in possession, reversion or remainder, this operates to extinguish the power. Chance Powers 3137; Williams' Real Prop. *256; 2 Washb. Real Prop. #308. Chancellor Kent states that a total alienation of the estate extinguishes the power whether appendant or in gross. Thus, if a tenant for life, with a power to grant leases in possession, conveys away the life estate, the power is gone, since its exercise would be derogatory to his own grant. 4 Kent's Comm. *347. But such is not the generally accepted doctrine as to powers in gross. 2 Washb. Real Prop. *309; Chance, Powers, § 3172, though it is true as to powers appendant. 2 Washb. Real Prop. *310. If the donee of a power appendant grant a lease out of his interest, the power is so far suspended that it cannot be exercised until the expiration of the lease. 4 Kent's Comm. *346; 2 Washb. Real Prop. *310. A total alienation of the estate operates as an extinguishment of a power appendant, where it cannot be exercised without defeating the interest granted. Thus, if a tenant for life with a power to grant leases in possession conveyed away his life estate, the power is gone. It is no longer possible for him to execute it, since the execution of the power would be in derogation of his own grant. 1 Sugd. Pow. *56. Mr. Sugden lays down the following rules: 1. That a tenant for life with a power of leasing may exercise it, although he has conveyed away his whole life estate by way of mortgage or security, provided he has reserved to himself that right as against the incumbrancer. On this the cases are agreed. (See Wilson v. Troup, 2 Cow. (N. Y.) 195.) Some cases hold that he may exercise the power as against the incumbrancer, even though he has not reserved the right in his conveyance. 2. That a tenant for life with a power of sale and exchange may exercise it, (a) though he has created an interest out of his life estate (or reserved his reversion so as to remain tenant for life under the settlement), and though he has not reserved to himself any right to exercise the power as against the incumbrancer; but the incumbrancer is not affected thereby; (b) where he has parted with his whole life estate by way of mortgage or security, and though he has not reserved to himself the right to exercise the power as against the incumbrancer. 1 Sugd. Pow. *68. Though the whole estate of the donee of the power is conveyed by him, yet, if it is by way of resettlement, and the prior uses are relimited, and the prior powers of sale and exchange saved and confirmed, these powers may still be exercised, though the present powers of sale and exchange are reserved by the new settlement to different persons. I Sugd. Pow. *75. Sugden also says that an assignment of the whole estate or other alteration of the estate for life, does not affect a collateral power or a power in gross. 1 Sugd. Pow. *85. So if the donee be tenant for years, and survive the years, still he may exercise his power, because the power does not fall within the compass of his estate, but takes effect out of an interest not vested in him. 1 Sugd. Pow. *85. Thus, if a tenant for life assume to pass a fee by a bargain and sale, a covenant to stand seized, or a lease and release, the power will not be destroyed, for the reason that such conveyance passes only what the tenant for life might lawfully convey, to-wit: his life estate. Phitton's Case, cited in Hard. 412; Scrope v. Offley, 4 Bro. P. C. 237; Savile v. Blacket, 1 P. Wms. 777. But if the tenant for life, with a power in gross, join in a settlement to new uses, though he is still made the tenant for life, his power is destroyed, where the contrary construction would enable him to defeat his own grant. Savile v. Blacket, 1 P. Wms. 777. As powers in gross are independent of the donee, they are not suspended by a grant of a lease. 1 Sugd. Pow.*55: Edwards v. Slater, Hard. 413. In this case the lease was from the death of the tenant for life, and therefore did not arise out of the tenancy for life, but out of the first estate. A present power not simply collateral may be extinguished by release to any one who has an estate of free-hold in the land in possession, reversion or remainder. 1 Sugd. Pow. *89. The estates which were already defeasible or chargeable by the power are by such release made absolute. Albany's Case, 1 Rep. 110 b; Coke Litt. 265 b. If a tenant for life with a power of revocation grant a lease, the rent charge, etc., to take effect out of his interest, he will not be permitted to defeat this interest. 1 Sugd. Pow. 48; Goodright v. Cator, Dougl. 460; Noell v. Henley, M. & Y. 302. Compare Anonymous, Mo. 612; Billock v. Thorne, Mo. 615; Yelland v. Ficlis, Mo. 788; sub. nom. Yeoland v. Fettis, 1 R. Abr. 473 (K), pl. 3. The power to consent to a sale where donee of the power is the lifetenant, is not necessarily extinguished by the absolute alienation by him of his life-estate. The rule is that, so long as nothing is done in derogation of the alienee's estate, the alienation has no effect on the power. Leggett v. Doremus, 25 N. J. Eq. 122. The trustees of a settled estate had a power of sale, to be exercised at the request and direction of the tenant for life, who was also entitled to the ultimate reversion in fee. The life-tenant made an absolute conveyance of all his interest for value to A, and the trustees subsequently, at the request of the life-tenant, purported to exercise the power of sale by conveying the estate to A. Held, that the lifetenant's power to consent was not extinguished by the absolute alienation of his life-estate, and could still be exercised with the concurrence of the purchaser. Alexander v. Mills, 6 L. R. Ch. 124; 40 L. J. Ch. 73; 24 L. T., N. S. 206; 19 W. R. 310. Where one has, under a will, a lifeestate in land and a power to appoint by his own will, and the estate is to go to the heirs of the original testator in 2. Where a duty rests upon the donee to exercise the power, default of the execution of the power, the life-tenant may release his power of appointment to the testator's heirs, or he and they can convey the land. Grosvenor v. Bowen, 15 R. I. 549. Where lands are devised to the testator's wife for life, with remainder to his sons on her death intestate, and with power to her to appoint and designate by will the shares and proportions in which they shall take, under such safeguards, in trust or otherwise, as she may deem proper, a power in gross is created and the widow may release or extinguish the power of appointment by joining with the adult remaindermen in a bill asking a sale of the lands for partition. Thorington v. Thorington, 82 Ala. 489. of appointment, the descendants of X living at the death of E would take in equal shares. In re Susanni, 26 W. R. 93. An equitable power of appointment may be effectually released by the voluntary covenant not to exercise it, entered into by the donee of the power with the trustees of the fund which is subject to the power. Isaac v. Hughes, 39 L. J. Ch. 379; 22 L. T., N. S. 11. Where the power is future and to arise by a contingent event, it may be defeasanced, and thereby annulled in whole or in part. 1 Sugd. Pow. *90. Collateral powers cannot be destroyed or suspended by any act of the donee. Chance Powers, 3105; 2 Washb. Real Prop. *308; 4 Kent Comm. *346; Wharton's Law Lexicon. The donee of a collateral power cannot by any act whatever, either his own or that of any other person postpone or extinguish it. I Sugd. Pow. 45-46. An undivided one-fourth interest in certain lots was devised to testator's wife for life, with power to appoint the remainder, and the other three-fourths to his three sons in fee. A certain legacy was made a charge on all the lands devised, and, for the purpose of "It is a settled rule that where a life raising money to pay it, the sons con interest or other estate is.given to the veyed their interest to the life-tenant, person who is authorized to devise or who thereupon, by an instrument of appoint the property, the person doubtful efficiency, attempted to exer- authorized to appoint can release and cise the power by appointing to one of extinguish the power. This is called the sons, and then joined with him in a executing a fee simple warranty deed, to a purchaser of the lots. These instruments were held to operate as a release of the power of appointment, and it was adjudged that the purchaser_took a good title in fee. Atkinson v. Dowling (S. Car. 1890), 12 S. E. Rep. 93. If a tenant for life, with power to grant leases in possession for twentyone years at the best rent, mortgages his life-estate to trustees to pay an annuity for his life and the surplus to himself, the power is not thereby extinguished, but he may still grant a lease agreeably to the terms thereof. Roe v. Bulkeley, 1 Dougl. 292. Where trustees under a will have during the lives of the life-tenants, power to work a quarry on the estate and are directed to work it and divide the profits among the persons entitled, a court cannot order a partition and sale as long as the power lasts. Taylor v. Grange, L. R., 13 Ch. Div. 223; L. R., 15 Ch. Div. 165. Where a fund was settled upon the death of E for such descendants of X as E should by will appoint, upon default power in gross. But where the power to appoint is given to one who has no estate or interest in the property to be distributed, which is called a power simply collateral, the person intrusted with the power cannot release or extinguish it, but may exercise it notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary." (Citing 4 Kent's Comm. 346; 1 Sugd. Powers, 80, 90, 93, 100; Smith v. Death, 5 Madd. 371; Albany's Case, 1 Rep. 111; West v. Berney, 1 R. & M. 431; Bickley v. Guest, Russ. & M. 440; Horner v. Swann, T. & R. 430; Hillyard v. Miller, 10 Pa. St. 326; Miles v. Knight, 12 Jur. 666.) Norris v. Thompson, 19 N. J. Eq. 307. In Fontain v. Ravenel, 17 How. (U. S.) 369, where the testator directed that after the death of his wife his executor should apply the residue of his estate for the benefit of such charitable institutions as he should deem best, and the wife survived the executor, it was held that the executor took a mere naked power, to be exercised on conditions that never happened, and that the clause creating it was therefore void. whether appendant or collateral, he cannot extinguish it by a release.1 3. Where the purpose is accomplished for which the power was given, or where it becomes impossible of execution, the power ceases.2 1. 2 Chance Powers 584, 3121; Williams' Real Prop. *256; 2 Washb. Real Prop. *309. 2. Fontain v. Ravenel, 17 How. (U. S.) 369; Smith v. Taylor, 21 Ill. 296; Deveraux Dunn, 2 Ired. Eq. (N. Car.) 206; Ward v. Barrows, 2 Ohio St. 241. Where, in a deed executing a power, there are words which show that the party has fully executed his power, or which amounts to a release of it, he cannot execute it further. Hervey v. Hervey, 2 Atk. 567. Where a deed of land was made to the grantor's daughter for life, remainder to her children, or in case she should die without leaving children or their descendants, then to the grantor's heirs on the death of the daughter and her husband. And the deed further provided that, if she and her husband should ever sell the land, the purchase-money should be invested in other land, the title to which should be secured to the daughter in the same manner as was the title to the land originally conveyed, and a sale was made and other lands purchased, the power of sale was exhausted with the sale of the land originally granted, and did not extend to the lands purchased with the proceeds. Fritsch v. Klausing (Ky. 1890), 13 S. W. Rep. 241. In a case arising in New York, land was devised to the executors with power of sale for the purpose of distributing the proceeds, one-third each to testatrix's brother and sister, and the income of the other third to another sister, A, while she remained the wife of her then husband. If she survived her husband, she was to take the corpus of the fund, and, if she did not, there was a void limitation over. Upon the resignation of the surviving executor, the supreme court appointed A as trustee, to whom testatrix's brother and other sister conveyed and transferred their contingent interest in the property. It was held that, as, in the event that A did not survive her husband, testatrix would die intestate as to such fund, or, in case the power of sale was not exercised by sale of the land during her life, the intestacy would be applicable to it, as it would go to testatrix's only heirs and next of kin, the brother and sister; and that, the brother and sister having conveyed their interest to A, she acquired the entire beneficial interest in the property, making the exercise of the power of sale unnecessary. Greenland v. Waddell, 116 N. Y. 234; 15 Am. St. Rep. 400. A power to sell fails when its objects are unattainable. Sharpsteen v. Tillou, 3 Cow. (N. Y.) 651; Hetzell v. Barber, 69 N. Y. 1. And this is so, though the purpose is defeated by the voluntary act of the person for whose benefit the power was created, as happened in the case last cited. There land was devised, one-third to testatrix's husband in fee and one-third each to their two daughters, with power to the husband to sell and convey; and he deeded first his third and afterwards the whole. The last deed was held to be inoperative, since by deeding the one-third he had disabled himself from complying with the terms of the power. Hetzell v. Barber, 69 N. Y. 1. But the death of one of several for whose benefit the power is given, does not impair the power. Ely v. Dix, 118 Ill. 477. Where property is devised to trustees in trust to convey the same to such person or persons as A shall appoint, and in case of his death, leaving his wife, without making such appointment, then according to the appointment of the wife of A, to defeat the power of appointment by the wife of A, there must have been an actual execution of the power by A in the form required by the power. Haslen v. Kean, 2 Murph. (N. Car.) 382. If in the first instrument executing the original power, there is reserved a power of revocation and of new appointment, such instrument does not constitute a new settlement, destructive of the first; nor is the original power thereby exhausted and at an end, but upon the revocation of such instrument exists in full force. Saunders v. Evans, 8 H. L. Cas. 721; 7 Jur., N. S. 1292; 31 L. J. Ch. 233. Where, in the body of a will, authority is given the executor to sell certain |