so as to give the player opportunity to get his leg under the table, and so constructed as to be cheaper than the curved or ogee form, has sufficient utility to support a patent. Collender v. Griffith, 2 Fed. Rep. 206.

1. Parker v. Stiles, 5 McLean (U. S.) 44; Mesker v. Thuener, 42 Fed. Rep. 329; Huber v. Nelson Mfg. Co., 38 Fed. Rep. 830.

The presumption of utility must be rebutted by proof. Kirk v. Du Bois, 33 Fed. Rep. 252.

Conclusiveness of the Presumption.— But that it is not conclusive, the invention may be shown to be useless. Lee v. Blandy, 2 Fish. Pat. Cas. 89; s. c., I Bond (U. S.) 361. Presumption of utility arises from oath of applicant for the patent that it is useful. Hays v. Sulsor, Fish. Pat. Cas. 532; s. c., I Bond (U. S.) 279. Presumption of utility can only be overcome by clear proof, that the device is utterly worthjess. 2 Fish. Pat. Cas. 229; s. c., I Bond (U. S.) 511. And if the device is useful even in a small degree, it is not usual for the court to reverse the decision of the Patent Office. Doherty v. Haynes, 1 Bann. & Ard. Pat. Cas. 289. 2. The fact that the defendants were contesting a patent is evidence that the invention is useful. Smith v. O'Connor, 6 Fish. Pat. Cas. 469; s. c., 2 Sawy. (U. S.) 461; 4 Pat. Off. Gaz. 633; Megraw v. Campbell, 4 Bann. & Ard. Pat. Cas. 325; Niles Tool Works v. Betts Machine Co., 27 Fed. Rep. 301; Kearney v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 32 Fed. Rep. 320.

And this evidence has been held conclusive. Hays v. Sulsor, I Fish. Pat. Cas. 532; s. c., 1 Bond (U. S.) 279; Vance v. Campbell, 1 Fish. Pat. Cas. 483; Hancock Inspirator Co. v. Jenks, 21 Fed. Rep. 911; La Rue v. Western Electric Co., 31 Fed. Rep. 8o.

3. Birdsall v. McDonald, 1 Bann. &

Ard. Pat. Cas. 165; s. c., 6 Pat. Off. Gaz. 682; Henry v. Francestown Soapstone Co., 2 Fed. Rep. 78; s. c., 17 Pat. Off. Gaz. 569.

Neither filing the model nor writing the paper commonly called the specification, gives the date of the application from which the two years are to be reckoned. "Application," in this connection, includes the paper as some written paper and its presentation to the Commissioner. Henry v. Francestown Soapstone Co., 2 Fed. Rep. 78; s. c., 17 Pat. Off. Gaz. 569; Draper v. Wattles, 16 Pat. Off. Gaz. 629.

4. Sewall v. Jones, 91 U. S. 171; s. c., 9 Pat. Off. Gaz. 47.

5. Godfrey v. Eames, 1 Wall. (U. S.) 317; Smith v. O'Connor, 2 Sawy. (U. S.) 461; s. c., 6 Fish. Pat. Cas. 469; s. c., 4 Pat. Off. Gaz. 633; Smith v. Goodyear Dental etc. Co., 93 U. S. 486; S. C., II Pat. Off. Gaz. 246; Howes v. McNeal, 15 Blatchf. (U. S.) 103; s. c., 3 Bann. & Ard. Pat. Cas. 376; s. c., 15 Pat. Off. Gaz. 608; Blandy v. Griffith, 3 Fish. Pat. Cas. 609; Howe v. Newton, 2 Fish. Pat. Cas. 531; Goodyear Dental etc. Co. v. Willis, 1 Flipp. (U. S.) 385; s. c., 1 Bann. & Ard. Pat. Cas. 560; Weston v. White, 13 Blatchf. (U. S.) 364; s. c., 2 Bann. & Ard. Pat. Cas. 321; Colgate v. Western Union Tel. Co., 15 Blatchf. (U. S.) 365; s. c., 4 Bann. & Ard. Pat. Cas. 37; s. c., 14 Pat. Off. Gaz. 943; Graham v. Geneva etc. Mfg. Co., 11 Fed. Rep. 779.

This rule is modified by § 32 of act of 1870, so that where an application is abandoned by failure to prosecute within two years, a new application filed does not relate back to the date of the prior application, but only to the date of its own filing. Lindsay v. Stein, 21 Pat. Off. Gaz. 1613; s. c., 10 Fed. Rep. 907.

6. United States Rifle Co. v. Whitney Arms Co., 14 Blatchf. (U. S.) 94;

s. c., 2 Bann. & Ard. Pat. Cas. 493; s. c., 11 Pat. Off. Gaz. 373; Rich v. Lippincott, 2 Fish. Pat. Cas. I.

Whether a new application is a continuance of an old one, is a question of fact. Berin v. East Hampton Bell Co., 9 Blatchf. (U. S.) 50; s. c., 5 Fish. Pat. Cas. 23; Weston v. White, 13 Blatchf. (U. S.) 364; s. c., 2 Bann. & Ard. Pat. Cas. 321; Rich v. Lippincott, 2 Fish. Pat. Čas. 1.

Filing New Application for Rejected Matter. A second application embracing a claim in a prior application which claim had been rejected and was canceled from the first application after the filing of the second (both applications going to issue), is a continuation of the first application. Graham v. McCormick, 20 Biss. (U. S.) 39; s. c., 5 Bann. & Ard. Pat. Cas. 244; S. C., 11 Fed. Rep. 859; s. c., 21 Pat. Off. Gaz. 1533.

But not where the action of the applicant would show intention to abandon the matter contained in the original claim. Pelton v. Waters, 1 Bann. & Ard. Pat. Cas. 599; s. c., 7 Pat. Off. Gaz. 425.

1. Patterson v. Kentucky, 197 U. S. 501; Webber v. Virginia, 103 U. S. 344; Jordan v. Overseers of Dayton, 4 Ohio 295; In re Brosnahan, 18 Fed. Rep. 62.

There remains in the patentee, as in every other citizen, the power to manage his property or give direction to his laborers at his pleasure, subject only to the paramount claims of society, which require that his enjoyment may be modified by the exigencies of the society to which he belongs, and regulated by the laws which render it subservient to the general welfare, if held subject to State control. Jordan v. Overseers of Dayton, 4 Ohio 295; Patterson v. Kentucky, 97 U. S. 501; In re Brosnahan, 18 Fed. Rep. 62.

2. Ex parte Robinson, 2 Biss. (U. S.) 309; 8. C., 4 Fish. Pat. Cas. 186; Helm v. First Nat. Bank, 43 Ind.

167; Hollida v. Hunt, 70 Ill. 109; Crittenden v. White, 9 Chic. L. N. 110.

While this power is not expressly prohibited to the States, it is so impliedly. Helm v. First Nat. Bank, 43 Ind. 167.

3. Webber v. Virginia, 103 U. S. 344; Patterson v. Kentucky, 97 U. S. 501; Jordan v. Overseers of Dayton, 4 Ohio 294; Thompson v. Staats, 15 Wend. (N. Y.) 395; In re Brosnahan, 18 Fed. Rep. 62; United States v. American Bell Telephone Co., 29 Fed. Rep. 43; May v. Buchanan Co., 29 Fed. Rep. 473.

A license which does not impose any discrimination between articles manufactured under a patent and those not so manufactured, is legally imposed. Webber v. Virginia, 103 U. S. 344; People v. Russell, 49 Mich. 617.

A State has the right to prohibit a dangerous manufacture or the sale of a dangerous product, even if thereby it destroys the availability of a patent. Patterson v. Kentucky, 97 U. S. 501.

Or to prevent the use of a patent which is calculated to produce immorality. Vannini v. Paine, I Harr.

(Del.) 65.

A State may regulate the sale of a patented thing and may not regulate the sale of the patent covering that thing. A patentee has two kinds of rights in his invention. He has a right both to make, use and sell specimens of his invention, and to prevent all other persons from doing either of these acts. The first of these is entirely independent of the patent laws; the second exists by virtue of these laws alone. Walker on Patents, 2nd ed. § 155.

Marking Notes Given for Patent Rights.-State statutes cornpelling, under penalty, a distinguishing mark to be placed on notes given for patent rights, have been declared invalid as in conflict with the constitution of the United States. Ohio, State v. Peck, 25 Ohio St. 26.

Indiana, Helm v. Bank, 43 Ind. 167;

Fry v. State, 63 Ind. 552; Hereth v. Bank, 34 Ind. 380; Machine Co. v. Butler, 53 Ind. 454; Castle v. Hutchinson, 25 Fed. Rep. 394

Illinois, Hollida v. Hunt, 70 Ill. 109; s. c., 22 Am. Rep. 63.

Wisconsin, State v. Lockwood, 43 Wis. 403.

Pennsylvania, Bowen v. Kemmun, 2 Pearson (Pa.) 250.

Maine, Hask call v. Whitmore, 19 Me. 102.

Kentucky, Patterson v. Commonwealth, 1 Bush (Ky.) 311; s. c., 21 Am. Rep. 20.

Nebraska, Welch v. Phelps, 25 Pat. Off. Gaz. 981.

In Pennsylvania such statutes have been upheld. Haskell v. Jones, 86 Pa. St. 173; Shires v. Commonwealth, 120 Pa. St. 368.

Statutes of Limitation.-State statutes cannot limit the time within which actions for the infringement of letters patent may be brought in the United States. Čollins v. Peebles, 2 Fish. Pat. Cas. 541; Parker v. Hollock, 2 Fish. Pat. Čas. 543; Anthony v. Carroll, 2 Bann. & Ard. Pat. Cas. 195; S. C., 9 Pat. Off. Gaz. 199; Wood v. Cleveland Rolling Mill, 4 Fish. Pat. Cas. 550; Sayles v. Dubuque R. Co., 5 Dill. (U. S.) 561; s. c., 3 Bann. & Ard. Pat. Cas. 219; Stephens v. Kansas Pac. R. Co., 5 Dill. (U. S.) 486; Wetherill v. New Jersey Zinc Co., I Bann. & Ard. Pat. Cas. 485; Sayles v. Louisville etc. R. Co., 9 Fed. Rep. 512; Adams v. Bellaire Stamping Co., 25 Fed. Rep. 270; May v. Logan Co., 127 Fed. Rep. 692; May v. Buchanan Co., 30 Fed. Rep. 257; May v. Cass Co., 30 Fed. Rep. 762; May v. Ralls Co., 31 Fed. Rep. 473. Contra, Parker v. Hawk, 2 Fish. Pat. Cas. 58; Rich v. Ricketts, 7 Blatchf. (U. S.) 230; Hayden v. Oriental Mills, 15 Fed. Rep. 605; Royer v. Coupe, 29 Fed. Rep. 362.

1. Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780;

Smith v. Frazer, 5 Fish. Pat. Cas. 548; s. c., 2 Pat. Off. Gaz. 175.

A combination of arrangements and processes to work out a new and useful result is an art. Roberts v. Dickey, 4 Fish. Pat. Cas. 532; s. C., 4 Brews. (Pa.) 260; s. c., 1 Pat. Off. Gaz. 4.

2. Piper v. Brown, 4 Fish. Pat. Cas. 175.

For examples of process, see Tilghman v. Norse, 5 Fish. Pat. Cas. 323; s. c., 9 Blatchf. (U. S.) 421 ; s. C., 1 Pat. Off. Gaz. 574; Piper v. Brown, 4 Fish. Pat. Cas. 165; American Bell Telephone Co. v. Spencer, 20 Pat. Off. Gaz. 299; s. c., 8 Fed. Rep. 509; American Bell Telephone Co. v. Dolbear, 23 Pat. Off. Gaz. 535; s. C., 15 Fed. Rep. 448; The Telephone Cases, 126 U. S. 1.

"Process" or "method," when used to represent the means of producing a beneficial result, are, in law, synony mous with art, provided the means are not effected by mechanism or mechanical combinations. Piper v. Brown, 4 Fish. Pat. Cas. 175.

A combination of arrangements and processes to work out a new and useful result, is a new and useful art. Roberts v. Dickey, 4 Fish. Pat. Cas. 632; s. c., 4 Brews. (U. S.).260; s. c., 1 Pat. Off. Gaz. 4, 1000.

A patent for an art must be practicable and referable to something which may prove to be useful. Evans v. Eaton, 1 Pet. (C. C.) 322; s. c., 3 Wheat. (U. S.) 454; s. c., 1 Robb Pat. Cas. 68, 243.

A process may be patentable irrespective of the particular form of the instrumentalities used. Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U. S. 780.

A new application of some property in nature never before known or in use, by which a new and useful result is produced, is the subject of a patent, independently of any peculiar or new arrangement of machinery. Foot v. Silsby, 2 Blatchf. (U. S.) 260; aff❜g 20 How. (U. S.) 378.

The elements of a process may be old, but when combined for the purpose of putting a new idea to practical use, they constitute a new and useful process. Andrews v. Cannon, 13 Blatchf. (U. S.) 307; s. c., 2 Bann. & Ard. Pat. Cas. 277; Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U. S. 780.

An inventor may use any means, new or old, in the application of the new property to produce the new and useful result to the exclusion of all other means. Foote v. Silsby, 2 Blatchf. (U.S.) 260: s. c., 10 How. (U. S.) 378; Dolbear v. American Bell Telephone Co., 126 U. S. 1.

Distinction Between an Art or Process and a Principle of Nature." In this art -or what is the same thing under the Patent Law, this process, this way of transmitting speech-electricity is employed, but electricity left to itself will not do what is wanted. The art consists in so controlling the force as to make it accomplish the purpose. It had long been believed that if the vibrations of air caused by the voice in speaking could be reproduced at a distance by means of electricity, the speech itself would be reproduced and understood. How to do it was the question. Bell discovered that it could be done by gradually changing the intensity of an

electric current so as to make it correspond to the changes in the density of the air caused by the sound of the voice. This was his art." Dolbear v. American Bell.Telephone Co., 126 U. S. 1.

Distinction Between a Machine and a Process. A machine is a thing. A process is a mode of acting. The one is visible to the eye. The other a conception of the mind seen only by its effects when being executed or performed. Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U. S. 708.

A patentee who has invented an effective means for giving circular direction to a feed mechanism is entitled to a patent for the means, but not for giving such a direction to his mechanism, nor for the process of operating his mechanism for giving such direction. Dryfoos v. Weise, 26 Pat. Off. Gaz. 639. 1. Corning v. Burden, 15 How. (U.

S.) 252; Mowry v. Whitney, 14 Wall. (U. S.) 620; Tilghman v. Proctor, 19 Pat. Off. Gaz. 859; s. c., 102 U. S. 707. 2. Smith v. Downing, 1 Fish. Pat. Cas. 64; French v. Rogers, 1 Fish. Pat. Cas. 133.

78.

3. Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U. S.

4. McKay v. Jackman, 22 Pat. Off. Gaz. 85; s. c., 12 Fed. Rep. 615.

5. McKay v. Jackman, 23 Pat. Off. Gaz. 85; s. c., 12 Fed. Rep. 615; New v. Warren, 22 Pat. Off. Gaz. 589.

A process eo nomine, is not made the subject of a patent in any act of congress. It is included in the term "useful art." An art may require one or more processes or machines in order to produce a certain result or manufacture. Where the result is produced by chemical action, or by the operation or application of some element or power of nature, or of one substance to another, such modes or methods are called processes. It is when the term process is used to represent the means or method of producing a result, that it is patentable; and it will include all methods

or means which are not effected by mechanism or mechanical combinations; but where the term "process" represents the function of a machine, or the effect produced by it on the material subjected to the action of the machine, it is not patentable, since a man cannot have a patent for the function or abstract effect of a machine, but only for the machine which produces it. Corning v. Bur den, 15 How. (U. S.) 252.

A mere mechanical operation is not patentable as a process and is not within the protection of the Patent Law, when taken apart from the means of performing it. McKay v. Jackman, 22 Pat. Off. Gaz. 85; New v. Warren, 22 Pat. Off. Gaz. 589.

A mere process for making an arti cle is not of itself a patentable invention. Mackay v. Jackman, 12 Fed. Rep. 615.

A person cannot patent a result, but only the means or art by which the result is effected. New Process Fermentation Co. v. Maus, 20 Fed. Rep. 725.

Reversed, but on the ground that a means was patented. New Process Fermentation Co. v. Maus, 122 U. S. 413. Compare also Consolidated Bunging Apparatus Co. v. Clausen Brewing Co. 39 Fed. Rep. 277; New Process Fermentation Co. v. Koch, 21 Fed. Rep. 580.

1. Woodcock v. Parker, 1 Gall. (U. S.) 438; s. c., 1 Robb. Pat. Cas. 37; Geiger v. Cook, 3 W. & S. (Pa.) 266; Sanford v. Merrimack Hat Co., 4 Cliff. (U. S.) 404; s. c., 10 Pat. Off. Gaz. 466; Renwick v. Pond, 10 Blatchf. (U. S.) 39; s. c., 5 Fish. Pat. Cas. 569; s. c., 2 Pat. Off. Gaz. 392; Black v. Thorne, 10 Blatchf. (U. S.) 66; s. c., 2 Pat. Off. Gaz. 388; Hammerschlag v. Scamoni, 7 Fed. Rep. 584: s. c., 20 Pat. Off. Gaz. 75; Bailey etc. Washing Mach. Co. v. Lincoln, 4 Fish. Pat. Gaz. 379.

Definition. A concrete thing consisting of parts or of certain devices or combination of devices. Burr v. Duryee, 1 Wall. (U. S.) 531. See Hatch v. Moffitt, 15 Fed. Rep. 252.

2. Wintermute v. Redington, 1 Fish. Pat. Cas. 239; Williams v. Rome etc. R. Co., 15 Blatchf. (U. S.) 200; s. C., 3 Bann. & Ard. Pat. Cas. 413; s. C., 15 Pat. Off. Gaz. 563; Sanford v. Merrimack Hat Co., 4 Cliff. (U. S.) 404; s. c., 10 Pat. Off. Gaz. 466; Edgarton v. Furst etc. Mfg. Co., 10 Biss. (U. S.) 402; S. C., 9 Fed. Rep. 450; s. c, 21 Pat. Off. Gaz. 261; Hill v. Sawyer, 31 Fed. Rep. 282; Burgess v. Chapman, 44 Fed. Rep. 427; Holliday v. Rheem, 18 Pa. St. 368; Union Paper Bag Mach. Co. v. Murphy, 97 U. S. 120.

A patent for a combination does not cover the parts separately. Treadwell v. Bladen, 4 Wash. (U. Š.) 703; s. c., I Robb Pat. Cas. 531; Case v. Brown, 2 Wall. (U. S.) 320; Roberts v. Harnden, 2 Cliff. (U. S.) 500; Metropolitan Washing Mach. Co. v. Providence Tool Co., 20 Wall. (U. S.) 342; McCormick v. Talcott, 20 How. (U. S.) 402; Eddy v. Dennis, 95 U. S. 560; Schumacher v. Cornell, 96 U. S. 249; Goss v. Cam

eron, 14 Fed. Rep. 576; Matterson v. Caine, 8 Sawy. (U. S.) 488.

The principle is well established and is implied in almost every case in infringement of combination.

3. U. S. Rev. Stat. § 4886.

It has been held to cover a hotel register constructed to receive advertisements about its margin. Hawes v. Washburne, 5 Pat. Off. Gaz. 491; Hawes v. Cook, 5 Pat. Off. Gaz. 493

Probably the coupon book held patentable belongs to this class of inventions. Munson v. Mayor etc. of N. Y., 18 Blatchf. (U. S.) 237; s. c., 5 Bann. & Ard. Pat. Cas. 486; s. c., 3 Fed. Rep. 338.

But not a balloon with a banner hav

ing an advertisement attached thereto. Ex parte Gould, 1 McArthur (U. S.) 410; s. c., 5 Pat. Off. Gaz. 121.

A machine need not be automatic. Coupe v. Weatherhead, 16 Fed, Rep. 673; s. c., 23 Pat. Off. Gaz. 1927.

4. Wheeler v. Clipper Mower etc. Co., 10 Blatchf. (U. S.)_181; s. c., 6

Fish. Pat. Cas. 1; s. c., 2 Pat. Off. Gaz. 442.

An added element or substantial change of the element, to a machine, makes a new machine. Bliss v. Brook

lyn, 10 Blatchf. (U.S.) 521; s. c., 6 Fish. Pat. Cas. 289; s. c., 3 Pat. Off. Gaz. 269; Rheem v. Holliday, 16 Pa. St. 347; Hale v. Stimpson, 2 Fish. Pat. Čas. 565; Sharp v. Tift, 18 Blatchf. (U. S.) 132; S. C., 5 Bann. & Ard. Pat. Cas. 399; s. c., 2 Fed. Rep. 687; s. c., 17 Pat. Off. Gaz. 1282.

5. American Wood Paper Co. v. Fibre Disintegrating Co., 23 Wall. (U. S.) 566; Goodyear v. Providence Rubber Co., 2 Fish. Pat. Cas. 499; s. C., 2 Cliff. (U. S.) 351; Goodyear v. Railroad, 2 Wall., Jr. (C. C.) 356; s. C., I Fish. Pat. Cas. 626; Goodyear v. Wait, 9 Blatchf. (U. S.) 77; United Nickel Co. v. Pendleton, 15 Fed. Rep. 739; Simpson v. Davis, 20 Blatchf. (U .S.) 413; 12 Fed. Rep. 144.