Gambar halaman
PDF
ePub

attach to a reissue, which has all the attributes of an original patent.2

V. NOVELTY-1. Definition of Patentable Novelty Patentable novelty is something new invented ;3 a thing which did not exist before, differing from all other things in its structure, movement or effect, by reason of the introduction of some new mechanical combination or principle, a substantial difference in principle

Burner Co., 19 Blatchf. (U. S.) 544; s.
c., 9 Fed. Rep. 390; s. c., 20 Pat. Off.
Gaz. 1377
Woodworth v. Hall, I
Woodb. & M. (U. S.) 248; s. c., 2 Robb
Pat. Cas. 495.

1. See Whiteley v. Fisher, 4 Fish. Pat. Cas. 248; Woodworth v. Hall, 1 Woodb. & M. (U. S.) 248; s. c., 2 Robb Pat. Cas. 495; Hartshorn v. Eagle Shade Roller Co., 18 Fed. Rep. 90; Burr v. Duryee, 2 Fish. Pat. Cas. 275; Wisner v. Grant, 7 Fed. Rep. 922; Carroll v. Morse, 9 Pat. Off. Gaz. 483; Carleton v. Bokee, 17 Wall. (U. S.) 463; Sergeant v. Burge, 10 Pat. Off. Gaz. 285; Jones v. McMurry, 2 Hughes (U. S.) 527; s. c., 3 Bann. & Ard. Pat. Cas. 130; Frinck v. Doty, 14 Pat. Off. Gaz. 157; Shaw v. Colwell Lead Co., 11 Fed. Rep. 711; s. c., 20 Blatchf. (U. S.) 417; Newton v. Mfg. Co., 119 U. S. 373; s. c., 38 Pat. Off. Gaz. 104.

2. French v. Rogers, 1 Fish. Pat. Cas. 133; Morse v. Baine, 9 West L. J. 106. 3. See INVENTION, vol. II, p. 780. Articles may be new in the commercial sense when they are not new in the sense of the Patent Law. New articles of commerce are not patentable as new articles of manufacture, unless it appears in the given case that the production of the new article involved the exercise of invention or discovery beyond what was necessary to construct the apparatus for its manufacture or production. Union Paper Collar Co. v. Van Dusen, 23 Wall. (U. S.) 530.

The novelty required by the Patent Law does not refer to the materials out of which the article is made, to the form or workmanship of the parts, or the use of one known equivalent for another. Forbush v. Cook, 2 Fish. Pat. Cas. 668; Union Paper Collar Co. v. Van Deuzen, 10 Blatchf. (U.S.) 109. 4. Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 4 McLean (U. S.) 456; Affg 11 How. (U. S.) 248.

Meaning of Word Principle with Reference to Novelty. The word principle does not mean new mechanical

power, but consists in the mode of applying or contriving mechanical powers to produce a certain result. Smith v. Pearce, 2 McLean (U. S.) 176; s. c., 2 Robb Pat. Cas. 13; Dunbar v. Marden, 13 N. H. 311.

It is not a new principle in the abstract sense but a new combination or mode. Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 4 McLean (U. S.) 456.

To be new in the sense of the Patent Law, there must be a discovery of new principles, or the employment of old ones in a new proportion, in a new process or to a new purpose. Holden v. Curtis, 2 N. H. 61. See Bell v. Daniels, 1 Bond (U. S.) 212; s. c., I Fish. Pat. Cas. 372.

A new application of a principle by new mechanical contrivances and apparatus, by means of which a new and beneficial result is produced in the use of an article to which it has thus been applied, is patentable. Silsby v. Foote, 1 Blatchf. (U. S.) 445; Aff'g 14 How. (U. S.) 218; Mowry v. Whitney, 5 Fish. Pet. Cas. 515.

Novelty in principle may consist in a new and valuable mode of applying an old power; effecting it, not merely by a new instrument or form of the machine, but by something giving a new or greater advantage. Hovey v. Stephens, 1 Woodb. & M. (U. S.) 290.

When the mechanism in two machines is substantially different from anything before known in its mode of operation, it is new. Lowell v. Lewis, 1 Mason (U. S.) 182; s. c., 1 Robb Pat. Cas. 132; Blanchard v. Puttman, 2 Bond (U. S.) 84; s. c., 3 Fish. Pat. Cas. 186; Whipple v. Baldwin Mfg. Co., 4 Fish. Pat. Cas. 29.

Equivalents. The doctrine of equivalents must be critically considered. Sayles v. Chicago etc. R. Co., 1 Biss. (U. S.) 468; s. c., 2 Fish. Pat. Cas. 523; Blake v. Rawson, 1 Holmes (U. S.) 200; s. c., 6 Fish. Pat. Cas. 74; s. c., 3 Pat. Off. Gaz. 122.

Change of Form.-Change of form is immaterial where it does not contrib

and application,1 or a new mode of operation produced.2

ute to a new result; otherwise where it does. Adams v. Edwards, 1 Fish. Pat. Cas. I.

1. Smith v. Pearce, 2 McLean (U. S.) 176; s. c., 2 Robb Pat. Cas. 13.

Examples.--Williams Mfg. Co. v. Franklin, 41 Fed. Rep. 393; Hiller v. Levy, 41 Fed. Rep. 627; Timken v. Olin, 37 Fed. Rep. 205; Ingham v. Pierce, 31 Fed. Rep. 822; Gandy v. Main Belting Co., 28 Fed. Rep. 573; Boston Electric Co. v. Fuller, 29 Fed. Rep. 515.

2. Forbush v. Cook, 2 Fish. Pat. Cas. 668; Eames v. Cook, 2 Fish. Pat. Cas. 146; Suffolk Mfg. Co. v. Hayden, 4 Fish. Pat. Cas. 86; Stainthrop v. Humiston, 4 Fish. Pat. Cas. 107; Cook v. Earnest, 5 Fish. Pat. Cas. 396; s. c., 2 Pat. Off. Gaz. 89; Waterbury Brass Co. v. Miller, 9 Blatchf. (U. S.) 77; s. c., 5 Fish. Pat. Cas. 48; Dukes v. Bauerle, 41 Fed. Rep. 778; Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Wagner Palace Car Co., 38 Fed. Rep. 416.

Whether a device is new depends upon whether it is the same kind of instrument as another, or whether it acts in the same way and produces the same result in substance. Colt v. Massachusetts Arms Co., 1 Fish. Pat. Cas. 108; Washburn v. Gould, 3 Story (U. S.) 122; s. c., 2 Robb Pat. Cas. 209; Smith v. Higgins, 1 Fish. Pat. Cas. 537; Fisk v. Church, 5 Fish. Pat. Cas. 540; S. C., Pat. Off. Gaz. 634; Bray v. Hartshorn, I Cliff. (U. S.) 538; Robert v. Schuyler, 12 Blatchf. (U. S.) 444; s. c., 2 Bann. & Ard. Pat. Cas. 5; Blake v. Robertson, 94 U. S. 728; s. c., II Pat. Off. Gaz. 887; Butch v. Boyer, 8 Phila. (Pa.) 57; Dalton v. Jennings, 93 U. S. 271; Chase v. Sabin, 1 Holmes (U. S.) 395; s. c., 1 Bann. & Ard. Pat. Cas. 399; s. c., 6 Pat. Off. Gaz. 728; Dane v. Chicago Mfg. Co., 6 Fish. Pat. Cas. 130; s. c., 3 Biss. (U. S.) 374; Tufts v. Boston Mfg. Co., 1 Holmes (U. S.) 459; s. c., 1 Bann. & Ard. Pat. Cas. 633; s. c., 8 Pat. Off. Gaz. 239; Decker v. Silver brand, 8 Pat. Off. Gaz. 944; Mfg. Co. v. Walworth, 9 Pat. Off. Gaz. 746; Lyman Ventilating etc. Co. v. Chamberlain, 2 Bann. & Ard. Pat. Cas. 433; s. c., 10 Pat. Off. Gaz. 588; Boomer v. United Power Press Co., 13 Blatchf. (U. S.) 107; s. c., 2 Bann. & Ard. Pat. Cas. 107; Fuller v. Yentzer, 11 Pat. Off. Gaz. 597; s. c., 1 Bann. & Ard. Pat. Cas. 520; Plastic Slate Roofing Co. v.

Moore, 1 Holmes (U. S.) 167; United Nickel Co. v. Keith, 1 Holmes (U. S.) 328; s. c., 1 Bann. & Ard. Pat. Cas. 44; s. c., 54 Pat. Off. Gaz. 272; Carr v. Rice, Fish. Pat. Cas. 198; Howes v. Nute, 4 Cliff. (U. S.) 173; s. c., 4 Fish. Pat. Cas. 263; Platt v. United States Button etc. Mfg. Co., 5 Fish. Pat. Cas. 265; s. c., 9 Blatchf. (U. S.) 342; s. c., I Pat. Off. Gaz. 524; Rumford Chemical Works v. Lauer, 10 Blatchf. (U. S.) 122; s. c., 5 Fish. Pat. Cas. 615; s. c., 3 Pat. Off. Gaz. 249; Singer v. Braunsdorf, 7 Blatchf. (U. S.) 521; Wilcox v. Komp, 7 Blatchf. (U. S.) 126; Springer v. Stanton, 2 Pat. Off. Gaz. 2; Studebaker etc. Mfg. Co. v. Illinois Iron etc. Co., 42 Fed. Rep. 52; Sackett v. Smith, 42 Fed. Rep. 846; National etc. R. Co. v. Sioux City etc. R. Co., 42 Fed. Rep. 679; Cleveland Fence Co. v. Indianapolis Fence Co., 42 Fed. Rep. 911; Smith v. Pittsburg Gas Co., 42 Fed. Rep. 145; Holmes etc. Tel. Co. v. Domestic Tel. Co., 42 Fed. Rep. 220; Williams v. Barnard, 41 Fed. Rep. 358; Wollensak v. Sargent, 41 Fed. Rep. 53; Uhlmann v. Bartholomae etc. Brewing Co., 41 Fed. Rep. 132; Consolidated Roller Mill Co. v. Coombs, 39 Fed. 25; Norton v. Cary, 39 Fed. Rep. 544; Peninsular Novelty Co. v. American Shoe Tip Co., 39 Fed. Rep. 791; McDonald v. McLean, 38 Fed. Rep. 328; Facer v. Midvale Steel Works, 38 Fed. Rep. 231; Whitman Saddle Co. v. Smith, 38 Fed. Rep. 414; Hake v. Brown, 37 Fed. Rep. 783; Sawyer Spindle Co. v. Buttrick, 37 Fed. Řep. 794; Fonduer v. Chambers, 37 Fed. Rep. 333; Joel v. Gesrwein, 36 Fed. Rep. 592; Stegner v. Blake, 36 Fed. Rep. 183; Marvin v. Gotschall, 36 Fed. Rep. 314; National Hat Pouncing Mach. Co. v. Brown, 36 Fed. Rep. 317; Hill v. Sawyer, 31 Fed. Rep. 282; Howe Mach. Co. v. National Needle Co., 134 U. S. 388; Day v. Fair Haven R. Co., 132 W. S. 98.

To render an article new in the sense of the patent law, it must be more or less efficacious or possess new properties by a combination with other ingredients. Milligan etc. Glue Co. v. Upton, 97 U. S. 3; Consolidated Brewing Apparatus Co. v. Clausen etc. Brewing Co., 39 Fed. Rep. 277; Fawcett v. Rubber etc. Harness Trimming Co., 38 Fed. Rep. 739; Am Ende v. Seabury, 36 Fed. Rep. 593; Marchand v. Emken,

2. Presumption of Novelty-Novelty Essential to Patentability.Novelty is presumed on the grant of a patent,1 and the patent is prima facie evidence thereof. Novelty is essential to patentability.3

3. Intrinsic Evidence of Novelty.-A new effect, or a materially different effect, or as good an effect more cheaply attained, have been held evidence of the novelty of the device. The production of the same result by two devices, except where the result

132 U. S. 195; Steam Gauge etc. Co. v. Kennedy, 41 Fed. Rep. 18; United States Bung Mfg. Co. v. Independent, Bung Co., 31 Fed. Rep. 76; Adams v. Bridgewater Iron Co., 26 Fed. Rep. 324; Western Electric Co. v. Ansonia Brass etc. Co., 114 U. S. 447; Van Deusen v. Nellis, 18 Fed. Rep. 596.

Extreme Cases.-A process of making whiskey, consisting in the utilization of the small particles of sugar, starch and yeast contained in the slop, in the subsequent operations of whiskey-making, by straining the slop of the chaff and other large particles, and cooling it quickly to prevent the accumulation of acid. The slop in a sweet condition, is added to the liquid in the mash tub at the end of the mashing. Held, that though the utilization of the slop from which the fine particles were lost, and the use of the straining and cooling apparatus were old, yet the utilization of the particles being new, the process is a novel one. Frankfort Co. v. Mill Creek Co., 37 Fed. Rep. 533.

The only change an increase in heat. Cary v. Lovell Mfg Co., 31 Fed. Rep. 344

Only change increase of time in rubbing off the coating. Lockwood v. Hooper, 25 Fed. Rep. 910.

84.

1. Swift v. Whisen, 2 Bond (U. S.) This presumption can only be rebutted on clear proof. Donoughe v. Hubbard, 27 Fed. Rep. 742; Cohansey Glass Mfg. Co. v. Wharton, 28 Fed. Rep. 189; Butler v. Bainbridge, 29 Fed. Rep. 142.

2. Matthews v. Skates, 1 Fish. Pat. Cas. 602; Winans v. New York etc. R. Co., 1 Fish. Pat. Cas. 213; Hussey v. Bradley, 5 Blatchf. (U. S.) 134; S. C., 2 Fish. Pat. Cas. 362; Serrill v. Collins, I Fish. Pat. Čas. 289; Middletown Tool Co. v. Judd, 3 Fish. Pat. Cas. 141; Ransom v. Mayor etc. of N. Y., I Fish. Pat. Cas. 252; Poppenhausen v. N. Y. Gutta Percha Comb Co., 2 Fish. Pat. Cas. 62; Haselden v. Ogden, 3 Fish.

Pat. Cas. 378; Waterbury Brass Co. v. New York etc. Brass Co., 3 Fish. Pat. Cas. 43; Judson v. Moore, 1 Bond (U. S.) 285; Goodyear v. Beverly Rubber Co., 1 Cliff. (U. S.) 348; Carter v. Baker, 1 Sawyer (U. S.) 512; s. c., 4 Fish. Pat. Cas. 404; Huber v. Nelson Mfg. Co., 38 Fed. Rep. 830; Frankfort Whiskey Process Co. v. Mill Creek Distilling Co., 37 Fed. Rep. 533.

3. Blanchard v. Putnam, 2 Bond (U. S.) 84; Rice v. Heald, 13 Pac. Law J. 33; Matthews v. Skates, I Fish. Pat. Cas. 602; Packing Co. Cases, 105 U. S. 566; Bruff v. Ives, 14 Blatchf. (U. S. 198; s. c., 2 Bann. & Ard. Pat. Cas. 595; s. c., II Pat. Off. Gaz. 924. This point is so well established that authorities which, if exhaustively cited, would embrace almost all cases involving infringement of patents, that further citation is thought unnecessary.

4. Waterbury etc. Brass Co. v. New York etc. Brass Co., 3 Fish. Pat. Cas. 43; Suffolk Mfg. Co. v. Hayden, 4 Fish. Pat. Cas. 86; Forbush v. Cook, 2 Fish. Pat. Cas. 668; Eames v. Cook, 2 Fish. Pat. Cas. 146; Roberts v. Dickey, 4 Brews. (U. S.) 260; s. c., 4 Fish. Pat. Cas. 532; s. c., 1 Pat. Off. Gaz. 4; Masury v. Anderson, II Blatchf. (U. S.) 162; s. c., 4 Pat. Off. Gaz. 55; s. c., 6 Fish. Pat. Cas 457; Child v. Boston Iron Works, 6 Fish. Pat. Cas. 606; s. c., I Holmes (U. S.) 303; s. c., 5 Pat. Off. Gaz. 61; International Tooth Crown Co. v. Richmond, 30 Fed. Rep. 775.

5. Eames v. Cook, 2 Fish. Pat. Cas. 146; Buerk v. Valentine, 5 Fish. Pat. Cas. 366; s. c., 9 Blatchf. (U. S.) 479; Whittemore v. Cutter, 1 Gall. (U. S.) 478; s. c., I Robb Pat. Cas. 40; Colt v. Massachusetts Arms Co., 1 Fish. Pat. Cas. 108; Platt v. United States Button etc. Mfg. Co., 5 Fish. Pat. Cas. 265; s. c., 9 Blatchf. (U. S.) 342; s. c., I Pat. Off. Gaz. 524; Rumford Chemical Works v. Lauer, 5 Fish. Pat. Cas. 615; s. c., 10 Blatchf. (U. S.) 122; S. C., 3

is produced by the same mode of operation, is no criterion to determine that the devices are the same.

4. Date of an Invention-(a) AS BETWEEN RIVAL INVENTORS.— Where the question of the date of an invention is between two rival inventors, or the date of the invention of the patentee is to be fixed, the date of the invention is the time at which a complete and intelligible embodiment, by which those skilled in the art could understand it, is made2

Pat. Off. Gaz. 249; Singer v. Brauns, dorf, 7 Blatchf. (U. S.) 521; Wilcox v. Komp, 7 Blatchf. (U. S.) 126; Springer v. Stanton, 2 Pat. Off. Gaz. 2. If the same results are produced by combinations of machinery operating in a substantially different manner, the machines are different. Whittemore v. Cutter, 1 Gall. (U. S.) 478; S. C., I Robb Pat. Cas. 40.

1. Whittemore v. Cutter, I Gall. (U. S.) 51; s. c., I Robb Pat. Cas. 40; Odiorne v. Winkley, 2 Gall. (U. S.) 21; s. C., I Robb Pat. Cas. 52.

2. Webster Loom Co. v. Higgins, 105 U. S. 580; s. c., 21 Pat. Off. Gaz. 2031; Draper v. Potomska Mills, 3 Bann. & Ard. Pat. Cas. 214; Reeves v. Key. stone Bridge Co., 1 Pat. Off. Gaz. 466; Matthews v. Skates, 1 Fish. Pat. Čas. 602; Brodie v. Ophir Min. Co., 5 Sawy. (U. S.) 608; s. c., 4 Fish. Pat. Cas. 137; Reed v. Cutter, i Story (U. S.) 590; s. c., 2 Robb Pat. Cas. 81; Williames v. Barnard, 41 Fed. Rep. 358.

In the race of diligence between two inventors, he who first reduces the invention to a fixed, positive and practical form, is entitled to a priority of right to a patent. Therefore, Reed v. Cutter, 1 Story (U. S.) 590; Parkhurst v. Kinsman, 1 Blatchf. (U. S.) 488; Foot v. Silsby, 2 Blatchf. (U.S.) 260; Rich v. Lippincott, 2 Fish. Pat. Cas. 1; White v. Allen, 2 Cliff. (U. S.) 224; Ellithorpe v. Robertson, 2 Fish. Pat. Cas. 183; s. c., 4 Blatchf. (U. S.) 307; Whitely v. Swayne, 4 Fish. Pat. Cas. 117; Seymour v. Osborne, 3 Fish. Pat. Cas. 555.

The inventor who first perfects a machine and makes it capable of useful operation, is entitled to the patent. Agawam Co. v. Jordan, 7 Wall. (U. S.) 583; Albright v. Celluloid etc. Harness Trimming Co., 2 Bann. & Ard. Pat. Cas. 629; Pennsylvania Diamond Drill Co. v. Simpson, 37 Pat. Off. Gaz. 219. Fourteen years. Pickering v. Miller, 25 Pat. Off. Gaz. 189; s. c., 16 Fed. Rep. 540.

He is the first inventor who, being the original discoverer, has first perfected and adapted the invention to actual use. Whitely v. Swayne, 7 Wall. (U.S.) 685. Quoting Curtis on Patents, §§ 43, 37 (3rd ed.), "who first perfected and adapted the same" (his invention) "to use." Seymour v. Osborne, 11 Wall. (U. S.) 516.

Various Statements of Date of Invention.-The date of an invention is the date of the discovery of the principle involved and the attempt to embody it in some machine; not the date of the perfecting of the instrument. Colt.v. Massachusetts Arms Co., I Fish. Pat. Cas. 108; National etc. Oil Co. v. Arctic Oil Co., 4 Fish. Pat. Cas. 514; s. c., 8 Blatchf. (U. S.) 416.

The period when he strikes out the plan which he afterwards patents. Adams v. Edwards, 1 Fish. Pat. Cas. I. Or first perfected the intellectual production, or the idea or conception of the thing patented, so that, without more inventive power, further trial or experiment, he could have successfully applied it in practice. Ransom v. New York, 1 Fish. Pat. Cas. 252; Stimpson v. Woodman, 3 Fish. Pat. Cas. 98.

When the inventor's experiments have reached such a stage of maturity that he has a clear and definite idea of application of principle and has reduced his idea to a distinct form. Matthews v. Skates, 1 Fish. Pat. Cas. 602; Brodie v. Ophir etc. Min. Co., 5 Sawy. (U. S.) 608.

The date of an invention may be prior to the time the invention is embodied in a form capable of being patented. Colt v. Massachusetts Arms Co., 1 Fish. Pat. Cas. 108; National Oil Co. v. Arctic Oil Co., 4 Fish. Pat. Cas. 514; s. c., 8 Blatchf. (U. S.) 416; Adams v. Edwards, I Fish. Pat. Cas. 1; Ransom v. New York, 1 Fish. Pat. Cas. 252; Stimpson v. Woodman, 10 Wall. (U. S.) 117.

Priority of invention is not scientific precedence. French v. Rogers,

in the United States.1

5. Diligence. The first of two or more rival inventors is entitled to the patent, provided he uses reasonable diligence in perfecting and adapting his invention. After the perfecting of his invention and its application to practical use, no delay in applying for the patent, unless others are injured by his laches, will deprive him of his right to the patent.

6. Anticipation (a) BY INVENTION OF THIRD PARTIES.-Patented inventions can only be anticipated by inventions of third parties, when these have been reduced to a practical form,5

v.

1 Fish. Pat. Cas. 133. Nor priority of speculations of a philosopher or a mechanic. Bedford v. Hunt, 1 Mason (U. S.) 302. Nor the mere suggestion of an idea of application of a principle to practical purposes. Foote Silsby, Blatchf. (U.S.) 445. Nor the mere prior conception of an invention however perfect the plan may have been, and although the inventor actually described the plan to another. White v. Allen, 2 Fish. Pat. Cas. 440; 8. C., 2 Cliff. (U. S.) 224; Parkhurst v. Kinsman, 1 Blatchf. (U. S.) 488.

Nor do illustrative drawings of conceived ideas constitute an invention, unless followed up by reasonable observance of the requirements of the patent laws; they have no effect upon subsequently granted patent to another. Reeves v. Keystone Bridge Co., 5 Fish. Pat. Cas. 456; Drill Co. v. Simpson, 37 Pat. Öff. Gaz. 219; Ellithorp v. Robertson, 4 Blatchf. (U.S.) 307; Electric etc. Signal Co. v. Hall etc. Signal Co., 6 Fed. Rep. 603; Pennsylvania etc. Drill Co. v. Simpson, 29 Fed. Rep. 288. Even when an antedated drawing exhibits a perfect machine in all its parts. Detroit Lubricator Mfg. Co. v. Renchard, 9 Fed. Rep. 293. But compare Webster Loom Co. v. Higgins, 105 U. S. 580; S. c., 21 Pat. Off. Gaz. 2031.

1. Brush Electric Co. v. Julien Electric Co., 41 Fed. Rep. 679; Electrical Accumulator Co. v. Julien Electric Co., 38 Fed. Rep. 117.

2. White v. Allen, 2 Fish. Pat. Cas. 440; s. c., 2 Cliff. (U. S.) 224; Reed v. Cutter, Story (U. S.) 590; s. c., 2 Robb Pat. Cas.81; Singer v. Walmsley, 1 Fish. Pat. Cas. 558; Čox v. Griggs, I Biss. (U.S.) 362; s. c., 2 Fish. Pat. Cas. 174; Whitney v. Emmet, 1 Baldw. (U. S.) 303; s. c., 1 Robb Pat. Cas. 567; National etc. Oil Co. v. Arctic Oil Co., 8 Blatchf. (U. S.) 416; s. c., 4 Fish. Pat. Cas. 514; Kneeland v. Sheriff, 5 Bann.

& Ard. Pat. Cas. 482; s. c., 2 Fed. Rep. 901; s. c., 18 Pat. Off. Gaz. 242; Agawan Co. v. Jordan, 7 Wall. (U. S.) 583; Gates v. Benson, 3 A. L. T. 113; Hubell v. Dick, 24 Blatchf. (U. S.) 139; s. C., 28 Fed. Rep. 132.

Inventors have the right to take a reasonable time in which to experiment and test the invention. Kendall v. Winsor, 21 How. (U. S.) 322; McCormick Harvester Mach. Co. v. Minneapolis Harvester Works, 42 Fed. Rep. 152.

But between two inventors, one just as early as the other in their conception and equally meritorious, the one who first gets the patent is to be favored. Cox v. Griggs, 2 Fish. Pat. Cas. 174; s. c., I Biss. (U. S.) 362; Seibert etc. Oil Cup Co. v. Phillips Lubricator Co., 10 Fed. Rep. 677; Eagle Mfg. Co. v. Miller, 41 Fed. Rep. 351.

3. Allen v. Blunt, 2 Woodb. & M. (U. S.) 121; s. c., 2 Robb. Pat. Cas. 530; Hubel v. Dick, 20 Fed. Rep. 132.

4. Where an unreasonable delay is allowed to occur between the perfection of an invention and the application, and in the meanwhile other parties have independently invented the device and put it to use, a patent granted is void. New York v. Ransom, 23 How. (U. S.) 487.

5. Cahoon v. Ring, 1 Cliff. (U. S.) 592; s. c., 1 Fish. Pat. Cas. 397; Hildreth v. Heath, Cranch Pat. Dec. 96.

Drawings not sufficient. Ellithorp v. Robertson, Law's Dig. 428, § 48; Reèves v. Keystone Bridge Co., 5 Fish. Pat. Cas. 456; s. c., 1 Pat. Off. Gaz. 466; Carleton v. Atwood, 2 A. L. T. R. 129.

Use as Evidence of Reduction to Prac

tice.-Putting into use is evidence of reduction to practice. Coffin v. Ogden, 7 Blatchf. (U. S.) 61.

Making a machine and applying it to actual use without patenting it is a complete invention. Stephenson 7.

« SebelumnyaLanjutkan »