made to this court for the appointment of a trusteee to hold a moiety of said ground rents, with authority to extinguish the same.

Here we have a good charitable use, but a trustee who is forbidden to take. This court has sustained the charitable use, raised up a trustee to support it, and thus the will of the testatrix has been carried out. This is done, not in violation of the law, but in obedience to it. The trustee will collect the income, and use the organization of the Missionary Society to distribute it to the persons whom the testatrix intended to benefit. When the rent is redeemed, the money will be applied by the trustee to the same uses and by the same agency. It will no longer be real estate, but movable personal property." Frazier v. Rector etc. of St. Luke's Church, 48 Leg. Int. (Pa.) 276.

1. "Here there was a separation of the gift from the estate of the testator; the beneficiary was in being, and the gift, though its application for the purposes ultimately intended was deferred, was immediate, and the beneficiary was itself the trustee. It is an established rule that if a testator leaves a legacy, absolutely as regards his estate, but restricts the mode of the legatee's enjoy ment of it to certain objects for the benefit of the legatee, upon failure of such objects the absolute gift prevails. This proposition, which was declared by Lord Cappenham in Lassence v. Tierney (1 Mac. & Gord. 551), was adopted by the House of Lords in Kellett v. Kellett (Law Rep., 3 H. L. 160), and has been followed in numerous subsequent cases. It was applied in Philadelphia v. Girard, 9 Wright (Pa.) 9, where it was held that where a vested estate for a lawful purpose is distinctly given, and there are annexed to it unlawful conditions, limitations, powers, trusts or restraints, the unlawful conditions, etc., and the estate limited thereon are alone void, and the principal or vested estate remains. is said by Mr. Gray: 'If the court can

It

see an intention to make an unconditional gift to charity (and the court is very keen-sighted to discover this intention), then the gift will be regarded as immediate, not subject to any condition precedent and therefore not within the Rule against Perpetuities. And where there is an unconditional gift to charity, the gift will be regarded as immediate and good, although the particular mode of carrying out the charity which the donor has indicated is too remote. Consequently, in such a case, if a direction for accumulation is too remote, the only result is that the income is immediately distributable in charity; the heirs or next of kin are not let in.'

"A gift to a charity after a prior provision for accumulation for its benefit, which would otherwise transgress the rule, was held good in Odell v. Odell, 10 Allen (Mass.) 1;" Penrose, J., in Franklin's Estate, 27 W. N. C. (Pa.) 545

A testator who died domiciled in Georgia, created a trust for accumulation, valid under the laws of Georgia, but void according to the laws of Pennsylvania. After disposing of fivesixths of the annual income of his estate in trust, to pay annuities to his widow and children for life, he devised the remaining one-sixth, to be reinvested and to accumulate for the benefit of his children's children; and on failure of issue, or if such issue all died before attaining the age of twenty-one, without having issue, then over to trustees to establish a hospital for incurables in Philadelphia County. "The rule certainly applies as to matters of mere local or State policy, resulting from custom or legislative enactment, as distinguished from public policy founded on some immutable principle of right and wrong, and universally recognized by all civilized nations and countries.

"Our act of April 18, 1853, regulating trusts for accumulation, was not intended to have any extra-territorial operation. It was designed only to regulate the holding of property under

and

our laws and in our own State, and a trust intending to take effect in another State falls neither within its letter nor spirit." "It is well settled that statutes relating to gifts to charities are local in their action, and that they do not affect a gift of personal estate in aid of a foreign charity." Lawrence v. Kitteridge, 21 Conn. 577; Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, 43 N. Y. 433; Draper v. College, 57 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 269; School Directors v. James, 5 Wend. (N. Y.) 571.

In Hillyard v. Miller, 10 Pa. St. 326, the court by Gibson, C. J., said: "Trusts for accumulation beyond the period allowed for the vesting of an executory limitation are absolutely void, although the fund thus to be created is directed to be ultimately applied to the formation and support of a charity.

But though, as it is said, trusts for accumulation have no immediate connection with the doctrine of perpetuities, they may sometimes fall within the rule against them."

Act 7th July, 1885, P. L. (Pennsyl vania) 259, provides, "That in the disposition of property by will made or to be made for any relig. ious, charitable, literary, educational or scientific use or purpose, if the same shall be void for uncertainty or the object of the trust be not ascertainable, or has ceased to exist, or by an unlawful perpetuity, such property shall go to the heirs at law and next of kin of the decedent, as in the case of persons who have died or may die intestate."

1. Methodist Church v. Clark, 41 Mich. 730.

2. Little v. Millford, 31 Minn. 173. 3. Grimes v. Harmon, 35 Ind. 198. 4. Caster v. Balfour, 9 Ala. 814, 830. See Williams v. Pearson, 38 Ala. 299.

5. Green v. Allen, 5 Humph. (Tenn.) 170; White v. Hale, 2 Coldw. (Tenn.) 77; Dickson v. Montgomery, 1 Swan (Tenn.) 348.

6. Gallego v. Attorney General, 3 Leigh (Va.) 450; Janey v. Latane, 4 Leigh (Va.) 327; Seaburn v. Seaburn, 15 Gratt. (Va.) 423; Kelly v. Love, 20 Gratt. (Va.) 124; Wheeler v. Smith, 9 How. (U. S.) 55; Kain v. Gibboney, 101 U. S. 362. But see Literary Fund v. Dawson, 10 Leigh (Va.) 147; 1 Rob. 421; Kinnaird v. Miller, 25 Gratt. (Va.) 107.

7. Carpenter v. Miller, 3 W. Va. 174; Mong v. Roush, 29 W. Va. 119. See University v. Tucker, 31 W.Va. 621.

8. Connecticut Gen. Sts. (Rev. 1875), tit. 18, ch. 6, pt. 1, § 3; White v. Fisk, 22 Conn. 31; Jocelyn v. Nott, 44 Conn. 55; Hughes v. Daly, 49 Conn. 34; Fairfield v. Lawson, 50 Conn. 501; Coit v. Comstock, 51 Conn. 352. But see Treat's Appeal, 30 Conn. 113; Adye v. Smith, 44 Conn. 60; White v. Howard, 38 Conn. 342.

9. Holland v. Peck, 2 Ired. Eq. (N. Car.) 255; White v. University, 4 Ired. Eq. (N. Car.) 19; Bridges v. Pleasants, 4 Ired. Eq. (N. Car.) 26; McAuley v. Wilson, 1 Dev. Eq. (N. Car.) 276. See Miller v. Atkinson, 63 N. Car. 537; Griffin v. Graham, 1 Hawks (N. Car.) 96.

10. Miller v. Chittenden, 2 Iowa 315; 4 Iowa 252. See Johnson v. Mayne, 4 Iowa 180; Byers v. McCartney, 62 Iowa 339.

1. Georgia Rev. Code, art. 49, § 2: "Limitations of estate may extend through any number of lives in being at the time when the limitations commence, and twenty-one years. A limitation beyond that period the law terms a perpetuity, and forbids its creation. When an attempt is made to create a perpetuity, the law gives effect to the limitations not too remote, declaring the others void, and thereby vests the fee in the last taker under the legal limitations." See Jones v. Haversham, 107 U. S. 174.

2. Iowa Code of 1873, § 2267: "Every disposition of property is void which suspends the absolute power of controlling the same for a longer period than during the lives of persons then in being and for twenty-one years thereafter." See Todhunter v. R. Co., 58 Iowa 205. See Gray on Perp. 435.

3. Kentucky Gen. Sts. (1873), ch. 63, art. 1, 27: "The absolute power of alienation shall not be suspended by any limitation or condition whatever for a longer period than during the continuance of a life or lives in being at the creation of the estate, and twenty-one years and ten months thereafter."

See the recent case of Davis v. Buford (Ky.), 3 S.W. Rep. 4. See Moore v. Howe, 4 Mon. (Ky.) 199.

Common Law Rule.-Recent cases in States where the English rule is unchanged by statute are: In Massachusetts, Doring v. Lovering, 147 Mass. 530; in Pennsylvania, Lawrence's Estate, 136 Pa. St. 366; in New Jersey, Stout v. Stout, 44 N. J. Eq. 479; Randolph v. Randolph, 3 Cent. Rep. 106; in Virginia, Woodruff v. Pleasant, 81 Va. 37; in Tennessee, Brown v. Brown, 6 S. W. Rep. 869; in Maryland, Collins v. Foley, 63 Md. 158.

Louisiana. The articles of the Louisiana Code as to the validity of contingent gifts are: Rev. Code, 1870, art. 542, 1482, 1698, 1699, 1534. See Gray on Perp., §§ 766-772. See also Succession of Strauss, 38 La. Ann. 55. 4. Connecticut Gen. St. (1875), tit. 18, ch. 6, pt. 1, § 3, p. 352: "No estate in fee simple, fee tail or any less estate, shall be given, by deed or will, to any persons but such as are, at the time of

making such deed or will, in being, or to their immediate issue or descendants." See the recent cases of Farnam v. Farnam, 1 N. E. Rep. 312; also Kand v. Butler, 48 Conn. 293; Bronson v. Stowe, 57 Conn. 147; Anthony v. Anthony, 55 Conn. 256. See also Alfred v. Marks, 49 Conn. 473.

In Anthony v. Anthony, 55 Conn. 256, a provision by which the testator left $4,000 to be divided equally among the widow's legal heirs after death, was held void under the Connecticut statute, since the legacy could not obviously vest until the death of the widow.

By the same will, the income of the residuary estate was left to trustees for the benefit of the testator's two sons, "and their families," during the lives of the sons; upon the death of either leaving "no heirs," over. The word "heirs" was held to mean children; the provision was sustained.

5. Ohio Rev. Sts. (1880), § 4200: "No estate in fee simple, fee tail, or any lesser estate, in lands or tenements, lying within this State, shall be given or granted by deed or will, to any person or persons but such as are in being, or to the immediate issue or descendants of such as are in being at the time of making such deed or will." The word "immediate descendants" is construed more liberally in Ohio than in Connecticut. See M'Arthur v. Scott, 113 U. S. 340.

There the devise of their parent's share to the children of any grandchild deceased before the time of divison, was held valid as to those great-grandchildren whose parent, a grandchild of the testator, was living at the time of his death, because they would be immediate issue of a person in being at that time; likewise such devise was held valid as to any greatgrandchildren whose parent, though born after the testator's death, had died before their grandparent, a child of the testator, because they were, if not immediate issue, certainly immediate descendants of that child, who was in being at that time.

See also Stevenson v. Evans, 10 Ohio St. 307; Turley v. Turley, 11 Ohio St. 173.

6. Alabama Rev. Code of 1876, §

2188: Land may be conveyed to the wife and children or children only, generally, successively and jointly; and to the heirs of the body of the survivor if they come of age, and in default thereof over, but conveyances to other than the wife and children or children only, cannot extend beyond the lives in being at the date of the conveyance, and ten years thereafter. The statute, § 2190, forbids the creation of leasehold estates for more than twenty years.

1. Mississippi Rev. Code of 1871, § 2286: "Estates in fee tail are prohibited, and every estate which shall be created an estate in fee tail, shall be an estate in fee simple, provided, that any person may make a conveyance or a devise of lands to a succession of donees then living, not exceeding two; and to the heirs of the body of the remainderman, and in default thereof, to the right heirs of the donor in fee simple." See Cannon v. Burg, 59 Wis. 289.

2. In Arizona, any person may by deed convey real estate to his legitimate child or children, and natural child or children, or his child or children by adoption, and their issue during their natural lives, whether born or begotten before or after the conveyance; and in such conveyance may inhibit the alienation of such estate during the natural lives of such children and issue. Arizona Comp. Laws 1877, 2287.

3. The statute is here given in full, except the clauses relating to accumulations, which will be found infra, this title, under Accumulations.

1. New York Rev. Stat. 722, § 14: "Every future estate shall be void in its creation which shall suspend the absolute power, of alienation for a longer period than is prescribed in this article. Such power of alienation is suspended, when there are no persons in being, by whom an absolute fee in possession can be conveyed.

"15. The absolute power of alienation shall not be suspended by any limitation or condition whatever, for a longer period than during the continuance of not more than two lives in being at the creation of the estate, except in the single case mentioned in the next section.

"§ 16. A contingent remainder in fee may be created on a prior remainder in fee, to take effect in the event that the persons to whom the first remainder is limited, shall die under the age of twenty-one years, or upon any other contingency, by which the estate of such persons may be determined before they attain their full age.

"§ 17. Successive estates for life shall not be limited, unless to persons in being at the creation thereof; and where a remainder shall be limited on more than two successive estates for life, all the life estates subsequent to those of the two persons first entitled thereto, shall be void, and upon the death of those persons the remainder shall take effect, in the same manner as if no other life estates had been created.

"18. No remainder shall be created upon an estate for the life of any other person or persons than the grantee or devisee of such estate, unless such remainder be in fee; nor shall a remainder be created upon such an estate in a term for years, unless it be for the whole residue of such term.

"19. When a remainder shall be created upon any such life-estate, and more than two persons shall be named, as the persons during whose lives the life-estate shall continue, the remainder shall take effect upon the death of the persons first, in the same manner as if no other lives had been introduced.

"20. A contingent remainder shall not be created on a term of years unless the nature of the contingency on which it is limited be such that the remainder must vest in interest, during the continuance of not more than two lives in being at the creation of such re