PERMIT; PERMISSIVE (See also ALLOW, vol. 1, p. 492).— Permit is more positive than "allow" or "suffer," and denotes decided assent.1 PERPETRATION.-See note 2. PERPETUATION OF TESTIMONY.-See BILL TO PERPETUATE TESTIMONY, vol. 2, p. 277; BILL TO TAKE TESTIMONY DE BENE ESSE, vol, 2, p. 285; DEPOSITIONS, vol. 5, p, 581; WITNESSES. Permanent Employment. "Permanent employment" is nothing more than an employment for an indefinite time which may be severed by either party. Thus, in Lord v. Goldberg, 81 Cal. 596, where the defendants employed the plaintiff as salesman, promising, "that they would give him permanent employment so long as he would use his best efforts to extend their business," it was held, that the employment was to be "permanent;" "but that only meant that it was to continue indefinitely and until one or the other of the parties should wish, for some good reason, to sever the relation." So in Perry v. Wheeler 12 Bush (Ky.) 541, the plaintiff was elected," 'permanent rector of a church, and was afterwards, as he claimed, wrongfully dismissed. The court said: "He was certainly elected permanent rector, but we do not understand the term permanent, as used in this case, to mean that the parties were to be bound together by ties to be dissolved only by mutual consent, or for sufficient legal or ecclesiastical We understand that reasons. the plaintiff was called as rector of the church for an indefinite period, and that it was intended that he should continue to hold the place until one or the other contracting parties should desire to terminate the connection. 66 And in Elderton v. Emmens, 4 C. B. 479, plaintiff claimed that he was employed as permanent" attorney and solicitor for defendants, but it was held, that the word "permanent," as used in the resolution of appointment, denoted nothing more than a general employment as contradistinguished from an occasional and special employment. Permanent Trespass.-A trespass consisting of trespasses of one and the same kind, committed on several days, which are in their nature capable of renewal or continuation, and are actually renewed or continued from day to day, so that the particular injury done on each particular day cannot be distinguished from what was done on an other day. In declaring for such trespasses, they may be laid with a continuando. Bouv. L. Dict. See also TRESPASS. 1. Chicago v. Stearns, 105 Ill. 558. "Permit " implies consent given or leave granted. Loosey v. Orser, 4 Bosw. (N. Y.) 391, 404. "Permit " may mean "suffer." Ex parte Eyston, 7 Ch. D. 145; Territory v. Stone, 2 Dak. 155. "Permit" has been defined to mean "allow by not prohibiting." As in a city ordinance that "no person shall permit swine to go upon any sidewalk," etc., means "allow by not prohibiting." Commonwealth v. Curtis, 9 Allen (Mass.) 266. See also Commercial Wharf Co. v. Winsor, 146 Mass. 539; Cowley v. People, 83 N. Y. 471. One who has engaged not to permit a ditch to be dug on his land, is liable, if it is made by one to whom he has sold the premises without a restriction; such a sale permits the work. Bennet v. Kennedy, 7 Wend. (N. Y.) 163. Every definition of "suffer" and "permit " includes knowledge of what is to be done under the sufferance and permission, and intention that what is done is what was to be done. Gregory v. United States, 17 Blatchf. (U. S.) 325. A licensed person cannot be convicted of "permitting" drunkenness under the 13th section of the English Licensing Act, 1872, by reason of getting drunk on his own premises. Warden v. Tye, 2 C. P. D. 74. Permissive Waste. That kind of waste which is a matter of omission only; as by suffering a house to fall for want of necessary reparations. Burrill Law Dict. See also WASTE. 2. An Indiana statute provides that if a homicide is committed "in the perpetration" of burglary and certain other of the higher felonies, it shall be murder. In Bissot v. State, 53 Ind. 413, the defendant, having burglariously entered a house, while still in the house was fired upon by a watchman, and returning the fire, killed the watchman, defendant's counsel con PERPETUITIES (The rule against) and TRUSTS FOR ACCUMULATION. (See also CHARITIES, vol. 3, p. 122; CONFLICT OF LAWS, vol. 3, P. 499; EQUITABLE CONVERSION, vol. 6, p. 664; ESTATES, vol, 6. p. 875; LEGACIES AND DEVISES, vol. 13, p. 7; REMAINDERS; TRUSTS; WILLS.) 1. The Common Law Rule, 3351. Exposition, 335. (a) Origin, 335. (b) Statement, 338. (c) Purpose, 339. (d) Period, 339. (e) Scope, 341. Application, 346. 2. Rights Affected by the Rule, 348. (a) Remainders, 348. (1) Vested, 348. (b) Reversionary Interests, (c) Easements, 353. (d) Executory Limitations, 353. (e) Equitable Estates; Trusts, 354. Contractual Rights, 355. (g) Powers, 357 3. Effect of Limitations Void for II. Statutory Provisions in the United 1. Statutes of Georgia, Iowa, and Kentucky, Slightly Modifying the Common Law Rule, 371. 2. Statutes of Connecticut, Ohio, Alabama, Mississippi, and Arizona, Considerably Modifying the Common Law Rule, 371. 3. Independent System of New Tork, Michigan, Wisconsin, and Minnesota. The Statutes of California and Idaho und Dakota; The Statute of Indiana, 372. III. Trusts for Accumulations, 381. 2. At Common Law, 382. (f) Where the Time for Accu- (g) Where the Time Exceeds the Period of the Act and is Within the Period of the Rule, 389. (h) Void Directions to Accumulate, 389. (1) Personal Property, I THE COMMON LAW RULE-1. Exposition—(a) ORIGIN.-In the beginning of the common law there could be no question of re tended that as the act of burglary had been completed by the entrance of the house, that the homicide could not be said to have been committed "in the perpetration" of the burglary; but the court, by BIDDLE, J., said: "In our opinion, when the homicide is committed within the res gesta of the felony charged, it is committed "in the perpetration" of, or attempt to perpetrate felony, within the meaning of the statute." And we think, according to this view, that the evidence in this case fairly warrants that the homicide alleged was committed "in the perpetration" of the burglary. moteness in the vesting of future interests, since, by the necessity of livery of seisin in all conveyances, every interest granted was a vested one. Freehold estates could be granted with a view to future possession only as remainders. A rule, grounded on the same principle, prevented the granting of incorporeal hereditaments, as well as remainders and reversions, in futuro.1 In such reversionary interests as after estates with special limitations (such as the old fee simple conditional), the same principle prevented the question of remoteness. And this seems to have applied equally to estates on condition properly so called, though the interest was not reversionary, but a purely contractual right. After the statute De Donis changed the "fee simple conditional" into a fee tail, and the courts had sanctioned fines and common recoveries, all estates limited to vest in posession after estates tail could be destroyed by the tenant in tail. There was therefore less reason for a question of remoteness to arise here. The statute Quia Emptores, in enacting that in conveyances in fee, the whole estate of the grantor shall pass, and the grantee shall hold of the grantor's lord, abolished all qualified fees, and with them all possibilities of reverter.3 Thus far no necessity of considering remoteness in conveyances existed, in theory at least. Inasmuch, however, as in practice, the vesting in possession of remainders and reversions after estates tail (after other conditional fees they had ceased to exist) were, for all purposes, uncertain in their devolution, and in so far a drag on commerce in land, the question might have arisen here, had not the method of barring estates tail and thereby destroying all remainders and reversions Jimited after them, removed the whole cause. Contingent remainders were a late fruit of the common law. But here the same reason as in estates tail prevented the urgency for a rule against remoteness; the tenant for life could easily destroy such remainders.5 Whatever may be the foundation of the cases in the doctrine of a possibility on a possibility, or of the rule forbidding limiting 1. See note, Gray's Rule against Perpetuities, § 123. See also § 10, citing Wms. Real Property (13th ed.), 265-267, 40 Edw. III, 9 c. See Marsden's note at the end of ch. 1. 2. See infra, this title, Scope; Reversionary Interest; Contractual Rights. 3. Estates for life or in tail were, of course, not affected. An estate in fee, with right of entry for condition broken, not being a reversionary interest, was also unaffected. The right of entry is contractual, and the entry a substitution of the original feoffor in the feoffee's place. See Gray's Rule against Perp., §§ 14, 20-51. See Marsden's Perp. 71, 72; Pollock's Land Law, 213-215. See, however, Challis on Real Property, 168. 4. Gray, 19, citing Digby's Hist. Law Real Prop., ch. 5, § 2; 2 Bl. Com. 348-364; Wms. Real Prop., ch. 2; Marsden on Perp. 37; Butler's note to Fearne on Cont. Rem. 561. 5. Gray, § 10, § 134, citing Williams on Seisin 190-191; Wms. Real Prop. (13th ed.), 265-267. See 40 Edw. III, 9 b. 6. This doctrine is commonly ascribed to Chief Justice Popham, in the Rector of Chedington's Case, 1 Co. 153 a. 156 b. It is denied in Blamford 7. Blamford, 3 Bulst. 98; 1 Roll. R. 318, an estate to the issue of an unborn person1 which is found in various guises, there is no doubt that they were successive attempts to supply in the executory estates of the common law the remedy which the Rule against Perpetuities afforded against remote executory devises and conditional limitations.2 It is a mistake, however, to hold that the Rule against Perpetuities arose in application to interests outside of the common law. It had, it is true, no reference to common law estates in real property. But its origin can be traced directly as a restriction on executory interests at common law in chattels real.3 The urgency began when an executory devise of a term after a devise for life was held good,—an estate which the first taker could not destroy. The Rule obtained in the Duke of Norfolk's case for the first time its character as an inhibition, not against certain 321, and in The Duke of Norfolk's 1. Sir Edward Sugden, in Cole v. Sewall, calls the doctrine against possibilities "obsolete," but credits to it the origin of the second rule. 4 Dr. & W. 28-32. See Nicholls v. Sheffield, 2 Bro. C. C. 215. Prof. Gray discusses both theories very thoroughly. Gray on Perp., § 287. He denies existence to any doctrine other than as a rule against remoteness, based on the rule against perpetuities, supporting himself by Mogg v. Mogg, 1 Mer. 654; and Cattlin v. Brown, 11 Hare 372, 375. He argues that the Rule against Perpetuities applies to remainders, a question on which the authorities are closely divided. See Gray on Perp. §§ 296-299, citing 1 Jarm. Wills (4th ed.) 255-258, 260-263; 2 Jarm. Wills 845; 60 L. T. 247; 69 L. T. 360; Theob. Wills (22 ed.) 424-429; Tud. L. C. in Real Prop. (3d ed.), 470-475; 1 Hayes, Conv. (5th ed.) 494, 495; Wood v. Griffin, 4 N. H. 230, 235. So Lewis' Perp., ch. 16. Against the view are, besides Wms. Real Prop. (13th ed.), 274-277; 8 Jur, pt. 2, 20, 283; 69 L. T. 336; Sugd. Pow. (8th ed.) 393-394; Fearne Cont. Rem. 501; 3 Dav. Prec. Conv. (3d ed.) 270, 336-338; Third Rep. Real Prop. Comm. 29-31; notably Challis on Real Prop., who denies its application to the old common law limitations, 152 et. seq., 207. See Marsden on Perp., ch. 8. who seems to follow Cattlin v. Brown, 11 Hare, 372, 375. Both of these doctrines, that forbidding remainders to the issue of unborn persons, and the rule against a possi bility on a possibility, have been unexpectedly revived in two modern English cases, that of Whitby v. Mitchell, 42 Ch. D. 494; aff. 44 Ch. D. 85; and In re Frost, 43 Ch. D. 246, 251, 262. See for a discussion of them, infra, this title, Scope. 2. See Gray on Perp. §§ 191–199. 3. Only if an extreme distinction be allowed, can terms of years be excluded from common law estates, as argued by Challis' Real Property 47. Although not protected by the law until the statute 21 Hen. VII, ch. 15, in a collusive recovery, they were yet as much a part of the common law as estates by the custom of the manor. See Co. Litt. 46 a., Harg., n. 2. And Marsden (Perp., ch. 1.), while he is right in calling the Rule "an invention of the chancellors" (see In re Ridley, 11 Ch. D. 645, 649), is wrong in so far as he ascribes to it the purpose of governing the interests created by the Statute of Uses, since that statute did not affect leaseholds. Nor was the Rule intended primarily for the executory devises permitted by the statute against wills, since leaseholds were devisable before the statute. See, for a thorough discussion of the question, Gray on Perp., §§ 148-158, 160-169, 296–298, 300-302, 312, 315, 316, 319, 321, 323. See Statute of Uses, 27 Hen. VIII, ch. 10; Statute of Wills, 32 Hen. VIII, ch. 1. For cases of devises of terms directly, not in trust, see the text, infra, under Scope. 4. Manning's Case, 8 Co., 94 c; Lampet's Case, 10 Co. 46 b. 5. See 3 Ch. Cas. 1; Pollesf. 223, entirely overturning the effect of Child v. Baylie (Cro. Jac. 459; Palm. 48, 333), kinds of contingencies (such as an indefinite failure of issue), but purely against remoteness of limitation, as measured by lives in being. The extension of the period by the addition, first of a minority, then of a term of twenty years in gross together with the period of gestation, after lives in being, resulted from a misconceived analogy with the period, during which at common law, after the statute De Donis, the alienation of remainders could be restrained. The confusion, which has often been pointed out, was of the vesting of estates with the restraint of their alienation. The Rule, being worded against the vesting of estates, enlarged the period of suspension of alienation beyond the intended limits. The importance of distinguishing these often confused terms appears in the New York statutes and the cases which interpret it. Throughout the United States this confusion has materially altered and complicated the application of the Rule. The Rule has thus been shown to have been developed in the determination of the limits within which executory estates in personalty might be created. How far it was subsequently applied to other interests will be considered separately under another subdivision.5 (b) STATEMENT.--Future limitations are void unless they must vest if at all within lives in being at the creation of the limitation and twenty-one years thereafter. which in forbidding "perpetuities" referred only to peculiar contingencies, not at all to remoteness of time. 1. Lloyd v. Carew, Prec. Ch. 72, 106; Taylor v. Biddall, 2 Mod. 289; Stephens v. Stephens, Cas. temp. Talb. 228. 2. Caddell v. Palmer, 1 Cl. & F. 372. 3. The extension was established by Lloyd v. Carew, Prec. Ch. 72, where it is noteworthy that the decree of the chancellor and the opinions of the chief justice and other judges was overruled by a lay body.. 4. See Gray on Perp., §§ 178, 186-188, who quotes Treby, C. J., in Scattergood v. Edge, 12 Mod. 278; Lord Brougham, in Tollemache v. Coventry, 2 Cl. & F. 611, 624, and Phipps v. Ackers, 9 Cl. & F. 583, 598, and most emphatically in Dungannon, 12 Cl. & F. 546, 629, 680, where he says: "I have a strong opinion. that it (the Rule) arises out of an accidental circumstance, out of a confusion, I may say, a misapprehension in confounding together the nature of the estate with the remedy at law by fine and recovery, which could not be applied till a certain life came to twenty-one years." See also Cole v. Sewell, 2 H. L. C. 186, 233; Sugd. Law of Property, 315, 316, all these collected in Gray's Perp., § 186, n. 6. 5. See infra, this title, Rights Affected by the Rule. 6. The definitions by Sanders and Lewis of a perpetuity have been approved by the English courts. The first is "a future limitation, restraining the owner of the estate from aliening the fee simple of the property, discharged of such future use or estate, before the event is determined, or the period arrived, when such future use or estate is to arrive." Sanders on Uses and Trusts, vol. 1., p. 204. See Marsden, ch. 1, p. 1; London etc. R. Co. v. Gomm, 20 Ch. D. 562; 51 L. J., Ch. 193, 530. That of Lewis is "a future limitation whether executory or by way of remainder, and of either real or personal property, which is not to vest until after the expiration of, or which will not necessarily vest within, the period fixed and prescribed by law for the creation of future estates and interests; and which is not destructible by the persons for the time being entitled to the property subject to the future limitation, except with the concurrence of the individual interested under that limitation." See Lewis on Perp., p. |