Gambar halaman
PDF
ePub

quate remedy at law.1

Equity will order the conveyance of a property to a party having the equitable right by a party having the legal title.2

16. Execution on a Patent Right.-A patent right may be taken in execution on a bill in the nature of a creditor's bill praying that the owner may be compelled to assign his rights in the court in which the judgment is obtained.3 In some States other proceedings have been upheld by which the patent right has been subjected to execution.

17. Insolvency and Bankruptcy.-A patent right does not pass by the mere assignment under a State insolvent law, but does under a bankrupt act.5

1. McKay v. Smith, 29 Fed. Rep. 295. To enjoin the breach of a mutual agreement by holders of patent rights as to the way in which they shall manufacture. Star Salt Castor Co. v. Crossman, 4 Cliff. (U. S.) 568.

Where a plaintiff is suing for royalties, he will not be enjoined from so doing on account of a breach of his agreement with defendant, but will be enjoined, pending his suit, from determining the contract. An adequate remedy at law existing in one case but not in the other. Baker Mfg. Co. v. Washburne etc. Mfg. Co., 5 McCrary (U. S.) 504; s. c., 18 Fed. Rep. 172.

But equity will not enjoin at the suit of complainant guilty of fraudulent concealment to the disadvantage of the defendant. Washburne etc. Mfg. Co. v. Scutt, 22 Fed. Rep. 710; Washburne etc. Mfg. Co. v. Cincinnati Barbed Wire Fence Co., 22 Fed. Rep. 712.

2. Emmons v. Sladdin, 2 Bann. & Ard. Pat. Cas. 199; s. c., 9 Pat. Off. Gaz. 352.

A court will decree the conveyance of the right to royalties by the holder of the legal title, to the holder of the equitable right. Rogers v. Riessner, 30 Fed. Rep. 525.

The court will decree the convey ance where the trust is a constructive

one.

Fire Extinguisher Mfg. Co. v. Graham, 16 Fed. Rep. 543.

3. Barnes v. Morgan, 3 Hun (N. Y.) 703; Pacific Bank v. Robinson, 57 Cal. 520; s. c., 20 Pat. Off. Gaz. 1314; Murray v. Ager, 20 Pat. Off. Gaz. 1311; s. c., 1 Mackey (D. C.) 87; Ager v. Murray, 105 U. S. 126; s. c., 21 Pat. Off. Gaz. 1197; Clan Ranald v. Wyckhoff, 41 N. Y. Super. Ct. 527; Carver v. Peck, 131 Mass. 291; Gillett v. Bate, 86 N. Y. 87; Edmeston v. Lyde, I Paige (N. Y.) 637; Brinkerhoff v.

Brown, 4 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 671; McDermutt v. Strong, 4 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 687; Spader v. Davis, 5 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 280; Hadden v. Spader, 20 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 554

Where the owner of the patent is insolvent, he may be compelled by an insolvent court or court of equity to assign his rights to a receiver or trustee. Petition of Keech, 14 R. I. 571.

Ordinarily the owner of the patent must be compelled to assign in the regular manner. Ashcroft v. Walworth, 1 Holmes (U. S.) 152; s. c., 5 Fish. Pat. Cas. 528; s. c., 2 Pat. Off. Gaz. 546.

In Pennsylvania apparently the patent right cannot be reached by equitable process.

Rutter's Appeal (Pa. 1887), 8 Atl. Rep. 170; Bakewell v. Keller, 11 W. N. C. (Pa.) 300.

In some jurisdictions it can be reached by a creditor's bill in the usual form. Gorrell v. Dickson, 26 Fed. Rep. 454; Gillett v. Bate, 86 N. Y. 87.

And a federal court can take jurisdiction in a creditor's bill where the State court could not grant relief. Gorrell v. Dickson, 26 Fed. Rep. 454.

Generally a patent right cannot be subjected to any of the usual methods of execution. It has been held that it could not be thus seized in Carver v. Peck, 131 Mass. 291; Pacific Bank v. Robinson, 57 Cal. 520; Stevens v. Gladding, 17 How. (U. S.) 447; Stevens v. Cady, 14 How. (U. S.) 528.

4. Ashcroft v. Walworth, 1 Holmes (U. S.) 152; s. c., 5 Fish. Pat. Cas. 528; s. c., 2 Pat. Off. Gaz. 546; Gordon v. Anthony, 16 Blatchf. (U. S.) 234; S. C., 4 Bann. & Ard. Pat. Cas. 248; s. c., 16 Pat. Off. Gaz. 1135; Petition of Keach, 14 R. I. 571.

5. Prime v. Brandon Mfg. Co., 16 Blatchf. (U. S.) 453; s. C., 4 Bann & Ard. Pat. Cas. 379.

18. Jurisdiction in Suits Over Patent Property.-In cases where the validity or infringement of patent rights are not involved,1 the jurisdiction in suits on contracts relating to patent rights or for the redress of wrongs connected therewith, is in the courts of the States, unless the courts of the United States obtain jurisdiction by diverse citizenship.

An assignment by a bankruptcy court need not be recorded in Patent Office. Prime v. Brandon Mfg. Co., 16 Blatchf. (U. S.) 453; s. c., 4 Bann. & Ard. Pat. Cas. 379.

But it will not override prior agreements. Frane v. Galis, 20 Reporter 427.

1. Dudley v. Mayhew, 3 N. Y. 9; Parkhurst v. Kinsman, 6 N. J. Eq. 600; Kempton v. Bray, 99 Mass. 350; Tomlinsion v. Buttel, 4 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.) 266, Gibson v. Woodworth, 8 Paige (N. Y.) 132; Parsons v. Barnard, 7 Johns. (N. Y.) 144; Stone v. Edwards, 35 Tex. 556; Elmer v. Pennel, 40 Me. 430; Albright v. Teas, 106 U. S. 613.

Nor can it acquire jurisdiction suing in the form of an action to recover upon a quantum valebat for use of the patented invention. Battin v. Kear, 2 Phila. (Pa.) 301: De Witt v. Elmira etc. Mfg. Co, 66 N. Y. 459.

Has Not Equitable Jurisdiction.- A State court cannot enjoin the collection of a decree of a United States court. Kendall v. Winsor, 6 R. I. 453.

Nor to restrain a party from an alleged illegal act when that party justifies under a patent. Hovey v. Rubber Tip Pencil Co., 33 N. Y. Super. Ct. 522. Nor to consider a set-off consisting of a claim for infringement of a patent. Smith v. McClelland, 11 Bush (Ky.) 523.

But a State court may incidentally in the course of a controversy, inquire into the validity, etc., of a patent. Burrall v. Jewett, 2 Paige (N. Y.) 134; Sherman v. Champlain Transp. Co., 31 Vt. 162; Lindsay v. Roraback, 4 Jones' Eq. (N. Car.) 124, Middlebrook v. Broadbent, 47 N. Y. 443; Saxton v. Dodge, 57 Barb. (N. Y.) 84; Beebe v. Mackenzie, 47 N. Y. 662; Rich v. Atwater, 16 Conn. 409; Nash v. Lull, 102 Mass. 60, McKenzie v. Bailie, 3 Cin. L. B. (Ohio) 209; Slemmer's Appeal, 58 Pa. St. 155; Keith v. Hobbs, 69 Mo. 84. 2. Rice v. Garnhart, 34 Wis. 453; Street v. Silver, Bright. (Pa.) 96; Hunt v. Hoover, 24 Iowa 231; Warren v. Cole, 15 Mich. 265; David v. Park, 103 Mass. 501; Billings v. Ames, 32 18 C. of L.-10

Mo. 265; Lockwood v. Lockwood, 33 Iowa 509; McDougall v. Fogg, 2 Bosw. (N. Y.) 387; Bloomer v. McQuewan, 14 How. (U. S.) 539; Chaffee v. Boston Belting Co., 22 How. (U. S.) 217; Kel. ly v. Porter, 8 Sawy. (U. S.) 482; s. c., 17 Fed. Rep. 519.

And as well in actions in equity as in law. To rescind a contract. Lindsay v. Roraback, 4 Jones' Eq. (N. Car.) 124; Page v. Dickerson, 28 Wis. 694; Consolidated Fruit Jar Co. v. Whitney, 2 Bann. & Ard. Pat. Cas. 30.

To compel an account of royalties. Adams' Appeal, 113 Pa. St. 449.

For specific performance of a contract. Binney v. Annan, 107 Mass. 94; Brooks v. Stolley, 3 McLean (U. S.) 523; s. c., 2 Robb Pat. Cas. 28; Perry v. Littlefield, 17 Blatchf. (U. S.) 272; s. c., 17 Pat. Off. Gaz. 51; Fuller etc. Co. v. Bartlett, 68 Wis. 73.

Jurisdiction of Equity Over Assignments on the Ground of Fraud or Mistake.-Where an assignment agreement has been entered into by fraud. Colburn v. Van Velzer, II Fed. Rep. 795; Secombe v. Campbell, 18 Blatchf. (U. S.) 108.

Darst v.

A negotiable instrument given for a void patent will be compelled to be given up and cancelled. Brockway, 11 Ohio 462; Bellas v. Hays, 5 Š. & R. (Pa.) 427.

Otherwise in the case of a non-negotiable instrument where there was no actual fraud in the sale. Cansler v. Eaton, 2 Jones (N. Car.) 499. Or a mutual mistake made.

Burrall v. Jewett, 2 Paige (N._Y.) 134; Black v. Stoul, 33 Ala. 327; Foss v. Richardson, 15 Gray (Mass.) 303; Gay v. Cornell, 1 Blatchf. (U. S.) 506. The instrument may be cancelled or reformed.

Bona Fide Purchaser.-A plea of bona fide purchaser for "good and valuable consideration," when interposed in a case where equity would otherwise grant a reformation and profits, must set forth the consideration. Secombe v. Campbell, 18 Blatchf. (U. S.) 108.

Authorities for Patent Law.-Curtis on Patents, once the only authorized 145

PATERNITY.-See BASTARDY, vol. 2, p. 129; CHILD, vol. 3, p. 229; ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN, vol. 9, p. 930; PARENT AND CHILD. PATRIMONY.—Property received from one's father, or ancestors, whence patrimonial.i

PATRONAGE; PATRONIZE.-See note 2.

PAUPER.-See POOR and POOR LAWS.

PAWN, PAWNBROKER.-See BAILMENT, vol. 2, p. 40; PLEDGE AND COLLATERAL SECURITY.

PAY; PAYABLE; PAID-(See also PAYMENT).-" Pay." To pay is defined by lexicographers to discharge a debt, to deliver a creditor the value of a debt, either in money or in goods, to his acceptance, by which the debt is discharged.3

text-book, is now somewhat antiquated. The second edition of Walker on Patents of 1889 presents a clear, terse view of the law, coming down to April 30th, 1889. Robinson on Patents, 1890, a scholarly work containing a full citation of cases, coming down, by means of an appendix in the last volume, to 1890, is the latest work on the subject. Simonds' (present Commissioner of Patents) Digest is extremely full in all cases of practical value to the practitioner. Bumps on Patents, Trademark and Copyright, coming down to October, 1883, is practically a complete compilation of patent cases to that time. In Special Departments Duryee's Assignment of Patent Rights has much value. Fenton, Law of Patents for Designs, coming down to January, 1889 is the unquestioned, and unquestionable authority on its subject. Hall's Patent Estate is of value. Among older digests may be mentioned Preble's Patent Case Index.

1. And. L. Dict.

"Patrimony" is not necessarily restricted to property derived directly from a father. (Green v. Giles, 5 Ir. Ch. Rep. 25.)

2. The female inmates of a house of ill-fame cannot be said to "patronize" the house. Raymond v. People, 9 Bradw. (Ill.) 344.

The court said: "The primary meaning of the word 'patronize' is to act as patron toward. `. The patrons of the house, within the meaning of the law, are those who go there in the character of purchasers to be accommodated and entertained in the way of a bawdyhouse... But the patrons of a house

are not those who are occupied in the house, in and about the premises of the house."

To state "that a loose woman is under the patronage of a man named, is a technical statement that she is sup ported by him for the purpose of sexual indulgence. More v. Bennet, 48 N. Y. 472, 475.

3. Beals v. Home Ins. Co., 36 N. Y. 522; Aff'g 36 Barb. (N. Y.) 614.

To pay is to discharge an obligation by a performance according to its terms or requirements. Tolman v. Manufacturers' Ins. Co., I Cush. (Mass.) 76.

Pay is a fixed and direct amount given by law to persons in the military service, in consideration of and as compensation for their personal service. Sherburne v. United States, 16 Ct. of Cl. 496.

Though the word "pay" has sometimes a wide sense which includes pay. ment in other things than money (Anderson's L. Dict., "Payment"; Fo ley v. Mason, 6 M. & D. 37), yet, where an agent's authority was to "pay bills," it was held that he exceeded it by making payment in merchandise. Claflin v. Continental Jersey Works (Ga. 1890), 11 S. E. Rep. 723.

Payable. Where there is a gift to a remainderman on attaining twenty-one or marrying, but to go over in case of his death before his share becomes "payable," this word will generally be read as "vested." Emperor v. Rolfe, I Ves. Sen. 208.

Payable in Currency.-See MONEY.

"Payable in trade" (as used in a dealer's written contract to pay a speci. fied sum for services rendered "payable in trade"), means payable in such ar

ticles as the promisor deals in. Dudley v. Vose, 114 Mass. 34.

Payable as Convenient.-A written contract containing a provision that a certain sum shall be payable as convenient, cannot be construed so that it shall not be payable at all, but only as an extension of credit. Black v. Bachelder, 120 Mass. 171,

Payable in one or two years is not an uncommon form of expression in memoranda of agreements and other writings, and is always understood to mean at the expiration of one and two years respectively. Allentown School Dist. v. Derr, 115 Pa. St. 439. See also DUE, vol. 6, p. 36; DEBT, vol. 5, p. 165.

Paid.-A testamentary direction that all legacies are to be "paid" free of legacy duty, will be read as including the idea of satisfaction, transfer or delivery; so that chattels, stock or shares, the subject of a specific legacy, will, like payment of a pecuniary legacy, have to be delivered or transferred free of duty to the legatee. Ansley v. Cotton, 16 L. J. Ch. 55; Re Johnston, Cockerell v. Essex, 26 Ch. D. 538.

A testamentary direction that debts are to be "paid" (whether legacies are also mentioned or not) prevents the presumption that a legacy to a creditor is in satisfaction of his claim. Re Huish, 43 Ch. D. 260; disapproving Edmunds v. Low, 3 K. & J. 318; s. c., 26 L. J. Ch. 432.

Articles of a company which empower the declaration of dividends "to be paid" to members, do not authorize the issue of bonds for dividends. Wood v. Odessa Water W. Co., 42 Ch. D. 636, 628; Hoole v. Great Western Ry., 3 Ch. 262.

A bill of sale "truly sets forth its consideration," within the English bills of sales act of 1882, if the money therein stated to be "paid" did not actually pass in cash, but was a sum òwing by the grantor to the grantee for unpaid purchase money of the chattels therein comprised. Ex parte Bolland, 21 Ch.

D. 543.

In a charter-party agreeing to pay the highest sum proved to have been paid, "paid" may be read as meaning "contracted to be paid." Gether v. Čapper, 15 C. B. 701.

A Minnesota tax law provides that judgments and sales for delinquent taxes shall be void upon proof at any time that such tax shall have been paid or (that) such property was exempt. The word "paid" is here used in a com

prehensive sense, embracing the meanredemption or sale," which were used ing of the words "satisfied by payment, in a previous section. The court says: "This is within the proper signification of the word itself; among the primary definitions are, to satisfy, to discharge one's obligations to." Forrest v. Henry, 33 Minn. 434.

Where a statute required a payment of rates before the person could become a voter in a burrough, it was held that from the words "unless he shall have paid" it was to be inferred that the voter must pay himself and payment for him by another would not satisfy the statute. Reg. v. Bridgnorth, 10 A. & E. 68; s. c., 37 E. C. L. 46.

A Connecticut statute provided that all damages done by dogs to sheep, in any town, should be paid by such town. Held, where the selectmen gave to a person, whose sheep had been injured by dogs, an order on the town treasurer, which was given and received in satisfaction of the claim, that it was "payment" within the meaning of the statute. Wilton v. Weston, 48 Conn. 325.

Paid up Policies.-See INSURANCE, vol. 11, p. 306.

To be Paid.-This phrase in an agreement inter partes creates a covenant to pay. Bower v. Hodges, 13 C. B. 765.

In a will it is generally synonymous with PAYABLE. See further 1 Jarman on Wills 837. In Martineau v. Rogers, 25 L. J. Ch. 398; s. c., 8 D. G. M. & G.. 328, a testator bequeathed legacies to two nephews and a niece by name, if they respectively survived him and attained twenty-one, when the nephews' legacies were "to be paid." In case of the death of either of the nephews or of the niece leaving issue, such issue to take the parent's legacy as the parent should by will appoint. But in case of the death of either of the nephews or the niece before his or her legacy became payable, the legacy to go to the survivors. During the minorities of the legatees the trustees were to apply the income of the legacies for their maintenance and education. The legacy of the niece and any share she might acquire by the death of her brothers, or either of them, was to be settled for her separate use. Held, that upon the whole context, the word "paid" must be construed as "vested" or "payable," and that the executory gift to the issue would take effect in the event of the parent dying after attaining twenty-one.

PAYMENT (See also ACCORD AND SATISFACTION, vol. 1, p. 94; DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, vol. 5, p. 179; DEBTS OF DECEDENTS, vol. 5, p. 206; DEMAND, vol. 5, p. 522; FRAUDS, STATUTE OF, vol. 8, p. 657; INTEREST, vol. 11, p. 379; MISTAKE, vol. 15, p. 625; NOVATION, vol. 16, p. 862; TENDER: UNITED STATES).

I. Definition, 149.

II. What Constitutes Payment,

150.

1. In General, 150.

2. By Levy of Execution, 160. 3. Payment or Purchase, 160. III. Medium of Payment, 163. 1. In Money, 163.

2. Bank Bills, 164.

3. Confederate Notes, 165.
4. Illegal Currency, 167.

5. Account Against Another,
167.

6. Note, Bill or Check, 167.
(a) General Rule, 167.
(b) Of Third Party, 171.
(c) Effect of Course of Deal-
ing, 173.

(d) Payment by Check Relates
to Date Thereof, 174.

(e) By Worthless Check or
Note, 174.

(f) Note Negotiated, 175.
(g) Recovery on

Original

Cause of Action, 176. (h) Right of Action

pended, 177.

(i) Rule in Indiana, 178.

Sus

(k) Rule in Massachusetts and Maine, 179.

(1) In Payment of Goods Sold, 182.

(m) By Surety, 184.

(n) By Executor, 184.

(0) Certificate of Deposit, 184.
(p) Order, 184.

7. Higher Security, 185.
8. Specific Articles, 186.

IV. By Whom Payment May be
Made, 187.

1. In General, 187.

2. By a Third Party, 187.

V. To Whom Payment May be Made, 188.

1. In General, 188.

2. After Assignment, 190.

3. To the Holder of a Bill or

Note, 190.

[blocks in formation]
[blocks in formation]

1. The General Rule, 198.
2. When Note Is Payable at a
Particular Bank, 199.

IX. Evidence of Payment, 200.
1. Receipt of Payment, 200.
2. Book Entries, 200.

3. Burden of Proof, 201. X. Presumption of Payment, 203. 1. From Circumstances, 203. 2. Payment or Loan, 205. 3. From Possession of Instrument by Debtor, 206. 4. Same Party Debtor and Creditor, 207.

5. From Lapse of Time, 207.
6. Rebutting Presumption, 211.
7. Distinction Between Pre-
sumption of Payment and
Statute of Limitations,

214.
XI. Waiver by Payment, 214..
XII. Voluntary Payments, 214.

1. Cannot be Recovered Back, 214.

2. Under Duress or by Fraud,
218.

3. Protest Necessary, 219.
4. Of Taxes or Assessments,

[blocks in formation]
« SebelumnyaLanjutkan »