RILL.

1. Where a deed is executed by the attorney of the grantor, or officer or agent of a corporation, lawfully authorized, he is the party executing the same who may make the acknowledgment. Lovett v. Steam Sawmill Assoc., 6 Paige (N. Y.) 54.

A statute enacting that the holder of any negotiable note or bill may institute one suit against the whole or any number of the parties liable to such holder, but shall not institute more than one suit on such note or bill, should be construed as embracing all the makers as one party, all the endorsers as another, etc.; and, therefore, a suit and judgment upon such joint note or bill against one maker, or one endorsee, etc., will constitute a bar to any other suit against any other maker or endorser, etc. Archer v. Heiman, 21 Ind. 29.

A statute declaring every contract for the sale of lands void, unless subscribed by the party by whom such sale is to be made, or by the agent of such party lawfully authorized, requires signatures of all the vendors, when more than one unite in the contract of sale. Snyder v. Neefus, 53 Barb. (N. Y.) 63.

In article 10 of the treaty between the United States and Great Britain, August 9, 1842 (8 St. at Large, 576), providing that, on extradition, the expense of apprehension and delivery shall be borne by the "party who makes the requisition, and receives the fugitive," the word "party" refers to the contracting parties to the treaty, and has no reference to any question which may arise between the government which receives the fugitive and its officers or citizens. People v. Board of Supervisors, 8 N. Y. Supp. 752.

A Kentucky statute provides that in case of schism or division of the church, each party is to have the use of the church and appurtenances a part of the time in proportion to its members. Held, that where a number of members of a church congregation, although they constituted a majority thereof, dissolved their connection with the church of which they were members, and with the entire ecclesiastical body of which it is a member, and united with another and distant religious organization, they cannot be regarded as a "party" within the meaning of the statute. McKinney v. Griggs, 5

Bush (Ky.) 401; s. c., 96 Am. Dec. 360.

Party or Privy.-Though a covenant that the covenanter has not done, permitted, or suffered anything preventing him from conveying, is not broken by his having assented to what he could not prevent, yet if the words "or been party or privy to" were added, there would be a breach in such a case (Hobson v. Middleton, 6 B. & C. 295; 9 D. & R. 249. Vh. Elph. 490; Dart, 885, 886; Sug. V. & P. 603, 604). Vh. Clifford v. Hoare, 43 L. J. D. P. 225; L. R., 9 C. P. 362; PERMIT.

Party Read as Person.-"Signed by the party to be charged therewith," 4, 17, St. of Frauds;-"Party" there is not to be construed party as to a deed, but person in general (Sug. V. & P. 129, citing 3 Atk. 503).

"Party" read "Person" in Barlow v. Osborne, 6 H. L. Ca. 556.

See also Re Quartz Hill Gold Min. Co., 21 Ch. D 642; East London Waterworks Company v. Vestry of St. Matthew Bethnal Green, 17 Q. B. D. 484.

Boards for the equalization of taxes are not judicial tribunals and a nomenclature used in acts relating to them, though sometimes such as is used in reference to proceedings in courts is not there used in its technical legal sense. For instance, the word "party" as used in the Arkansas act, is used in its popular sense of "person" and not in its technical sense "party to a suit." Prairie Co. v. Matthews, 46 Ark, 383. See also Pulaski Co. Equalization Board Cases, 49 Ark. 518. See also PERSON.

1. Robinson v. Currey, 7 Q. B. Div.

470.

Section 1294 Code of Civil Procedure of New York, gives the right of appeal to the "party aggrieved." It was held, in Watts Campbell Co. v. Yuengling, 3 N. Y. Supp. 868. that, where judgment was rendered by request of defendant's attorney, defendant is not aggrieved, within the meaning of the

statute.

The statute authorizing "the party

aggrieved" to prosecute an action to set aside a judgment obtained by means of the fraud of the "prevailing party," held, not to authorize one not a party to the action in which such judgment was recovered, although he was directly interested in the results, to maintain such statutory action. Stewart v. Duncan, 40 Minn. 410.

An Indiana act provides that every telegraph company having lines within the State, etc., shall receive, dispatch, and transmit the same, with impartiality, in the order in which they are received, and that any person contravening the act shall be liable to the party aggrieved, to the penalty of $100. Held, that the act was penal in its nature and must be construed strictly, and that the sender alone is the party aggrieved within the meaning of the statute. Hadley v. Western Union Tel. Co., 115 Ind. 191; s. c., 21 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 72.

A Minnesota statute provides that "a party aggrieved" may appeal from an order appointing an administrator. "This does not include a mere debtor of the estate. It refers to one, who as heir, devisee, legatee, or creditor, has what may be called a legal interest in the assets of the estate and their due administration." In Re Hardy, 35 Minn. 193.

In proceedings to vacate an assessment for a street improvement, it appeared that the partitioner purchased the land assessed after the work had been commenced and before the assessment had been laid. The land was conveyed to him, subject to any assessment to be made for the work, and the payment of the assessment was made to the principal consideration for the conveyance. Held, that it could not be said, as matter of law, that the petitioner was not a "party aggrieved" within the meaning of the statute; that to effect that result it is necessary that it should affirmatively appear that the legal owner cannot in any respect be injured by the assessment; that the conveyance imposed no liability upon the grantee beyond the payment of any legal assess

RILL.

1. Where a deed is executed by the attorney of the grantor, or officer or agent of a corporation, lawfully authorized, he is the party executing the same who may make the acknowledgment. Lovett v. Steam Sawmill Assoc., 6 Paige (N. Y.) 54.

A statute enacting that the holder of any negotiable note or bill may institute one suit against the whole or any number of the parties liable to such holder, but shall not institute more than one suit on such note or bill, should be construed as embracing all the makers as one party, all the endorsers as another, etc.; and, therefore, a suit and judgment upon such joint note or bill against one maker, or one endorsee, etc., will constitute a bar to any other suit against any other maker or endorser, etc. Archer v. Heiman, 21 Ind. 29.

A statute declaring every contract for the sale of lands void, unless subscribed by the party by whom such sale is to be made, or by the agent of such party lawfully authorized, requires signatures of all the vendors, when more than one unite in the contract of sale. Snyder v. Neefus, 53 Barb. (N. Y.) 63.

In article 10 of the treaty between the United States and Great Britain, August 9, 1842 (8 St. at Large, 576), providing that, on extradition, the expense of apprehension and delivery shall be borne by the "party who makes the requisition, and receives the fugitive," the word "party" refers to the contracting parties to the treaty, and has no reference to any question which may arise between the government which receives the fugitive and its officers or citizens. People v. Board of Supervisors, 8 N. Y. Supp. 752.

A Kentucky statute provides that in case of schism or division of the church, each party is to have the use of the church and appurtenances a part of the time in proportion to its members. Held, that where a number of members of a church congregation, although they constituted a majority thereof, dissolved their connection with the church of which they were members, and with the entire ecclesiastical body of which it is a member, and united with another and distant religious organization, they cannot be regarded as a "party" within the meaning of the statute. McKinney v. Griggs, 5

Bush (Ky.) 401; s. c., 96 Am. Dec. 360.

Party or Privy.-Though a covenant that the covenanter has not done, permitted, or suffered anything preventing him from conveying, is not broken by his having assented to what he could not prevent, yet if the words "or been party or privy to" were added, there would be a breach in such a case (Hobson v. Middleton, 6 B. & C. 295; 9 D. & R. 249. Vh. Elph. 490; Dart, 885, 886; Sug. V. & P. 603, 604). Vh. Clifford v. Hoare, 43 L. J. D. P. 225; L. R., 9 C. P. 362; PERMIT.

Party Read as Person.-"Signed by the party to be charged therewith," 4, 17, St. of Frauds;-"Party" there is not to be construed party as to a deed, but person in general (Sug. V. & P. 129, citing 3 Atk. 503).

"Party" read "Person" in Barlow v. Osborne, 6 H. L. Ca. 556.

See also Re Quartz Hill Gold Min. Co., 21 Ch. D 642; East London Waterworks Company v. Vestry of St. Matthew Bethnal Green, 17 Q. B. D. 484.

Boards for the equalization of taxes are not judicial tribunals and a nomenclature used in acts relating to them, though sometimes such as is used in reference to proceedings in courts is not there used in its technical legal sense. For instance, the word "party" as used in the Arkansas act, is used in its popular sense of "person" and not in its technical sense "party to a suit." Prairie Co. v. Matthews, 46 Ark, 383. See also Pulaski Co. Equalization Board Cases, 49 Ark. 518. See also PERSON.

1. Robinson v. Currey, 7 Q. B. Div. 470.

Section 1294 Code of Civil Procedure of New York, gives the right of appeal to the "party aggrieved." It was held, in Watts Campbell Co. v. Yuengling, 3 N. Y. Supp. 868, that, where judgment was rendered by request of defendant's attorney, defendant is not aggrieved, within the meaning of the statute.

The statute authorizing "the party

aggrieved" to prosecute an action to set aside a judgment obtained by means of the fraud of the “prevailing_party," held, not to authorize one not a party to the action in which such judgment was recovered, although he was directly interested in the results, to maintain such statutory action. Stewart v. Duncan, 40 Minn. 410.

An Indiana act provides that every telegraph company having lines within the State, etc., shall receive, dispatch, and transmit the same, with impartiality, in the order in which they are received, and that any person contravening the act shall be liable to the party aggrieved, to the penalty of $100. Held, that the act was penal in its nature and must be construed strictly, and that the sender alone is the party aggrieved within the meaning of the statute. Hadley v. Western Union Tel. Co., 115 Ind. 191; s. c., 21 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 72.

A Minnesota statute provides that "a party aggrieved" may appeal from an order appointing an administrator. "This does not include a mere debtor of the estate. It refers to one, who as heir, devisee, legatee, or creditor, has what may be called a legal interest in the assets of the estate and their due administration." In Re Hardy, 35 Minn. 193.

In proceedings to vacate an assessment for a street improvement, it appeared that the partitioner purchased the land assessed after the work had been commenced and before the assessment had been laid. The land was conveyed to him, subject to any assessment to be made for the work, and the payment of the assessment was made to the principal consideration for the conveyance. Held, that it could not be said, as matter of law, that the petitioner was not a "party aggrieved" within the meaning of the statute; that to effect that result it is necessary that it should affirmatively appear that the legal owner cannot in any respect be injured by the assessment; that the conveyance imposed no liability upon the grantee beyond the payment of any legal assess

I. Definition, 3.

II. How Created, 4.

(a) Party Wall Agreements, 4.
(b) Implied Grant, 7.
(c) Prescription, 8.
(d) Statutes, 8.

III. When a Party Wall Ceases to be

Such, 9.

IV. Rights, Duties and Liabilities of
Adjoining Owners, 10.

(a) General Statement, 10.
(b) Erection and Use, 11.
(c) Alteration, II.

(d) Repair, 13.

(e) Contribution, 13.

V. Remedies, 16.

VI. Practice and Procedure, 17.

ment that might be made. Matter of Pennie, 108 N. Y. 365.

1. Abb. L. Dict. 252; Hiatt v. Morris, 10 Ohio St. 523; Koeing v. Haddix, 21 Ill. App. 53; Hammann v. Jordan, 9 N. Y. Supp. 423.

One of two adjoining owners of land in a city, who erects a wall over the boundary line under the ordinances of the city respecting party-walls, cannot claim the benefit of such wall as a party-wall, unless it be built of the width prescribed by the ordinance, and also be solid and free from any openings. Traute v. White (N. J.), 19 Atl. Rep. 196.

A dividing wall between two build ings in the city of Philadelphia owned by different parties, the foundation of which rest partly upon the ground of each is a party-wall. It is immaterial that the foundation is not equally laid upon the lot of each party, and that the wall itself, above the foundation, is wholly within the lot of one of the adjoining owners. Western Nat. Banks App. 102 Pa. St. 171; Gordon v. Milne, 10 Phila. (Pa.) 15. Compare Beaver v. Nutter, 10 Phila. (Pa.) 345.

2. Montgomery v. Masonic Hall, 70 Ga. 38; Brown v. Werner, 40 Md. 15; Orman v. Day, 5 Fla. 392; Sherred v.

Cisco, 4 Sandf. (N. Y.) 480; Regina v. Copp, 17 Ont. Reps. (Can.) 738; Cubitt v. Porter, 8 Barn. & C. 257; Wiltshire v. Sidford, 8 Barn. & C. 259; Watson v. Gray, 14 Ch. Div. 192; Jones v. Read, 10 Is. R. C. L. 315; Standard Band of B. S. A. v. Stokes, 9 Ch. D. 68; 47 L. J. Ch. 554; 38 L. T. 672; 26 W. R. 492.

3. In this case the owners are not tenants in common, even if the wall was erected at their joint expense; Matts v. Hawkins, 5 Taunt. 20; but where there has been a common user of the wall erected at the common expense, that, in the absence of any other evidence, is sufficient evidence for a jury to find that the wall is held by the two parties as tenants in common; Cubitt v. Porter, 8 Barn. & C. 257; Standard Bank v. Stokes, 29 Ch. D. 68.

4. Rogers v. Sinsheimer. 50 N. Y. 646.

The term is so used in the English Metropolitan Building Act. 18 & 19 V. ch. 122,§ 3; Knight v. Pursell, 1 Ch. 1 D. 412. Such a wall may be a party-wall for some part of its height, and above that height the separate property of one of the adjoining owners; Weston v. Arnold, 43 L. J. Ch. 123; 8 Ch. 1084; and in same way such a wall may be