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business agent of different affiliated unions, and also Mrs. Ellen Lindstrom, business agent of said affiliated unions, and also G. H. Alexander, president of its affiliated unions, Anna Sorenson, business agent of its affiliated unions, and S. J. Stern, an officer of the district council, have advised strikers that the modification of the injunction permitted picketing of petitioner's place of business and other wholesale tailors, and said modification also permitted the congregating of pickets upon the streets and alleys; that said persons above named have urged and incited the assembling of strikers in large numbers before the places of business of petitioner, and have continually incited and urged the congregating of such pickets in such manner and for the purpose of threatening the employees of petitioner; that said last named persons have been personally present in crowds of strikers, and have gone among such strikers and urged them to intercept the employees of petitioner, and urged personal violence, which is set forth in the petition; that on March 14, 1905, a large crowd, including such last named persons and also Albert Pettlekan, Braglin, Frank Kreston, Ernest F. Albrecht, Charles Anderson, J. B. Scott, William Dohney, Frank Sporka, William Bodett, Ralph Ferrero, W. Hankinson, H. Hovander and

Hake, numbering four or five hundred people in all, assembled upon the streets, alleys and approaches to petitioner's place of business for the purpose of making and demonstrating against petitioner's business and for the purpose of intimidating the employees of petitioner as they were leaving its place of business, and that said crowd of strikers, including all the parties above named, hollered and jeered at the employees of petitioner as they were leaving its place of business, and said employees were frightened. and intimidated by said threatening attitudes and actions of said defendants; that one James Sweet, a cutter of petitioner, who was employed by petitioner, while leaving its place of business, was followed by one Charles Anderson,

with five or six other strikers, to Franklin street, near Van Buren, in the city of Chicago; that Charles Anderson pointed out said Sweet to the crowd and shouted, "There is Jim Sweet, the cutter; give it to him;' and that one of the other men who was with Charles Anderson seized said Sweet by the neck and threw him upon the ground, and that thereupon Anderson, with five or six other men, struck said Sweet; that another one of the crowd struck him, and that among said crowd so assaulting and beating said Sweet was a man by the name of James B. Scott.

"Petitioner further shows that on the 14th of March, 1904, as Philip Zuck, one of petitioner's employees, with several other employees of petitioner, was leaving his work, said crowd followed said employees, and three of said strikers slugged and struck said Zuck a great number of times and bruised him so that he had to be assisted back to petitioner's place of business, and thereafter, while he was returning to his home, said S. J. Stern, in company with a number of others, followed said Zuck; that with Stern was one Braglin; that said Braglin was stopped and prevented from assaulting said Zuck.

"Petitioner further represents that upon the 14th day of March, 1905, William Kirchberger, secretary and treasurer of petitioner, and one William Jungstrom, an employee, were leaving the business establishment of petitioner when a crowd of pickets followed said Kirchberger and Jungstrom, and when they had gone around the corner one of said strikers motioned to the other strikers, and one short man with a tan overcoat, whose name is unknown but who petitioner prays may be made a party to the petition when discovered, struck Jungstrom with his fist on the back of his head, knocking said Jungstrom forward, and that one of said strikers struck said Kirchberger a glancing blow in the face, breaking his glasses and knocking off his hat, and that among said strikers so assaulting said Kirchberger and Jungstrom was W. Dohney and Hake, and the said

strikers commenced to knock the said Kirchberger and Jungstrom about until a sergeant of police came up and dispersed the crowd, and thereafter said Kirchberger and Jungstrom returned to their place of business; that later Kirchberger started home, whereupon said strikers, including said Ellen Lindstrom and G. H. Alexander, followed said Kirchberger, calling him 'scab,' and that said Alexander pointed out said Kirchberger to the crowd and motioned to the crowd to follow said Kirchberger, whereupon a man by the name of Hake, who was with said Alexander and Lindstrom, struck said Kirchberger a blow in the stomach with his fist, knocking said Kirchberger in the arms of a policeman.

"The petitioner further shows that all of said above named persons were present in said crowd of strikers on said 14th of March, 1905, in front of and upon the streets leading to petitioner's place of business, and that they, each of them, took part in the threatening of the employees of the petitioner and in the acts of Alexander and Noren, Stern, Sorenson, Lindstrom, in advising said strikers and the members that the modification of the injunction permitted picketing the petitioner's place of business, and in inciting said pickets and strikers to the acts of violence above set forth; that said acts constituted a violation of said injunction and a contempt of court, and that all the parties so engaged, as aforesaid, knew of the issuance of the injunction and of the terms thereof, and that the violation of said injunction and contempt of the order of this court was knowingly and willfully committed by said named persons; that the petitioner annexes certain affidavits to the petition, setting forth specific acts of violence, and makes them a part of the petition. The petition prays that said persons be ruled to appear by a short day and answer the petition, and show cause why they, and each of them, should not be adjudged guilty of contempt of court and punished accordingly. Attached to said petition are the affidavits of William A. Kirchberger, James Sweet, J. W. Scharff, Philip

Zuck, William M. Jungstrom, Harry S. Beaumond, Michael Zuck, Maurice Feldman, Robert Seligman and Joe Kevarik.

"Appellant Frank Sporka filed an answer to the rule to show cause, denying the averments of the petition and affidavits. Appellants Charles Anderson, William J. Dohney and John Hake filed similar answers.

"On the hearing, in addition to the petition and affidavits in support thereof, and the respective answers and affidavits in support thereof, the court heard and considered oral testimony of witnesses as to the acts complained of, and on April 3 the court entered an order finding appellants guilty as charged in the petition and affidavits, and committing each of appellants to the county jail of Cook county for a period of four months or until discharged by due process of law, and discharged the other respondents to the petition.

"The cases are consolidated by agreement of parties for the purpose of hearing in this court."

William J. Dohney did not appeal from the judgment of the Appellate Court.

JACOB C. LEBOSKY, JOHN J. SONSTEBY, and DANIEL L. CRUICE, (WILLIAM SLACK, of counsel,) for appellants.

WHEELER, SILBER & ISAACS, for appellee.

Mr. JUSTICE VICKERS delivered the opinion of the court:

It is first insisted by appellants that the petition fails to state a case of contempt and that the evidence fails to establish such case, in that there is a failure to set out the order of injunction, or any modification thereof, in the petition. This contention is based on a failure of the petitioner to recite at length in the petition the injunctional order. The petition merely recites that "complainant filed its bill of complaint against the Garment Workers of America, and certain other affiliated local unions, on the 28th

day of November; that an injunction was issued herein, as will more fully appear, reference thereunto being thereby especially had." If the contempt proceeding had been an original action instituted for the purpose of punishing a contempt which did not arise in connection with a pending. cause, the pleading and the order would necessarily have to contain a statement of all the facts constituting the contempt. But where the contempt consists in the violation of some order of the court in a pending proceeding by one who is bound by such order, either as a party or otherwise, there is no necessity for setting out the previous order of the court in the petition. The court wherein the proceeding is pending will take judicial notice of all orders previously entered in the cause. The only matter about which the court was not fully advised was the alleged acts of appellants upon which the charge of contempt was based. The proceedings here for contempt were incidental to the general relief sought by the original bill. If the injunctional order had been recited in the petition it might have been said that the bill upon which such order was entered also should have been set out. Both the bill and the order for the injunction were before the court, and no necessity existed for again reciting them at large in the petition.

There is a distinction to be noted, in several respects, between practice in contempt proceedings in a court of chancery and proceedings to punish contempts in a court at law. Where the proceeding is in a court of equity, the contempt is punished as an incident to the enforcement of orders and decrees made in furtherance of the remedy sought. In cases of common law cognizance the contempt usually consists in some act in disregard of the power and dignity of the court, and which has a tendency to interrupt or disturb the due administration of justice. In cases of common law jurisdiction for contempt the defendant is tried upon his answer made to interrogatories filed. No other evidence is heard. If the answers prove false the remedy is by indictment for

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