SECTION VII.

Containing several other Strictures on the Defence of his First Argument.

The next thing which merits attention is, the dilemma to which he is evidently reduced, by. discarding, and yet retaining his darling position, that a man may sin from a holy principle. This position he has made the very basis of his first argument. For, he pleads, "Though a person should exercise a good principle, in the neglect of any external action which God has commanded, his neglect would still be sinful." Then he concludes thus: "Now if the omission of external actions, commanded by God, be in itself sinful, it necessarily follows, that the doing of them is a duty." This is his method of proving, that there is a right and wrong in action as well as in temper and principle. But, the fallacy of this reasoning was detected in the dialogue, by shewing the impossibility of a man's sinning from good principles. For, all sin consists in a bad principle or temper, and not in a good one. And, to set the matter in a clear light, the following cases were put, the pertinency of which he has frankly allowed. Mendicus is a real beggar, and consequently a proper object of charity and Generosus is a man of fortune, who loves to help the needy. But, though Mendicus appears to others to be an object of charity, he does not appear in this light to Generosus. He does not therefore impart his favours to Mendicus, because he thinks it wrong to encourage needless beggars. Now,

:

the question is not this; whether Generosus is faulty not in seeing that Mendicus is a real object of charity? For, according to the supposition, Mendicus is a real beggar, and exhib its ample evidence to others of his distressing poverty. But, this is the case of conscience; whether it is the duty of Generosus to bestow his charity upon one, who he conscientiously thinks, does not need it? And, it is easy to see, that it is not his duty for it is certainly wrong for a man to act contrary to the present light and voice of conscience. In this given case, then, Generosus does not neglect his duty, from a good principle. It is not his duty to violate conscience. For, whatsoever is not of faith, is sin. The other case which I put was of this nature. A certain express is obliged to cross the wilderness in so many hours, to deliver a packet to an officer whose detachment is in the greatest danger of being cut off by the enemy. The general directs him to go twenty miles to the parting of the way, and then to take the right hand, and not the left hand path. But, in consequence of criminal inattention to his seasonable instructions, he really thinks, when he comes to the parting of the way, that he was directed to take the left hand and not the right. Now, what is his duty at the divis ion of the way, while he really thinks he was directed to take the left hand? shall he take the left hand, according to his present judg ment, or shall he take the right hand, contrary to it? the case is obvious; and there is no dilemma. The least child, as well as the most

present cirIn this giv For, he acts But, in not

able casuist, says, it is his duty in cumstances to take the left hand. en case, then, he is not faulty. according to his best judgment. paying proper attention to his seasonable instructions, he was very faulty.

...But, let us now attend to Mr. T.'s reply. For, he must either approve this reasoning or disapprove it, or approve and disapprove it both, and make the best he can of a most intolerable dilemma. He says (page 12) with his usual freedom, "I shall just observe, that all your reasoning is easily answered by only distinguishing between those practical errors of the judgment which are invincible, and therefore innocent; and those which are voluntary and criminal. If a person is invincibly ignorant of the rule of duty in any given case, it does not reach him in that case; it is to him no law, and therefore no transgression. With respect, then, to the cases you put, if a real object of charity exhibit evidence of his being so, you are bound by the law of God to treat him as such. Nor is your obligation cancelled by want of full evidence, that he is such an object. For you had sufficient means of instruction presented. And yet, if you help him in contradiction to your present erroneous judgment, you sin, because you do it not conscientiously."

But, where is our Theorist now? If I mistake not, he both sees and feels the force of a dilemma. For, must Generosus sin in giving to Mendicus, and sin in not giving too, amid the same circumstances? if he act according to his conscience, he sins, and if he act.con

trary to his conscience, he sins. This is a hard case indeed. Is there no way for him to escape sin, in this given case? let us then, for the sake of relief, appeal to Mr. T.'s rule of invincible ignorance just stated. If, says he, "If a person is invincibly ignorant of the rule of duty in any given case, obligation does not reach him in that case; it is to him no law, and there fore there can be no transgression." The applie cation of this rule to the case before us is easy and natural. For, is not Generosus invincibly ignorant that it is his duty to treat Mendicus as an object of charity, while he conscientiously thinks that he is a needless beggar? withholding charity, therefore in this given case is not sinful. For, says Mr. T. "If you help him in contradiction to your present judgment, you sin because you do it not conscientiously." But, let us apply this "invincible rule" to the kindred case, Is not the express at the parting of the way, invincibly ignorant of the rule of direction? is it not naturally impossible for him to think that he ought to take the right hand, while he conscientiously thinks that he was directed to take the left? it is therefore evident, according to Mr. T. whose authority I prize in this instance, that the rule of direction does not reach him in this given case. It is to him no law, and therefore there can be no transgression, in his taking the left hand path, according to his present judgment. The consequence is then obvious, that in all given cases of this nature, persons do not neglect duty from a good prin ciple. For, it is never a man's duty to violate

his conscience. It is also equally obvious, that Mr. T. has supplanted himself. For, he thinks he has proved that there is a morality in actions, distinct from motive, because it would be sinful for a person to neglect any part of his duty from a good principle.

On the whole I thank him for his happy dis tinction between vincible and invincible ignorance and am pretty sure he will never plead again, that it is possible for a man to sin from a good principle. But, if he should renew his plea conscientiously, I shall apply the foregoing rule and impute no iniquity.*

The reader will keep in mind, that the ques tion in debate is this, "Whether any thing is required of man as duty, which does not involve holy love ?" to prove that God does not require ány thing but what involves holy love, I cited this text, "Love is the fulfilling of the law." And, I still think it saps the foundation of his theory. For how can love be the fulfilment of the law, if any actions be required which are L But, according to this doctrine, says the objector, Paul did his duty in persecuting Christ; for he verily thought that he ought to do many things, contrary to the name of Jesus. Answer. By no means. For, duty neither consists in an erroneous conscience, nor in a rightly informed conscience; but, duty invariably consists only in good motives, or in good exercises of heart. Paul did not, therefore, do any part of his duty in persecuting christians. For the spirit of persecution is a wrong motive, or exercise of heart. Accordingly that he was exceedingly mad against them, he amply and most humbly confesses, The objection destroys itself. For it is as impossible to persecute Christ from good motives, as it is to love him with all the heart, while we hate him with all the heart. The spirit of persecution is a bad motive and not a good motive; and is invariably forbidden.