Were I ignorant of his past and present efforts to support his theory from this rare position, that a man may sin from good principles, I should think the printer had not done him justice. For, it is as impossible to commit murder from good motives, as it is to love God and prepare for heaven from bad motives. For murder consists in a bad motive, or volition, and not in a good one. A good murderer is a monster. And it is happy that he is known only in theory. For, his actions fall under the cognizance of no law, human or divine.

But, to return; what is the import of the question respecting Joash? Mr. T. does not mean to ask us 1. whether we can tell that the murder of Joash was criminal abstractly from any volition of the agents: for, he says, (page 10) that "The bare act of stabbing another is confessedly indifferent in itself." Nor, does he ask 2. whether murder is criminal abstractly from criminal volition. For, to adopt his own phrase, it is "The voluntary commission of murder" of which he is treating. Nor 3. does he ask whether murder is criminal adstractly from any motive whatever? for, he says (page 9 & 14) that "Moral agents never act as such without motive," and that “Choice or voluntary action implies and arises from motive.”

If, then, his question be not this, whether murder be criminal, abstractly from volition; nor abstractly from criminal volition; nor abstractly from motive, he means to ask us whether we cannot tell that the murder of Joash was criminal, though we do not know that

his servants killed him for the sake of honour, profit or revenge-And, I willingly answer that we can determine the criminality of their conduct in murdering their king, though we do not know the NAME of the particular motive by which they were actuated. For, murder is criminality itself. But, what is the consequence of our knowing that murder is murder, or that murder is criminal, though we do not know the name of the agent's motive? Mr. T. replies, “If you say you can determine this act of murder to have been criminal, let the unknown, motives of the authors have been what they may, you allow a morality in actions themselves, abstractly from their motives. To say that I deny the consequence, and that Mr. T. is chargeable with a great mistake, is needless. I do not allow the morality of actions, abstractly from their motives. For, motives belong to AGENTS and not to actions: and the moral actions and motives of agents are the same. All that I allow in answering his question is this, that murder is a criminal action or motive, though I do not know whether the agents were actuated by pride, or revenge. But, this will never establish the morality of actions, abstractly from the morality of mtioves, any more than it will establish the morality of actions, abstractly from the morality of actions. For, the effective motive and volition of the agent are the same. And, though we do not know the particular name of the motive, or volition, by which those Regicides were influenced; yet we know the nature of it. For, all

motives forbidden by the sixth command, are by scripture and universal consent, styled murder. Mr. T.'s question therefore is finally reduced to this, whether the effective volition of an agent is not as really moral as any volition which precedes it in the same series? but this no one disputes: nor is it to his purpose. For, it does not follow, that there is a morality in actions, abstractly from motive, because we can determine the moral quality of one action, without knowing the name of another. And, if he had accurately defined his terms, and marked the difference between objective and subjective motives; and used words steadily, according to the common acceptation, he would escape the heavy tax of advocating that theory which requires so much help from ambiguity and obscurity.

But, what are the grounds of his mistake in his first argument? 1. He takes it for granted, that the morality of the agent's motive, and his voluntary choice, are not the same. Accordingly, he says, (page 14)“ Tho' choice implies motive, yet it is not the same thing, but plainly distinguishable from it." But, tho' he was repeatedly urged to define his terms, and to point out the supposed difference between motive and choice, yet he has not done it. But, shall he be blamed? for, who can ascertain the difference between good motives of heart, and good exercises of heart? for, we have all been taught by the best authorities, to say, that Mary's motive in saluting Christ was good, and the motive of Judas was bad. But,

2 The original ground of his mistake lies in taking it for granted, that mere externals, which are the natural expressions of the heart, are of a moral nature. Accordingly he says, (page 11) "That duty or sin consists, in some degree, in the performance or omission of external commanded actions, distinct from the motive or end." But, this every one must see, who can examine things, is deeply erroneous. For, it proves that hypocrisy is a duty; because hypocrisy consists only in performing those external actions with a bad heart, which are the genuine expressions of a good heart. Agreeably, while God requires sacrifices and offerings, as expressions of love, he utterly forbids and rejects them when destitue of love. But, the following narration will perhaps display the mistake to advantage. "A noted vintager, at a proper time, directed his servants to go to his distant vineyard and gather grapes. They attended to his command with apparent obedience only: for, they had no intention to comply with it. A went a mile, B two miles, and C three miles, toward the vineyard. But, gladly meeting with their vicious companions, spent the day with them in idleness, and never went into the vineyard. At night they all returned, and the master asked them whether they had done their duty? they unitedly pled that they had done part of their duty. What part have you done, said the master? I went a mile toward the vineyard, said A, I went two miles, said B: and C pled three miles of duty. But, the master called them idle villains, and told them, up

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on ascertaining their motives, that they had done no part of their duty in the least degree. Query, were not the servants acquainted with Mr. T.'s theory either by nature or education? and did not C. perform three times as much duty as A.?" For duty, says our theorist, consists in some degree, in the performance of external commanded action, distinct from the motive or end."

From this view of Mr. T.'s reply, it appears quite needless to vindicate those particular il lustrations, which were improved against it in the first part of the dialogue. He pleads that they are not pertinent: but, when the reader remembers that they were intended to expose the notion of external duty, abstractly from motive, for which Mr. T. so often and ernestly contends, the pertinency of them will be allowed in the face of his liberal exceptions. He says, they are calculated to catch and impose on vulgar minds, and has laboured hard to expose them; but, I can cheerfully submit them, when restored to the connexion in which they were used, to discerning minds. For, the morality of actions is nothing more nor less than the morality of the agent's motives, or the mu-" rality of his volitions. Moral actions, motives, ends and volitions, are the same: and these are good or bad, not according to the rule of appearance, but accordingly as they are conformed or opposed to the law of God.