The United States v. The New Bedford Bridge.
is most of its other powers, not as admiralty ones, except appeals from the district tribunals.
Nor will it be necessary in any of these cases, to make the jurisdiction exclusive of the State Courts, except where the power that is executed by it is exclusive in its nature.
In all other cases, the rights, and remedies, and duties and liabilities of our people can be taken care of in the State Courts, except where the laws of the latter may conflict with those of Congress on the same subject.
NOTE. This Opinion was mostly prepared before the decision in the case of Waring v. Clarke, (5 How. 441,) although it was not delivered until after.
1. The allegations of one of the parties
in a libel are not evidence for him, unless
called for by the other side, and are then
to be weighed as they deserve, without
requiring in all cases more than one wit-
ness to overcome them.
Jay v. Almy. 262
2. A nonsuit not the result of a judg-
ment of the Court, is no bar to a subse-
quent libel for the same cause of com-
plaint.
Ibid.
AMERICAN VESSEL.
As to what renders a vessel an Ameri-
can vessel under the crimes acts, see
SEAMEN, 6.
1. Where a bill in Chancery asks an-
swers to certain pertinent interrogatories,
according to the knowledge, information,
and belief of the respondents, it is their
duty, not merely to state their own
knowledge, but the information, if any
derived from others, and their belief on
the subject.
Kittridge v. Claremont Bank. 244
2. If one of the respondents be a cor-
poration, the officers answering are bound
to make full inquiries on the matter be-
fore answering.
Ibid.
3. When the Court have once ordered
the respondents to answer more fully on
such matters, and exceptions are taken
and sustained again to omissions or eva-
sions, the Court will not allow the an-
swers to be amended without cost, to be
followed by harsher measures, if the
omissions are repeated.
Ibid.
4. The sworn answer of a defendant in
equity, when responsive to material alle-
gations in the bill, must be taken as true,
unless impugned by the testimony of
more than one witness.
Towne v. Smith. 115
5. As to the form of an answer to a
bill for the violation of a patent, which
denies the validity of the patent, see IN-
JUNCTION, 7.
1. Whether an award, made under a
parol agreement to refer, and not under a
rule of Court, nor by a submission under
a statute provision, nor under bonds, with
penal provisions to enforce its execution,
can be pleaded in bar to any action, un-
less previously accepted, or carried into
effect,- quære.
United States v. Ames. 76
2. The United States had machinery
in operation, carried by water, on land
which had been sold to them, and over
which jurisdiction had been ceded to
them, by the State of Massachusetts. A.
owned mills above and below them, on
the same stream; and the dams of each
party flowed back so as to obstruct the
other. A submission of the matters in
dispute was entered into by A. on the
one part, and by the district attorney, au-
thorized by the solicitor of the treasury,
or war department, on the other part, but
without any authority from Congress;
and an award was made thereon, pre-
scribing the height of the dam. The
United States afterwards brought an ac-
tion of trespass against A. for flowing
their land. He pleaded a special bar of
the award, alleging that he had complied
with its terms. On general demurrer, it
was held, that the special plea could not
be sustained.
Ibid.
3. No officer of the United States has
authority to enter into a submission in
their behalf, which shall be binding on
them, unless the power is given by a spe-
cial act of Congress.
Ibid.
1. If an advance of money is made to
an officer of the marine corps, he becomes
liable as a debtor for the amount, to be
applied, and vouchers furnished as direct-
ed, or to return what is not thus accounted
for; and he is not to be treated as a bailee
of the money, and responsible for only
ordinary care in respect to it.
United States v. Freeman. 45
2. If he deposits it in a bank, which
1. Where one of the respondents was
discharged as a bankrupt in November,
1843, but showed no efforts to plead it
till April, 1845, and in July, 1846, after
the case had been published and an opin-
ion given on the merits, moved to be
allowed to avail himself of it; the Court
considered the application too late, and
the subject-matter of this bill, a claim in
equity to rescind a contract, as one not
provable under the bankrupt law.
Doggett v. Emerson.
2. If creditors object to the discharge
of a bankrupt, and obtain a verdict against
it in the District Court, and on appeal
here a verdict is rendered for the bank-
rupt, on new evidence, filed in a new ex-
amination and disclosure allowed to him
on leave, costs are not allowed to either
party.
In re Guild. 29
3. In such cases, usually, it is equita-
ble to give costs on each verdict to the
prevailing party in each; but not to the
party last recovering, unless it was on
the same evidence, and unless he was
able to pay costs, if losing the verdict.
4. If a person become a bankrupt, who
was interested in land in dispute one
tenth, and helped to defend in the suit,
the assignee may continue to defend, if
the creditors, knowing the fact, do not
object.
In re Babcock. 26
5. It may be otherwise in commencing
disputed suits, unless the creditors as-
Ibid.
6. The amount of the expense in the
defence would be in proportion to his in-
terest, where no contract to pay more had
been made by the bankrupt; but if he
had agreed to pay more, e. g. one half,
and the defence would not be continued
without his paying the half, the effects of
the bankrupt are liable for that half till
an assignee is appointed; and after that,
the assignee, as assignee, is liable for the
half, if the creditors did not object to a
continuance of the defence, and respecta-
ble counsel advised it, and the assignee
directed it.
Ibid.
As to costs in Bankruptcy, see BANK-
RUPTCY, 1, 2.
1. The terms of a final judgment can-
not be altered by the Court in any mate-
rial part, except on a review, or appeal,
or writ of error, or rehearing allowed for
sufficient cause.
Jenkins v. Eldredge. 61
2. Decrees are final, after the end of
the term at which they are rendered, un-
less specially entered otherwise, and they
are final after entered up as final on some
day before the end of the term, with a
view to other proceedings upon them as
final decrees. Especially are they not to
be altered when so entered by agreement
of the parties.
3. Extending time for payment of a
mortgage when foreclosed, is granted
afterwards as an exception in equity, but
extending the time to redeem in an appli-
cation to redeem, on which a final decree
has once been rendered, will not be so
granted.
Ibid.
4. Proceedings, such as the paying
money on an execution, the opening of
biddings at sales, and reports of Masters,
are not exceptions, but relate to new mat-
ters, after the decree, when they do not
precede a final decree.
Ibid.
5. Without special statutes, accident
in not appearing, or otherwise, happening
before final decree, cannot be relieved
against after final decree, unless by bill
in equity, or unless fraud was mingled
with it, or irregularity in the proceed-
ings.
1. Where a father conveyed land to his
son for services and affection, and took
back a lease for life, but did not wish to
have them recorded till after his death,
in order to keep the knowledge of them
from his wife and the public, the deed
was held to be well delivered, though
lodged with a third person under the
above arrangement.
Brown v. Brown. 325
2. If that third person falls sick, and
the grantor takes back the deed for safe-
ty, and dies leaving it among his papers,
from which it is taken by the grantee and
recorded, the original delivery still con-
tinues to be valid.
Ibid.
3. More confidence and looseness in
As to bonds of Postmasters, see POST- such matters are tolerated between a
father and a son, and such conveyances
are at times considered in Chancery, in
the nature of a settlement of the father's
Ibid.
As to recision of contracts of sale for estate to this extent.
fraud, see FRAUD.
4. If the complainant put in confes-
sions of the respondent, who was the
grantee, as to the arrangement about the
deposit and delivery of the deed, they
may be used by either side.
Ibid.
5. Where an estate, out of which a mill
privilege has been carved, becomes united
in ownership with other estates below,
the owner of both may convey different
rights and privileges from what were be-
fore attached to either estate; but in
conveying either to different and new
persons, any change in the privileges
made appurtenant to each must distinctly
appear, or each will be presumed to exist
as before the junction of the estates.
Perry v. Parker. 280.
As to the sufficiency of answer, see
ANSWER, 1, 2, 3; INJUNCTION, 7.
As to the effect to be given to a sworn
answer, see ANSWER, 4.
1. This Court will not interfere in equi-
ty, in a case where the parties appear to
have a full remedy for their rights at law.
Shapley v. Rangeley. 213
2. When a disclosure is sought here,
and has been obtained, the party may
then resort to a proceeding at law, if an
ample one exists.
Ibid.
3. A bill of peace does not generally
lie here in respect to land, unless the
complainant is or has been in possession,
or there is a defect in some deed, asked
to be given up.
Ibid.
4. Allegations in bills need not set out
all the facts, in detail, which are to be
proved; but if they do not, they must
contain general statements, under which
the details proved are pertinent.
Nesmith v. Calvert. 34
5. A deed, or other documentary exhib-
it, may be put in after the evidence is
published.
Ibid.
6. Where a bill claims relief on account
of fraud in a sale, it may be sufficient or
broad enough, in form, to justify a decree
against the sale, if a gross mistake ap-
pears.
Mason v. Crosby. 342
7. Where one of the complainants had
released all his interest in the land to the
others, it was held to be no bar to a join-
der of him in the bill to set aside the
original trade and refund what had been
paid.
Ibid.
8 If the parties to the conveyance are
made respondents, but not all those in-
terested in equity in the land, it is no
ground of objection to a recovery on the
merits against the respondents for their
shares.
Ibid.
9. Where the aid of a Court of Chan-
cery is indispensable to obtain the dis-
covery of the important facts in the case,
an application for relief can be sustained
in connection with that discovery, in the
Circuit Courts of the United States, not-
withstanding the 16th section of the ju-
diciary act prohibits such relief, when it
can be obtained at law in as ample a
manner.
Warner v. Daniels. 90
10. Length of time, short of the statute
of limitations, is sometimes a bar; but
not if fraud exists, or if the delay is ac-
counted for, or if such a course would
work injustice.
Ibid.
11. As to amending decrees in equity,
see DECREE.
12. As to the granting or dissolving
injunctions, see INJUNCTION.
As to when a former judgment will be
a bar, see JUDGMENT.
As to evidence necessary to overcome
a sworn answer in equity, see ANSWER, 4.
1. Under the treaty with Great Britain
of August, 1842, prisoners, charged with
piracy, committed contrary to acts of
parliament, and on board a British vessel,
may be arrested here, and surrendered
without any special act of Congress to
carry that treaty into effect.
The British Prisoners.
2. They may be examined, and, if be-
lieved guilty, be ordered into custody
with a view to a future surrender; and
this may be done by a magistrate of a
State, though he is not compellable to do
it by the United States.
Ibid.
3. The order to surrender may be sign-
ed by the Secretary of State, and issue
from the state department.
Ibid.
4. Without such proceedings for a sur-
render as are in that treaty, the law of
nations leaves it optional with the execu-
tive.
Ibid.
5. The application for the surrender
may be made by the British minister, and
need not be founded on a previous indict-
ment found against the prisoners by the
British tribunals, or on any warrant issu-
ing therefrom.
6. Where a bill in equity charges that a
company, represented by the respondents
to have been duly organized, was never
duly organized, the record of the organi-
tion is the best, and suitable evidence of
the fact, and not the oath of one of its
officers.
Warner v. Daniels. 90
2. But if a vendor of land is clearly
shown to have been overreached in a ma-
terial degree, by impositions, conceal-
ments, or misrepresentations, made by
the vendee, on which he properly relied,
he will be relieved in equity. Ibid.
3. And to sustain such a charge, the
whole circumstances of the case, and the
character and relations of the parties, are
proper subjects of consideration. Ibid.
4. Courts of equity can go more on
what is called presumptive evidence, than
Courts of law.
Ibid.
5. Where the vendee of land made rep-
resentations respecting the value of what
was taken for the consideration, which
were false in material points, and which
influenced the vendor to sell, whether the
vendee knew them to be false or not, it
was held that they would vitiate the sale.
Ibid.
6. So, also, if they were made by an-
other person, in the presence of the ven-
dee, and he was benefited by them.
Ibid.
7. Suppressio veri, is as fatal as sug-
gestio falsi.
Ibid.
8. Conversations of the respondent
with other persons, on a subject of a kin-
dred character, near the time of the trans-
action, and illustrating his intention, are
competent evidence for the complaint.
9. An entire failure of consideration, in
the receipt of what is mere moonshine,
is often sufficient to rescind a contract;
although a mere inadequacy of consider-
ation is not sufficient.
Ibid.
10. If either party cannot restore the
property in good condition, damages may
be given; and if the inability to restore
happens by the course of the complain-
ant, it should not prevent his obtaining
relief in some manner, if he was not then
aware of the fraud.
Ibid.
11. D. purchased a farm of W., pay-
ing him therefor in shares of the stock of
the Cleft Ledge Granite Co., which he
represented to be worth $6000. Several
representations were made to W. by D.
and also by F., who was concerned in the
same company, to induce W. to take the
stock in payment, which representations
proved to be false, and the stock worth-
less. On a bill in equity by W. for re-
lief, it was decreed, that the sale should
he rescinded, the shares reconveyed by
W. to D. and the farm by D. to W., and
a Master appointed to report the amount
of rents and waste, after deducting per-
manent improvements, which should be
allowed to W. by D.
Ibid.
12. But if neither the land nor the
shares could be reconveyed, the Master
must examine and report the damage
done to W. by the misrepresentations of
D. and F., and a decree be entered against
them for the amount. And if the land
could be reconveyed, and not the shares,
the land must be reconveyed, and the
value, if any thing, of the shares, at the
time of the sale, deducted from the net
income, and a decree made for the bal-
ance.
Ibid.
13. But a sale will not, on account of a
mistake alone, be rescinded, if a party
had full opportunity to examine the land
sold, and did examine it.
Mason v. Crosby. 342
14. Such an examination, however,
will not prevent a recovery for fraud, if
falsehood was practised in respect to
some of the examination, and the quality
of timber, and size of the streams on it to
float timber, or any matter more within
the vendor's knowledge; and the pur-
chaser, relying in part on the false repre-
sentations, made only a slight and gen-
eral examination himself.
Ibid.
15. If such falsehood is practised by
one of two owners of the paper title, and
one of six owners in interest under sub-
ordinate contracts, it vitiates the whole
sale; and the same result follows, if it
was practised by a third person, who had
a bond for a deed from some of the own-
ers in equity, and who made the contract
of sale, and the terms of which the own-
ers of the paper title, and the grantors in
the sale, adopted and carried into effect.
Ibid.
16. The grantors thus ratify the whole
sale, and cannot take the benefit of it, by
receiving the price agreed on, without
being liable at the same time civiliter on
account of the false representations made
in order to procure that price and the
sale.
17. If the sale be rescinded, the grant-
ors being the only respondents, are liable
severally to refund the money each has
received and retained for his equitable
share in the premises; but are not re-
sponsible after the lapse of several years
for the money, which was immediately
paid over to the other equitable share-
holders. Nor are they now responsible
for that part of the money, which was
paid to the agent for his services, and
never came into their hands, when the
lapse of time has been such that he is
dead and insolvent.
18. A delay in rescinding a contract,
and in instituting proceedings for a re-
covery of the money, though not so long
as to be a technical or equitable bar, by
the statute of limitations, to any relief,
yet may be so long as to change the po-
sitions of the parties and their remedies
over on third persons, and thus excuse
them in equity for the sums paid over to
such third persons.
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