Nesmith et al. v. Calvert et al. on his rights; but that it was contemplated can hardly admit of doubt on examining the evidence. When he afterwards, in 1842, proceeded to develope this idea in a machine, he seems to have been conscious that it did not differ materially in principle from what he had patented in 1841, and should have been included in that; and hence he proposed to the complainants to buy back from them the patent of that year. The change was rather a further progress in the same machine, than inventing a new one; was maturing its form without introducing any new principle- was merely withdrawing the angular tooth, and substituting for it the receiver, and a nearer position of the saw cylinder to the finetooth comb cylinder. He told Crane that the machine would work without the angular teeth, before he obtained his first patent; and his brother came to that same conclusion with him; but the precise substitute, if any, or the change throughout, which he had in his mind, was not developed to them in detail, if it was matured, till 1842. But it being admitted, that in the winter of 1841 he had not matured any part of his invention — that his plans were but partially explained to any one that the plaintiffs then, in advance of their completion and a patent, bought and he conveyed all of his improvements, such as they would be when matured-it was a natural form and design of the contract to reach every thing then in embryo in his mind on this subject; and after such a contract, it is equitable and just that it should pass the perfection or progress at any future day of any improvement in these machines, which he had thought of in 1841, and should at some future day complete. Under these circumstances, as the improvement in 1842 of what was patented in 1841, is proved in point of fact to have been only a further development of ideas entertained in 1841 on the same subject, we see no just reason why it should not Nesmith et al. v. Calvert et al. be considered as assigned and granted to the complainants as was stipulated to be done in February as well as October, 1841, in terms covering at least all improvements he had then contrived. It is hardly necessary to go much into various other points pressed by the counsel on the one side or the other. The bill distinctly avers that the improvements patented in 1843 were contemplated by said Francis A. Calvert in 1841, and hence the proof on this point is admissible, and the probata thus correspond, as they should, with the allegata. Story's Eq. Plead. § 264; 2 Story, 469; 18 Ves. 312. I do not by this remark mean to be understood as expressing an opinion, that no evidence can be put in which is not alleged or specifically described in the bill; but there must be in the bill allegations broad enough to cover any evidence offered, before it becomes admissible. After that, confessions, or declarations, or documents, or cumulative facts are admissible to support any general allegations to which they apply; and such general allegations are alone often sufficient to render the introduction of such evidence proper. v. Burnham, 2 Sumn. 612; Jenkins v. Eldredge, 3 Story, 181. Nor is it necessary to examine in detail another question which the counsel have discussed,-whether a demand should be made for a conveyance of the patent of 1841 or 1843, before Francis A. Calvert is bound to convey them. For in all views of the deed and the testimony, he must be considered as having covenanted unconditionally to transfer them when obtained. He has long since received the consideration for doing it, and he now refuses absolutely to assign or grant the use of the last patent of 1843, which is a neglect of duty and violation of his contract sufficient to sustain the bill. Believing, for the reasons assigned, that he is bound to do it, so far as regards its use for cleaning wool, I think the The United States v. Freeman. prayers in the bill against F. A. Calvert ought to be granted; and the use of both patents for that purpose be assigned to the complainants, conferring on them an exclusive license to use both in that way, and an injunction issue also to all the respondents, as all have interfered in making, or using, or vending these machines, to do so no more, for cleaning wool; and that they render an account of whatever has hitherto been received for the same beyond the expenses incurred. Decree for Plaintiffs. THE UNITED STATES VS. WILLIAM H. FREEMAN. If an advance of money is made to an officer of the marine corps, he becomes liable as a debtor for the amount, to be applied, and vouchers furnished as directed, or to return what is not thus accounted for; and he is not to be treated as a bailee of the money, and responsible for only ordinary care in respect to it. If he deposits it in a bank, which afterwards fails, whether the bank was or was not a public depository, it does not exonerate him as a debtor without a special act of Congress to that effect. Where a Captain in that corps acts as Captain, and has charge of clothing, he is entitled to an allowance therefor; but while he acts as brevet Lieutenant Colonel, and is paid as such, he cannot, during the same period, receive either the pay or allowances attached to the duties of Captain. Such an officer, while in the command of a separate post, is entitled to double rations, if the post be one designated by the President as entitled to extra rations, and a post so designated by the Navy Department, is presumed to be by direction of the President. Additional brevet pay is not to be allowed to such an officer, at such a post, unless there be at it, at least, two organized companies of men with suitable officers, though the whole number of men present may average enough for two compa nies. THIS was an action of assumpsit for a balance appearing due on the books of the treasury, from the defendant to the United States, for money advanced to him as an officer in The United States v. Freeman. the marine corps, to be used in the Florida war, whither he was detached in 1836. There was an agreement by the counsel for the parties as to the facts, which were, in substance, as follows: : That Freeman received a draft from the paymaster of the corps, on the Commonwealth Bank in Boston, for the purpose aforesaid, in May, 1836, for $2500. That he drew the money thereon, and had it deposited to his credit in the same bank, without any designation that it was public money, or belonged to him in his official capacity. That he drew out all of it except $222.67. That the bank failed in January, 1838, and when Freeman was called on to pay said balance, he offered a check on the bank for the amount. That the bank, at the time of his deposit, was one of the banks selected by the government for holding its funds; but not knowing that Freeman considered this deposit as public, it did not sue or recover from the bank any thing on this account, though it did for what appeared to be public deposits. The defendant relied on these facts to exonerate him from paying the balance. Another sum of $73.10 had been charged against Freeman, by the comptroller of the treasury, which the quartermaster of the marine corps had credited to him on his books, and which Freeman contended he did not owe. No evidence was offered showing the impropriety of said credit. On the other hand, the defendant claimed certain allowances, and pay, and rations, under the following facts: He was appointed captain in the marine corps July 17th, 1821, and was made a brevet lieutenant-colonel February 30th, 1832, to take rank from July 17th, 1831, and was appointed major in the line from June 30th, 1834. His first claim was for responsibility for arms and clothing as a captain, from July 17th, 1831, to June 30th, 1834, amounting to $354, at $10 per month. This claim had been duly presented to the treasury, and disallowed, on the The United States v. Freeman. ground that he received during that period pay in the grade of lieutenant-colonel, and not as a captain. His second claim was for $1669, for double rations, while in command of the Boston station, from June 30th, 1834, to April 1st, 1842. His third claim of $1013.93, was for brevet pay and emoluments, as lieutenant-colonel in command of said station, from June 30th, 1834, to April 1st, 1842. These last two claims had also been presented to the proper officer of the treasury, and disallowed. Some of the facts in this case have before been agreed on, and the opinion of the Supreme Court rendered on them, as reported in 3 Howard, 556. But more facts are now added, and some new points raised. Colonel Freeman has since died, and it is agreed by the counsel for his representatives and the district attorney, that the various documents and regulations there referred to, constitute a part of this case with the others now annexed to it. All the other facts necessary to a full understanding of the case appear in the opinion of the Court. Rantoul, District Attorney, for plaintiffs. Aylwin, for defendant. WOODBURY, J. The right of the government to recover the balance of the money advanced to the defendant, is the first question presented, and it seems well settled on principle. This was not a case of bailment of any specified article, to be kept, or to be used and then returned. In such cases, a borrower or bailee, unless a public carrier for hire, might not, as is argued for the defendant, be responsible for any loss, if he exercised ordinary care in keeping the property. Such care was probably exercised in this instance. Nor was the present transaction a mere fiduciary one, a trust of funds, to be kept, or invested, loaned out and returned, like that of guardians or administrators, as to the |