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The rules thus enacted have the force of law, and are binding upon the individual justices. Matter of Moore, 108 N. Y. 280, 15 N. E. 369. The respondent did not observe these rules. He opened and adjourned his court al: hours that suited his own convenience, without regard to the inconvenience and expense to which others were thereby daily subjected. It was the rule, rather than the exception, that he did not open court at 10 o'clock, and it was not an infrequent occurrence that he adjourned court early in the day, when trials ready to be proceeded with were pending before him, and when he had a congested calendar, requiring that trials be progressed as rapidly as possible. In that court there is always. a large attendance of attorneys, litigants, and witnesses. The law provides that their convenience requires that the court should be opened promptly at 10 o'clock in the morning. This rule should. be strictly observed. During several months in 1902 and 1903, while the respondent was living at White Plains, he ordinarily devoted Wednesdays to reading evidence, examining briefs, and deciding cases, doing the work at his private office, No. 3 Chambers street. He, however, allowed actions and proceedings to be made returnable on and adjourned cases to those days, necessitating the attendance of great numbers of attorneys, litigants, and witnesses. The respondent was not indolent. He worked hard, and often held court on Saturday, when, under the rules, he was not obliged to do so; but he willfully disregarded the court rules and the rights of litigants, their attorneys and witnesses, concerning the days and hours for holding court.

The fourth charge alleges a violation of section 63 of the Code of Civil Procedure in permitting those not attorneys to practice in the Municipal Court. By virtue of that section only attorneys and counselors of courts of record are permitted to practice in the Municipal Courts of New York, and a justice who knowingly permits a violation is guilty of a misdemeanor. It satisfactorily appears that one Max Levine, not an attorney, as the respondent well knew, not only was permitted to practice in the respondent's court for years, as often as he liked (which was quite frequently), but also after the specific objection had been taken that he was not an attorney and authorized to so practice. These facts are also important in connection with the charges of favoritism toward this same individual. The referee, in reaching the conclusion that the specification was not sustained in so far as it relates to the respondent's permitting Isaac Brinn, not an attorney, to practice, was more considerate toward the respondent than the facts_warranted. The evidence shows that the respondent, knowing Brinn not to be an attorney, permitted him to practice quite generally, the same as Levine.

Counsel for the petitioner agreed that the fifth charge-that the respondent permitted clerks whose certificates had not been filed. to answer at the call of the calendar-is trivial as reported by the referee. Without examining the evidence or expressing an opinion thereon, this charge should therefore be dismissed.

The facts upon which the sixth, eighth, twelfth, and fourteenth

charges are based are of the same general nature, and are so interwoven that they will be considered together. They allege partiality, favoritism, corruption, and the abuse of judicial discretion in the conduct and decision of cases. The referee recommends that they be all sustained except the specification of favoritism towards Max D. Steuer and Israel M. Lerner, and that the favoritism was not habitually exercised, except in favor of Aaron Morris. There is no evidence that the respondent received or accepted any pecuniary benefit other than his salary for any of his official acts, and we believe that he did not. We are, however, convinced by the evidence that he often allowed his friendships and prejudices. to influence, and at times to control, his rulings and decisions. Judicial action and discretion were frequently arbitrarily exercised favorably to particular attorneys and suitors, with no consideration of the claims or rights of the adverse party or opposing attorney. This abuse of judicial discretion was oppressive, and the discontinuance or settlement of litigation was not infrequently coerced thereby. The official conduct of the respondent became a judicial scandal. In January, 1903, the East Side Civic Club employed an attorney to observe and investigate it. The attorney thus employed visited the court daily for a long period of time, and presented accurate and valuable information with respect to the proceedings, and especially concerning the respondent's hours upon the bench. Abuses of judicial process in the respondent's court by secondhand dealers in bringing actions and obtaining judgments, upon which body executions issued without personal service of process, was brought to the attention of the Italian Consul, who, together with prominent Italian attorneys, presented the matter to the respondent. It also appears that attention was drawn by the public press to certain abuses in the respondent's court. The conduct of the respondent cannot be excused for want of knowledge of the law or of his duty. His misconduct was deliberate and willful. In one instance, after a case had been twice tried and twice reversed on appeal, and the law of the case had been settled against the party whom the respondent was favoring, and after the parties had been required to attend upon the trial on almost innumerable adjournments, the respondent stated from the bench that he was in a better position than the Appellate Term to determine the law of the case, and openly declared that he could not give a judgment for the party who was clearly entitled thereto under the decision of the Appellate Term, and arbitrarily and without authority and against objection transferred the case to another district. The favoritism of the respondent to particular attorneys and particular parties was manifested by repeated adjournments of cases against objection, and without necessity or cause shown as required by the court rules, which it was his duty to observe, and refusing like favors to the adverse party; by arbitrarily controlling the action. of the stenographer, whose duties are in all respects similar to those of a Supreme Court stenographer, and refusing to allow objections or exceptions to be noted, in consequence of which an appeal would be futile; by omitting evidence, objections, and ex

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ceptions from returns on appeal; by granting, without authority, ex parte orders in actions pending in other districts; by making, on ex parte application, or of his own motion, illegal entries and alterations in court records and papers; by adding causes to the calendar in direct violation of a rule of the court binding upon him; by asserting and exercising jurisdiction when it had been shown on a traverse to the marshal's return of service that process had not been served; by refusing to grant judgments on verified complaints in default of verified answers; by assuming to dispose of cases not upon the clear legal rights of the parties as presented, but upon his notions of equity; and by consulting privately with counsel or with parties on one side concerning the disposition of an application pending or to be made. Favoritism in the performance of judicial duties constitutes corruption as disastrous in its consequence as if the judicial officer received and was moved by a bribe. If the respondent was actuated by a desire to favor his friends in matters resting in discretion, it is not at all unlikely that his decisions were likewise influenced, although obviously that could only be shown by circumstances. The willful abuse of judicial discretion is the most oppressive and injurious kind of official misconduct. The parties prejudiced may obtain redress on appeal from an illegal ruling or decision upon a question of law, even though the judge acted corruptly and knew that his ruling or decision was wrong; but even for the extreme exercise of judicial discretion by an inferior court there is little or no redress to the litigant whose rights have been violated or ignored, for he has no adequate remedy. The bias and prejudice of the respondent was often manifested openly, and was calculated to and did impair public confidence in his integrity and fairness as a judicial officer. These charges are amply sustained by the evidence, and they not only justify, but inevitably require, the removal of the respondent. The seventh charge alleges willful insubordination, and it involves the attitude of the respondent towards the decisions of the appellate courts and his refusal to follow them. Although the referee thinks the respondent should be exonerated on this charge, except in so far as it is embraced in the charges of favoritism, and it is not pressed by counsel for petitioner, we are disinclined to pass, without notice, the attitude of the petitioner towards the courts constituted by law to review his decisions. It at least de

serves severe censure.

The ninth charge alleges that the respondent connived at the bringing of actions in his court which belonged elsewhere. The referee deemed the evidence insufficient to sustain the charge. The practice of assigning claims so that actions may be brought in a particular district for the convenience of the attorneys who are to have charge thereof undoubtedly exists; but that alone does not invalidate the assignment of the cause of action. The practice ought not to be encouraged, but the evidence does not connect the respondent with any of the assignments, and we are therefore also of opinion that the charge should be dismissed.

The tenth charge alleges that the respondent corruptly refused

to allow actions to be removed to the City Court and to transfer actions to other District Courts. In actions in the Municipal Court, where damages exceeding $250 are demanded, the defendant, at his election, after issue joined, and before adjournment, and upon giving an undertaking as therein provided in an amount to be fixed by the court, not exceeding twice the amount demanded, is entitled to an order transferring the case to the City Court. Section 1366 of the Greater New York Charter (Laws 1901, p. 581, c. 466), and section 3 of the Municipal Court Act (Laws 1902, p. 1490, c. 580). If an action is brought in the Municipal Court in a district in which neither party resides, it must be transferred to the proper district if the defendant so demands upon or before joinder of issue. Section 1370, Greater New York Charter (Laws 1901, p. 584, c. 466), and section 25 of the Municipal Court Act (Laws 1902, p. 1497, c. 580). The referee has sustained three of the specifications under this charge. One relates to the respondent's refusal to allow a case. to be removed to the City Court, and the other two relate to his refusal to transfer cases to other District Courts. Counsel for petitioner cites evidence tending to support other specifications not sustained by the referee. The evidence fairly sustains one specification relating to a refusal to allow a removal and another relating to a refusal to allow a transfer. Standing alone, we would hesitate to hold this charge sufficient to require the removal of the respondent, but the evidence adduced thereunder indicates that his judicial action was the result of favoritism, and we think it highly probable that the respondent was influenced to retain the cases in his court by friendship for the party or attorney opposing the removal or transfer.

The eleventh charge relates to placing cases upon the calendar where the return of service of process had not been made within the time prescribed therefor. Rule 4 of the Municipal Court Rules, duly adopted and binding, provides that, to entitle a case to go upon the calendar, the summons must be returned to the clerk's office the day before it is returnable. This is an eminently proper rule, and is calculated to facilitate the timely making of a calendar for the convenience of the parties and their attorneys. It is evident, in view of this rule, that, if the return of service be not filed in time, the defendant would be justified in assuming that the case had been withdrawn or discontinued. At any rate, the rule was binding on the respondent, and he did not observe it. He not only added cases to the calendar in violation of the rule, but added cases to the calendar after the return hour of the summonses had expired and the regular calendar had been called; and did this on one occasion against the objection of the attorney for the defendant, who happened to be in court, and on another occasion without any appearance for the defendant. The respondent frankly admits that he suspends this rule whenever he deems it proper. Some, if not all, of these acts of misconduct were committed for the purpose of favoring his friends.

The thirteenth charge alleges the withholding of decisions on motions and the reception of papers ex parte. It is not sustained

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by the referee, is not urged by counsel for petitioner, and should be dismissed.

The fifteenth charge alleges deportment unbecoming a justice of the Municipal Court. The eighteenth also relates to his deportment and the effect upon spectators and on the community. These two charges may therefore be properly considered together. The referee recommends that they both be sustained, and we are of opinion that they are fairly supported by the evidence. The respondent, while on the bench publicly exercising judicial functions, has at times been guilty of conduct and given public utterance to sentiments not only highly undignified, but showing prejudice against classes of attorneys and litigants on account of their nationality; and also a determination to conduct judicial proceedings arbitrarily and despotically, and willfully refusing to accord to parties or their attorneys their clear constitutional and statutory rights. If these charges and the evidence adduced thereunder stood alone, we might, in view of the volume of business pending before the respondent and the trial upon his patience incident to calendar calls, the adjournment of causes, and the impertinence at times of attorneys, deem it sufficient to express condemnation, and reprimand the respondent, without removing him. The demeanor of the respondent on the bench has occasionally, at least, been domineering and tyrannical. He has been disrespectful and abusive to members of the bar without cause. His conduct in this regard was not merely the manifestations of temper which might be excused for cause, but the only provocation was opposition to the desires of his friends with reference to the conduct or disposition of their cases.

The sixteenth charge and specifications thereunder allege acts of oppression in granting illegal ex parte orders in actions pending in other District Courts. Rule 15 of the Municipal Court Rules provides that ex parte applications may be made to any justice. This rule only authorizes applications in actions pending in one district to a justice of another district for such orders as may be granted by a justice as distinguished from the court. It is not authority for such applications when the order may only be granted by the court. The court in each district is separate and distinct from the court in each other district, and it is manifest that there should be no interference by one judge with matters pertaining to the court in another district. The only authority for ordering the exhibition of a writing or account declared on in an action in the Municipal Court is contained in section 165 of the Municipal Court Act, and it is conferred upon the court, and not upon a justice. It does not authorize the examination of books as by a bill of discovery. That is not within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Court. The extension of the practice in the courts of record to the Municipal Court by section 20 of the Municipal Court Act was merely intended to regulate the practice in matters over which the Municipal Court has jurisdiction. The order granted ex parte by the respondent in an action pending in another district requiring the plaintiff to deliver his books at the office of the defendants, a firm