ject to control, however, both before and after trial, by a revision of any decision it might erroneously make on such a point, by a transfer to courts of the last resort. Delays might arise from this cause, but neither Great Britain nor McLeod had any proper ground of complaint against the United States arising from the arrangement of our judicial tribunals. Any American litigant in British courts might equally well make it a ground of complaint, that the cost or delay of those tribunals operated in any given case as a denial of justice, and claim compensation for it as an international wrong. No such principle of international law exists.

Lord Ashburton stated that this delay was a matter of mutual regret, and expressed the hope that provision might be made to obviate its occurrence in the case of others engaged in the same transaction who were liable to be arrested at any time on their crossing the border. This suggestion was promptly met, and a remedy was provided for the immediate transfer of these cases to a court of the last resort, where such defence might be more readily made available. It is clear, therefore, that there is no legal or equitable international claim or grounds of complaint, except such complaint as must always exist in all free constitutional governments that persons must be holden amenable to process of law, duly and legally instituted, until such time as proper adjudication can be on any plea interposed for their defence.

Considerable stress in this case has been laid on a statement of Mr. Webster, in a speech in the United States Senate, that the owners of the steamer Caroline had violated the laws of the United States, and were not entitled to compensation. From this admission it has been argued that no person could be held liable for the destruction of the steamer Caroline, and that there was no ground of complaint for the invasion of the United States territory to effect its destruction. neither of these results follow from such an admission.

But

If it be admitted that the Caroline was aiding and abetting the rebellion on Navy Island, in violation of law, it does not follow that it was justifiable to seize and burn her in the United States territory. and take the life of a citizen who was casually present on the wharf. It is not a question of property, but of sovereignty. Such an act might at the time have caused the loss of many lives, and desolated the entire frontier. It was, therefore, exceedingly hazardous and dangerous in its consequences, and was an act that, in the words of

Mr. Webster, and of every constitutional writer, would be justifiable only in case of self-defence, impelled by absolute necessity—" a necessity instant and overwhelming, leaving no choice of means or moment for deliberation."

The justification never came up to anything like this. Indeed, it was attempted to be palliated on other and different grounds. It was said, when the expedition started, it was supposed the Caroline was at Navy Island, and that it was an after-thought and sudden movement merely that induced them to proceed across the river, and seize her there, and was not a deliberately planned invasion of the United States. territory. Some of the aggravating circumstances attending the burning of the Caroline, and sending her adrift over the falls were attempted to be explained away by saying that they could not take her across the river. It was also said that Durfee's life was taken by a chance shot from some one on the wharf.

These allegations and mitigating circumstances were pleaded in extenuation of the wrong done. They furnished no justification of the act. Great excitement arose from it, enough to show that if it had been slightly more calamitous its consequences might have been truly deplorable. It was fortunate that it was attended with no worse results.

All these matters alleged were duly considered. The statesmen of both countries regarded the outbreak and collision as sudden and unpremeditated, while neither party really designed wrong to the other; and looking on the occurrences from this high and honorable international view, the whole matter was fully adjusted by such action on the part of the United States government, in reference to McLeod, as I have named, which was all the case admitted of; and by such apology on the part of Great Britain, in reference to the violation of the United States territory as, in the words of Mr. Webster, "a high and honorable nation only could give, and a high and honorable nation receive."

For these reasons, I am of opinion that neither on its merits, nor as an open ground of controversy, can the claim before us be allowed. It appears from the testimony in the case, that McLeod had been sheriff for some years in the county adjoining the Niagara frontier, and took an active and efficient part as a civil officer in suppressing the rising within his district. McLeod attributes to these efforts the erroneous impression that he was engaged in the seizure of the

Caroline, or it may have caused, as he thinks, a conspiracy to persecute and oppress him, instigated by persons concerned in the rebellion, who had fled to the United States. If this be so, it might, perhaps, form a consideration for some allowance to him by his own country. Beyond this, there is no ground on which he may claim damage of any government, other than the general claim of any citizen who may have suffered under erroneous prosecution.

It may excite some surprise that this case should be submitted to us by the British government. It doubtless arises from the fact that the agents of the governments have adopted the course to present all claims found on file since the peace of 1814, and this has been presented through inadvertence and should not be persisted in. I cannot believe that his lordship, the secretary for foreign affairs, or the ministry with which he is associated, can have forgotten the final adjustment of this controversy many years since, or that they can give a construction to the correspondence on this subject different from what I have affixed to it. For this reason, I especially regret that it has become the ground of a difference of opinion before this commission, and thus assumes the character of a claim presented in violation of this adjustment, and of the good faith the people of both countries have affixed to the acts of eminent negotiators now passed away.

NOTE. The opinion of Mr. HORNBY, the British commissioner, in this and some other Cases, delivered near the close of the commission, was to have been forwarded to be placed on file. It is much to be regretted that they have not been received.

BATES, Umpire :

The commissioners under the convention having been unable to agree upon the decision to be given with reference to the claim of Alexander McLeod, of Upper Canada, against the government of the United States, I have carefully examined and considered the papers and evidence produced on the hearing of the said claim.

This case arose out of the burning and destruction of the American steamboat Caroline, at Schlosser, in the State of New York, on the Niagara river, by an armed force from Canada, in the year 1837, for which the British government appears to have delayed formally answering the claims of the United States, until 1840, when the claimant was arrested by the authorities of the State of New York on a charge of murder and arson, as having been one of the party which destroyed the "Caroline." The British government then assumed the responsibility of the act, as done by order of the government authorities in Canada, and pleaded justification on the ground of urgent necessity.

From this time the case of the claimant became a political question between the two governments, and the United States used every means in their power to insure the safety of the claimant, and to procure his discharge, which was effected after considerable delay.

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It appears by the diplomatic correspondence that the affair of the Caroline," the death of Durfee, who was killed in the affray, and the arrest of the claimant, were all amicably and finally settled by the diplomatic agents of the two governments in 1841 and 1842.

The question, in my judgment, having been so settled, ought not now to be brought before this commission as a private claim. I therefore reject it.

GREAT WESTERN STEAMSHIP COMPANY.

Where coal was imported and stored, and was afterwards consumed at sea, in outward bound steamers, held that such consumption was not an exportation, within the meaning of the act of March 2, 1799, to regulate the collection of duties on imports and tonnage, so as to entitle the owners to a drawback for duties paid upon it.

Held that the act of March 3, 1853, making appropriations for the civil and diplomatic expenses of the government, by which the Secretary of the Treasury was authorized to cancel any outstanding debenture bonds given prior to July 1, 1850, on the importation of foreign coal, entitled the owners also to drawback for the duties paid on such coal. Interest was allowed by the umpire on said drawback from July 1, 1850.

In 1835 a steamer of the Great Western Steamship Company arrived at New York, and was required by the collector of the port to land the surplus coal remaining on board at the end of the voyage, and pay duties upon it.

This was esteemed a hardship, so far as regarded a reasonable surplus of coal remaining on hand, because it was contended a steamer should take on board enough, not only for a voyage of the ordinary duration, but to provide for the contingencies and delays that are constantly liable to arise, and that so long as they have a supply, merely to this extent, a duty should not be charged upon it as freight.

Application was made to Congress for a change of the law to this effect, and an act was passed exempting such amount of coals from duty.

The steamship company, however, desired further relief and commenced shipping coal to New York in other vessels. They landed the coal, paid the duties upon it, and stored it in warehouses. They then supplied their steamers from the coal thus deposited, and consumed it on their outward voyage, and under the act of March 2, 1799, to regulate the collection of duties on imports and tonnage, claimed a