ONTARIO.

First Report of the Bureau of Labor, 1900. R. Glockling, Secretary.

101 pp.

This bureau, which is under the commissioner of public works, came into existence under the provisions of an act approved April 30, 1900.(@)

The report presents the results of an inquiry as to labor organizations, including the subject of strikes and lockouts; parts of addresses on certain subjects of industrial interest; a synopsis of the labor laws of Ontario, and digests of official publications on changes in wages.

To the 340 schedules addressed to labor organizations 133 replies were received, representing about 50 trades and callings. Seventyeight unions report a membership of 6,346.

Thirty-five strikes and 2 lockouts were reported to have occurred during the year 1899 and up to September 1, 1900. Of these, 13 were reported as successful, 8 compromised, 2 settled by arbitration, and 5 unsuccessful. In 1 case there was no settlement, and 8 were still pending when the report closed.

a See Bulletin No. 33, p. 295, U. S. Department of Labor.

DECISIONS OF COURTS AFFECTING LABOR.

[This subject, begun in Bulletin No. 2, has been continued in successive issues. All material parts of the decisions are reproduced in the words of the courts, indicated when short by quotation marks and when long by being printed solid. In order to save space, matter needed simply by way of explanation is given in the words of the editorial reviser.]

DECISIONS UNDER STATUTORY LAW.

CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT-LIMITATIONS-RELEASE OF CLAIM FOR DAMAGES-FRAUD-Missouri, Kansas and Teras Railway Company e Smith, Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, 68 Southwestern Reporter, page 543.-J. E. Smith was a conductor employed by the above-named railway company and was injured in 1892 while attempting to effect a coupling between two cars. He brought suit to recover damages, but before the matter came to trial one Maxwell, as agent for the company. induced Smith to withdraw the suit, promising him, as he averred, employment for life at $60 per month. Smith withdrew the suit and signed a release of all claims for damages arising from the above accident, receiving in consideration therefor the sum of $300. He was given employment for two years at $60 per month and then asked for a lay off of six or seven months, which was granted. When he went to resume work he was told there was no place for him, but after repeated solicitations he was given work for two days and again discharged. This was in April, 1897, since which time employment had been refused him, and on September 10, 1900, he filed a petition stating the above facts and claiming that the release signed had been fraudulently obtained and that the failure of the company to furnish continuous employment was a failure of the consideration for which he agreed to the release, for all of which, and for loss of employment. he asked damages in the sum of $20,000. He was allowed the sum of $4,000 and costs in the district court of Hill County, from which judgment the company appealed and obtained a reversal of the lower court. Judge Bookhout, who announced the decision of the court, first discussed the contention of the railway company that since more than two years had intervened since Smith's right of action, if he had such right, had accrued before the filing of his petition, such cause of action was barred by the statute of limitations of two years. point the court said:

On this

If it be conceded that the plaintiff was induced to dismiss the suit then pending in the district court of Grayson County [the original

suit for damages] by the fraud of the defendant's agents, this would hot prevent the statute of limitations running from the time he discovered, or should, in the exercise of ordinary diligence, have discov-red, the fraud. Undiscovered fraud will prevent the running of the statute of limitations, provided the failure to discover the fraud is not attributable to the want of proper diligence by the party assertng it. This suit was instituted on September 10, 1900, three years and a little over four months after the company had terminated his employment. Ought not the appellee to have discovered more than wo years before the filing of this suit that appellant did not intend to give him employment? After he took his lay off to rest up, he says hat when he returned and asked to be put back to work he was told by the agent that "they had no work for him, and that he had lost out." This expression does not indicate that the agents of the comDany were attempting to conceal from Smith the fact that they did not intend to longer employ him. After hounding after them, as he says, for six or seven months, he was put back to work, and after working two days was again let out. There is not an iota of evidence hat the agents and officers of the company led him to believe that he would be again employed, or that they in any way concealed from him their determination not to again employ him. We are of the opinion that the appellee's own testimony shows that his failure to scertain that the company did not intend to give him employment vas attributable to his failure to use ordinary diligence to discover hat fact.

The court held that this fact in itself furnished sufficient ground for reversal of judgment, and that judgment should have been rendered For the company. Another point was discussed, however, which was he question as to whether fraud was practiced in procuring the elease.

On this Judge Bookhout said:

The statements made by Maxwell promising appellee a lifetime job f he would dismiss his suit were made at Denison, and before appellee vent to work for the company. The releases were signed by him at Waco, and after he had begun to work for the company. Appellee estified that agent "Bower had the release there in the front office, nd said to me: 'Smith, here is something for you to sign. You are going to work here and we (I) will take care of you. I will make a good place for you.'" Unless this statement shows fraud, there is no estimony in the record showing fraud in the signing of the releases. There is nothing in this statement showing that appellee was to be given lifetime job. Appellee did not call for a more specific statement as o what Bower meant by the remark that he would take care of him." The release plainly showed that it was a settlement of the suit and a release of his demands in consideration of $300. But appellee says he did not read the release. He explains that the money, $300, was Daid him voluntarily by the company. It is held that, in order to set aside a release on the ground of fraud the evidence must be clear, precise, and convincing. Slight parol evidence is insufficient. The fact that appellee did not read the release before signing was not sufficient, under the facts connected with his signing, to justify the ury in finding there was fraud in the execution. (Insurance Co. v.

Harris (Tex. Civ. App.), 64 S. W., 871.) We are of the opinion that the evidence did not authorize the court to submit to the jury the issue of fraud in the procurement of the releases, and that there was error in so doing.

EIGHT-HOUR LAW-MUNICIPALITIES-SCHOOL DISTRICTS—State e. Wilson, Supreme Court of Kansas, 69 Pacific Reporter, page 172.The State charged James. Wilson with violating the eight-hour law (sec. 3827, Gen. St., 1901) by permitting a laborer in his employ to work more than eight hours in one day in and about the erection of a school building which Wilson was constructing under a contract with the board of education of the city of Iola. The district court of Allen County held that no public offense was charged, as a school district was not within the law, and quashed the information. The State appealed and obtained a reversal of the court below.

The statute relates to employment "by or on behalf of the State of Kansas, or by or on behalf of any county, city, township, or other municipality of said State." Nothing being considered but a question of law, the following syllabus by the court is a sufficient statement of the finding:

A school district is a "municipality" within the meaning of chapter 114, Laws 1891 (sec. 3827, Gen. St., 1901), known as the "eight-hour law."

EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY-ORDERS-LINE OF DUTY-CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTE-Cincinnati, Hamilton and Dayton Railroad Company v. Thiebaud, United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, 114 Federal Reporter, page 918.-This was an action brought by Thiebaud, as administrator, against the above-named railroad company to recover damages for the death of one Sweetman, an engineer, who was killed while in the service of the company by the admitted negligence of the conductor and engineer of another train. The action came under the employers' liability act of Indiana, in which State the accident occurred, a clause of which provides for the recovery of damages for personal injury suffered by an employee through the negligence of coemployees under certain conditions, one being that of the person injured acting at the time of his injury in obedience or conformity to the order of some superior having authority to direct.

Judgment was for the plaintiff, and the company appealed on various grounds, one of which was that the statute was unconstitutional as discriminating between corporations and individual employers. As to this the court merely cited Tullis v. Railroad Co., 175 U. S., 348. 20 Sup. Ct., 136, 44 L. Ed., 192 (see Bulletin, No. 29, U. S. Department of Labor, page 890), as deciding in favor of the act.

The other contentions of the company were resolved in favor of he plaintiff and the judgment of the lower court was affirmed. But one of these need be noted here. It was contended by the company's ttorneys that the case was not within the scope of the Indiana statute ince the deceased engineer was not, at the time of the injury causing is death, acting under any special direction, or otherwise than in the ischarge of the general duty of his employment.

Judge Severens, speaking for the court, after referring to cases acted -n by the supreme court of Indiana, said:

We are required to follow the construction of the act given by the upreme court of that State. But under the obligation of the same ule we are also required by the decision in the last-mentioned case Railroad Co. v. Montgomery, 152 Ind. 1, 49 N. E. 582, 71 Am. St. Rep. 301 (see Bulletin No. 18, U. S. Department of Labor, page 23)], to hold, as was there held, that the requirement that the injured person should be acting in conformity to the order of some superior equivalent to a requirement that he should be acting in the line of is duty as an employee. Having regard to the well-known order of usiness of railroad companies, of which the court must take judicial otice, it could not be otherwise than that a subordinate, such as a ocomotive engineer, when acting in the line of his duty as such, would be acting under the order of some superior. It is stated in the ill of exceptions that the deceased was guilty of no negligence and hat he had the right to be with his train at the time and place when nd where the accident occurred. This can have no other reasonable eaning than that he was discharging the regular duties of his mployment. The negligence of the conductor and engineer of the ther train being conceded, it would seem that a case was made out ulfilling the conditions of the Indiana statute, and, as the accident and eath happened in that State, that is the law applicable to the case.

EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY-RAILROAD COMPANIES FELLOW-SERVNTS-St. Louis and San Francisco Railroad Company v. Furry, United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, 114 Federal Reporter, page 898.-This was a suit by Warren G. Furry, a fireman mployed by the above-named company, who was injured in Arkansas a collision resulting from the failure of a telegraph operator to eliver orders received by him from the train dispatcher. Damages ere awarded in the lower court, under sections 6248 and 6249, Sand. nd H. Dig. Arkansas statutes (see Railway Co. v. Thurmond, below, or law), and appeal was taken by the company, resulting in the judgent of the lower court being affirmed, Judge Sanborn dissenting. Judge Thayer for the court reviewed the common-law decisions as o similar cases in a number of States, and also the decisions under tatutes of like form to the statute of Arkansas, and concluded:

Without pursuing the subject to any greater length, we are forced o conclude that Furry and the defendant's telegraph operator at