DECISIONS OF COURTS AFFECTING LABOR.

[This subject, begun in Bulletin No. 2, has been continued in successive issues. All material parts of the decisions are reproduced in the words of the courts, indicated when short by quotation marks, and when long by being printed solid. In order to save space, matter needed simply by way of explanation is given in the words of the editorial reviser.]

DECISIONS UNDER STATUTORY LAW.

CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT-BREACH-MERGER OF CORPORATIONS— Globe and Rutgers Fire Insurance Company of New York v. Jones, Supreme Court of Michigan, 89 Northwestern Reporter, page 580.Action was brought in the circuit court of Wayne County to recover from James A. Jones the sum of $1,106.19 alleged to be due the company named. Jones had been agent for the Rutgers Fire Insurance Company under a contract for five years from March 1, 1898. . On the 20th day of December, 1898, the Rutgers Fire Insurance Company and the Globe Fire Insurance Company, both corporations of the State of New York, merged to form a new corporation under the style of the Globe and Rutgers Fire Insurance Company. A New York statute provides for such mergers, and that "The new corporation shall succeed to all the obligations and liabilities of the merging corporations. or either of them." Another clause provides that "All the rights, franchises, and interests of the merging corporations in and to every species of property and things in action belonging to them, or either of them, shall be deemed to be transferred to and vested in the new corporation."

Jones claimed that he first learned that the Rutgers had ceased to do business in Michigan in March, 1899, and learned about the same time of the consolidation. At that date he had on hand the sum named above as a balance due the Rutgers Company. He was offered the agency of the new company, but declined it, declaring that he had objection to the men in control of the Globe. The judge of the court below had ruled that the consolidation of the Rutgers with the Globe was a breach of the former's contract with Jones, and that Jones was entitled to recover damages therefor to the amount of the company's claim against him, if the jury found that he had sustained that amount of damages. The jury so found, and the company appealed, declaring that Jones's con tract with the Rutgers was made with a knowledge of the provisions of the New York statute relating to merger, and subject to the same,

and that acts done in accordance with the statute could not be breach of contract.

Judge Moore, who announced the opinion of the supreme court, affirmed the judgment of the court below, using in part the following language:

It will be noticed that by the terms of the New York statute the two corporations were merged in the corporation provided for in the agreement. This made a new corporation. (3 Cook, Corp. sec. 897; Smith v. Railway Co., 114 Mich. 460, 72 N. W. 328.) Is it true, as contended here, that, because one has contracted to render personal service for one corporation for a definite period of time, his contract for personal service may pass to a new corporation, made up of two or more corporations by virtue of the merger of the two or more companies? In 2 Wood, Mast. & St. sec. 91, it is said: "When a person contracts to work for another for a term, the parties are treated as having contracted in reference to the personal qualities of each other, and the master can not shift his liability by turning the servant over to another master before the term is ended, nor can the servant compel the master to accept the services of another person in lieu of his own. The consent of the parties is essential to effect a substitution, and this is true even though the servant is ill, and unable to labor himself. [Cases cited.] Everyone knows that insurance companies, like individuals, differ in reputation and methods of doing business. An insurance agent has a right to say for whom he will work, and under a contract to work for one company he can not be required to work for an entirely different company. Judgment is affirmed.

COURT OF MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION-CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTE REHEARING-MANDAMUS-Renaud et al. v. State Board of Mediation and Arbitration, Supreme Court of Michigan, 83 Northwestern Reporter, page 620.-Act No. 238, acts of 1889 (sections 559568, Compiled Statutes of Michigan, 1897), provides for the appointment by the governor of "three competent persons" who shall constitute a "State court of mediation and arbitration," the title of the act being "An act to provide for the amicable adjustment of grievances and disputes that may arise between employers and employees and to authorize a State court of mediation and arbitration." Under the provisions of this act, Pingree & Smith, manufacturers of boots and shoes, and their employees, by Timothy O'Connor and E. A. Allen, submitted a question as to the prices to be paid by the employers for certain classes of work. The case was heard and a decision arrived at, with which Pingree & Smith were dissatisfied, and they moved for a rehearing. The court granted such rehearing, whereupon Renaud and others asked of the supreme court an appropriate writ to prevent the rehearing, claiming that in granting rehearing the court exceeded its powers. Pingree & Smith also attacked the court as being improp

erly constituted, so that the supreme court passed upon the three questions of the constitutionality of the act establishing the court, its right to grant a rehearing, and the proper remedy to be sought if such rehearing was improperly allowed.

The contention of Pingree & Smith is first taken up by Judge Moore, who announced the opinion of the court, concerning which he said:

We can not state their position more clearly than by quoting from brief of counsel. "By section 23 of article 6 [of the constitution], the legislature may establish courts of conciliation, with such powers and duties as shall be prescribed by law. The general scheme of the constitution, as far as it relates to judicial officers, is for their elec tion, and not for their appointment. Section 23, art. 6, of the constitution provides for the establishment of courts of conciliation; and by courts', here, as well as elsewhere in the constitution, is meant a permanent organization for the administration of justice, and not a special tribunal provided for by law. If the administration of justice embraces the enforcement of the orders or decrees of courts, the court of mediation and arbitration, being deficient in authority given by the legislature to do this, is not such a court as is meant by section 23 of article 6; for, by the act of its creation, it can do nothing but render a decision on subjects submitted to it in a particular way, and file its decision with the county clerk. Under the act there is no authority given to the judges or members of the court to compel the appearance of either party, nor is there any method of composing the differences or question in dispute by turning over the parties to a court with authority to enforce its decrees."

* * *

It is true that as to the members of the supreme court, the circuit judges, judges of probate, and justices of the peace, the constitution provides that they shall be elected; but we think it is not open to question that, if the constitution did not require these judicial officers to be elected, but authorized the legislature to establish these courts and prescribe their powers and duties, it would be entirely competent for the legislature to do so. This is just what is done by section 29, article 6, of the constitution. The act does not fail because the legis lature, in creating the court, did not provide its members should be elected. [The article referred to] reads, "The legislature may establish courts of conciliation with such powers and duties as shall be prescribed by law." This language is simple and clear, and would seem to give the legislature abundant authority to create courts of conciliation, and to clothe them with as little or as great power as to the legislature seemed proper. It is to be regretted that the law passed by the legislature is not a more perfect one, but we think it very clear that the power conferred upon the respondent, if exercised, is calculated to bring about conciliations between those employers and employed between whom differences have arisen, and that the law was enacted, as suggested by its title, to provide for the amicable adjust ment of grievances and disputes that may arise between employers and employed. The act does not undertake to confer power or impose duties in relation to all classes of civil cases, but such power as it does confer is within the constitutional right of the legislature.

On the question of rehearing, Judge Moore said:

The law which called this court into existence is the limit of its power. The act nowhere authorizes the court to grant a rehearing. When its decision has been rendered and filed, it has exhausted its power in a given case.

As to the mode of preventing the rehearing, the court relied on section 191, Comp. Laws, which gives the supreme court general superin tending control over all inferior courts, and accordingly issued a writ of mandamus vacating the order granting a rehearing.

COURT OF MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION-POWER-CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTE-Pingree et al. v. State Court of Mediation and Arbitration, Supreme Court of Michigan, 89 Northwestern Reporter, page 943.-The questions here discussed are as to the scope of the power of the State court of mediation and arbitration, and as to interpretation of the clause providing that the court's decision shall be rendered in prescribed form within ten days after the matter submitted has been fully heard.

Pingree & Smith, manufacturers of boots and shoes, having failed to reach an agreement with their employees as to the prices to be paid for certain classes of work, the two parties submitted to the court a statement of the points in issue, with the following introductory sentences: "Being unable to agree on prices of the following work, we hereby jointly request an arbitration of same by your honorable board, agreeing to abide by your decision. Prices to remain in force until May 1, 1900." This paper bore date of December 16, 1899. The case had been fully heard on March 9, 1900, and the decision was rendered on the 31st day of the same month.

From the remarks of Judge Moore, who announced the conclusions of the supreme court, the following is quoted:

Pingree & Smith insist that, as a matter of law, the finding of the State court of mediation and arbitration was erroneous, because said court did not confine itself to the terms of said written submission. It is said by counsel: "The decision of this court of mediation and arbitration makes a new contract between employers and employees, and substitutes it for the one existing at the time the submission was made. Without any authority under the submission or elsewhere so to do, the court of arbitration said to the firm that the men who were engaged to work and who were working by the day or week must be considered or treated as if they had been engaged to work and were working by the piece." It is, of course, well settled that when arbitrators go beyond the submission they exceed their jurisdiction, and the award may be set aside. The record shows that an attempt had been made to have the prices fixed by the piece, instead of having the work done by the day or week, and that upon the hearing, without

objection, testimony was given upon both sides, not only by local experts, but by witnesses from a distance, in relation to the scale of wages by the piece as well as by the day. The terms of submission were doubtless prepared in view of the actual situation and the claims of the respective parties, and, we think, are sufficiently broad to justify the court in saying the compensation should be by the piece, instead of by the day or week.

The court of arbitration fixed July 26, 1899, as the date when the scale of prices fixed by it should go into effect. To this the firm objected, maintaining that the submission contained nothing authoriz ing the fixing of a date. From the records it appears that a new machine had been put into the factory on the date fixed by the court, and that it was the change in methods caused by the introduction of this machine that was in part responsible for the dispute as to prices. A statement was made during the hearing by Mr. Pingree to the effect that the prices set would control from the time the machine was put in. Quoting this and other expressions of similar intent, the court said:

In view of these statements, made during the progress of the trial. we do not think the respondents can be heard to say the court erred in fixing the date it did when its decision should take effect.

The contention that the decision was void because announced only after twenty-two days instead of after ten days, as the law provides, wa overruled by the court on the ground that such statute is directory and not strictly binding, citing Rawson v. Parsons, 6 Mich., 405, in support of this position. Judge Moore said of the case in hand:

Several complicated scales of prices were introduced, and, if the testimony was to be intelligently considered and passed upon, some time would necessarily elapse. What little delay there was is not to be charged against the parties to the litigation, if to anybody; and the law ought not to be given such a construction as is contended for by the relators.

The case is affirmed.

From the above, Judge Hooker dissented, maintaining that the case was not properly in court and that the writ by which it was sought to be brought to its consideration should have been dismissed with costs

DEATH OF MINOR UNLAWFULLY EMPLOYED RIGHT OF ACTIONCONSTRUCTION OF STATUTE-Kansas and Texas Coal Company Gabsky et al., Supreme Court of Arkansas, 66 Southwestern Reporter. page 915.—Mary Gabsky and others sued the above-named company the circuit court of Sebastian County to recover damages for the death of John Gabsky, a minor, employed in the mines of the company cor trary to the provisions of the law.