apart from any tribe of Indians therein, and has adopted the habits of civilized life, is hereby declared to be a citizen of the United States, and is entitled to all the rights, privileges, and immunities of such citizens, whether said Indian has been or not, by birth or otherwise, a member of any tribe of Indians within the territorial limts of the United States, without in any manner impairing or otherwise affecting the right of any such Indian to tribal or other property. Another cognate provision is found in act August 9, 1888, c. 818, 25 Stat., 382, which declares that a tribal Indian woman "hereafter" marrying a citizen of the United States shall become thereby a citizen of the United States, with all the rights, privileges, and immunities of such a citizen, without impairing or in any way affecting her right to any tribal property or any interest therein. These acts disclose a settled and persistent purpose on the part of Congress so to broaden the original rule respecting the right to share in tribal property as to place individual Indians who have abandoned tribal relations, once existing, and have adopted the customs, habits, and manners of civilized life, upon the same footing, in that regard, as though they had maintained their tribal relations. Not only this, but these acts, omitting that of 1865, are general and continuing in their nature, and therefore are as applicable to the Chippewas in Minnesota as to other Indians, unless the act of 1889 discloses, either expressly or by necessary implication, that Congress intended otherwise. In our opinion that act does not thus disclose such an intention. True, it speaks of the Indians concerned as "bands or tribes," provides that all, save those on the Red Lake Reservation, shall * * * be removed" to the White Earth Reservation, and is entitled "An act for the relief and civilization of the Chippewa Indians in the State of Minnesota"; but the inference sought to be drawn therefrom, namely, that only tribal and uncivilized Indians are to have the benefits of the act, is materially weakened when we turn to other provisions, such as those directing that enough lands be withheld from the contemplated cession "to make and fill the allotments required by this and existing acts," and that the allotments be made "in conformity with" the act of February 8, 1887, which expressly recognizes the right of individual Indians, who have abandoned their tribal relations and have adopted the customs, habits, and manners of civilized life, to share in tribal property. An inference of such uncertain strength is not enough to overcome the general aversion to repeals by implication, especially where a settled policy in legislation is involved and no reason for disturbing it is apparent. (United States v. Gear, 3 How., 120, 130, 11 L. Ed., 523; Frost v. Wenie, 157 U. S., 46, 58, 15 Sup. Ct., 532, 39 L. Ed., 614; United States v. Healey, 160 U. S., 136, 146, 16 Sup. Ct., 247, 40 L. Ed., 369; United States v. Greathouse, 166 U. S., 601, 605, 17 Sup. Ct., 701, 41 L. Ed., 1130; McChoral v. Louisville, etc., Co., 183 U. S., 483, 500, 22 Sup. Ct., 165, 46 L. Ed., 289; Great Northern Ry. Co. v. United States, 84 C. C. A., 93, 109, 155, Fed., 945, 961.)

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We conclude that Mrs. Oakes and Mrs. Jones, who formerly were members of the tribe, are within the saving provisions of the acts of March 3, 1875, and February 8, 1887, and so are entitled to share in the allotment and distribution of the tribal property, the same as though they had maintained their tribal relations, but that Mrs. Andrews and Mrs. Bent. who never were members of the tribe, can not derive any benefit from any of the acts mentioned; and we reach this conclusion with greater satisfaction, because it is in accord with rulings of the Secretary of the Interior in cases which are not distinguishable from this. (William Banks, 26 Land Dec., Dep. Int., 71; Minnie H. Sparks, 36 Land Dec., Dep. Int., 234.)

In support of the claims of Mrs. Andrews and Mrs. Bent, our attention is invited to the still later act of June 7, 1897 (30 Stat., 90, c. 3, sec. 1), which reads as follows:

All children born of a marriage heretofore solemnized between a white man and an Indian woman, by blood and not by adoption, where said Indian woman is at this time, or was at the time of her death, recognized by the tribe, shall have the same rights and privileges to the property of the tribe to which the mother belongs, or belonged at the time of her death, by blood, as any other member of the tribe, and no prior act of Congress shall be construed as to debar such child of such right."

But of this act it is enough to say that its terms are such that it does not embrace the children of a mother, such as Mrs. Jones, who was living at the time of its passage and was not then recognized by the tribe as one of its members.

As a defense to the claims of Mrs. Oakes and Mrs. Jones, it is alleged that all of the land selected by the former and a part of that selected by the latter has been " duly allotted to other Indians; but, as this defense was not passed upon by the circuit court, and as the record indicates that the evidence bearing thereon is not as full and clear as it might be, we deem it the better course to leave the matter open to further consideration in the circuit court. And it is suggested, without indicating any conclusion thereon, that a question has arisen as to whether a decree displacing or annulling the existing allotments to other Indians lawfully can be rendered unless the allotees be made parties and be given an opportunity to defend. (United States v. Fairbanks (decided by this court June 3, 1909), 171 Fed., 337; Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U. S., 373, 387, 22 Sup. Ct., 650, 46 L. Ed., 954.)

In the answer it is also alleged that part of the land selected by Mrs. Jones has been specially set apart for allotment to Indians who may be removed from the Mile Lac Reservation; but no proof of any such setting apart or of any authority therefor is contained in the record, and no mention thereof is made in the Government's brief,, so this defense must be regarded as abandoned.

Following what has been said, the decree of the Circuit Court is affirmed in so far as it dismisses the bill as to Mrs. Andrews and Mrs. Bent, and in other respects it is reversed, with directions for further proceedings not inconsistent with the views expressed herein.

Mr. STEENERSON. May I ask a question there as to the effect of this decision? The CHAIRMAN. Ask your question, so that it will go in the record.

Mr. STEENERSON. What was the effect of this decision? Was the effect simply to increase the amount to be paid to certain members of the Chippewa Indians and correspondingly less than the amount to be paid to the others?

Mr. MERITT. It in effect decided that certain Indian children, who were born apart from the tribe and were living off the reservation, were entitled to participate in the distribution of the Chippewa Indian funds. By that decision it lessened the amount of money that would be paid to the other members on the roll.

Mr. STEENERSON. So it would really be a matter of justice that those who lost that money, that those whose portion was diminished, should not pay for the services of a lawyer, which resulted in diminishing their own funds? It was really a service in the interest of those children who gained by it? Mr. MERITT. That is a reasonable conclusion.

Now, as to the compensation that has been received by Mr. Ballinger for this work, I have a statement here showing that he has received as attorney fees from the appropriation that has been made for the council, $9,330.23, and for traveling and other expenses, $821.20, making a total of $10,151.43. This covers a period from July 24, 1917, down to December 4, 1920.

The committee may be interested to know why this money was paid to Mr. Ballinger, in the face of the fact that there was no attorney's contract made with him by the department.

Mr. MCCORMICK. May I interpose a question here, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. If you will let him finish that.

Mr. MERITT. The department transmitted these bills to the auditor with adverse recommendations, but in view of the wording of the law passed by Congress, making the appropriation for this tribal council, amounting to $10,000 a year, we were powerless to prevent this money being paid to Mr. Ballinger by the auditor. The item for the council, as passed by Congress and contained in the Indian appropriations act, a sample of which is found in the appropriation act of February 14, 1920, reads as follows:

"That the sum of $10,000, or so much thereof as may be necessary, of the tribal funds of the Chippewa Indians of the State of Minnesota is hereby appropriated to pay the expenses of the general council of said tribe, to be held at Bemidji, Minn., beginning the second Tuesday in July, 1920, pursuant to the constitution of the general council of said Chippewa Indians of Minnesota, organized in May, 1913, and to pay the expenses of said general council in looking after the affairs of said tribe, including the actual and necessary expenses of its legislative committee in visiting Washington during the second session of the Sixty-sixth Congress; said sum to be immediately available, and said expenses to be approved by the president and secretary of the general council and certified to the Secretary of the Interior, and as so approved and certified to be paid."

We were left with no discretion whatever under that language, and the council had it in its power to pay as much as it desired out of this appropriation for attorney fees to Mr. Ballinger.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, Mr. McCormick?

Mr. MCCORMICK. I would like to ask Mr. Meritt, if the rule requiring approval by the Secretary of the Interior of the contract between an attorney and tribai council follows a positive law of Congress on the subject, or is it a regulation of the department?

Mr. MERITT. If follows a positive law on the subject, and I was going to place in the record the law covering attorney contracts, and for the information of the committee, I will read one section and include the other sections in my statement.

The law is found in sections 2103, 2104, 2105, and 2106 of the Revised Statutes, and reads as follows:

"SEC. 2103. No agreement shall be made by any person with any tribe of Indians, or individual Indians not citizens of the United States, for the payment or delivery of any money or other thing of value, in present or in prospective, or for the granting or procuring any privilege to him, or any other persons in consideration of services for said Indians relative to their lands, or to any claims growing out of, or in reference to, annuities, installments, or other moneys, claims, demands, or thing, under laws or treaties with the United States, or official acts of any officers thereof, or in any way connected with or due from the United States, unless such contract or agreement be executed and approved as follows:

"First. Such agreement shall be in writing and a duplicate of it delivered to each party.

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Second. It shall be executed before a judge of a court of record and bear the approval of the Secretary of the Interior and the Commissioner of Indian Affairs indorsed upon it.

"Third. It shall contain the names of all parties in interest, their residence and occupation; and if made with a tribe, by their tribal authorities, the scope of authority and the reason for exercising that authority, shall be given specifically.

"Fourth. It shall state the time when and place where made, the particular purpose for which made, the special thing or things to be done under it, and, if for the collection of money, the basis of the claim, the source from which it is to be collected, the disposition to be made of it when collected, the amount or rate per cent of the fee in all cases; and if any contingent matter or condition constitutes a part of the contract or agreement it shall be specifically set forth. "Fifth. It shall have a fixed limited time to run, which shall be distinctly stated.

"Sixth. The judge before whom such contract or agreement is executed shall certify officially the time when and place where such contract or agreement was executed and that it was in his presence and who are the interested parties thereto, as stated to him at the time; the parties present making the same; the source and extent of authority claimed at the time by the contracting parties to make the contract or agreement, and whether made in person or by agent or attorney of either party or parties.

"All contracts or agreements made in violation of this section shall be null and void, and all money or other thing of value paid to any person by any Indian or tribe, or anyone else, for or on his or their behalf, on account of such services, in excess of the amount approved by the commissioner and Secretary for such services, may be recovered by suit in the name of the United States in any court of the United States regardless of the amount in controversy; and one half thereof shall be paid to the person suing for the same and the other half shall be paid into the Treasury for the use of the Indian or tribe by or for whom it was so paid.

"SEC. 2104. No money shall be paid to any agent or attorney by an officer of the United States under any such contract or agreement, other than the fees due him for services rendered thereunder; but the moneys due the tribe, Indian, or Indians, as the case may be, shall be paid by the United States, through its own officers or agents, to the party or parties entitled thereto; and no money or thing shall be paid to any person for services under such contract or agreement until such person shall have first filed with the Commissioner of Indian Affairs a sworn statement showing each particular act of service under the contract, giving date and fact in detail, and the Secretary of the Interior and Commissioner of Indian Affairs shall determine therefrom

whether, in their judgment, such contract or agreement has been complied with or fulfilled; if so, the same may be paid, and, if not, it shall be paid in proportion to the services rendered under the contract.

"SEC. 2105. The person so receiving such money contrary to the provisions of the two preceding sections, and his aiders and abettors, shall, in addition to the forfeiture of such sum, be punishable by imprisonment for not less than six months and by a fine of not less than $1,000. And it shall be the duty of all district attorneys to prosecute such cases when applied to to do so, and their failure and refusal shall be ground for their removal from office. Any Indian agent or other person in the employment of the United States who shall, in violation of the provisions of the preceding section, advise, sanction, or in any way aid in the making of such contracts or agreements, or in making such payments as are here prohibited, shall, in addition to the punishment herein imposed on the person making such contract, or receiving such money, be, on conviction, dismissed from the service of the United States and be forever disqualified from holding any office of profit or trust under the same.

SEC. 2106. No assignment of any contracts embraced by section 2103, or of any part of one, shall be valid unless the names of the assignees and their residences and occupations be entered in writing upon the contract, and the consent of the Secretary of the Interior and the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to such assignment be also indorsed thereon.

Attention is also invited to the act of June 30, 1913 (38 Stat., 97), which reads as follows:

"No contract made with any Indian, where such contract relates to the tribal funds or property in the hands of the United States, shall be valid, nor shall any payment for services rendered in relation thereto be made unless the consent of the United States has previously been given."

It has also been held by the law officers of the Government that a citizen can not create a claim against the Government without the consent of the Government. There are a number of decisions on that subject.

Mr. ROACH. In connection with the law you have just read, even if we should find an amount which, in our opinion, was due to Mr. Ballinger, and passed this bill, the Interior Department could not lawfully authorize the payment of the account, could it, as the bill is now drawn?

Mr. MERITT. We could not lawfully authorize the payment under the existing law. It would require specific direction from Congress.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Roach's question was whether, if this bill should be passed, you would then have authority to pay it?

Mr. MERITT. Congress would have authority to authorize payment of this bill. Mr. ROACH. Could the Secretary of the Interior approve the payment of Mr. Ballinger's account now, not having first approved his contract before he rendered the service?

Mr. MERITT. We could not, under existing law, but Congress could pass legislation directing that that bill be paid.

Mr. ROACH. This law that is proposed now is identical with the one which you read a moment ago, under which you held the Interior Department was powerless and that this law required the approval of the account by the Secretary of the Interior after it has been passed by Congress?

Mr. MERITT. My interpretation is that if it was passed by Congress it would give the Secretary of the Interior legal authority to pay Mr. Ballinger such amount as he (the Secretary of the Interior) deemed his service is worth.

Mr. ROACH. Notwithstanding, we already have a law which requires all these contracts to be approved by the Secretary of the Interior before the accounts can be paid?

Mr. MERITT. That would be my interpretation of it.

Mr. BURTNESS. The very purpose of this act would be to waive that provision of the law.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. This would be a particular case; it would have no effect on the general law in the future, except it would establish a precedent whereby other attorneys could come before the committee and get special treatment.

Mr. ROACH. I understand that, but Mr. Meritt made a statement just a moment ago that the Interior Department was helpless to prevent the payment of the $10,000 already paid to Mr. Ballinger, because in that law it did not require the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, but merely required the approval of the council of the tribe. Now, we have an identical

bill here with the law which he read, with the exception that this bill requires the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, and following up his idea about the matter, if that had been in the law he read, he could have stopped the payment of the account. Now, could he not just as well stop the payment of this account?

Mr. MERITT. We have stopped the payment of this account and will not pay it unless authorized by Congress, and this bill here is a direct authorization as it stands to-day.

Mr. BURTNESS. Even though it is a direct authorization, still it leaves the matter up to the Secretary of the Interior as to whether he will approve the account that may be approved by the tribal council.

The CHAIRMAN. But it goes this far-it notifies the Secretary of the Interior there is an account to be adjusted.

Mr. BURTNESS. Yes; it shows the intent of Congress that it requires the account to be adjusted and upon that the Secretary of the Interior would proceed.

Mr. LEATHERWOOD. But would this bill, if passed, authorize the payment of an irregular account, assuming it is irregular, as it now stands?

The CHAIRMAN. As I understand it, it would notify the Secretary of the Interior that there was an account which ought to be adjusted, and the Secretary of the Interior would make the adjustment, and if he found nothing new, nothing would be paid.

Mr. BURTNESS. And all technicalities or irregularities would be waived?
The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

Mr. BURTNESS. That would be the intent of the law, simply that the Secretary of the Interior would get at the matter of the details of the account.

Mr. ROACH. Does the fact here that the contract was supposed to have been made with the general council in any way change or alter the terms of the law referred to by Mr. Meritt?

Mr. MERITT. No, sir. I would say that any contract made by the council would have no validity under sections 2103, 2104, 2105, and 2106 of the Revised Statutes without the approval of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs and the Secretary of the Interior, and in accordance with the provisions of those statutes.

Mr. GENSMAN. You mean a contract made at this time after the service has been performed?

Mr. MERITT. A contract made at this time, or a contract made at any time. Mr. BURTNESS. But, Mr. Meritt, if I understand it correctly, Congress could at any time later, by appropriate legislation, ratify a contract that was made? Mr. MERITT. Yes, sir.

Mr. ROACH. If we specifically do it.

Mr. BURTNESS. Yes.

Mr. ROACH. I want to get this clear in the record, if I may: The bill Mr. Meritt read, which provides for the appropriation of certain funds to defray the expenses of legal proceedings, had the same provisions in it as the bill now under consideration, with the exception that the bill under consideration requires the matter to be finally passed upon by the Secretary of the Interior. Now, if I understood Mr. Meritt correctly a moment ago, he at least left the impression upon me that if that provision had been in the bill which authorized these other payments that have been made, the Secretary of the Interior would have stopped the payments that have been made to Mr. Ballinger. Now that is in the present bill, and I do not understand why anyone questions that he could stop it, it being in the bill, and in the other instance he could not. This bill merely requires the council to pass upon the matter and pass it over to the Secretary of the Interior, and requires the approval of the Secretary of the Interior before it can be paid. I understood his statement a moment ago to be that if that provision had been in the bill the payment would have been stopped. How does this change it? It simply provides for paying legal expenses without specifying what they are, and authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to pass on the matter finally.

Mr. MERITT. Under that law I read, making appropriations for the Chippewa Council, there was no discretion vested in the Secretary of the Interior in regard to the payment of those bills. The only thing we could do under that language was to certify the bill to the accounting officers of the Treasury Department, which we did with an adverse recommendation, but notwithstanding the adverse recommendation, under the language of the law, the accounts were passed by the accounting officers of the Treasury Department. Under