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to fortified places is regarded as no longer tenable.'
main object of a blockade is the closing of the ports of a
belligerent so as to exclude him from all commercial inter-
course, and this is a belligerent right recognized on all sides.2
Neutral vessels attempting to run such blockade are open to
confiscation, on proceedings instituted by the belligerent im-
posing the blockade. But war-ships of neutrals are not in-
frequently excepted from blockade, as was the case with the
blockades instituted by the United States government of the
Confederate ports. It becomes, in many cases, a difficult

1 Heffter, § 154; Perels, § 48. Kent, i. 145; Phillimore,

§ 285.

Perels, § 48.

blockade at the time of sailing, her iii. approaching the blockaded port for the purpose of inquiring there, is in itself a consummation of the offence; and amounts to an actual breach. The Cheshire, 3 Wall. 231; The Delta, Blatchford's Prize Cases, 654.

Unless the blockade be directed against ingress or egress alone, a vessel violates the law of blockade by any positive act towards entering or quitting, or by showing a clear and speedy intention to enter or leave a blockaded port, except in distress. Field's Code Int. Law, § 892, citing The Coosa, 1 Newberry's Ad. Rep. 393; The Hiawatha, Blatch. Prize Cases, p. 1; 2 Blatch. 635; The Empress, Blatch. Pr. Cas. p. 175; Halleck's Intern. Law, ch. 23, § 23.

Actual necessity, e. g., for repairs, supplies, or shelter, will justify an entrance into a blockaded port; but the burden is on the party setting up the reality and urgency of the necessity. The Major Barbour, Blatch. Prize Ca. 167; The Sunbeam, id. 316, 638, 656; The Diana, 7 Wal. 354.

If it can be fully shown that the purpose to run the blockade had been abandoned, the property is not liable to confiscation because of the previous wrongful purpose. 1 Kent's Commentaries, 147; and see, also, The John Gilpin, Blatchford's Prize Cases, 291, 661.

Unless there be an excusatory treaty stipulation, when a ship knew of the

That a sovereign may blockade ports in the control of insurgent subjects, see Prize Cases, 2 Black, U. S. 635; The Mary, Blatchford's Prize Cases, 556, 618.

That a contract to run a foreign blockade is not illegal, see Whart. on Cont. § 480; Chavasse, ex parte, 4 D. J. S. 655; The Helen, L. R. 1 Ad. & Ec. 1.

The United States courts pressed the right of arrest to a dangerous extreme in the case of the Springbok (Blatch. Pr. Ca. 380, 434; 5 Wal. 1) during the late civil war. This vessel left London on December 9, 1862, destined for Nassau. She was captured on February 3, 1863, when on the way to Nassau, and 150 miles from that port, by the Federal cruiser Sonoma. The district court of New York condemned both ship and cargo. This decree was reversed by the supreme court of the United States in December, 1866, so far as concerns the ship, but affirmed as to the cargo. There was nothing in the papers seized on the Springbok to show that the intention was to run the

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question to determine whether the attempt to run the blockade is made out sufficiently to justify a seizure. It may happen,

United States; and it is a matter of regret that Mr. Fish's instructions in this respect were not pressed so as to secure the repudiation of the doctrine. As concurring in this criticism, see Gessner, 12th ed., p. 231.

Bluntschli (p. 469) maintains that the ruling of the supreme court in the Springbok case is more perilous to the rights of neutrals than the doctrine of

The question of the liability of the Springbok to confiscation was the subject of discussion by several members of the Institute of International Law in 1881. (Revue de droit int., xiv. 328.) It was agreed on all sides that the opinions of the supreme court of the United States in this case established a theory entirely novel. At a meeting of the institute at Genoa, in 1882, the question was brought formally up by M. Martens, an eminent publicist and professor in the imperial school of law at St. Petersburg. That the decision of the supreme court on the question could not be sustained was agreed to by all who took part in the discussion; though it was the general sense of those present that it was not within the province of the institute to pass resolutions condemning the action of governments or courts in concrete

blockade. The British government
had previously (on March 13, 1863)
referred this question to its official
counsel, who, in an opinion signed
also by Sir R. Phillimore, declared
"that there was nothing to justify the
seizure of the barque Springbok and
her cargo; and that her majesty's
government would be justified in de-
manding the immediate restitution of
the ship and the cargo, without sub-paper blockade.
mitting to any judication by an Amer-
ican prize court." But, notwithstand-
ing this emphatic judgment, the decree
of the supreme court of the United
States was approved by the mixed
commission instituted at Washington
in pursuance of the treaty between
the British and the United States
governments for the settlement of the
points in dispute between them. This
is more remarkable, since in a docu-
ment published in Washington on
November 30, 1873 (cited in Gessner,
12th ed., 231), appears the official
instructions of Mr. Fish, then secretary
of state, to the counsel of the United
States, in which it is said that the
government approves of all the prize
decisions given in the United States,
except that in the case of the Springbok.
It is easy to see why Great Britain,
mistress of the seas, should, after the
first annoyance and excitement of the
capture was over, have approved of
a doctrine which sustains the seizure
of neutral vessels and cargoes, not
only when running into a blockaded
port, but when making a voyage be-
tween two ports of the neutral under
whose flag she sails. But that such a
doctrine should have been approved
by the supreme court of the United
States is extraordinary, as it is in con-
flict with the maritime policy of the

cases.

"The doctrine of continued or continuous voyages," says Dr. Woolsey, Int. Law, app. iii., n. 27, "which Sir W. Scott, afterwards Lord Stowell, originated, deserves to be noticed, and may be noticed here, although it first arose in reference to colonial trade with another country, carried on by neutrals. As the English courts condemned such trade, the neutrals in the first part of this century, especially shippers and

in cases where a vessel is seized at some distance from the blockaded port, that the allegation of blockade running may be disputed. In such cases it is for the prize court to deter

captains belonging to the United States, tried to evade the rule by stopping at a neutral port and seeming to pay duties, and then, perhaps, after landing and relading the cargoes, carried them to the mother-country of the colony. The motive for this was, that if the goods in question were bona fide imported from the neutral country, the transaction was a regular one. The courts held, that if an original intention could be proved of carrying the goods from the colony to the mothercountry, the proceedings in the neutral territory, even if they amounted to landing goods and paying duties, could not overcome the evidence of such intention; the voyage was really a continued one artfully interrupted, and the penalties of law had to take effect. Evidence, therefore, of original intention and destination was the turningpoint in such cases. See, especially, the case of the Polly, Robinson's Rep., ii. 361-372; the cases of the Maria and of the William, ibid., v. 365–372 and 385-406, and the cases there mentioned.

“The principle of continued voyages will apply when cases of contraband, attempt to break blockade, etc., come up before courts which accept this English doctrine. In our late war many British vessels went to Nassau, and either landed their cargoes destined for Confederate ports there to be carried forward in some other vessel, or stopped at that port as a convenient place for a new start towards Charleston or some other harbor. If an intention to enter a blockaded port can be shown, the vessel and the cargo, as is said in the text, are subject to capture according to English and American doctrine from

the time of setting sail. Now the doctrine of continued voyages has been so applied by our supreme court that it matters not if the vessel stops at a neutral port, or unlades its cargo and another vessel conveys it onward, or if formalities of consignment to a person at the neutral port, or the payment even of duties are used to cover the transaction, provided destination to the blockaded port, or, in the case of contraband, to the hostile country, can be established, the ship on any part of its voyage, and the cargo before and after being landed, are held to be liable to confiscation. Or, if again the master of the vessel was ordered to stop at the neutral port to ascertain what the danger was of continuing the voyage to the blockaded harbor, still guilt rested on the parties to the transaction as before. All this seems a natural extension of the English principle of continued voyages, as at first given out; but there is danger that courts will infer intention on insufficient grounds. A still bolder extension was given to it by our courts in the case of vessels and goods bound to the Rio Grande, the goods being then carried up by lighters to Matamoras. We could not prohibit neutrals from sending goods to the Mexican side of that river; but if it could be made to appear that the goods were destined for the side belonging to the United States, that was held to be sufficient ground for condemnation of them; although, in order to reach their destination, they would need overland carriage over neutral territory. See Prof. Bernard's Brit. Neutral., 307-317, and comp. Dana's note 231 on Wheaton, § 508."

To the effect that a blockade once

mine as to the liability of the seized ship. A neutral making the blockaded port from necessity in case of disaster is exempt from capture. A vessel, also, may without liability to condemnation, sail on an alternative destination to a blockaded port, with the intention to go elsewhere if it prove that the blockade is continued.2-Whether the possession of a port by the land forces controlling the blockade terminates the blockade has been much discussed. The negative has been held by the supreme court of the United States; the affirmative by the mixed commission appointed under the treaty of Washington at the close of the late civil war."

§ 234. To constitute a binding blockade, it is necessary that the neutral to be affected should have notice that the blockade exists. No particular form of giving notice is requisite."

established and notified is presumed to continue, see The Baigorry, 2 Wall. 474; The Circassian, id. 134.

That sailing from a home port with intent to break a blockade is a breach of blockade, see Fitzsimmons v. Ins. Co., 4 Cranch, 185; Yeaton v. Fry, 5 Cranch, 335; The Circassian, 2 Wall. 135; The Admiral, 3 Wall. 603. That a blockade must be effectual, see The Peterhoff, 5 Wall. 28; but that it is not vacated by casus, such as a storm dispersing the blockading ship, see The Columbia, 1 C. Rob. 154; The Hoffnung, 6 C. Rob. 116; Radcliff v. Ins. Co., 7 Johns. 38.

A blockade does not preclude a vessel which entered the port before its institution from coming out with a cargo bona fide purchased and laden before the blockade began. The Vrow Judith, 1 C. Rob. 150; The Gerasimo, 11 Moore P. C. 88; Olivera v. Ins. Co., 3 Wheat. 185; Prize Cases, 2 Black, 635. In the volume of Blatchford's Prize Cases will be found a series of decisions as to what constitutes evidence of intent to run a blockade.

1 Perels, §§ 48, 51. But the neces

sity must be imperative. The Diana, 7 Wall. 354.

2 Naylor v. Taylor, 9 B. & C. 718; Sperry v. Int. Co., 2 Wash. C. C. 243.

The Baigorry, 2 Wall. 474; The Josephine, 3 Wall. 83.

4 Lorimer's Law of Nations, 145. "A British ship, The Circassian, was actually seized and confiscated by the American prize courts for attempting to run the blockade at New Orleans, after New Orleans had been retaken and was in possession of the north; and she was restored only under the mixed commission appointed by the treaty of Washington at the close of the war. The commission held that as the blockade was terminated by the recapture, the right of a belligerent to exercise the privileges which it conferred against a neutral vessel was at an end." Lorimer's Law of Nations, 145. The point decided in The Circassian, 2 Wall. 135, was that the sailing from a neutral port, with intent to run a blockade, exposes a vessel to confiscation at any place at which she may be seized.

5 This is fully and ably discussed in Gessner, 12th ed., p. 197.

Notice of

and intent to run the

blockade

must be

made out.

When duly given, the subjects as well as the governments of neutral states are bound. Notice may be express, to a particular government, or to a ship, or it may be inferred from all the facts, among which notoriety is to be especially considered.' A notice to a foreign government is notice to all the subjects of such government.2-To proceed to the mouth of the blockaded port on the plea of there seeking information, exposes the vessel to serious suspicion ;3 and the mere hovering round a blockaded port, as if to seize some unguarded point to enter, is ground for seizure.1

Vessel at

tempting to

run block

ade may be

§ 235. A vessel condemned for breach of blockade, either intentional or actual, is subject to confiscation; and the cargo is also subject to confiscation unless it should be shown that the owners of the cargo were innocent of any intention to break the blockade. vessel, so it has been held, is open to seizure at any time during the return voyage, though she cannot be seized after she reaches the home port. But by high authorities it has been

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The Adelaide, 2 C. Rob. 111.

The Neptunus, 2 C. Rob. 110; The Hiawatha, Blatch. Pr. 1.

See The Spes, 5 C. Rob. 72; The Josephine, 3 Wall. 83; The Admiral, 3 Wall. 603.

4 The Charlotte Christine, 6 C. Rob. 101; The Gute Erwartung, 6 C. Rob. 182; Radcliff v. Ins. Co., 7 Johns. 38; The Cornelius, 3 Wall. 214.

The

confiscated

of nations upon this point. The intention must be mauifested in such manner as to be equivalent to an attempt. Fitzsimmons v. Newport Ins. Co., 4 Cranch, 185.

In the absence of such a treaty, the courts do not require notice; Field's Code Int. Law, § 892, citing 1 Kent Com. 150; The Circassian, 2 Wall. 135; Wheaton on Capture, 193–207; The Hallie Jackson, Blatchford's Prize Cases, 2, 41; The Empress, id. 175; except where the vessel sails without a knowledge of the blockade; The Nayade, 1 Newberry's Adm. Rep. 366.

The treaty between the United States and Great Britain provides that every vessel may be turned away from every blockaded or besieged port or place, which shall have sailed for the same without knowledge of the blockade or siege; but she shall not be detained, nor her cargo, if not contraband, be confiscated unless, after notice, she shall again attempt to enter; but she shall be permitted to go to any other port or place she may think proper. And this treaty is conceived to be a § 836; Gessner, 229; Perels, § 57. correct exposition of the present law

5 The Panaghia Rhomba, 12 Moore's P. C. 168; The Neptunus, 3 C. Rob. 173; The Alexander, 4 C. Rob. 93.

6 Wheaton, Part IV. ch. v.; The Welvaart Van Pillaw, 2 C. Rob. 128; The Yuffrow Maria, 3 C. Rob. 147. Hautefeuille, iii. 151; Bluntschli,

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