ments have initiated for the suppression of revolutions by main force." But this does not apply to the recognition on the part of European powers of belligerent insurgents in this country, or even expressions of sympathy with such insurgents. England at an early period of their revolt recognized, in full accordance with the United States, the independence of the Spanish South American colonies; and the United States were prompt not only to recognize the independence of Greece and of Belgium, but, in the case of Greece, to expres sympathy as well as to extend assistance to the furthest Fmits of neutral obligation.3

Wooley, int. Law, § 147.

Sup a § 141; infra, §§ 240 et seq. 3 Mr. Seward, i. 1868, when secretary of state, profested a treaty with the United States of Colombia, and **was so desirous of securing some satisizctory arrangement with that government," so writes Mr. Baker, his Eiographer (Diplom. Itist, of War, p. 34), "that he sent Mr. Caleb Cushng, as a special agent, to join our ministor at Bogota u the negotiations. A treaty embodying the Monroe die eine was agreed upon and signed i he minister. The treaty was rekte 1 by the senate of Colombia, and for unknown reason. failed to receive the approval of the senate of the United States." (Appleton's Cyclop., 186, pp. 108, 704; Secrecy Cvaris's Report, March 8, 1880; Ex. D. 112, Senate. 46th Cong. 2d sess.) Mr. Seward's } o test against French intercreace in 153, in Mexican affairs, though HSN22 PQ IN the house of representatives, as possed over, no doubt with the assent administration, without action in the senate.

the

And Mr. Seward, in his atte to Montholon, of December 6, 1865, Jces not place his objections to French interference in Mexico on the ground of the Monroe doctrine, but on the ground : that "the people of every state on the

American continent have a right to
secure for themselves a republican gov-
ernment if they choose, and that inter-
ference by foreign states to prevent the
enjoyment of such institutions deliber-
ately established is wrongful, and in
its effects antagonistical to the free and
popular form of government existing in
the United States." (Diplom. Hist. of
the War, 427.) A striking speech on
this topic by General Dix will be found
in Dix's Life, i. 217, in which he says
that the protests of Presidents Monroe
and Polk "are sustained by an undi-
vided public opinion, even though they
Taay not have received a formal response
congress." This is true so far as
cerns the arbitrary interference
"opean sovereigns in American
the attempt of any European
Per
obtain the control of the
stlines of Parama. But the doctrine
should not be extended so as to pre-
d. de a bit open power from receiving
for its own purposes (e. g., for coaling
steators) a cession of territory in South
America.

For an article in the Mnroe doctrine in relation to the Isthmiar Canal, see North American Review (1 June, 1880, 4d sees me Review, Dec182, 1881; Soch Law Rev. N. S. vi. 7AN

VIII. NATURALIZED AND OTHER RESIDENTS-SLAVES.

Naturalization now

accepted.

177. Until the middle of the present century, the prevalent doctrine was that allegiance could not be divested or repudiated. No matter how long a party may have been absent from his native land, generally no matter how solemnly he may have abjured his native allegiance, no matter how sacred may have been the ties he may have formed in his new home, his allegiance of birth was held to continue; and this doctrine was held in the United States as well as in England.' It is now, however, generally agreed that personal expatriation is in accordance with the law of nations; and there are no civilized nations which do not now grant naturalization in some shape to proper applicants. Treaties, also, are in existence between the prin cipal states of Europe and the United States by which the rights of naturalized citizens are reciprocally respected. Difficulties, however, arise in cases of conflict between naturalizations, and in respect to naturalization fraudulently obtained in order to elude conscription or taxation. By some states naturalization is only granted on the production of a release from the original allegiance. This, however, is not the rule in the United States, where emigrants are naturalized without any such certificate; nor is it consistent with our institutions that such a condition should be prescribed.

The following conclusions may be considered as settled:(1) A naturalization obtained fraudulently, not for the purpose of transferring allegiance and residence, but for the purpose of evading some duty to the native state, may be treated as void by the latter state, should the party naturalized return to its shores.

(2) A legitimate child takes its father's nationality, an illegitimate child that of the mother.2

(3) Between particular states the duties and privileges of naturalization are regulated by treaties. Among these treaties

1 Whart. Conf. of Laws, § 5, and * See infra, §§ 256 et seq., 432 cases there cited. As to constitutional

limits, see infra. § 431.

may be mentioned that of 1868 between Germany and the United States.1

(4) It should be added that France holds to the permanent allegiance of her subjects more strongly than do other European states, insisting in many instances that they cannot divest themselves of this allegiance even when settled in a foreign land."

(5) The naturalization of the husband, according to the old view, carries with it the naturalization of the wife, though it may be doubted whether this rule obtains in states where married women have the capacity of independent action, and where the husband insists, against his wife's wishes, she refusing to accompany him, upon crossing the seas to accept the nationality of a foreign land under conditions entirely different from those under which the marriage was solemnized. It is otherwise if she accompany him, and it is clear that the naturalization of a father carries with it the naturalization of his minor children whom he takes with him.3

Foreigners subjected to law of place of residence.

§ 178. In most civilized states (the rule as to barbarous and semi-civilized states having been already considered) a foreigner is entitled to the immunities of citizens, though he is in most jurisdictions compelled to give security on bringing suit, and cannot act in a fiduciary capacity without giving bond. In some states an alien is prevented from acquiring real estate beyond a certain limit. But there is no limitation on the acquisition of personal property (mobilia), and under the constitution of the United States a foreigner has the special privilege of suing in the Federal courts. When a foreigner is indicted for a crime, he cannot, by our practice, set up his alienage as a defense, although by the English common law

1 See on this topic the enumeration of treaties in Whart. Conf. of Laws, chap. i.

2 That marriages of Frenchmen in a foreign land will be declared void if not solemnized according to home laws, see Whart. Conf. of Laws, 2d ed., §§ 151, 162, 173, 185.

As to naturalization in the United States by statute and by annexation, see infra, §§ 431 et seq.

That naturalization creates political status, see infra, & 262.

3 Whart. Conf. of Laws, §§ 8 et seq. Infra, § 262.

• Supra, § 147.

he is entitled to a jury of which a portion should be of a race speaking his own language. An interesting question arises when a foreigner is indicted for a political offence which he is required to commit by his own sovereign. In such a case the command of the foreign sovereign is no defence. If the defendant, in such a prosecution, is convicted in violation of the law of nations, it is the duty of the executive to interfere with a pardon. If this is impracticable, the question is one for international adjustment. A foreigner cannot say that he is not bound to obey the laws of the state where he is sojourning. But if the act for which he is convicted is one enjoined by his own sovereign, then that sovereign must be held responsible.1

See, on the above topic, Whart. Con. of Laws, §§ 819, 820; Whart. Crim. Law, 8th ed., §§ 269, 281, chap. i.; Holtzendorff, op. cit., 1215; Bonfils, De la competence des tribunaux français à l'egard des Estrangers, 1865; Ueber die Fehler des Franz. Civilrechts bezuglich der Fremden. As to compulsion by sovereign as a defence, see supra, § 144: infra, § 210; Whart. Crim. Law, 8th ed., §§ 94, 283, 310; Ford v. Surget, 97 U. S. 594, cited infra, § 210. As to conflicts of criminal jurisprudence, see infra, §§ 350 et seq.

Sir R. Phillimore (op. cit., 445), differing in this respect from Heffter (§ 58), holds that, “as a general proposition, a man can have only one allegiance." But I must agree with Heffter in holding that a mere resident in a state owes, for the time being, allegiance to such state, and may be guilty of treason to such state if, as a private person, he wages war against it, or renders comfort to its enemies. Cobbett, for instance, when in the United States, was never naturalized, nor did he ever restrain himself from declaring that he was and meant to continue to be a British subject; yet

no one would have pretended that Cobbett, while residing in the United States, was not liable to be indicted for all offences, political or otherwise, made indictable in the place of his residence. The same position has been repeatedly taken by the British government in respect to citizens of the United States who, when residing in Ireland, have been engaged in conspiracies against the British-government. The question, however, may be merely of the meaning of words, since Sir R. Phillimore, in the next page to that from which the above passage is cited, says: "All strangers commorant in a land owe obedience, as subjects for the time being, to the laws of it.

That the home sovereign has allegiance due him from such persons is maintained by all civilized states, there being no such state which does not maintain its right to levy taxes on such persons, and to hold them responsible for all offences committed by them against its sovereignty. Whart. Crim. Law, 8th ed., §§ 269 et seq., 281; Phill., op. cit., 455; Van Wyck, De delictis extra regni territ. commiss., Utrecht, 1839. As to commer

§ 179. It is within the constitutional power of a sovereign to exclude foreigners, either as a class or specially from his