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Modifications by treaty of

1856.

§ 133. The object of the treaty of Vienna was to perpetuate in Europe the dynasties that existed prior to the French Revolution, and especially to exclude all of Paris of members of the Bonaparte family from political power. The result of the French Revolution of 1848 was to give the presidency of the new republic to Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, whom Napoleon I. had designated as his heir; and subsequently, by a coup d'état, sanctioned by a popular vote, Louis Napoleon became emperor, the dynasty being re-established in his family. It might have been supposed that the sovereigns whose predecessors had united in putting the Bonaparte family under the ban would have interfered, had they the power, to prevent this defiance of the adjudications of the Vienna Congress. But they had not the power, and, even if they had, it is questionable whether any one of them would have had the temerity to undertake a second war for the establishment of legitimacy in France. The general acquiescence, therefore, in the restoration of the Bonaparte dynasty in France signified a general acquiescence in the repudiation of the duty of intervention in favor of legitimacy which the Vienna Congress proclaimed. And it is a remarkable fact that the re-establishment of Napoleonic imperialism in France, so far from being regarded with anger or fear, was welcomed by the other great powers. It was plain that France would not tolerate either of the Bourbon dynasties; and the Orleans family in particular had always been disliked by the courts of Russia and Austria, and had made itself detestable in England by its intrigues for the possession of the Spanish throne. The only alternatives, therefore, were the republic and Napoleonic imperialism. The republic had already sufficiently exhibited its capacity for revolutionary propagandism to make it the object of unqualified dread and dislike on the part of the continental courts; and not only was the revival of Napoleonism, which claimed in its new attitude to be a system of peace, in itself preferable to republicanism, which was war, but Louis Napoleon took the first opportunity to show that his policy was to be conservative, so far as the established institutions of Europe were concerned. England had been the most implacable

adversary of his uncle, and to England the first French empire had finally succumbed; but in England Louis Napoleon found a kindly welcome during his exile; he had been received as a prince by the English aristocracy, and had served as a volunteer policeman during some momentary disturbances in London; he took the first opportunity, when elected president, to announce his determination to establish intimate political relations with England; and outrageous as was the coup d'état, it received the cordial support even of leading English statesmen. Nor was he less successful in conciliating the autocratic courts. He found, when he entered on the presidency, Rome under the control of a popular government which had been aided by the French republican authorities; he withdrew the French troops, and co-operated in the reestablishment of the pope. It is true that in part from his de termination to take a leading position in Europe, in part from an irrepressible tendency to conspiracy, which was one of the chief features of his remarkable character, he showed no reluctance to engage in war; and the first war into which he entered led to important consequences in the domain of international law. Turkey, so it was alleged, was threatened with destruction by Russia, the consequence of which would be the control by Russia, not only of the mouth of the Danube, but of the Eastern Mediterranean. England was the state most exposed to injury by such an aggrandizement of Russia; but Napoleon III. hastened to ally himself with England in demanding a guarantee from Russia of the integrity of the Turkish possessions. Sardinia, under Victor Emmanuel, joined in the war which followed, and the alliance was productive of important results. It placed Napoleon III. in intimate relations with the English crown, and won for him unquestionable popularity with the English people. It elevated Sardinia from an obscure to a conspicuous position in European politics, and gave to Victor Emmanuel that confidential relationship which afterwards led to an alliance against Austria. And the war, successful in maintaining the integrity of Turkey and in ultimately destroying Sebastopol, was closed by the peace of Paris (1856), in which England, France, Prussia, Austria, Sardinia, Russia, and Turkey took part.

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Among the articles of this peace, it was stipulated that the Danube should be open to free navigation, Russia relinquishing her control over its mouth, and England relinquishing the insignia of universal maritime supremacy. Blockades, unless actual and effective, were not to be regarded as binding; the rights of neutrals received additional security; and privateering was to be surrendered by all the subscribing powers. these conclusions all the states of Europe gave in their adhe sions. The government of the United States withheld its assent on the ground that the measures for the protection of neutrals were not sufficiently thorough; and afterwards, during the civil war, in vain endeavored, by assenting specially to the provision in respect to privateers, to obtain the benefits of that provision.'-The treaty of Paris further provided that, before war was actually commenced, the combatants should invoke the friendly offices of an independent state as a mediator. But that this provision was not regarded by the parties as binding is shown by the great continental wars which followed, no one of which was preceded by attempts at arbitration.2

Tendency to absorption of minor states.

§ 134. Another important recent tendency to be noticed is that of the absorption of minor states. At one time it seemed as if the permanent policy of Europe was decentralization. Germany, which had previously been united under an imperial control, was split up into a series of independent states, some of them without appreciable political power. Spain had been stripped of her colonies, and of her Italian and Flemish dependencies. From Turkey Greece had been torn; the ancient union of Denmark and Sweden was dissolved; Portugal was finally severed from Spain; England lost her chief American colonies. The reaction to annexation and territorial aggrandizement was first exhibited in the United States, whose territory was increased by the addition of Louisiana and Florida, to be followed by that of Texas, California, and Alaska. A still more important national aggrandizement flowed from the success of the government in the great civil war, which

See infra, § 201.

2 Infra, §§ 216 et seq.

terminated in 1864. It is true that this war brought no accession of territory, and that propositions for the annexation of additional territory have since then been repelled. But before the war it was always an open question how far particular states might be entitled, under the constitution, to secede; and this right had been claimed at the Hartford convention as a constitutional safeguard, and was the basis of the revolutionary action of the southern states in 1858. Not only was this claim finally extinguished by the result of the civil war, but the chief element of domestic dissension was removed by the abolition of slavery. Hence, as is stated by Holtzendorff, it was not until after this war and the extinction of the element of discord caused by slavery, that the United States took the position of a leading power. In Europe, also, there has been a marked tendency to consolidation. By the congress of Vienna, in 1815, Venice was attached to Austria, a large portion of Saxony to Prussia, Genoa to Sardinia, and Norway to Sweden; and in each case without consulting the wishes of the population annexed. In 1859 Italy was united in a kingdom under the house of Savoy. By the rapid and thorough victories in 1864 of Prussia in the campaign against Austria, all the minor states of North Germany were absorbed in Prussia; and an imperial system has been since established, of which Bavaria, Saxony, and Würtemberg are members, and Prussia is the head, while the new empire has become a maritime power by the acquisition of seaports to the north. The vast colonial system of England, impaired by the American Revolution, was increased by new conquests in India, while in 1878 Cyprus was acquired, and in 1882 a dominant influence in Egypt. In 1860 France acquired Savoy, and in 1882 took virtual possession of Tunis and Madagascar. In 1877 Russia, in teeth of the lesson of Sebastopol (by which England and France were supposed to have taught her at such enormous cost that she must not interfere with Turkey), proclaimed war on Turkey, and after a victorious campaign obtained, by the treaty of San Stefano, of March 3, 1878, considerable accession of territory. This, however, was reduced by the general pacification effected by the

1 Op. cit., 1199.

congress of Berlin, in the fall of the same year, England obtaining in that congress the cession of Cyprus. Russia, also, between 1836 and 1880, has been vastly increasing her possessions in Asia. The consequences of these territorial changes are of much interest in connection with the topic before us. In the first place, they diminish the probability of war by diminishing the number of parties by whom war can be begun. In the second place, they make the institution of pacific and liberal reforms more practicable by the diminution of the parties whose assent is required to a change. In the third place, each of these territorial changes has been in defiance of the principle of jure-divino legitimacy, and has hence been a ratification, if not of a popular scheme of government, at least of the right to change institutions from time to time as policy requires. And several important ameliorations of the old rules of international law have followed this reconstruction of states. By a convention held in Geneva in 1864 rules were adopted for the better treatment of wounded prisoners. In 1866 Prussia, Italy, and Austria united in urging the adoption of the rule proposed by the United States, that private property should not be the subject of capture at sea; and though this was not accepted by France or England, its general recognition may be regarded as only a question of time. The abolition of slavery in the United States and in Russia removes any doubt from the question whether slavery is an offence by the law of nations. The increase of railroads, with tunnels, by which even the barriers of the Alps have been removed; the establishment of telegraphs, by which instantaneous communication can be had with all civilized states in Europe and America, have done much to unite these states in a community of interests, which make war the more unlikely, by making it the more distressing and the more destructive.

III. INDEPENDENT SOVEREIGNTY, ITS INVIOLABILITY AND

INCIDENTS.

§ 135. The independent sovereignty of states is the basis of public international law, just as equality in the distribution of rights is the basis of municipal law. As far as concerns muni1 Infra, §§ 216 et seq.

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