idea of it in the first section; wherein he treats of the difference which there is between the universal law of nations and the European law of nations; showing that the latter being founded on the positive principles and received usages of a general consent of the European nations, may be changed in the same manner.

In the disputes which constitute the subject of this Essay, the question being concerning the commerce of merchants, subjects of neutral states, and the pretended power of belligerents to stop neutral vessels on the high seas, it has been deemed proper to touch somewhat on the rights of neutral people, of their free commerce and its foundations, and also on the liberty and the empire of the seas, which is done in the second, third and fourth sections.

The author has therein established the principles, according to which he maintains in the fifth section that conformably to the universal law of nations neutral states have an absolute and unlimited freedom in their navigation and commerce, in time of war as well as in time of peace, and for all kinds of merchandise, even for arms and munitions of war, and therefore that the belligerent parties have no right to prescribe laws to them in these matters, to interdict certain sorts of merchandises, nor to seize under any pretext whatever their vessels on the high seas, nor finally to exercise a jurisdiction over these vessels, their cargoes and owners.

But as the belligerents, far from recognising this absolute freedom of the commerce of neutral states, have rather assailed it in all maritime wars, the author takes occasion, in his sixth section, to remark on what has been the practice of the ancients in these affairs. He cites the laws of some Roman emperors, and the constitutions of several of the popes, by which it was forbidden to sell arms and other articles suitable for war to the enemies of the Roman empire, and the infidels as enemies of the church. Hence has been introduced throughout Europe the usage by which the belligerents interdict the commerce of their merchandise to neutrals.

The powers of Europe having begun to make treaties of commerce with each other, it was therein stipulated by the contracting parties that their subjects should not furnish to the enemies of each other, either arms or other munitions of war, which, to this end, are very exactly specified. Another essential point of these conventions regards enemy's goods laden on board neutral vessels. The rule was adopted in the treaties that enemy's effects found on board neutrals were confiscable, and, on the other hand, that neutral effects laden on board enemies should be free-The ownership alone of the merchandise was considered. But this usage having afforded the privateers of the belligerent parties an occasion or a pretext for visiting the neutral vessels, which they often made use of to commit depredations and other acts of violence, this rule has been altered since the middle of the last century, and another established, according to which, a neutral vessel neutralises the whole cargo, though it be in part or altogether enemies' property, as in return, an enemy's vessel, with all the cargo are confiscable, though belonging to a neutral. Here nothing was regarded but the ownership of the vessel, and not the goods. This new rule was adopted, with few exceptions, in all commercial treaties concluded from that time till All this composes the contents of the seventh section. The usages and principles adopted in the commercial treaties of European powers have given existence to the law of nations in point of commerce; and the convenience of all these treaties, or the greater part of them, is in proof. According to law, arms and munitions of war are contraband goods, which neutrals are not allowed to carry, in time of war, to the enemies of either of the belligerent parties; who had moreover a right to seize and confiscate enemy's effects found on board neutrals. But this having been altered by the establishment of a new usage, which declares neutral vessels free, together with their cargoes, and condemns enemy's vessels with all on board to be confiscated, a new point is thus made in the law of European nations, which has subsisted till

now.

now. Thus the jurisdiction of the belligerents over the prizes made by their vessels of war or their privateers is authorized by this right. But as in some of the Courts of Admiralty the judicial proceedings are very strange, irregular and entirely contrary to the known principles of jurisprudence, the sovereigns, whose vessels and effects are put on their trial before these tribunals, are not obliged to recognise the sentences, often unjust and partial, which emanate from them.-The law of European nations approves likewise the ordinances and notifications, which belligerents have published at the commencement of war, but only for arms and munitions of war, all other merchandise remaining free and permitted. By all which it appears that the absolute freedom of commerce which the universal law of nations gives to all people has been extremely restricted by that of Europe: which is explained in the eighth section.

The proceedings of belligerents against neutrals having at all times produced controversies and disputes between them, an historical abridgement is given in the ninth section of many remarkable cases of these sorts of affairs, and more particularly of the contests which took place in the year 1752, between the kings of Great Britain and Russia, with an outline of the reasons advanced on both sides.

In the tenth and last section the author has added some observations to which he could not assign a convenient place in the preceding parts of the work. He has reported examples of the freedom of commerce sometimes granted by bellige rent parties to their respective subjects in the midst of war. He has shown the injustice of the seizure of enemy's goods on board of neutral vessels, between whose sovereigns and the belligerent parties no treaty of commerce exists. This proceeding forming a complete contrast with the new European law of nations, the author maintains that all neutral states have a right to demand of the belligerents that they shall treat, in such a case, their commercial subjects agreeably to. the new European law of nations, and not, as the latter pre

tend, according to the ancient. He has finally shown how advantageous a code of the right of war and marine made with the common consent of the princes and states of Europe would be, as well for the preservation of the just rights of neutrals, as for restraining the too enlarged pretensions of belligerents, and in general for the freedom of the commerce of all the people of Europe.

Such is the plan which the author has pursued in this essay. He has not been checked by the opinions of the learned, even those most celebrated who might differ from his principles; but he has treated his subject according to his own ideas, consigning the whole to the judgment and discretion of the equitable and impartial reader.

Freedom of the Navigation and Commerce

OF

NEUTRAL NATIONS, IN TIME OF WAR.

INTRODUCTION.

THE troubles of war which so often agitate Europe owe their birth, either to disputes which concern only the persons and the rights of sovereigns, and do not concern their people, or to offences by which the people interfere with each other in their property, their possessions or their rights. A distinction may be formed from them between the wars of princes and those of people. (a) The former most frequently constitute the misfortune of monarchical states, and the latter are an incon

(a) This distinction is not received, to my knowledge, by those authors who consider these matters. Yet it may serve to decide some questions often debated; for instance, whether a duel, to which princes in former times have challenged each other, by way of avoiding or terminating a bloody war, should take place: and whether in a kingdom, wherein affairs of war and peace are within the province of the legislative authority, the legislature is bound to consent to a war, and bear the expense of it, when the subject of the war does not regard the state at large, but merely the chief. In Germany, the war of the Spanish succession in 1702; that for the election of a king of Poland in 1753; and especially the two last wars against the Turks in 1716 and 1737, deserve to be considered in this point of view.

All Louis XIV.'s wars except those against the piratical African states, were wars of the prince; those of the United Provinces were national wars. However, it is not pretended to be denied that the wars of monarchs are not also national wars, as those between France and Great Britain have almost always been.