of the government which is to confer the ordinary civil rights upon the new inhabitants, while withholding from them all political privileges.

It may be asked whether they have the right to trial by jury and to the other civil rights guaranteed by the Constitution. It is sufficient to say that these rights are in no wise dependent, either upon citizenship or alienage. They are accorded to all persons.1

It is quite possible, however, that the Supreme Court might decide that some of these limitations were only operative upon Congress when acting within the United States proper, and that, therefore, they did not apply to the new inhabitants. It is thus seen that this question is entirely beside that of citizenship or alienage and has only to do with the applicability of certain portions of the Constitution when limiting the power of Congress legislating for the new territory."

The theory propounded in this article will doubtless be dissented from by many because of its novelty. Omne ignotum pro magnifico. The bugbear of novelty often indisposes conservative minds, but certainly the above constitutes a far less novel theory than that of "American Aliens." While according to our new possessions certain rights, and conferring upon their inhabitants a country, it does not in any way interfere with the policies of the people of the United States by giving to the new peoples any political power, and hence any voice as to our government or institutions. They are alike cut off, in both cases, from any injurious interference in the destinies of the nation.

In our own history we have but one precedent as indicated above, and that one which Americans can scarcely regard with pride, namely the condition or status of the free negro before the Fourteenth Amendment, as determined by the Dred Scott case. Other nations, however, have for years past had the same problem before them as we have now, and have solved it in line with the theory herein set forth, which is submitted as the true interpretation of the language of the Treaty of Paris in the light of our existing constitutional jurisprudence.

1Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1885), 118 U. S. 370. (1901) Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244.

One of the most interesting of recent territorial acquisitions by reason of the mixed character of the population is that of Algeria by France. The French Chambers not having legislated as to the status of the inhabitants of Algeria, the question came before the Court of Appeals of Paris in 1839 as to the status of the natives of Algeria. The question was thus very similar to that involved in the Gonzalez case, as in neither case had the executive or the leg. islative authorities conferred any rights of citizenship upon the annexed people, but had simply transferred their allegiance from their former sovereign to the new one. The Court there decided that although there was no legislation fixing their status, and it had not been established by any treaty, nevertheless the Ordinance of the 10th of August, 1834, had submitted the Algerians to French law and sovereignty, and from that time it was no longer possible to assimilate them to strangers. On the 14th of July, 1865, only, were they actually declared French by a senatus consultum, but although decided to be French they were held to be still governed by the Mussulman law, to which they had been subject at the time of their annexation. The French Government thus recognized a situation which we, until very recent years, refused to recognize in the case of the Indians, namely, that such tribes or peoples living under a different law and civilization, possessing a complete organization of their own, should be treated as nationals of the sovereignty of which they were really subject, but should be in their private relations governed by their tribal law. While we did not interfere with the tribal law of the Indians, we yet affected to assimilate them rather to a foreign people than to nationals, and made treaties with them in preference to legislating for them directly. Our legal theory was thus at variance with the actual facts.

To return to the Algerians. By administrative decrees of the 10th of September, 1886, and of the 17th of April, 1889, the Mussulman law ceased to be the common law for the inhabitants of Algeria, and thereafter the French law was to apply to them. Certain exceptions, however, were notedly retained in what concerns the status of persons, successions and real estate held in community.

The Algerian subject is accorded no political rights.

whatever and can possess none except by becoming a French citizen. This the Algerian may become by act of law either by legislation, as, for example, the Décret Crémieux, October, 1870, which conferred French citizenship on the Israelite inhabitants of Algeria or by naturalization, but this naturalization is somewhat different from the naturalization of an alien. The Algerian has only to make a simple declaration before the mayor, and after the inquiry by the mayor and the recommendation of the Council of State the naturalization is granted as matter of right.

As instancing the difficulties in the treatment of the Algerian population, and which we should endeavor to avoid in the treatment of our new population, especially that of the Philippines, may be cited the following example:

The Arab tribes in Algeria possessed lands in common, which belonged to the tribes as such, and in which the individual had no interest save by reason of membership in such tribe. Prior to the decrees of 1886 and 1889 certain thrifty, but not over-scrupulous, speculators purchased from a member of the tribe his interest in the tribal property. The purchaser, a French citizen, then invoked the principle of French law that no man shall be forced to remain a tenant in common and may always have the property divided among the co-owners by beginning a suit in the French courts. Process was issued and the stolid Arab members of the tribe were duly served by the Huissier with the various legal papers incident to such a litigation. It is easy to imagine that the effect of service of process was not understood by the Arab, and that in all probability the ornamental blue paper, on which process is usually inscribed, was used for the purpose of igniting his pipe. In any event after the given time judgment was taken by default, and the tribal property put up at auction, sold and the bulk of it applied to the payment of the legal expenses incident to the suit against the tribe. Of course this resulted in mere eviction from the communal land, and the abuse grew so great and the injustice so manifest as to lead to serious revolts, and a special act of the 28th of April, 1887, has provided some remedies for these evils, but has not succeeded in eradicating them. The object aimed at was to apply the Mussulman law to this communal prop

erty regardless of whether the litigation was between natives or natives and French citizens.

Many other illustrations from the practice and legislation of Great Britain and other foreign countries might be adduced to show that the status of the Islanders as nationals, but not as citizens, has in it nothing anomalous, and that it is far more logical, as well as more just and expedient, to consider them as such rather than to treat them as aliens.

"

The Attorney-General of the United States in his argument in the Insular Cases suggested and ably maintained that the Islanders were American subjects. That term, however, is one which is foreign to our legal system and alien to our trend of political thought. The term "National fits the case more accurately and bears with it no unpleasant inference of political inferiority or servitude to an individual. "American National" is a term of which no one need be ashamed.

FREDERIC R. COUDERT, JR.

RECEIVERS IN BANKRUPTCY AND THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE BANKRUPT LAW AS TO CORPORATIONS.

A feature of the present bankruptcy law which has thus far attracted no special attention, but which is of large importance, is found in the power of courts of bankruptcy to appoint receivers of the property of debtors before adjudication. This power is now freely exercised, and is likely, if the proposed amendments of the law before Congress are adopted, to be exercised much more extensively in the future.

Before considering the practical working of this procedure and the wisdom of extending it, it is necessary to refer briefly to a particular phase of bankruptcy legislation.

The present Act provides that the trustee of the estate of the bankrupt shall be vested, by operation of law, with the title of the bankrupt as of the date he is adjudged a bankrupt.1 This is a departure from previous bankruptcy legislation as to the time of vesting title.

Under the English bankruptcy law, the rule early established was that the title of the assignee related back to the time of the act of bankruptcy upon which the adjudication was had. The injustice of this rule, as applied to persons dealing with the bankrupt in good faith previous to the adjudication, is apparent, and modern legislation has sought to find some more suitable regulation regarding the time of transfer of title.

The present English statute protects payments made by or to the bankrupt, and conveyances by or to the bankrupt, and any contract, dealing or transaction by or with the bankrupt for a valuable consideration before the date of the receiving order on the part of a person having no notice of an available act of bankruptcy committed by the bankrupt before that time.3

Section 70 Bankrupt Law.

213 Eliz. Ch. 7. See Eden Bankruptcy Laws, p. 258.

3Bankruptcy Act of 1883, sec. 49. See Williams on Bankruptcy, p. 171, and on the subject generally the following line of decisions, King v. Leith, (1787) 2 T. R. 141; Edwards v. Gabriel, (1862) 31 L. J. Exch. 113; Ex p. Snowball v. Douglas, (1872) L. R. 7 Ch. 534; Ex p. Edwards v. Chapman, (1884) 13 Q. B. 747.