« SebelumnyaLanjutkan »
or in a representative capacity, is not liable on the instrument; although he is not exempted by the mere addition of words of description, without disclosing his principal. This decision impliedly construes “ principal” broadly enough to include the correlative of “representative capacity," and then holds that the disclosure need not be on the face of the instrument. At common law, in New York, an agent could show by parol evidence that he was not bound, Brockway v. Allen (1837) 17 Wend. 40, but no decision seems to have gone so far when there was no actual principal behind the person signing: In Schmittler v. Simon (1889) 114 N. Y. 176, which has been cited for that proposition, Hilliard v. Smith (1895) 14 N. Y. Misc. 239, the parol evidence only showed that the instrument was merely a draft on a particular fund. PLEADING AND PRACTICE-JOINDER OF CAUSES OF Action. The Wisconsin Rev. Stats. 1878, $ 2647, provide that a plaintiff may unite in the same complaint “causes of action arising out of the same transaction, or transactions connected with the same subject of action." Hild, an action on a warranty in a deed can be joined with an action for fraud. Koepke v. Winterfield (Wis. 1902) 92 N; W. 437.
The use of the word or” has been overlooked by the New York courts in construing the similar provision in N. Y. Code Civ. Proc. $ 484, subd. 9. In Sweet v. Ingerson (1856) 12 How. Pr. 331, and Springstead v. Lawson (1862) 14 Abb. Pr. 328, the courts refused to allow the plaintiff to join actions for breach of warranty and fraudulent representations in selling a horse, though these rights of action clearly arose out of the same transaction. Pomeroy, Code Remedies (3d Ed.).$$ 473, 477 and 500; p. 539, note 1. Nor can the always pertinent objection that the two remedies are inconsistent be successfully urged in such a case; the plaintiff is not put to his election. Pom. Code. Rem. & 503, and note 4. The result in the principal case seems to accord with sound sense, though the reasoning in the Wisconsin cases is not very analytical Alliance Elevator Co. v. Wells (1896) 93 Wis. 5. PROCEDURE-FEDERAL JURISDICTION-AMOUNT IN CONTROVERSY. Plaintiffs asked for an injunction to restrain the collection of an illegal license tax imposed by a city ordinance, amounting to $500, and enforceable by the daily arrest of the plaintiffs' employees, alleging that it would result in serious interference with their business and a direct loss exceeding $2,000. Held, the amount involved for jurisdictional purposes was not alone the amount of the tax, but the value of the plaintiffs' right to conduct their business without interference. City of Hutchinson et al. v. Beckham et al. (C. C. A., 8th Circ., 1902) 118 Fed. 399.
U. S. Circuit Courts have not original jurisdiction of cases in which the amount in controversy is less than $2,000. 25 Stats. at Large, 434: But the courts have interpreted the term amount in controversy liberally. Not the damage suffered by the nuisance, but the removal of it, has been held to be the object of a bill brought to abate the nuisance and recover damages. Miss., etc., R. Co. v. Ward (1862) 67 U. S. 485. Not the protits sought to be recovered, in a suit to restrain the infringement of a trade-mark, but the right to the sole use of the trade-mark, is the determining jurisdictional element. Symonds v. Greene et al. (1886) 28 Fed. 834. American Fertilizing Co. v. Board of Agriculture of N. C. (1890) 43 Fed. 609, is directly in line with the principal case. REAL PROPERTY-EXCAVATIONS ON THE SEASHORE-INJURY TO NEIGHBORING OWNER. The defendant, owning to low water mark, dug sand from his beach. This caused the sea to wash sand from the adjoining beach into the excavation, so exposing plaintiff's land to the action of the waves. Held, defendant should be enjoined; the owner of land which forms a natural barrier to a water course or to the sea, must not so use it as to expose the land of neighbors to injury from the action of the water. Murray v. Pannaci (N. J. 1902) 53 Atl. 595.
The case follows dicta of Shaw, C. J. in Com. v. Alger (1851) 7 Cush. 53, 87, and the decision on an analogous state of facts in Mears v. Dole (1883) 135 Mass. 508. In England in Atty. Gen. v. Tomline (1879) 12 Ch. Div. 214, an injunction to protect public land was granted on the theory that it was a prerogative of the Crown to protect the realm from the invasion of the sea, but it was intimated that a private landholder would have no right of action. The American doctrine seems the better. The bare fact that an owner is making an ordinary use of his property, should not protect him in injuring another's land by directly or indirectly removing a natural barrier against such a force as the waves of the sea, or the current of a river. REAL PROPERTY-LATERAL SUPPORT-TERMINATION OF EASEMENT. The plaintiff owned half of a double house and had an easement of lateral support in the other half, which was owned by the defendant. By order of the board of health the defendant tore down his half of the house. Held, the defendant was not liable, as destruction of his half of the house terminated the plaintiff's easement. McKenna v. Eaton (Mass. 1902) 65 N. E. 382.
The easement of lateral support in a building, as in a party-wall, being in the structure itself, is not intended to outlast that structure. Pierce v. Dyer (1872) 109 Mass. 374: Heartt v. Kruger (1890) 121 N. Y. 386. The owner of the wall or building is under no duty to repair, and if it has fallen into hopeless disrepair, he may even remove it. Partridge v. Gilbert (1857) 15 N. Y. 601. Destruction by decay or by the elements terminates such an easement. Sherred v. Cisco (N. Y. 1851) 4 Sandf. 480. Violence of war or action of public authority would naturally have the same effect. That the defendant performed the actual work of removal seems immaterial so long as he did it in obedience to the valid order of the board of health. If for the public safety the public authorities can destroy the right of ownership in a house, it would seem they can destroy an easement therein. REAL PROPERTY-Public Rights—Right to KEEP OYSTERS ON THE FORE
The defendant stored oysters which he had brought from another locality, at a place on the foreshore of which the plaintiff was the lessee. The purpose was to cleanse and fatten them. Held, there is no public right of keeping oysters on the foreshore as private property, and if the defendant stored them with the purpose of excluding other people, he was a trespasser on the plaintiff. Corporation of Truro v. Rowe, (1902] 2 K. B. 709.
In America it is held that an individual may have an oyster bed in public waters, and that one who takes the oysters from it is liable civilly in tort, Fleet v. Hegeman (1835) 14 Wend. 42, or criminally for larceny, State v. Taylor (1858), 27 N. J. L. 117. A lessee of the foreshore would take subject to the right. It would seem, therefore, that the principal case would not be law in America. REAL PROPERTY-REMAINDERS. A testator limited to one of his sons an estate for life, remainder to any surviving child of the life tenant, and in default thereof, to such tenant's brothers and sisters. At the death of the testator the life tenant was without issue. Held, each of the brothers and sisters became seized of a vested remainder, subject to being divested by the birth of a child to the life tenant. Boatman et al. v. Boatman (I11. 1902) 65 N. E. 81.
Loddington v. Kime (1697) i Ld. Raym. 203, s. C. 1 Salk. 224, established the rule that after a contingent remainder in fee no vested remainder can be limited. Fearne Cont. Rem. 225 and 2 Washburn Real Prop. (6th ed.) $S 1566, 1575, favor the rule;
and though Leake Real Prop. 338 note (d) doubts it, the case he cites, Egerton v. Massey (1857) 3 C. B. N. s. 338, supports the rule. The principal case cites no authority in support of its position. A vested remainder may be limited after a contingent remainder, provided the latter is not a remainder in fee. Fearne 225.
In the principal case there is a condition precedent to the vesting of the remainder in the brothers and sisters, namely, that the first contingent remainder in fee shall never vest.
STATUTES-FRAUDULENT USE OF Mails-Power of Postmaster-GENERAL. U. S. Revised Statutes, $ 3929, provide that the Postmaster-General
upon evidence satisfactory to him” that any persons are engaged in conducting any fraudulent scheme for obtaining money, instruct postmasters to return letters sent to them. The plaintiffs carried on the business of magnetic healing based, they said, on the influence of mind over body. To a bill filed to enjoin a postmaster from acting under the statute the defendant demurred. Held, as the facts averred in the bill were admitted, the business of magnetic healing cannot be presumed to be fraudulent, as that is a mere matter of opinion. Am. School of Magnetic Healing v. Mc Annulty (1902) 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 33.
In a case in Missouri, Weltnier v. Bishop (1902) 71 N. W. 167, faith healers were refused a recovery in an action for libel where the defendant proved fraud. The principal case is important in limiting the authority of the Postmaster-General to this extent: Where an act constitutes a fraud he may act "on evidence satisfactory to him "; but where reasonable men may differ as to the falsity of the representations, then, says the court, it was not the legislative intent that the Postmaster-General should exercise the power upon a mere matter of opinion. SURETYSHIP-Rights Of A MORTGAGOR AS SURETY-NOTICE TO CREDITOR To SUE. A mortgagor conveyed the premises to a grantee who did not assume payment of the mortgage. On the maturity of the mortgage, the mortgagor gave notice to the mortgagee to foreclose.
The mortgagee neglected to foreclose for a year and a half, during which time he permitted taxes, water rates and interest to accumulate, and also permitted the grantee of the premises to receive the rents. Held, on application for a deficiency judgment against the mortgagor, he should be allowed (Van Brunt, Þ. J., and Patterson, J., dissenting) such sums as should equal the value of such taxes, water rates and interest, in so far as the failure to pay or collect them was due to the mortgagee's delay; but nothing (Hatch and Laughlin, JJ., dissenting) for the rents. Gottschalk v. Jungmann (1903) 79 N. Y. Supp. 551. See Notes, p. 199. TORTS- Joint WRONGDOERS–SATISFACTION. The plaintiff recovered a judgment against one of two joint wrongdoers and brought this action against the other. The first defendant voluntarily paid the amount of the judgment to the clerk, and this defendant pleaded such fact. Held, the plaintiff could not thus be deprived of his election and might disregard the payment by the first defendant. Mc Donald v. Nugen (la. 1902) 92 N. W. 675.
Under the American rule, as judgment is no bar until satisfied, a plaintiff can recover separate judgments against joint wrongdoers and elect against whom he will enforce satisfaction. This decision logically defines satisfaction to be such as shall be accepted by the judgment creditor. Otherwise the election would rest with the defendants. In Blann v. Crocheron (1852) 20 Ala. 320, the court suggests that if such voluntary payment would operate as a satisfaction, the one against whom a smaller judgment had been obtained could pay the clerk and free the others against whom larger judgments might be recovered. Indeed, in any civil action a payment to the clerk, not specially authorized, will not satisfy a judgment; he is not agent of the judgment creditor to receive. Seymore v. Haines (1882) 104 Ill. 557. Nor is the receipt of the clo admis: Die as evidence to show satisfaction. Matusevitz Hughes (Mont. 1902) 68 Pac. 467.
A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF INTERCORPORATE RELATIONS. — By Walter Chadwick Noyes. Boston. Little, Brown & Co. 1902. pp. xlviii, 703.
The reviewer's estimate of this work can best be measured by stating his reaction from a strong prejudice against the book, for the reading of it was begun with anything but a predisposition in its favor. The reviewer starts with the strong and somewhat combative belief that most of the so-called treatises on law published in recent years have no value. Through haste in preparation and looseness of thought they tend to promote confusion rather than clearness, and have no usefulness except as partial digests of the law reports. For this purpose they are usually ill-arranged, and three criticisms occur strikingly to anyone reading them. First, most text books would be better digests if they were designed primarily for the latter purpose; more attention should be paid to collating authorities and less to diffusing the author's views and comments, for the law is declared by courts and not by the text-book writers. Second, few text books would lose anything of value through being so abridged. Third, the law reports are already so voluminous, that no one should attempt to add to the mass of legal writings unless he has some distinct contribution to make to the philosophy of law, and has the time to make it. Too often the courts themselves fall into the text-book habit and substitute lengthy opinions or treatises for decisions. In view of the constant increase in the number of official reports, the aim of legal writers should be a systematic arrangement and simplification of precedents rather than any unnecessary enlargement of the volume of legal literature.
To one holding these views, the preface to Judge Noyes' work on Intercorporate Relations does not commend the book. He tells us that it has been “prepared amid the distractions incident to the performance of other duties,” and he warns us that “the conclusions may not always follow from the premises and the theories may have no foundation at all.” Such deprecation is often to be found at the beginning of a book, and is usually not intended to be taken literally. But it is frequently the exact truth, and where it is true the book might better remain unpublished, at least until the author has time to remedy such defects. In the present instance, however, the author's apology is not a fair criticism. Judge Noyes' book is marked throughout by logical analysis, clear reasoning and scholarly preparation. If his conclusions are not always true it is because the subject is new and untried. Some of the premises may be deficient, but there is no lack of care in reasoning. The noteworthy feature of the book, which distinguishes it from ordinary text books of law,
is the accuracy with which it adheres to a logical plan and a high standard of clearness and conciseness. It is to be commended, also, for the care and discrimination and completeness with which it gathers and sets forth the significant decisions of the courts, and the constitutional and statutory provisions of our many different jurisdictions relating to this important and unsettled branch of the law.
The theorem of the book is, that while for some purposes a corporation may be regarded as an artificial person, and while its relations to other corporations as persons are in substance the same as the relations of natural persons, yet corporations are something other than persons, and their relations to each other as corporations are essentially different from any other relations known to the law. Holding constantly to this distinction, the author discusses with unusual simplicity the various methods that have been employed by corporations in recent years to effect a concentration of their capital and resources. By his strict attention to the subject he has chosen to treat by his analysis, and accurate definition, and in general by his clear thinking and plain expression, he has condensed into a convenient volume of 700 pages a valuable and deeply interesting exposition of the rights of corporations to join forces, of the restraints and limitations imposed by law upon such joinder, and of the consequences that follow from it.
For the purpose of clearness the book classifies the various methods or processes of concentration under five heads. Part I has to do with “Consolidations." This term includes mergers and other unions that change the corporate existence of some or all of the constituent companies, and that result, except in the case of interstate consolidations, in a single corporate entity. Part II deals with the unions of corporate property and franchises through purchase, as distinguished from the actual union of the corporations themselves. Part III treats similarly of the concentration of control through the holding by one corporation of another's stock; and Part. V discusses “Combinations." Under the latter head are included all unions of corporations not amounting to consolidations. Owing to the differences of the origin and method in these various processes of concentration, and owing to the differences in the kinds of corporations to which they are applicable, each is subject to different restrictions, and different rules of law are applicable to each. Under each head are treated briefly and distinctly the rights of corporations to effect that kind of concentration ; the legal checks, whether of public policy or constitutional or statutory enactment, imposed upon such concentration; and the powers and obligations and limitations consequent upon the concentration.
Naturally Part I has to do mostly with railroads, and contains a valuable exposition of the law of railway consolidations, and a succinct summary of the American statutes dealing with that kind of consolidation. Parts II and III also devote special, though by no means exclusive, attention to railroad law, and Part III has a chapter on trackage agreements.
Nearly one-third of the book is given to the subject of “Combinations” in Part V. In defining the nature of combinations the author traces the development of the “trust ” as an attempt to obviate the