CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES-Continued. 21. A bill, according to Webster's definition, is "A form or draft of law presented to a legislature, but not enacted." Under our Constitution, after a bill has passed both branches of the Legislature and received the approval of the Governor it becomes a law; but until then it is a bill-a draft of a proposed law. The bill in question was precisely the same draft of a proposed law after as before the endorsements were made. Ibid. 22. A statute which treats of the whole of any subject matter, abrogates the common law on that subject, as a subsequent statute treating of the whole subject matter of a previous statute will be a virtual repeal of the previous statute. Hill vs. Ginn, 174. 23. The common-law right of securing damages by impounding cattle running at large on uninclosed lands is abrogated by the statute of this State passed March 2, 1893-Rev. Code, 482. Ibid. 24. The said statute provides that a written notice shall be given to the owner of the stock, and it must be proved at the trial that such notice was given, otherwise the plaintiff must recover such loss as he sustained by the detention of his property. But he cannot recover in this action for any injuries to the stock during the detention thereof. Ibid. 25. In a proceeding under the statute (Chap. 101, Sec. 6, p. 770, Rev. Code), to recover possession of demised premises after the expiration of the term, a verdict for the plaintiff and that he is entitled to the possession of the premises named and mentioned in said statement, and that there be a stay of execution for ten days on the same from the 3d of January, A. D. 1899, is not in accordance with the statute, and the judgment will be reversed. Crow vs. Cann, 208. 26. The statute is mandatory, and prescribes in terms what the judgment shall be, that is, that the plaintiff shall have judgment for the possession of the premises, and for his costs. The verdict is in direct violation of the provisions of the statute. Ibid. 27. A rule for writ of possession will be issued where the petitioners for the rule--the owners of the property-are the grantees of the purchaser at the sheriff's sale. It would be too narrow a construction of the statute, and defeat its remedial character, if it were restricted to the purchaser at the sheriff's sale. Kent vs. Pyle, 242. 28. When it is provided that before any organization shall be effected under an act of incorporation at least ten thousand dollars of the capital stock subscriptions therein shall be fully paid in cash, held that such cash payment is a condition precedent and must be averred. A condition subsequent need not be averred. State vs. Hancock, et al., 252. 29. When the respondents justify under a charter, the burden is on them to show the incorporation, and they have the right to open and close. Ibid. 30. Two companies whose charters were granted by the Legislatue prior to the adoption of the Constitution, but which did not organize till after, had the power merge: Held that the creation of a new company, after the adoption of the Constitution, by the merger of said companies, is not within the inhibition of Section I of Article 9 of the Constitution, which provides that "No corporation shall hereafter be created, renewed or revived by special act, but only by or under general law." Ibid. 31. Under the authority in the charter of a corporation "to consolidate or merge with any corporation or corporations heretofore or hereafter created," etc., "the right of merger being hereby conferred upon any company so wishing to consolidate that does not possess it," the company possessing such authority may merge with any other company or companies wishing to so merge. Ibid. CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES—Continued. 32. Where an act of incorporation provides "that before any organization shall be effected at least ten thousand dollars of the capital stock subscriptions therein authorized shall be fully paid in cash," such subscriptions must be in writing as provided by the act, and proof thereof by parol will not be permitted to vary such writing. Ibid. 33 The act entitled "An Act to Exempt Wages from Attachment Process" (Chap. 542, Vol. 16, Laws of Delaware, Rev. Code, 841), held to be constitutional and valid. P., W. & B. R. R. vs. Sharpe, 407. 34. Where the defendant had an option to purchase the article for which the writ of replevin was issued, the statute of limitations would not begin to run against the action until the expiration of defendant's right or option to purchase, because until that time the plaintiff's cause of action would not accrue. Sewing Machine Co. vs. Frame, 430. 35. A State may prevent foreign corporations from doing any business in the State until they have fulfilled all the requirements imposed by the Legislature. Advantage of the plaintiff's failure to comply with such requirements, however, is generally taken in other States by plea in abatement, other special plea or by answer. Where there is nothing in the pleadings or evidence showing that plaintiff had not complied with the requirements of the statute, held the statute was not applicable. Ibid. 36. The Court has no option to remit the 20 per cent. interest fixed by Sec. 3, Revised Code, 259, in cases where sheriff neglects to apply money according to the condition of his recognizance. Smith vs. Simmons, 462. 37. At common law, in this State, before the passage of what are called the married woman's acts, a married woman might not be suable in her own name alone during the life of her husband and during their marriage. But under Sec. 2, Chap. 550, Vol. 14, Laws of Delaware, the wife may be sued alone in her own name if the circumstances and evidence bring the case within the meaning of said sections. Black vs. Clements, 499. 38. The statute of frauds held to apply to contracts which, according to the intent and express understanding of the parties, cannot possibly be performed within one year, or which, by the special terms thereof, are to continue for more than one year; but not to such as may, by any possibility, be performed within a year, or when the performance rests upon a contingency which may happen within a year. Maxwell vs. Devalinger, 504. 39. The act of 1893, known as the lien law, Revised Code, 814, held to be constitutional, a reasonable time having been given by the terms of the act to judgment creditors in which to renew and continue their liens. Such statute merely affects the remedy for the enforcement of the judgment; that is, it shortens the time for the existence of the lien, without impairing the obligation of the contract. Ibid. 40. Section 52 of the General Corporation law approved March 10, 1899, (Chap. 273, Vol. 21, page 461, Laws of Delaware) applies to the preferred lien and wages of employees of such corporations only as have been first ascertained and adjudged to be insolvent by the Court of Chancery pursuant to the appropriate proceedings in that behalf, or, at least, are the subject of such proceedings pending in said Court; and not to the preferred lien and wages of employees of any corporation not so adjudged, or proceeded against as insolvent. The said section relates solely to corporations formed under said act, and to the payment of wages as a first preference to the employees of a corporation merely, and only after it has become insolvent; while section 1 of the act passed February 25, 1879, (Chap. 147, Vol. 16, page 214, Laws of Delaware) relates to employees of any person, association or corporation without any restriction as to insolvency. Hence CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES-Continued. it cannot be held that said section I of said act of 1879 is repealed or in any way affected by said section 52 of the act of 1899, or by any other statutory provisions, so far as concerns the preferred lien and payment of the wages of such employees. Lupton & Co., vs. Hughes, 515. 41. The "act for the protection of women," Chap. 350 Vol. 14, Laws of Delaware, (Rev. Code, 600) does not authorize the husband to maintain an action at law against his wife, and inasmuch as the attaching creditor has no greater power in the collection of the debt from the garnishee than the judgment debtor would have, it follows then the wife cannot be summoned as garnishee of her husband. Forbes vs. Thompson & Co., 530. 42. Statutes of limitation, when applicable, furnish a complete defense, and courts should not by judicial legislation or strained construction interpose obstructions to their effective operation. Larkin & Stites vs. Simms, 543. 43. The Act of April 9, 1873, entitled "An Act for the protection of women," (14 Laws of Del. 638), as amended by the Act of March 17, 1875 (15 Ib. 289), having made the property of a married woman her sole and separate property, and having enabled her to prosecute and defend suits at law and in equity for the preservation and protection of the same, as if unmarried, or jointly with her husband,-coverture is no longer a disability which prevents or delays the operation of the statute of limitations in respect to exceptions to accounts of executors, administrators or guardians. Ibid. 44. Statutes as to fees of public officers, etc. Gould vs. News Pub. Co., 548. 45. While the statute of this State makes a duly verified copy of a will proved in another State and probate, or the record thereof, "sufficient evidence," in courts of this State where such evidence is pertinent to the issue, it does not make such evidence conclusive, and the statements contained in such copy or record may, in an action in this State in relation to the title of land here situated, be contravened. Pritchard vs. Henderson, 553. 46. The Justice's Court is a Court of record, and has been so held by this Court; and the statute of this State with reference to the docket entries required to be made by the Justice expressly requires, that the return of service shall be made a part of the record. And in the case of a judgment by default the statute also requires that the service of process shall be verified by the officer making the service. In matters over which the jurisdiction of the Justice extends under the statute clothing him with authority in the premises, a safe rule is to make no distinction in the conclusiveness of presumption between recitals contained in the records of this Court and courts of justices of the peace. Stidham vs. Thatcher, 567. 47. Under the statutes of the State and the ordinances of the City of Wilmington, adopted in pursuance thereof, the Mayor and Council of Wilmington, and not the Board of Directors of the Street and Sewer Department, are entitled to have, receive and dispose of the fees and charges collected from farmers, traders, dealers and hucksters using the street markets in said city. The said The Mayor and Council of Wilmington are also entitled to receive the taxes on electric light poles in said city, and the rents collected from lessees of wharves along the river front at the end of streets owned by said city. St. and Sewer Dept. vs. Connell, 571. 48. A married woman in this State is still under such common-law disabilities as have not been removed by statute. Vincent vs. Ireland, 580. 49. By the act of 1873 a married woman's personal property, acquired from any person other than her husband, is made her sole and separate property. Where it is proved that personal property belongs to a married woman, it is not CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES-Continued. necessary for her to prove that she did not acquire it from her husband. In such case the general rule should prevail, that he who asserts an affirmative should prove it. Where there is no direct proof upon the point, the jury may draw their own conclusions from such proof as they have, as to the ownership of the property and how it was acquired. Ibid. CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE.-See NOTICE. CONSTUCTION OF SCAFFOLD.-See Master and SerVANT. CONTINUANCE. 1. An affidavit filed in a criminal case at the first term alleging the absence from the State of a material witness, upon which is based an application for a continuance of the case until the next term, must disclose the nature of the evidence which such witness is expected to give, so that the Court may be able to judge whether the facts are sufficient or not. But it is not necessary to go into details; it is only necessary to state the substance of what is proposed to be proved. State vs. Hawkins, 474. 2. Case continued and new jury impaneled. Wood vs. Bangs, 435. CONTRACT. 1. In an action for damages for the breach of a contract which provided that defendant should have the use of a sawmill, owned by plaintiff, free of charge, and that after thirty days' trial defendant should have the privilege of buying the same, if it should prove to be in good order and satisfactory, but if he should not buy he should put the sawmill back where he found it, in good order, according to the terms of said contract; the law implies a covenant by the defendant that he would use reasonable care in the use and preservation of the mill until it should be returned to the plaintiff. Unruh vs. Taylor, 42. 2. In order that an extension of time for the return of the mill may avail the defendant, it must appear that the agreement for such extension was actually made by the parties after the execution of written agreement; that it was made upon a new and valid consideration not set forth in said written agreement, and that it rescinded the covenant of the said written agreement as to the return of the sawmill, and in lieu thereof substituted a new and different provision, Ibid. 3. In such a case the damage to be recovered must be shown with reasonable certainty, and not left to speculation or conjecture. The measure of damage is the difference between the value of the mill, in good order, at the time and place when and where it was the duty of the defendant to have returned it, and the present value of the mill where it now is, together with such sum as is sufficient to compensate the plaintiff for the loss of the use of the mill since the time he was entitled to have it returned to him. Ibid. 4. In the case of Coyle vs. McIntyre, 7 Houst., 44, it was decided that a municipal corporation may be controlled and its constitution altered and amended by the government in such manner as the public interest may require, and that such legislative interference cannot be said to impair the contract by which the corporation was formed because there is in reality but one party to it; and that there is in fact no contract in any just sense of the word for the reason that public municipal corporations are not founded on contract. In view of such decision it is difficult to see how the consent of the city to an amendment to the charter could be of any consequence; such consent is not material. Mayor and Council vs. Ewing, 66. 5. If a person who is able to read signs his name to a paper, the presumption is that such person understood the meaning of the instrument, or by the exercise CONTRACT-Continued. of reasonable care might have done so. In order to avoid the contract the burden is placed on the defendant to show that she was so ignorant that she did not, and could not, understand what she signed. If she was able to understand it, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence might have understood it, the contract is valid and binding. Sewing Mach. Co. vs. Frame, 430. 6. Where a person has contracted with a corporation, such person is estopped from denying that the corporation was authorized by its charter to make the conIbid. tract. tract. 7. The liability of a surety is not to be extended beyond the terms of his conTo the extent and in the manner and under the circumstances pointed out in his obligation he is bouud, and no further. Ins. Co. vs. Slesinger et al., 443. 8. Under the law and practice in this State, although a recognizance which was entered into for the appearance of the principal at the next term of Court may at such term be declared forfeited, yet such forfeiture may, in the discretion of the Court, be taken off at the following term. Collins v. Hutchins, 496. 9. Such being the law, the surety in such forfeited recognizance has an interest in having the principal produced at the term of Court next following the forfeiture, and such an interest as would be sufficient to support a contract or promise to pay another whom he had induced to go beyond the State or county for the purpose of finding and producing the principal. Ibid. 10. Whether such a contract was conditional or not, that is, whether the principal should pay only in the event that he was liable under the recognizance, is a question of fact to be determined by the jury. Ibid. 11. The statute of frauds held to apply to contracts which, according to the intent and express understanding of the parties, cannot possibly be performed within one year, or which, by the special terms thereof, are to continue for more than one year; but not to such as may, by any possibility, be performed within a year, or when the performance rests upon a contingency which may happen within a year. Maxwell vs. Devalinger, 504. 12. A married woman has the right to make such use of her private property as will bring profit and benefit to her. And her rights and privileges conferred by the statute have not been made dependent upon her living separate from her husband. Although living with her husband she may receive for her own use and sue for in her own name, the wages of her personal services, provided they are not rendered for or in connection with her duties in the family of her husband, and are not inconsistent with the performance of such duties. Vincent vs. Ireland, 580. 13. There may be circumstances under which a married woman, although living with her husband, who has the general management and control of his house, and is the head of the family, may maintain an action in her own name for the board and lodging of a person living in the house of the husband, or for personal services rendered to such person. But if the boarder is under an express or implied agreement with the husband to pay him for the board, and the wife's services relate to the usual entertainment of the boarder, the husband and not the wife would be the proper person to sue for the board, which included the wife's services. Ibid. CONTRADICTING WITNESS.-See SURPRISE. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.-See Negligence. 1. When a defendant corporation which at one time had a legal existence, has contracted with the plaintiff as such corporation, and in the apparent exercise of |